Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 155South Africa
Nhlapo v S (A07/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 155 (17 February 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
17 February 2023
Headnotes
the bail proceedings were a nullity, Mr Mabilo submitted that the bail proceedings of the Appellant in this case must be declared to be a nullity:
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Nhlapo v S (A07/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 155 (17 February 2023)
Nhlapo v S (A07/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 155 (17 February 2023)
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sino date 17 February 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: A07/2023
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
Date:
17 February 2023
In
the matter between:
NHLAPO:
MDUDUZI APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE RESPONDENT
APPEAL
JUDGEMENT
ALLY
AJ
[1]
This is an appeal for the Appellant to be released from bail in terms
of Section 65 of the Criminal Procedure
Act
[1]
,
hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’.
[2]
The State was represented by Adv. VH Mongwane and the Appellant by Mr
TL Mabilo.
[3]
The Appellant had appeared before the Court
a
quo
on
a charge of kidnapping and robbery with aggravating circumstances
which common to the State and the Accused was accepted
[2]
as a Schedule 6 offence.
[4]
It is appropriate at this point to set out the statutory provisions
governing the bail procedures in relation
specifically to the
Appellant. Section 60 (11) of ‘the Act’ provides as
follows:
“
Notwithstanding
any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with an
offence
referred to-
(a)
in Schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be detained in
custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with
the law,
unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do
so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that
exceptional
circumstances exist which in the interests of justice permit his or
her release;”
[5]
Our Courts
[3]
have had occasion
to deal with what is meant by ‘exceptional circumstances’.
It is clear from the said cases and the
cases quoted therein that
‘exceptional circumstances’ means more than what can be
described as the run-of-the-mill
bail applications. An Applicant for
bail that faces a Schedule 6 charge is expected, in my view, to
present more than that he or
she will not interfere with witnesses or
will stand trial. He or she must present cogent evidence that can
stand up to scrutiny
and convince a Court
[4]
on a preponderance of probabilities that he should be committed to
bail.
[6]
Heher JA in the Mathebula case states the following in relation to
that case which circumstances come very
close to the present:
“
In
the present instance the appellant’s tilt at the state case was
blunted in several respects: first, he founded the attempt
upon
affidavit evidence not open to test by cross-examination and,
therefore, less persuasive: cf S v Pienaar
1992 (1) SACR 178
(W) at
180h; second, both the denial of complicity and the alibi defence
rested solely on his say-so with neither witnesses nor
objective
probabilities to strengthen them. The vulnerability of unsupported
alibi defences is notorious, depending as it does,
so much upon the
court’s assessment of the truth of the accused’s
testimony”
[7]
I align myself with the views expressed above and in applying the
reasoning to this particular case, I can
see no reason to interfere
with the decision of the Court
a quo.
The Appellant, through his Counsel, submitted that the cumulative
effect of the weak state case and the personal circumstances
of the
Appellant, evidences exceptional circumstances and that the Court
a
quo
misdirected itself in not finding that the above constituted
‘exceptional circumstances’.
[8]
Now an Appeal Court such as the present is guided by, firstly,
Section 65 (4) of ‘the Act’ and
secondly, by certain
principles that have been laid down by our Courts in applying the
said section. Section 65 (4) of ‘the
Act’ provides:
“
(4)
The court or judge hearing the appeal shall not set aside the
decision against which the appeal is brought, unless such court
or
judge is satisfied that the decision was wrong, in which event the
court or judge shall give the decision which in its or his
opinion
the lower court should have given.”
[9]
The following principle is trite as expounded in
S
v Barber
[5]
with
which I align myself, wherein it is stated:
“
It
is well known that the powers of this Court are largely limited where
the matter comes before it on appeal and not as a substantive
application for bail. This Court has to be persuaded that the
magistrate exercised the discretion which he has wrongly.
Accordingly,
although this Court may have a different view, it should
not substitute its own view for that of the magistrate because that
would
be an unfair interference with the magistrate's exercise of his
discretion. I think it should be stressed that, no matter what this
Court's own views are, the real question is whether it can be said
that the magistrate who had the discretion to grant bail exercised
that discretion wrongly.”
[10]
In applying the above quoted principles and statutory provision, this
Court is unable to find that the Court
a quo
misdirected
itself on the facts nor am I able to fault the reasoning of the
Magistrate.
[11]
Having found that this Court is unable to find fault with the
reasoning of the Court
a quo
as well as that there was no
misdirection on the facts, there is one issue that was raised by Mr
Mabilo which relates to a point
of law.
[12]
As I understand the point of law raised by Mr Mabilo, the State did
not produce a certificate from the Director of Public
Prosecutions
authorising the holding of bail proceedings in the Regional Court. In
this regard, Section 50(6) (c) of ‘the
Act’ needs
quoting:
“
The
bail application of a person who is charged with an offence referred
to in Schedule 6 must be considered by a magistrate's court:
Provided
that the Director of Public Prosecutions concerned, or a prosecutor
authorised thereto in writing by him or her may, if
he or she deems
it expedient or necessary for the administration of justice in a
particular case, direct in writing that the application
must be
considered by a regional court.”
[13]
Relying on the case of
S
v Mabena
[6]
wherein the Court dealing with a review held that the bail
proceedings were a nullity, Mr Mabilo submitted that the bail
proceedings
of the Appellant in this case must be declared to be a
nullity:
“
[8]
In terms of section 50(6)(c) bail proceedings of an accused who is
facing a Schedule 6 offence must be heard in a magistrate
court. Bail
proceedings for a Schedule 6 offence may only be heard in a regional
court when the DPP or a prosecutor authorised
for that purpose,
directs in writing. The subsection uses the word “must”,
which means that it is peremptory to obtain
a written authority for
bail application of a Schedule 6 offence to be heard in the regional
court.
[9]
The accused bail application was held in a regional court. According
to the memo of the Head of the District Court, on both
hard copy of
the record and mechanical proceedings, there is no mention that
written authority was obtained from the DPP, chief
prosecutor or
senior prosecutor for the bail application to be heard in the
regional court. The written authorisation must be handed
to the
presiding magistrate before the commencement of the bail application.
That did not happen in the case at hand and it therefore
amount to
gross irregularity.”
[14]
In terms of the doctrine of
stare
decisis
,
this Court is bound to follow the judgement of
Mabena
.
However, the first issue that needs determination is whether, the
Appellant is entitled to raise this issue for the first time
in his
Heads of Argument? Our Courts
[7]
have held that where a point law arises
ex
facie
the record, then a Court of Appeal is entitled to deal with such
point.
[15]
The facts of this case are similar to
Mabena
in that the
record of proceedings show no compliance with Section 50(6) (c) of
‘the Act’. Specifically, there is no
record of the
written authorisation by the Director of Public Prosecutions to hold
the bail proceedings in the Regional Court.
[16]
The complication of this case, however, is that there were two
accused in the Court
a quo
and the question arises as to what
happens in respect of the accused that was granted bail?
[17]
It is appropriate to mention that the bail proceedings in the Court
a
quo
concluded with judgement being handed down on 13 December
2022. Therefore, the accused that received bail has been out on bail
since
that date or shortly thereafter.
[18]
The judgement of the Court
a quo
makes it clear that the State
had conceded that accused number 1 in the Court
a quo
had met
the standard required of him to prove the existence of ‘exceptional
circumstances’ and thus warranted the committal
of him to bail.
[19]
The legal effect of a declaration of nullity of the bail proceedings
in the Court
a quo
, strictly speaking, is that a bench warrant
for accused number 1 would have to be issued and accused number 1
would have to once
again apply for bail. Such a consequence, in my
view, would be a conformance with the letter of the law rather than
the interests
of justice.
[20]
Having regard to the peculiar facts of this case, can one state that
the withdrawal of the bail in respect of accused
number 1, who is not
before this Appeal Court, is in the interests of justice? I submit
not. It is clear from the record, as stated
above, that the facts of
the case in respect of accused number 1, support an order for
committal to bail and that, in the interests
of justice, such order
should remain.
[21]
I have conducted research on this point, of the effect of a
declaration of nullity of bail proceedings in respect of
an
Appellant’s co-accused and have found no case in point. In the
Mabena
case, all the accused’s applications served
before the Review Court. In my view, it cannot be in the interests of
justice
for this Court, sitting as a Court of Appeal to issue a bench
warrant in respect of the Appellant’s co-accused and
accordingly,
this judgement relates specifically to the Appellant.
[22]
Having held that this Court is bound by the
Mabena
case it is
appropriate for this Court to declare the bail proceedings relating
to the Appellant in the Court
a quo
to be a nullity.
[23]
It should be noted that I requested Mr Mabilo and Adv. Mongwane to
provide supplementary Heads of Argument dealing with
the position of
the Appellant’s co-accused. Both Mr Mabilo and Adv. Mongwane
are in agreement that this Court’s declaration
of nullity
should not prejudice the Appellant’s co-accused.
[24]
Accordingly the following Order shall issue:
a)
The proceedings of the bail application in the Regional Court for the
Appellant are hereby held to be
a nullity and set aside.
b)
The matter is remitted back to the magistrate court for a fresh bail
application before another magistrate,
and also for the prosecution
to obtain the necessary written authority from the office of the DPP
should the proceedings be held
in the Regional Court.
G
ALLY
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG
Delivered:
This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down in Court and circulated
electronically
by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for hand-down is deemed to be
17
February 2023
.
Date
of hearing: 15 February 2023
Date
of judgment: 17 February 2023
Appearances:
Attorneys
for the Appellant:
MABILO TL INC ATTORNEYS
Counsel
for the Appellant:
Mr. T.L. Mabilo
Mabilo.legal@gmail.com
Attorneys
for the Respondent:
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PRIVATE
PROSECUTIONS
JOHANNESBURG
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Adv. V.H. Mongwane
vmongwane@npa.gov.za
[1]
51
of 1977, as amended
[2]
Caselines:
003-12; Record: page 11 at para 18-22
[3]
Fourie
v S 2020 GPPHC at para 10-13; S v Mabena & Ano 2006 SCA at para
5-6
[4]
Mathebula
v S 2009 SCA at para 11
[5]
1979
(4) SA 218
(D) at 220 E-H
[6]
2021
LMPPHC
[7]
Moroka
v Premier of the Free State & Others 2022 SCA at para 8
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