Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 234South Africa
Henque 3935 CC t/a PQ Clothing Outlet v Commissioner for the SA Revenue Service (2020/35790) [2023] ZAGPJHC 234; 2023 (6) SA 260 (GJ); 86 SATC 136 (7 March 2023)
Headnotes
on 12 February 2018.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Henque 3935 CC t/a PQ Clothing Outlet v Commissioner for the SA Revenue Service (2020/35790) [2023] ZAGPJHC 234; 2023 (6) SA 260 (GJ); 86 SATC 136 (7 March 2023)
Henque 3935 CC t/a PQ Clothing Outlet v Commissioner for the SA Revenue Service (2020/35790) [2023] ZAGPJHC 234; 2023 (6) SA 260 (GJ); 86 SATC 136 (7 March 2023)
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sino date 7 March 2023
FLYNOTES:
ADDITIONAL INCOME TAX ASSESSMENT
TAX
– Income tax – Assessment – Effect – Date
pertinent because taxpayer went into business rescue
–
Section 5(1) of the Income Tax Act establishes “generally
the liability” – Tax became due and payable
when
additional assessment made – Additional assessment
constitutes event that transforms general liability into an
actual
one – Additional assessment was not a pre-business rescue
debt –
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011
– Income Tax
Act 58 of 1962, s 5(1).
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2020/35790
Reportable:
Yes
Of
interest to other judges: Yes
DATE:
7 March 2023
In
the matter between:
HENQUE
3935 CC
t/a
PQ CLOTHING OUTLET (in Business
Rescue)
Applicant
and
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SA REVENUE SERVICE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Vally
J
[1]
Can the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SARS)
set-off a tax liability
of a company against the VAT refunds due to
the company in circumstances where the tax liability concerns a
period prior to the
company entering into business rescue, but was
only determined after the company had already entered into business
rescue? That
in essence is the question raised for determination
here.
[2]
The answer to this question lies in the construction of the relevant
sections of the Companies
Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act), the Income
Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (Income Tax Act) and the Tax Administration Act,
28 of 2011 (TAA).
[3]
The applicant, Henque 3935 CC (Henque), says it is unlawful for SARS
to do so. SARS says
otherwise. Consistent with its contention Henque
calls on this court to declare (i) that the 2017 additional
assessment of its
tax liability dated 4 April 2018 is a pre-business
rescue debt and, (ii) SARS is prohibited from collecting the 2017
additional
assessment by applying set-off against Henque’s VAT
refund payments due for the period 02/2018 to date.
[4]
Henque is a close corporation. Section 5(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act
requires it to pay
tax on its income earned or accrued during each of
its financial years. The tax is payable for the specific year that
the income
was earned. The tax is owed once the financial year is
completed. Thus, Henque is required to furnish SARS with a return
indicating
the profit it has earned as well as self-assess the tax
liability arising from the said profit. It is required to pay the tax
over
to SARS. The onus is on Henque to honestly and correctly assess
its tax liability and to pay over the amount it believes is owed
to
SARS. It filed a tax return for 2017 with SARS where it claimed to
have made a loss of R46 000.00. It was therefore not
obliged to
pay income tax. At the same time, it had accumulated tax credits for
VAT and was therefore entitled to a refund. In
terms of s 96 of the
TAA, SARS would then issue a notice of assessment on the tax
liability, which would specify the amount to
be paid as well as the
date when payment should be made. On 29 November 2017 SARS issued a
notice of assessment in which it recognised
that Henque was due a
refund. The assessment was based solely on the claims made by Henque
in its return. In the same notice, SARS
informed Henque that it was
to be subjected to an audit.
[5]
One of the innovations of the
Companies Act is
to be found in Chapter
6 thereof, where the concept or practice of business rescue is
introduced into our law. In terms of
Section 128(1)(b)
of the
Companies Act, business
rescue is a ‘proceeding’ that is
designed to ‘facilitate the rehabilitation’ of an entity
that is financially
distressed by (i) temporarily appointing a
Business Rescue Practitioner (BRP) who supervises and manages the
affairs of the entity;
(ii) placing a temporary moratorium on the
rights of claimants against the entity or against any ‘property’
in the
possession of the entity – the full extent of the
moratorium is further elaborated upon in s 133 of the Companies Act;
and,
(iii) allowing for a business rescue plan (the plan) to be
developed. By placing a temporary moratorium on the rights of
claimants,
the
Companies Act ring-fences
the debts of the entity that
have accrued prior to the commencement of business rescue. It is
these debts that the plan would focus
upon to ‘rehabilitate’
or ‘rescue’ the entity.
Sections 151
and
152
of the
Companies Act provide
for the plan to be tabled at a meeting of the
creditors for adoption. In cases where the plan adopted by the
creditors affects
the rights of shareholders or members, as in this
case, then the plan would have to be tabled at a meeting of these
shareholders
or members for their approval of the adoption. Should
the plan be adopted, and approved (in the case where approval is
necessary),
in terms of
s 152(4)
it is binding on all creditors
regardless of whether a creditor was at the meeting or not. Finally,
in terms of
s 154(2)
, no creditor, including SARS, if owed unpaid
taxes which were due and payable pre the commencement of business
rescue, can enforce
the debt except in terms of the plan. Post
commencement debts – referred to as ‘Post-commencement
finance’ in
the
Companies Act
- are an altogether
different species. They are dealt with in terms of
s 135
of the
Companies Act. They
are not affected or compromised by the plan.
Salaries earned by employees during the business rescue proceedings
constitute post-commencement
finance. Any taxes, such as income tax
arising from post-commencement profits, Skills Development Levies
(SDL) or VAT on post-commencement
sales for example, too, would
constitute post-commencement finance. All post-commencement finance
has to be settled before any
pre-commencement debts can be
considered.
[6]
Henque commenced business rescue on 31 January 2018. The decision to
commence with business
rescue was voluntarily taken by its sole
member. The first meeting of creditors and employees was held on 12
February 2018.
[7]
In terms of
s 92
of the TAA, SARS is obliged to make an additional
assessment if the original assessment ‘does not reflect the
correct application
of a tax to the prejudice of SARS or the fiscus’.
In this case, the original assessment was based solely on the return
of
Henque. Once the decision to conduct an audit of Henque’s
financial affairs was taken and conveyed to Henque on 29 November
2017 the likelihood of an additional assessment was no longer a
theoretical possibility, it became real. The BRP, therefore, knew
or
had to have known that the audit was still taking place when Henque
commenced business rescue. He knew or ought to have known
that the
tax liability of Henque for the 2017 year had yet to be determined.
[8]
The audit was only completed on 4 April 2018. It revealed that
Henque’s claim that
it had made a loss during the 2017 year was
false. In fact, the audit revealed that Henque had actually produced
a taxable income
of R16 793 724.00 for the 2017 year. The
additional assessment was issued to Henque on 1 May 2018. On the same
day an
employee of SARS informed the BRP that Henque’s income
tax liability for 2017 was R5 334 123.13. This amount
included
penalties and interest. The actual notice reflects the
amount payable as R5 620 571.03. It is not clear why the amounts are
different,
but for purpose of this judgment nothing turns on this.
[9]
In terms of
s 50
of the
Companies Act, the
BRP must, after
consultation ‘with creditors, other affected persons and the
management’ of the entity prepare a business
rescue plan. In
this case the BRP published his rescue plan on 31 May 2018. The plan
recognised a tax liability for VAT at R2 467
810.00 and for PAYE
at R568 728.00 making a total of R3 036 538.00. It
appears that the plan did not include the
income tax liability for
2017, which by this stage was issued to Henque as an additional
assessment. According to the plan, SARS
would receive only 15% of its
claim. There is a dispute as to whether this plan was served on SARS,
but nothing turns on that dispute.
It bears mentioning that at the
time Henque commenced business rescue it had 31 stores, and the BRP
managed to sell 23 of its stores
during the business rescue
proceedings. The other 17 stores were closed. The sale was for a sum
of R23.3m. It took place on 1 June
2018. The plan was adopted by the
creditors at a meeting on 13 June 2018. SARS was not present at the
creditors’ meeting.
Those creditors whose claims were accepted
by the BRP were paid. Employees were paid for all work done prior to
and during the
business rescue process. Many employees were lawfully
retrenched and appropriately remunerated or compensated. For some or
other
reason SARS was not paid.
[10]
On 2 August 2018 an employee of the SARS addressed a letter to the
BRP stating that SARS was not kept informed
of the business rescue
process, and that it was in the process of approaching court for an
order setting aside the business rescue
proceedings. The BRP
responded to the letter within thirty minutes. Two aspects of
the response are important: (i) he disputed
the claim that SARS was
not informed of the business rescue process. Hence, a dispute of fact
arose between SARS and the BRP as
to whether SARS was properly served
with a notice of the creditors’ meeting and a copy of the plan.
Again, this dispute is
of no moment; and (ii) the dispute aside, the
BRP asked SARS to send a copy of its claim against Henque to him so
that ‘it
can be adjudicated’.
[11]
SARS claimed R8 131 225.67 from Henque. The claim consisted
of: (i) a VAT claim of R2 840 005.05;
a PAYE claim of
R20 705,86; (iii) a UIF claim of R104 819.02; (iii) a SDL
claim of R64 334.60 and (iv) an income
tax claim of
R5 101 361.14 – this figure is different from the
additional assessment, but, again, nothing turns
on it. However, SARS
acknowledged that the claim for income tax (R5 101 361.14)
though raised on 4 April 2018 was a pre
commencement debt. SARS being
a concurrent creditor, would have to recover this debt in terms of
the plan. As for the rest, SARS
adopted the view that these were
post-commencement debts. Thus, on SARS’ view Henque owed it
R3 029 894.53. At
the same time, SARS owed Henque a refund
of R1 018 820.80 for overpayment of VAT. Henque requested
the refund. At first
SARS held on to its view that the refund could
be set-off against the R3 029 894.53, but after some
exchanges of letters
with Henque’s attorneys SARS agreed that
its view was wrong and that the refund was due and payable to Henque.
On 5 April
2019 SARS, in response to a query from Henque as to when
payment could be expected, said that it was in the process of being
paid.
By 2 May 2019 the refund was still outstanding. Henque’s
attorneys enquired as to when payment could be expected. They were
informed, once again, that it was still being processed. By 6 May
2019 it was still not paid. Henques’ attorneys enquired
from
SARS as to when repayment could be expected. They received no
response from SARS.
[12]
On 13 May
2019, the attorneys wrote again to SARS seeking an answer to their
question. On the same day Henque received an email
from SARS
informing it that SARS had reverted to its initial position, i.e.
that the VAT refund would not be paid as it had been
set-off against
the income tax liability of Henque. SARS drew Henque’s
attention to the fact that as at 13 May 2019 Henque’s
tax
liability amounted to R5 334 123.13 while the VAT totalled
R1 217 589.30 (which included the refund of
R1 018 820.80
which SARS had conceded was due to Henque). SARS claimed that the
income tax for the 2017 year had only
become due and payable on 31
May 2018 when the additional assessment with regard thereto was
completed. This liability constituted
a post commencement debt
[1]
.
And so, it said that in terms of
s 191
of the TAA it was entitled to
set-off the VAT refund from the amount owing to it. SARS’
latest stance was a complete
volte
face
from its earlier one. Henque disagreed with this view and
objected to the decision to set-off the refund against the income
tax
liability for the 2017 year. It claimed that that the purported
set-off was in contravention of
s 198(1)
of the TAA read with
s 154
of the
Companies Act. Its
attorneys wrote to SARS on 3 June 2019
expressing the view that the fact that the assessment of the income
tax was completed after
the commencement of business rescue did not
alter the more important fact, which was that the liability for the
2017 income tax
arose and was due on 28 February 2017. Accordingly,
it is a pre-commencement debt. The VAT refund of R1 018 820.80 could
not be
set-off against it.
[13]
Thereafter, further correspondence was exchanged between the parties
to resolve the impasse. And to this
end, a meeting between the
attorneys for Henque and an employee of SARS also took place. But no
progress was made. On 18 July 2019,
SARS informed Henque’s
attorneys that it steadfastly held to the view that
s
191
of the TAA entitled it to set-off the VAT refund. This position
was reiterated on 14 August 2019. As the differences between the
parties remained unresolved, Henque instituted the present
application.
[14]
The
Namibian Supreme Court in
Esselmann
[2]
had occasion to consider whether there arises a liability for payment
of taxes in circumstances where a proper income tax assessment
has
yet to be made and served on the person upon whom the liability
rests. In considering the question, the court noted that the
relevant
law –
s 5
of the ordinance regarding taxation, which
incidentally is similar to
s 5
of our Income Tax Act - provided that
‘there shall be paid annually for the benefit of the Territory
Revenue Fund (the equivalent
of our National Revenue Fund) an income
tax in respect of the taxable income received by or accrued to or in
favour of …
any person’
[3]
This provision, the court found, does not mean that the taxpayer is
liable for payment of annual income tax prior to such tax being
assessed and a notice issued to the taxpayer. The issuing of the
notice is crucial. Chief Justice Bekker (with the concurrence
of
Dumbutshena AJA and Mahomed AJA (who later became the first Deputy
President of our Constitutional Court and then our Chief
Justice)
succinctly summed up the legal position in a single sentence:
‘
In my view, s 5
merely established generally the
liability
to pay tax, but does not make tax payable before it has been
assessed.’
[4]
(Italics in
original)
[15]
Section 1 of the TAA defines an assessment as:
‘…
the
determination of the amount of a tax liability or refund, by way of
self-assessment by the taxpayer or by SARS’
[16]
In terms of
s 92 of the TAA, read with s 1 of the same Act, an ‘additional
assessment is simply an assessment made by SARS
in a circumstance
where it is satisfied that an assessment does not reflect the correct
application of a tax Act to the prejudice
of SARS or the fiscus.’
Thus, an additional assessment is no more than a reconsideration of
an assessment when SARS discovers
that the assessment prejudiced SARS
or the fiscus. We know from s 96 of the TAA that when SARS issues a
notice of assessment, as
it did in this case
[5]
,
it has to, amongst others, specify the amount to be paid as
well as the date for when payment is to be made. Reading s 5(1)(d)
of
the Income Tax Act in the context of ss 1, 92 and 96 of the TAA it is
unquestionably clear that the income tax only becomes
due and payable
when the assessment or additional assessment is made and issued to
the taxpayer.
[17]
This is so because for it to be due it has to be liquidated:
‘
The ordinary
meaning of ‘due’ is that ‘ … there must be a
liquidated money obligation presently claimable
by the creditor for
which an action could presently be brought against the debtor. Stated
another way, the debt must be one in
respect of which the debtor is
under an obligation to pay immediately.’
And:
‘
The word
‘payable’, can have at least two different meanings, viz
‘…(a) that which is due or must be paid,
or (b) that
which may be paid or have to be paid … The sense of (a) is a
present liability – due and payable - …
(b) a future or
contingent liability’. Depending on the context of the statute
involved, the word ‘payable’ may
refer to ‘…
what is eventually due, or what there is a liability to pay’’
[6]
(Citations omitted.)
[18]
Section 96(1)(f) of the TAA, as we have already noted, provides that
SARS must issue a notice of assessment
which is to include ‘the
date for paying the amount assessed’. In this case the
additional assessment was made on 4
April 2018 and issued to Henque
on 1 May 2018. The notice of the additional assessment identified the
‘due date’ to
be 1 May 2018 and the ‘second date’
to be 31 May 2018. The second date is the date by when it is to be
paid. The amount
assessed, thus, only became due and payable on 31
May 2018. Until then it was not a ‘debt’. Thus it
constitutes a post-commencement
debt or finance (in the parlance of
the
Companies Act).
[19
]
Henque submits that the fact that the additional assessment of the
income tax was only issued on 1 May 2018
does not detract from a more
fundamental fact: that in terms of s 5(1) of the Income Tax Act the
liability for the income tax arose
on 28 February 2017. An
assessment, including an additional assessment, of the liability
subsequent to 28 February 2017 only quantifies
the liability. It does
not create the liability. On the basis of the analysis of the various
tax legislations and authorities referred
to above, I find myself
unable to agree with the submission. I hold the view that Becker CJ’s
single sentence
dictum
concerning liability for income tax
applies with equal force to our tax legislations: that s 5(1) of the
Income Tax Act only establishes
‘generally the liability’
but that in terms of the relevant provisions of the TAA (analysed
above) the tax became due
and payable when the additional assessment
was made. Only when it was quantified and became due and payable did
it become a debt.
The additional assessment constitutes the important
event that transforms a general liability into an actual one.
Articulating
it differently, s 5(1) of the Income Tax Act has to be
interpreted in the context of the other relevant legislation, the
TAA.
On this approach tax liability is recognised as being a
mosaic made of various legislations.
[20]
To conclude: the 2017 additional assessment is not a pre-business
rescue debt. Accordingly, Henque’s
call for declaratory relief
holding otherwise has to be rejected
Costs
[21]
The parties correctly adopted the view that costs should follow the
result.
Order
[22]
The following order is made:
The application is
dismissed with costs.
Vally
J
Gauteng
High Court, Johannesburg
Date
of hearing:
18
January 2023
Date
of judgment:
7 March 2023
For
the applicant: J Peter SC with C Dreyer
(initial
heads drafted by C Dreyer)
Instructed
by: Fluxmans Attorneys
For
the
respondent: C Dauds
Instructed
by: State
Attorney
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2020/35790
Reportable:
Yes
Of
interest to other judges: Yes
7
March 2023
In
the matter between:
HENQUE
3935 CC
t/a
PQ CLOTHING OUTLET (in Business Rescue)
Applicant
and
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SA REVENUE SERVICE Respondent
LEGAL
SUMMARY
The
question to be determined by the court was whether the Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service (SARS) could set-off
a tax
liability of a company against the VAT refunds due to the company in
circumstances where the tax liability concerns a period
prior to the
company entering into business rescue, but was only determined after
the company had already entered into business
rescue?
The
court held that a proper reading of s 5(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act
in the context of ss 1, 92 and 96 of the TAA it is unquestionably
clear that the income tax only becomes due and payable when the
assessment or additional assessment is made and issued to the
taxpayer. Further, s 5(1) of the Income Tax Act has to be interpreted
in the context of the other relevant legislation, the TAA,
including
the
Companies Act because
tax liability is recognised as being a
mosaic made of various legislations.
In
terms of
section 96(1)(f)
of the TAA, SARS must issue a notice of
assessment which is to include ‘the date for paying the amount
assessed’. In
this case the additional assessment was made on 4
April 2018 and issued to Henque on 1 May 2018. The notice of the
additional assessment
identified the ‘due date’ to be 1
May 2018 and the ‘second date’ to be 31 May 2018. The
second date is
the date by when it is to be paid. The amount
assessed, thus, only became due and payable on 31 May 2018. Until
then it was not
a ‘debt’. Thus it constitutes a
post-commencement debt or finance.
Consequently,
the 2017 additional assessment was not a pre-business rescue debt.
Accordingly, Henque’s call for declaratory
relief was
dismissed.
[1]
The
Companies Act does
not provide for the concept post-commencement
debt, only post-commencement finance. In this case, the parties
understood the
two terms to mean one and the same thing.
[2]
Esselmann
v Secretary of Finance
1991 (3) SA 681 (NmSC)
[3]
Id at 688C
[4]
Id at 688E
[5]
See [4] above
[6]
Singh v
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service
2003 (4) SA 520
(SCA) at [25] and [26] (per the concurring judgment
of Olivier JA)
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