Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 238South Africa
Da Cruz v Manzella and Others (21/42640) [2023] ZAGPJHC 238 (16 March 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
16 March 2023
Headnotes
Summary: Uniform Rule 30 – further steps taken preclude reliance on Rule - overly technical approach not justified.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Da Cruz v Manzella and Others (21/42640) [2023] ZAGPJHC 238 (16 March 2023)
Da Cruz v Manzella and Others (21/42640) [2023] ZAGPJHC 238 (16 March 2023)
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sino date 16 March 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: 21/42640
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED YES/NO
DATE:
16 March 2023
In
the interlocutory application between:
DA
CRUZ, MANUEL JORGE MAIA
Applicant
and
MANZELLA,
PATRICIA MARLENE
First
Respondent
SOLBEL
PROPERTIES CC
Second
Respondent
MANZELLA,
PATRICIA MARLENE N.O.
Third
Respondent
in
re
DA
CRUZ, MANUEL JORGE MAIA
Applicant
and
MANZELLA,
PATRICIA MARLENE
First
Respondent
SOLBEL
PROPERTIES CC
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Heard
:
19 January 2023
Delivered:
16 March 2023 – This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives by
email, by being
uploaded to
CaseLines
. The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 10:00 on 16 March 2023.
Summary:
Uniform Rule 30
– further steps taken
preclude reliance on Rule - overly technical approach not justified.
TURNER
AJ
[1]
This is an application brought by the
applicant for an order in the following terms:
That the applicant’s
interlocutory application served on 21 July 2022 and the applicant’s
notice in terms of Rule 6(11)
brought by the first and second
respondents be set aside as an irregular step pursuant to Uniform
Rule 30(1).
[2]
Papers were exchanged between the parties
and heads were filed. However, on the day of the hearing, only the
applicant was represented
by counsel ready to argue the matter. Mr
Salani appeared
pro bono
for the first respondent to request that the matter be postponed so
it could be consolidated with an application which I was informed
had
been delivered by the respondents for the liquidation of the second
respondent. That liquidation application is set down for
mid-February
2023. Mr Salani was not briefed to argue the Rule 30 application.
[3]
Mr Moreno, who appeared for the applicant,
addressed the court on the postponement and Rule 30 application.
Although there was some
confusion as to the scope of the hearing when
Mr Moreno attempted also to address the Court on the merits of the
main application,
after reviewing the documents filed on Caselines
and particularly the set down notices which were before me, it was
clear that
only the Rule 30 application had been set down and was
before me for a decision. The merits of the main dispute were not set
down.
This also accords with the practice note delivered by the
applicant dated 4 January 2023, which indicated that the matter was
an
interlocutory one with a duration of only 30 minutes.
[4]
As appears from the relief quoted above,
the respondents attack two steps taken by the applicant as “irregular
steps”
:
(i)
The applicant’s delivery of its
interlocutory application served on 21 July 2022; and
(ii)
The applicant’s notice in terms of
Rule 6(11) delivered on 6 October 2022.
[5]
Uniform Rule 30 provides (in relevant
part):
“
30
Irregular proceedings
(1)
A party to a cause in which an irregular
step has been taken by any other party may apply to court to set it
aside.
(2)
An application in terms of subrule (1)
shall be on notice to all parties specifying particulars of the
irregularity or impropriety
alleged and be made only if –
(a) the
applicant has not himself taken a further step in the cause with
knowledge of the irregularity;
(b) the
applicant has, within 10 days of becoming aware of the step, by
written notice afforded his opponent an
opportunity of removing the
cause of complaint within 10 days;
(c)
the application was delivered within 15 days after the expiry of the
second period mentioned in paragraph
(b) of subrule (2).”
### Applicant’s
interlocutory application served on 21 July 2022
Applicant’s
interlocutory application served on 21 July 2022
[6]
There is no basis for the respondents to
use Rule 30 to attack the regularity of the interlocutory application
delivered on 21 July
2022. First, the respondents did not deliver the
required notice within 10 days of becoming aware of the application
having been
delivered on 21 July 2022; second, the respondents
delivered a notice to oppose the application on 15 August 2022 and
then filed
an answering affidavit responding to that application on 5
September 2022. All of these further steps were taken before the Rule
30 notice was delivered and so the Rule 30(2)(a) requirement was not
met.
### Rule 6(11) notice
delivered 6 October 2022
Rule 6(11) notice
delivered 6 October 2022
[7]
After receiving the Rule 6(11) notice, the
respondents delivered a Rule 30 notice on 12 October 2022 calling on
the applicant to
remove the cause of complaint. On 14 October the
applicant indicated that he did not intend to comply with the notice
and waived
the 10-day period afforded to him to remove the cause of
complaint. The current application was delivered on 26 October 2022,
within
the 15 days required.
[8]
There is therefore no technical
irregularity with the delivery of the Rule 30 notice directed at the
Rule 6(11) notice and so it
is necessary to deal with the merits
thereof.
[9]
The first objection is that the wrong rule
was used. The respondents contend that Rule 28 ought to have been the
subject matter
of the notice and not Rule 6(11). This is an overly
technical and spurious ground of objection. (See
Pangbourne
Properties Ltd v Pulse Moving CC and Another
2013
(3) SA 140(GSJ)
at [17])
The content of the
notice makes it clear that the applicant intends to amend its notice
of motion, giving the respondents the necessary
notice contemplated
in Rule 28, as it applies to applications.
[10]
Second, the respondents suggest that the
delivery of this notice somehow fatally undermines or has the effect
of removing the applicant’s
reliance on the 21 July 2022
affidavit. However this too is unjustified as the notice does not
record that the applicant intends
to delete any of the existing
relief sought in the notice of motion. Moreover, the notice invites
the respondents to “
supplement
your answering affidavit consequent on the applicant’s
supplementary replying affidavit
”
.
This clearly shows that the amendment is to add additional grounds of
relief and rely on the 21 July affidavit, not to delete
anything from
the existing notice of motion.
[11]
The third element is an objection to the
attempt by the applicant to join the first respondent in her capacity
as executor of her
husband’s deceased estate. This, however,
forms part of the substance of the 21 July 2022 interlocutory
application, the
merits of which are yet to be ventilated. As I have
held that the respondent is precluded from relying on Rule 30(2) to
object
to the 21 July 2022 application affidavit and because of the
further steps taken, this finding precludes me from dealing with the
merits of the objection at this stage. The Court hearing the
interlocutory application will need to decide whether the application
for joinder is competent and should be granted.
### Costs
Costs
[12]
The applicant sought an order for punitive
costs, asking that the respondents be held liable to pay the
applicants costs on the
scale as between attorney and client.
However, recognising that much of the factual material on which the
applicant relies for
this costs order is set out in the main
application on which no finding has yet been made, Mr Moreno
recognised that I could not
make the factual findings necessary to
support such a punitive costs order. In the circumstances, Mr Moreno
asked that I grant
an order for costs but reserve the scale of those
costs to be determined by a future court when determining the main
application.
### Order
Order
[13]
In the circumstances, I grant the following
order:
(1)
The first and second respondents’
application in terms of Rule 30 is dismissed, with costs.
(2)
The scale on which the costs are to be paid
by the first and second respondents to the applicant, is reserved.
TURNER
AJ
Counsel for the
applicants: Adv
CJ Moreno
Instructed by:
Mark
Anthony Beyl Attorneys
Counsel for the
respondent: Adv
Salani (on postponement only)
Instructed by:
Rossouws
Lesie Inc
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