Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 711South Africa
De Beer and Another v Director General, Home Affairs and Another (049991/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 711 (19 June 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
19 June 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## De Beer and Another v Director General, Home Affairs and Another (049991/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 711 (19 June 2023)
De Beer and Another v Director General, Home Affairs and Another (049991/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 711 (19 June 2023)
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sino date 19 June 2023
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number:
049991/2022
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
19.06.23
In
the matter between:
PETER
IAN DE BEER
First
Applicant
SANDRA
KERSTEN OSHEA (nee KOHLER)
Second
Applicant
And
DIRECTOR
GENERAL: HOME AFFAIRS
First
Respondent
MINISTER
OF HOME AFFAIRS
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1]
This is an application on an urgent basis in two parts. Part A, the
applicants seek relief from this court to urgently
suspend the
conduct of the respondents which declared the second applicant a
prohibited person- in terms of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
as
amended (the Act). The intended effect is to reunite the applicants
who stated that they have been separated against their will.
They
seek Part A to operate as an interim interdict until Part B is heard
which seeks to determine the Constitutionality of
section 29(1)
[1]
of the
Act. The respondents opposed the application disputing urgency and
indicating that the applicants had alternative remedies
that they had
not exhausted.
[2] The first and
second applicant (the applicants) are in a relationship for seven
years and regard each other as life partners.
In March 2016, the
applicants purchased property together in Kwazulu-Natal, South
Africa. The first applicant is a South African
national residing at
47[...], Pinetown, Kwazulu Natal. The second applicant is a German
national. The two are the joint owners
of 101 Plantations,
Registrations Divisions Ft, Kwazulu Natal. The first respondent is
the Director General of Home Affairs cited
in his official capacity,
for the determination of foreigners who are prohibited persons in
terms of the Act. The first respondent
was served on 12 floor North
State Building, 95 Market Street, Johannesburg. The second respondent
is the Minister of Home Affairs,
who has the power to issue
regulations in terms of the Act, delegated by
section 7
of the Act.
The Minister was served care of the State Attorney’s
Offices at New Government Building, Harrison and Plein
Streets,
Newtown. The first and second respondents (the respondents) oppose
this application.
Background Facts
[3] In 2017, the
applicants visited the German Embassy. Whilst at the Germany Embassy
they engaged in conversation with an
individual by apparent
coincidence before they were due to travel abroad, which led them to
utilise the services of an agent to
secure a permanent residence visa
for the second applicant. The latter, at that time, had a work visa
which permitted her to live
and work in South Africa until 1 February
2021. They paid the agent R5000 for the services and received a
document purporting to
be a permanent residence visa.
[4] They believed
they applied through the “correct” channels and that
their application was above board. They
received a receipt from VFS
in the amount of R1850 and believed that it was correct. They
were shocked when they received
the VFS receipt for R1850 but did not
do anything about it or check the authenticity of the document.
[5] She left South
Africa on 16 October 2022 and returned on 22 October 2022. Upon her
return, and entering OR Tambo International
Airport, she was taken
aside and questioned about her passport. It was established that the
document was fraudulent. She was informed
of the status of her
residence visa and received a form 37 notice which informed her that
she is refused entry because she is in
possession of a fraudulent
residence visa or passport or identification document. The notice
afforded the second applicant three
days to review the decision if
she disputed the decision. She was required to leave on the aircraft
if it was about to depart and
await the outcome of the review outside
of the Republic of South Africa. The interpreter’s
certificate is deleted.
[6]
In his application, the first applicant alleges that English is not
the second applicant’s mother tongue. She was
shocked when she
was issued a
section 37
Form and made to sign it. The form informed
the second applicant that she was refused entry because she was the
bearer of a fraudulent
passport. Consequently, she was refused entry
into the country. He subsequently called the officials and explained
what had occurred.
The applicants wish to be reunited urgently and
indicate that the second applicant has been plagued by panic attacks
and severe
mental instability. She has also been deprived of access
to her property in Kwazulu Natal. The second applicant was denied
services
of an interpreter when the form was furnished, and she
signed it. The administrative action was improperly taken. The
applicant
contends that it is just and equitable to grant urgent
relief in terms of section 172 of the Constitution.
[2]
[7]
The applicants seek the suspension of the section 29 of the Act
[3]
on an
urgent basis. On the basis of the relief they seek, they submit that
the second applicant be permitted to enter South Africa
on her
visa-exempt status whilst part B is to be heard. They also seek that
the decision of the respondents to refuse the second
applicant entry
into the country be suspended.
[8] In their
opposition, the respondents raised four points
in limine
:
8.1 Lack of urgency;
8.2 Failure to exhaust
internal remedies;
8.3 Lack of
jurisdictional factors to sustain a cause of action in the form of
an interim interdict;
8.4 Failure to comply
with Rule 16A of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Lack of Urgency
[9]
As alluded to already, the second applicant arrived in South Africa,
at OR Tambo airport, on 26 October 2022 and was interviewed
regarding
her passport. It was ascertained that her passport was fraudulent,
she was immediately informed of the consequences thereof.
The
interview was conducted in English as the second applicant furnished
her address details in English, according to the second
respondent.
The content of the confirmatory affidavit of the second applicant is
written in English, although the portion
after the commissioner
of oaths is in German. It is not clear what is intended by this.
Whether it is a notary, or whether the
person is verifying the person
attesting to the document is unclear. It is not in English and is not
translated, and it is not
clear what the notary intended. If it is
the second applicant who attested to the affidavit, it is in English,
and it is deduced
from the affidavit that she is conversant in
English. If she required an interpreter at the border at OR Tambo
International Airport,
she ought to have informed the authorities
accordingly. It is clear that she communicated in English and was
ordered by the officers
responsible to return to her country. The
application herein was lodged on 24 November 2022, approximately a
month later. The applicants
seek relief that despite the fraudulent
manner in which the passport was sourced, as alleged by the
respondents to have been in
contravention of the laws
[4]
of the
Republic, the second applicant should be permitted to return
forthwith.
[10] The first applicant
only lodged an appeal in terms of section 29(2) of the Act on 10
November 2022 after the three days as
prescribed by the Act.
According to the second respondent, this appeal lodged by the
applicants is still being considered. No decision
in relation to the
appeal has been made yet. This means that the internal appeal
is still pending. Thus, the applicants have
not made out a case for
urgency such that the laws of the Republic should be set aside to
allow for the entry of a foreign national
where prima facie, there
has been a disregard for the proper application of the laws of the
Republic including the Constitution.
The steps taken against such an
attack must be commensurate with the attack on national security.
This impacts the country’s
safety and security and how the
country is perceived by other countries with regard to its ease of
accessibility and safety and
security internationally. In any event,
the applicants have not shown that they will not obtain substantial
redress in due course,
having lodged their appeal with the relevant
Department. This ought to be dispositive of the matter. However, I
address the remainder
of the issues for the sake of completeness.
Interim Interdict
[11]
The factors to be satisfied before an interim interdict can be
granted are trite and set out in the decision of
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
[5]
.
In
Simon
NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others
[6]
the
Court set out the test as follows:
“
The
accepted test for a prima facie right in the context of an interim
interdict is to take the facts averred by the applicant,
together
with such facts set out by the respondent that are not or cannot be
disputed and to consider whether, having regard to
the inherent
probabilities, the applicant should on those facts obtain final
relief at the trial. The facts set up in contradiction
by the
respondent should then be considered and, if serious doubt is thrown
upon the case of the applicant, he cannot succeed.”
[12] The evidence on
record suggests that the applicants have not made out a case that
there is a well-grounded apprehension of
irreparable harm. This is so
especially in light of the internal review pending.
[13] The medical
certificate is in German and not comprehensible. It is speculative to
attribute her anxiety and mental insecurity
to one particular issue
without more information. In any event, the second applicant being
away from the property is not indeterminate
whilst the internal
review is pending. There is no indication that the property belonging
to the applicants requires the second
applicant’s attention in
particular. No case was made out in this regard.
[14]
It is unnecessary to veer into the sphere of the exercise of
executive power by granting an interim interdict. Our Courts have
held that this should only occur in exceptional circumstances and
when a strong case is made out.
[7]
This
is not an exceptional circumstance nor has a strong case been made as
I have indicated the internal review is still pending
and lies with
the executive.
Internal Remedies
[15] The applicants were
cognisant of the opportunity to review the declaration made when the
second applicant received the notice
of prohibition. They were
required to apply for a review of the respondent’s decision in
terms of section 29(2) of the Act.
Therefore, it is premature to
review the respondents’ decision as no decision has been made
with regard to the decision to
be taken by the Director General in
terms of section 29(2) of the Act. There is no right which is to be
protected in the interim
and where irreparable harm will ensure. This
is not ascertainable on the facts herein.
[16]
The Court in
Koyabe
and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others
[8]
the
Court said
“
[35]
Internal remedies are designed to provide immediate and
cost-effective relief, giving the executive the opportunity to
utilise its own mechanisms, rectifying irregularities first, before
aggrieved parties resort to litigation. Although courts play
a vital
role in providing litigants with access to justice, the importance of
more readily available and cost-effective internal
remedies cannot be
gainsaid.
[36] First,
approaching a court before the higher administrative body is given
the opportunity to exhaust its own existing
mechanisms undermines the
autonomy of the administrative process. It renders the judicial
process premature, effectively usurping
the executive role and
function.”
[17] The applicants
should exhaust the internal remedies prior to approaching any court.
The respondents should be permitted to
make the decisions they are
entrusted with, with deference accorded to them prior to a judicial
review. Fraudulent travelling documents,
particularly passports and
visas, attack the national security of any country and so too South
Africa. The only way the respondents
can address the issue of rogue
agents and fraudulent passports is to prosecute the agents and
discourage persons who utilise such
agents. The legislation does have
a process which affords unsuspecting persons who have fallen prey to
rogue agents to review their
declarations of prohibition.
[18] On Part B, which is
to be postponed
sine die
, it is appropriate that the parties
approach the Deputy Judge President for an appropriate date for an
allocation.
[19] For the reasons
above I am satisfied that the applicants have not made out a case for
urgency or an interim interdict for the
relief they sought in Part A.
Apart from this, taking into account that the respondents may delay
finalising the appeal, I deem
it appropriate to state that the
applicants are well advised to approach the Deputy Judge President
for an expedited date, for
a date for the hearing of Part B. I
accordingly make the following order:
ORDER:
1.
The application in Part A is dismissed with
costs.
2.
The application in Part B is postponed
sine
die
.
SC MIA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
M Arroyo
instructed
by
Smiedt
& Associate
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
A M Masombuka
instructed
by
State
Attorney
Heard:
15 December 2022
Delivered:
19 June 2023
[1]
Section
29(1) provides
Prohibited
persons are:
(1)
The following foreigners are prohibited persons and do not qualify
for a port of entry visa, admission into the Republic,
a visa or a
permanent residence permit:
(a)
Those
infected with or carrying infectious, communicable or other diseases
or viruses as prescribed;
(b)
anyone
against whom a warrant is outstanding, or a conviction has been
secured in the Republic or a foreign country in respect
of genocide,
terrorism, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, murder, torture,
drug-related charges, money laundering or kidnapping;
(c)
anyone
previously deported and not rehabilitated by the Director-General in
the prescribed manner;
(d)
a
member of or adherent to an association or organisation advocating
the practice of racial hatred or social violence;
(e)
anyone
who is or has been a member of or adherent to an organisation or
association utilising crime or terrorism to pursue its
ends; and
(f)
anyone
found in possession of a fraudulent visa, passport, permanent
residence permit or identification document
[2]
Constitution of South
Africa, Act 1996.
[3]
Section 29 provides:
“
(2)
The Director-General may, for good cause, declare a person referred
to in subsection (1) not to be a prohibited person.
[4]
S 29
of Act 13 of 2002
[5]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914
AD 221.
[6]
Simon
NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others
1999
(1) SA 217 (SCA).
[7]
National
Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and
Others (“OUTA”) 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
[8]
Koyabe
and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others
2009
(12) BCLR 1192
(CC);
2010 (4) SA 327
(CC)
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