Tariq Ahmad Bathawab and Another vs Mohsin Abdallah and Others (Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1997) [1999] TZHC 118 (22 January 1999)

TN 'J'HE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA AT DAR ES SALAAM CIVIL APPEAL NO. 84 OF 1997

1. TARTQ AHMAD BATHAWAB
2. ARUBAKAR ALT ABUBAKAR ................ APPLICANT VF.RSUS
3. MOHSIN ABDALLAH
4. ARIQ MIRZA
5. TARCIRTO KAVINDT. . ... RESPONDF.NT J U D G R M E N T KAT,F.GF.YA . . J. 'T'he AppellAnts, Tariq AhmA<'I RAthawAh Ano Ah11h;:ik;:ir Ali Ah11hAkF1r (style<'! 1st And ?.no Appellants resper.tively) ;,nil who were originA] plaintiffs are rhAl]enging the deri.sion of the Kisut.11 Resident MAgistrates' f'.011rt whirh clec_idecl in fAvo11r of Mohsin Ahd;:i]]Ah, Tariq Mir~a anrl TArcjrio Kavimhi (1st, 2nd and 1r<'l Respqnoents respertively, Ann who were the original nefenclr1nts). The former hr1d sueo the latter prr1y1 ng for, ;cimong others, ''(a) A PERMANENT INJUCTTON to restrain the Defenoants from expelling the pl;:iintiffs from THE HUNTERS ASSOCIATION OF TANZANIA (HAT). (h) A PERMANENT TNJUf'.TT0N restrr1ining the Defenoants from intefering and\or rne<'ldling in the cono1irt, mr1nagement. ;:ind running of the a ff ;=d rs of THE HUNTERS ASSOCTATTON OF TAN7.ANTA (HAT). (r) AN ORDF.R rlirecting THE HUNTERS' ASSOCTATTON OF TAN7.ANTA thro11gh thA good offir.es of the RF!C:;TSTRAR OF SOC'.TF.TTRS, MTNTSTRY OF HOME AFFATRS anrl in ronj11r.tion with the ASSOCTATTON'S PATRON Hon. R. M. Kaw;:iw;, to ronvene AN EXTRA ORDTNARY GF.NF.RAL MEF.TTNG within 4S d;,ys of the judgement with thA aim of ;:ippointing R CARRTAKER COMMT'T"T'F.E\ TN'T'F.RTM COMMITTEE to manage and rond11rt the ASSOCTA'T'TON'S affairs unti.l the next ANNUAL GENF.RAL MEETTNG". l

..fl For clarity, a summary of facts leading to this state of affairs is necessary and is as follows. The parties are members of an association called THE HUNTERS ASSOCIATION OF TANZANIA (herein after to he referred to as HAT) formed in the late 1980s and offir.ially inaugurated in October,. 1989. It hns four categories of members - full members; full members - Professional,. Assor.iate Members and Honorary memhers. Apart. from the Annual Genernl meeting the mAin org;:1n is t·he F.xer.lltive r.ommittP.e which has very wi.<le powers of r.ond11cting the Ass or. i a t i on ' s A f fa i rs . 'l' he Ann 11 ;:i l genera l m P. e t i_ n g c .:=rn e 1 e ct a T,ife PAtron\P;:itrons And Honorary President. All these are prescribed in whAt is intP-restingly ent.itled CONS'l'T'T'U'l'TON AND RUT,F.S OF 'T'HF. HHN'T'F.RS ASS01.TA'T'TON OF TAN7.ANTA (T r.alled ·J;_ interesting her.Ause T have not been able to see whir.hone 1s the constitution an<l which are Rules). By 19th March, 1993, the parties were members of the Executive Committee of the Association,. while Hon. Kawawa was the Association's pntron. 'J'he 2nd plaintiff_. Ahuhak.:=ff Ali Ahuhakar, was the Association's Chairman,. having held that position for three consecutive terms. 'T'he 1st nefend;:int, Mohsin Ahoallnh, wr1s the vir.e chairman, while the ?n<l defendant (Tariq Mira) And 3rd Defendant. ('T'arr.iri.o Kavindi) WfHB 'l'nas11rP.r and Secretr1ry resper.tively. On the said <late (19\3\93) the ind plaintiff tendered A letter of resi.gnRtion from his post to the ExRc11tive r.ommittee nf the Assor.iatinn. He oio not assign reasons for his Art.inn. On i6th Marr.h: 1993, he wrote Another letter, this time,. tn the pr1trnn explaining why he resigned,. ano: reAsons r1dvanred included being Against the vir.e r.hairman's Ar.t.s nf bribing relevant officials, the Committee's opposition to the proposal for appoi.ntment and anthori.sed officers who would assist in catching illegal hunters and those violating the wildlife conservati.on Laws, and election of office hearers hasing on business_. religious And friendship rel.at.ions. 2

On 14th April, 1993, by way of a letter (Exh.P.13) signed by the .1st Defendant, the 2nd plaintiff was summoned to appear before the Executive Committee on 20th April, 1993. He did not appear, instead he replied back (Exh.P.14) explaining that he· would not attend the meeting which he equated to a "Kangaroo Court''. On 24th Aprii he received a letter (Exh.P.15), again signed by the 1st Defendant informing him that the m~eting had expelled him from the Associatjon's membership. Thereafter, 13 of the Association's members requisitioned for an Extra-Ordinary General meeting for 11\6\93. The notice of requisition, among others_. called upon the Executive Committee to provide minutes of the 14th March, 1993 and 20th April, 1993, meetings and also a written acceptance of the proposed meeting. As the Executive Committee did not respond to any of these issues the requisitioning memhers pushed the date to 18th ,lune, from 11th. This prompted the Executive Committee, on 27\5\93, to respond by stating, II ..... the Annual General Meeting is scheduled on 25th June, 1993, just a week from the date for which you want an extraordinary AGM. We therefore see no reason of holding the meeting as requested by your goodselves". This in t11rn infuriated the requisitioni.ng members and they proceed to the court, filed a s11it, sought and ohtained an injuction against the holding of the Annual General. meeting. On 13th September, 1994, hy a letter (Exh.Pl) signed by the 1st Defendant, the 1st plaintiff was informed, "The F.xecut.ive Committee of Hunters' Association of Tanzania has on 8th September, 1994, ..... . unaminously voted to expel your goodself from the Hunters' Associr1tion of Tanzania". The plaintiffs then joined hands, petitioned and prayed as already quoted above. 3

Before the trial court, the Counsel, Mr. Nyange, who represented plaintiffs, and Mr. Ndyanabo who represented, Defendants, were all agreed on 4 issues which were framed as follows-

1. Whether the expulsion of the plaintiffs was lawful~
2. Whether the association should be required to commence\conduct an extraordinary General meeting.
3. Whethet the defendants have contravened the Constitution of the Association.
4. What reliefs are the parties entitled to. The trial Court's finding can best be painted by reproducing the relevant last part of the judgement, "Accordinalv this court enters juddment as follows: On the first issue of the explusion of the olaintiffs. this was lawful. On the second issue of the extraordinary meetina, the court finds that the executive committees actions in refusina to call it were unconstitutional. As to the third issue of whether thi• ·defendants have contravened the constitution the court finds that thev have not. The Court is finallv left with onlv the fourth issue what reliefs the oarties are entitled to. This court has found for the olaintiffs on the second issue. The loaical oaver that would follow would be for the court to issue an order that an extraordinarv aeneral J!le_t ina be held. But sad an order w9uld have to issue to the_executive committee. The first. second and third defendants while members of that committee are not the committee. The necessarv oartv is the executive committee is not_before this court. The court cannot issue a iudament. for the defendants t:.o _do somethina thev do not have the constitutional oower to do". The plaintiffs' un-impressed by this finding came to this court with a length memorandum of Appeal, which, in my view, even at the danger of making this judgement unnecessary long, should be reproduced in full, "1. There was no proof before the Court that the decisions to expel the Appellants were made by the Executive Committee of the Association. That although the Association's Executive Committee decisions are 4

' ... made in its absolute discretion and are binding on th~ members, the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by holding that the Appellants' expulsions were lawful when these were done in breach of the rules of natural justice. 2. If the decisions to expel were made by the Executive Committee of the Association which is denied, the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact because the procedural machinery for suspension\expulsion as laid down in the Constitution as well as the principles of natural justice were not adhered to by the said Executive Committee. 3. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in overlooking an additional violation of the Constitution by the Executive Committee as regards "the notices" which were issued for the Fourth Annual f:,eneral Meeting which was to he held on 25th June, 1993. 4. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the Association's Constitution has two categories of Full Members namely Ordinary and Professional when the two categories Full Member and Full Member Professional are distinctivi as regards their rights ;::i.nd obligations and thus the 1st Respondent: by his involvement in tourist hunting, should not be among the "Officers" of the Association. 5. That in the absence of Tourist Agent licence Class "A" and "B" in possession of the 1st Respondent .. the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the hunt which was conducted under PE#9 was not illegal as alleged by the Appellants. 6. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in not concurring with the Appellants' submission that on the face of the discrepancy in PE#17 when compared with PE# 18 and 19, the onus was on the 1st Respondent to prove that he had not involved himself in illegal trop~y dealing and therefore did no offence under Act No. 12 of 1994. 7. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law.and in fact by his failure to evaluate and consider cogent testimony including documentary evidence on the First Respondent's illegal acts and instead termed these allegaitons as all "sour grapes". 5

8. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the Respondents had not violated the Constitution because as the Association's members and its "officers" they are severally and jointly under an obligation toup hold and defend it.
9. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by his failure to take note of the alleged post of Vice-President under PE# 26 and creation of the post of Co-ordinator by 1st Respondent as proofs of his total disregard for the Association's Constitution and Rules.
10. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in that in reaching his judgment he was greatly influenced by extraneous factors and overlooked pertinent considerations such as the fact that the Second and Third Respondents who were the Treasurer and Secretary respectively opted not to testify when their testimonies were crucial to the case.
11. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in deciding that the Respondents were not the proper parties whereas this was never raised by way of a Preliminary Objection by the Respondents themselves who also failed to produce befo~e the Court the original signed\confirmed Minutes of the Association's i Executive Committee relative to the explusions of the Appellants". During the hearing of this appeal only Appellants prosecuted their appeal as the defendants decided to absent themselves though served. Arguments were presented by way of written submissions. In their submissions in support of the grounds of appeal the Appellants argued ground 1 and 2 together, and so are grounds 5, 6 and 7. Again, argued together are grounds 10 and 11. On my side however, I will deal with the appeal generally but centred around three categoiies of complaints - whether the explusions were made by the Executive Committee or individual Defendants and whether they were lawful; whether there were constitutional violations apart from the failure to convene the Extra-Ordinary General meeting; whether the defendants are the right parties and orders that can rightly be made by this court and to whom. 6

I' In the written submissions in support of his memorandum of appeal Mr. Nyange, argued strongly that the trial court erred in holding that the decision to expel Appellants was made by the Executive Committee of the Association. He insisted that had it been so they should have produced the minutes as much as 2nd and 3rd defendants shouid have testified i~stead of keeping silent. He further charged that the trial court either misunderstood or deliberately misinterpreted s. 143 of the Evidence Act, in tising it to justify 2nd and 3rd defendant's silence. Further to that Mr. Nyange instisted that article 32 of the Association's Constitution was violated and so were the principles of natural justice as they relate to fair hearing and preclusion of a man from being a judge in his own cause. On the above I should outrightly state that the trial court was perfectly right in holding that the decisions were made by the Executive Committee and not by the defendants in their individual capacities. In any case, if Mr. Nyange's argument on this was to be upheld he wo11ld be contradicting himself, for, whf then take up arms with something which cannot affect yo11r rights. Individual decisions of defendants whether as private persons or mere members of HAT could not terminate their (Appellants) membership. What Mr. Nyange should have concentrated upon, (and he argued on it) would only run along these lines - either that the Executive Committee was not properly constjtute<l or that it violated principles of natural justice making the decisions arrived at unsupportable. Having so concluded however, I should hastily add that I am all fours with Appellants that I cannot associate myself with the trial court's finding that the expulsions were lawful. And here I must be clear: I am dealing with the expulsions of plaintiffs simultenously although they took place on different dates, and, I am confining myself to expulsions per se. As to why I have concluded as I have done, the following are my reasons. 7

.. ' First, regarding the conclusion that it was the Executive Committees' act and not of individual defendants - we have clear evidence in the letter (Exh. 13) which was sent to 2nd plaintff calling upon him to attend a meeting of 20th April, 1993, at the Golden Dragon Restaurant: clearly this was signed by 1st Defendant in his capacity as acting chairman. Again, the epulsion notices issued on both plaintiffs (exh. P.15 and P.1) are in the Executive Committee's name. For clarity let the two notices take the floor:- Exh. Pl (in respect of 1st Plaintiff) dated 13th September 1994, stated, "Mr. 'T'ariq The Executive Committee of Hunters' Associati·on of Tanzania has on the 8th September, 1994, at its meeting at the Golden Dragon Restaurant, unanimously vot.eo t.o expel your goodself from the Hunters' Association of 'l'anzania. We auote from the Constitution and R11les nf Hunters' As;ociation of 'T'anz;=mia Para 32" thus ..... harmful to the reputation, welfare and prestige of the Association ;:ind its members, the Executive Commit.tee shall take such disciplinary action by expulsion from the Association as they shall think fit ... ". Also para 35" No member shall give any service whatever, direct or indirect for reward or not to any person who has been expelled from the Association or during any period when his membership shall have been declared to be undeserving of the assistance of a member of the Association .... ". Kindly return your Identity Card to the Association. Yours in Sport, . Mohsin Abdallah AC'l'TNG CHAIRMAN" 8

... While Exh. 15 (in respect of the 2nd plaintiff) dated 24th April, t993 runs as under, "Mr. A. A. Abubakar, The Executive Committee of the Hunters Association of Tanzania has on the 20th April 1993 at its meeting at the Motel ·Agip, unanimosly voted to expel your goodself from the Hunters Association 6f Tahzania. We quote from "Constitution and Rules of the Hunters Association of Tanzania". Paragraph 32.: quote 11 ••• harmful to the reputation, welfare and prestige of the Association and its members, the Executive Committee shall take such disciplinary action by expulsion from the Association, as they shall think fit ...... ". Yours in Sport, MOHSIN ABDALLAH AG. CHATRMAN CC.: 'I'HF. PATRON HON. R. M. KAWAWA". The absence of the relevant minutes, on which Mr. Nyange hinges his argument, at most, would go to affect the soundness or legality of the meeting's decision and nothing else. On this therefore the trial court was right in holding that the decisions were made by the Executive Committee. Now turning to the lawfulness or otherwise of the decisions made, I must again outrightly state that they violated the HATS Constitution as well as principles of natural justice. Article 32, provides, among others, "3 2· . Tn the case of the breach of or non-observance by any Member of any of the Game Ordinance or acts,· Laws of the National Parks, Game Reserves and Conservation Areas of the Government of Tanzania, and/ or any of the Rules of the Association, and/or if the conduct of any Member be the subject of complaint in writing by any Member or any other person to the Committee as being unsportsmanlike or unworthy of a Member and\or harmful to the reputation, welfare, and 9

.. prestige of the Association and its Members, the Executive Committee (after due consideration and investigation of the evidence submitted in the Member charged} shall take such disciplinary action in regard to such breach or non-observance or conduct by admonishment or warning, by suspension for a specific period (which may in the discretion of the Committee be reduced for good reasons shown) from membership or by expulsion fiom the Association, as they shall think fit. The Committee shall have full power to expel a Member from the Association". Apart from Article 32, we also have Art. 33, which is again categorical on the powers of the Executive Committee, which in part provides, "33. The Executive Committee shall in their absolute discretion decide whether the action or conduct of any Member complained of has been unsportsmanlike or unworthy of a Member, or is a harmful action to the reputation and welfare of the Association and its Members. The decision of the Executive Committee shall be absolutely final and binding on all Members of the Association. In like ~anner the Executive Committee shall have absolute power and authority to decide whether the conduct in the hunting, photographic or touring of any client of a professional hunter and\or game photographer and\or tour operator (whether a Member of the Association or not) is or has been of such a character that he should not enjoy the services (whether for reward or not) in the hunting, photographic or touring business of any Member of the Association. The Executive Committee may in their absolute reconsi.der and amend any decision made". In accordance with these provisions no one can doubt the very wide powers of the Executive Committee which powers include the making of the decisions as it did. However, I am afraid that the said powers were misused in the present case. Apart from the fact that we are disadvantaged by the absence of relevant minutes, for, we are not told how the deliberations were conducted before the decisions were made, the defendants (2nd and 3rd) decided not to testify at all. The 10

" plaintiffs' side did sufficiently issue notice ·to produce the minutes without response. As rightly observed by Mr. Nyange, if they are in existence at all, and in the prescribed and required manner, why should their production be sealed off! While this could suggest the existence of violations of the relevant constitution there is yet direct violations as I will hereby demonstrate. Article 32 is categorical. The Committee can commence proceedings of the tvoe at hand against a member, '' ..... if the conduct ...... be the subiect of comolaint in writina bv anv member or anv other oerson ...... '' (the full text has already been quoted above but the underlined part, the emphasis being mine, is the most relevant). Neither the 1st Defendant nor any of his witnesses testified as having come across such written complaints against either plaintiffs. In other words, if there are complaints at ·all they were orally made hence contrary to HATS constitution. 2ndly, there is n glaring failure by the said Committee to afford chance to the plaintiffs of defending themselves on charges levelled against them. The 1st plaintiff deposed to have simply received a letter of expulsion (Exh. Pl). And it wold seem this was because he had filed a suit against the Association hence seen as rebel in league with 2nd plaintiff. I gather this from the 1st Defendants testimony and also from the last paragraph of the expulsion letter (Exh. Pl) which is already quoted above. It wou]d seem, according to the Executive Committee, the mere filing of a suit against HAT by 1st plaintiff was taken as s11fficient evidence to put him on cross. This seems to hve blinded them to the extent of forgetting even the simple, basic principle of natural justice that no one should be condemned unheard for they never made any attempt at all to call him before them. Now turning to the 2nd plaintiff, can it be 11

.. argued that, by calling him to the meeting which he refused to attend sufficient opportunity was extended to him to defend himself? I have considered the latter carefully. While conceding that the 2nd plaintiff's act of refusal to attend the meeting, and branding the sitting as a "Kangaroo Court" cannot be condoned in a society which respects procedures and regulations set by itself for its own gobd, for, otherwise, we would be promoting lawlessness, that flaw by itself cannot rectify the equally wanting procedure adopted by the Executive Committee. In such situations, and in particular, in line with HAT's constitution, the committee should have attached a copy of the complaint made against him and called upon him to appear prepared to defend himself before the committee. If that step would have been taken the 2nd plaintiff would not have turned up and lleged failure to afford him chance to defend himself, for, the committee would have done all that was required to have him heard. From the above, it is clear that the expulsions of the plaintiffs were not lawful. On the strength of the facts available, had the trial court made the required analysis, it would have arrived at a concltision opposite from what it did. With that finding I find it unnecessary to discuss whether it was proper. for. the same Committee, against which 2nd plaintiff levelled complaints, to have adjudicated a controvrsy allegedly involving hi.rn. However, I should make observations on the trial c;ourts' finding on 2nd and 3rd Defendants failure to give their defence and invocation of s. 143 of the Evidence Act, which Mr. Nyange bitterly attacks. 12

I should simply observe that in civil cases where several parties are being severaly and jointly sued on same subject matter, and where the defence would invaluably be the same, it is not fatal if only some of the parties do testify. Of course this will depend on the circumstances of a particular case, and the party who opts for the latter course does so at his own risk. In the case at hand, for example, refusal to testify by the very Secretary of the HAT, consequently of the Executive Committee which expelled plaintiffs, was bound to draw negative inferences, and more so considerj_ng the nature of the controversy between the parties and failure by defendants to produce the minutes of the sittings that decided on the expulsion despite the issuance of the notice to produce. In the premises, while cautioning parties who adopt that mode, I cannot subscribe to Mr. Nyange's submission thats. 143 does not apply to witness who are defendants. S. 143 of the Evidence Act, provides, "Subject to the provisions of any other written law, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of ;:rny fact". That section makes no exception, and fortunately Mr. Nyange concedes that defendants are witnesses in their own cause. As I said before, where defendants are sued on same subject matter and where there individual defences would j11st be a reproduction of the other, they may, and indeed logic would demand io, not put some among themselves in the witness box. It ~hould be remembered that by then pleadings would be complete and on record: so if, at the close of the trial, the court is satisfied that there is a case against any of the defendants there is nothing to deter it from entering judgement against whoever miscalculated and refused to testify, otherwise, and apart from the possible negative inference that may be drawn as already indicated, the principle 1.3

that no particular number of witnesses is required to prove a particular fact stands sound in the matter. Next I turn to the category relating to other alleged violations of the HAT's constitution by defendants. I have carefully considered this part of the controversy in relatiori to the evidence tendered and HAT's constitution and I have reachd a conclusion that the trial court's finding that there are no violations committed apart from failure to call an Extra-Ordinary meeting upon requisition hy more than 10 members was properly arrived at. Apart from the "objectives" part of the Constitution which, among others, shows generally that the Association has to coll.aborate with the government and all officers charged with the protection of fauna and flora generally, there are no partjcular Articles which prescribe which type of a member shall <lo what, i.e. hunting, either professionally or in assistance with who; prohibiting formation of hunting companies and related. Only Article 32 refers to disciplinary action which has to be taken against all those who violate state laws relating to fauna and flora which is a statement of the obvious and as it obtains to each citizen or person within the boundaries of Tanzania as a country. This however does not deter the Association from deliberating and deciding on any member's questionable dealings which may tarnish its name. The above said however, I should hasten to add that the evidence establishes som dubious acts like exportation of two trophies instead of one.: taking up of ] icences in one name for use by the other; inside dealings between members and their r.omp;rnies which are susceptjhle to misuse. All this, I should sr1y .. is an eye opener to the Ministry concerned hut are not matters for decision by the court. As to the violations of Act 12 of 1974 pointed out by Mr. Nyange, the state organs concerned are the best placed to act accordingly and there is no time limit. 14

t 'l" Finally, I turn to whether the right parties wer~ sued and whether the court can make the orders prayed for against defendants. The trial court concluded that the defendants were wrongly sued for they are individuals and that the orders cannot be made against the Executive Committee as it was not a party to the proceedings. That finding is wrong. The true position is that where an 11nincorporated Association like the HAT has no Board of Trustees, when it comes to act.ions before the court, the ones to sue or defend are either the secretary or the chairman or both or members of the Executive Commit.tee in their personal names. This is so because the Association has no separate entity but functions by its members. That said, which direction should we take?. I have held that the plaintiffs' expulsion was effected by the Executive Committee . and that it was unl.,wfu] ly arrived at; that the said Executive Committee violated the constitution by refusing to convene an Ext.a-Ordinary meeting as req11isitioned by more than 10 members, and that. the defendr1nt.s were properly sued. The next question is whether te court cou]d grant the prayers as quoted at the beginning of this judgRment. Wj_th respect to the framers nf the plr1int,. Tam convinced th;:it. the prayers were wrongly drawn up. I am saying sn because, starting with prr1yer (a), this court cr1nnot. issue ·the "perrnamrnt injuct.ion" prayed for, as, in the first. plr1ce, the plaintiffs have already been expelled. Secon<lly,. and this is the most crucial, this court cannot pronounce that. HAT sho11ld never expel the plaintiffs permanently for thj_s would be tantamount to interfering with the internal organi.sation of the Association, .and in fact it would defeat common sense and logic, to give the said plaintiffs a blank cheque that they can do anything but can

1. 5

I I • never be proceeded against disciplinarily! I think, artd I believe this is what the plaintiffs had in my mind, and that is that the first prayer should have been clearly framed to state that it be declared that the expulsions were unlawful and that therefore plaintiffs are still members of HAT. In view of the findings made, though framed differently, prayer one is granted in the terms that the expulsions were unlawful and therefore the plaintiffs are still lawful members of HAT. Prayer (b) however cannot be granted. The defendants cannot be "restrained from interfering or meddling in the conduct. of Management and running of the affairs of HAT'' because these are members of the Executive Committee which has not been djsbanded nor have these members (and key members for that matter) been removed. The plaintiffs who all along have been claimourling for respect of the constit11tinn are making U - turn, against it. The court cannot be made a party to this unlawful proposition. Prayer (c) is clearly within the powers of this court regard being had to the findings and conclusions already arrived at. We have found that the convening of an Extra-Ordinary meeting where over 10 members of the Association have so requisitioned is not discretional but mandatory. This court can only therefore order the obvious: the Extra-Ordinary meeting should be convened by the Executive Committee within 45 days of delivery of this judgement. As to the outcome of the meeting that is outside the purview of this court. On the whole therefore the appeal succeeds on terms as indicated. Considering the fact that the plaintiffs' struggle were aimed at the welfare of the Asso6iation and not individuals as such, and as whatever costs that may be ordered would not be met by individual Defendants hut the Association, which act would 16

'I- ' ~ ~, ;,- go to deplete the: otherwise flagile (as per evidence on record) purse of the Association, no order is made as to costs. 17 (L. B. Kalegeya) JUDGE