Director of Public Prosecutions vs Anjelina Ojare (Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1997) [1998] TZHC 2130 (1 July 1998)
Judgment
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CRIMH;i\L /1.PPEbL :t--0" 21 OF 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF PliBLIC PROSECUTIONSo. o ••• .1\PFELL:';NT
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1\l,D .
NJ Ll"' J nEc:p;.,,,nr:'":T l:c /'!.. .r:::.i ·11\ 0 J .. RE•••aie•tt .. e-0000.:o•oooc~~"'Jco.., r . ._, •'t""J'-1~•-'I.·
(ApAl from th0 judmnt of thn Hi~~
.-Court of Tanzenia at .r,rusha)
(Nchalla J.)
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dated the 2(th day of March, 1j97
in
Criminal APJal No. 31 of 1,96
KISANGr.:, J. A. :
This afp0al aris?s from the jud1m:or;t of the Hih Court
(Nchalln, J.) which UJhE'ld .:,r,r'I 3ffirrn"'rl the rulin(! of the
resident ma,istrate' s c0urt rartiP<.:; bail to th!'? r-::> soniient~
Th€ bcktround to the-: case rpay ,-· s0t out brh,fly
1
ns
Court for bail unr1Pr section 14~. (1) of th2 Criminal Procedure
Act. The application was :na<lP at a timt- when proceedin!S &f
a preliminary in'-1-liry into a charce of murrier against thP
r€!sponrit?nt were 1tP.ninf i.n that court. The application was
rsisb~<i by the prosution on the ,round ·t:hot un<ir section
14~ (5) Ca) of the ..:riminal ri:oc,,dure Act the offence of murder
is not haila~~~: nri that in any case the R2sirlent Maistrate•s
Court. has n.o jud sdiction t"J gr.ant bail in respect of murrler
,.,
whic\ was not t;ia:Ole lty that Court.· The m=~istrate ovPrrul<"d
the c>~t<=!ction al':rl .~ranted bail. 71,P. Dir':"ctor of Puelic
Pr'.)SF'("'.td:ionr appn.;,lPd unsuccessfully to the High Court wi-.._ich,
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1.: , ' .. l·ea.dy stated, affir.med the rJecision of the rsident M •.
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r:•;.,,;·i. for by Mr ... A. Mgwai,
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letr3te
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s ,court, hence tne presnt appe.al to this Court •
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Before us the appellant:. nirecto.t' of i?ublic Pr.,.,sccutior,s
Wii.'S refreserted by Mr .. K.i'1. Mussa, lParnP.ri Principal Shb:!
. Att.r-r'!ey, while tne rP.sp,..,rviert was arlvocaterr.ed ar1voc-1te. · Counsel rqinterl out that. a nolle prose11ui
in re_spct of the charge had ;.ilready ,. .... en entered o~ )lehalf. of
the riir.ktor of Public Prsec1Jtions, und that this appeal was
now in.tend· onlY to Get the record rtght.
- TJo~t. t)s,<:!·· 1",'H"
'".J.vig~ ti.r~<'l i:1 csfming jurisd:i.c.tion.wi thiri t~~ provisions ef nrticlc ~ 1: -to 29 of th~ Cl"ln.cti'h!.tion withver a. matter· f.liin1',t O""ll'llplyil'l'J with the · .. rrovision!: of the Bas1c Rigi-;tnu ties - t Enfcremnt Aet. hat th1.caF'l=\ee jil<"'·~ ~r,.d i!:i 1inrantinq- h.iil v.0nt::rry toection 142 (5) Ca)urc Act. ,., '. .. ' ..f th~~ifflinMl P- '?
t· tti 'ku tio1'\ atid that ti-\e 5aA~ c-«rmot·· ~~ ·t'I! l~~~'!,-"~~~ c:r~ · in b,e,l<l'ing • .. thA t. s·E>ctiYn 14( 5) ( c1. / o: the Criminal -~,elli!dr-, Aet: vi.oli\t,er..!"t:fole·-.. '13 (fi) (b) · -•15 ( 2) k) ~f the· Copplied rin<l •· •11:f o,( i,y '.he eour~:, · '. 4.. 'IN THE ALTERNATIVE to ,•rowni · 2 herein;:i1'v'.thet learhed Juage non-cirected himself on the }'Osi tior,. of the lw ae it exi.ctcda~d- affirmingefore t!1E' enactment o-! section 140 (5) (a) »eft""! upboldinhP. C'lecision of b.e sul"odnat0. courte
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on + .. E, fh-s·:; grounri the thrust of Mr- Mussa' s submission is that
the :r:rnd jurlge wrongly conirleed anrl ecided on a matter
f2·
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1i:1g ..,;ithin Articles 12 to 29 of the Constitution which
m2tter came to the High Court by way of appeal from the district
ccurt. According t, the learned counsel the matter coulri have
· · ~~n col'!ed tha·!: tl--.c
le.arJle~ judge w~s justified to hear and :clccide the rr2tter on
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ap:-e,3.l from the district court ..
·'',A". .. clence through tbe reCOl'cl ~hows. that the issue of theidere<i <'!l'lrl decirle upon -ey the High Court only. if it was.
rought to that court pursuant to the proceure pro7ided for
1994. In response to that, Mr. MC¥Wai maint,.ii
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constitutionality of section 1~ (5) · ( a) of the Crimin
l Procedure Act was rise<l in the district court. Suhmissions 0:.1 behalf of the portie~ in that court were centered on whether or not that preTision viol:tted te fundamental ri')ht of personal freedom ''at .. t-Ji,e in,":lividucrl, anct the right 'lf .i.nranteed under Articles 13 (6) ,(:It) und 15 -( 1) (")f the_ Consti tu tio1'1 Af the U:·.i tcd Repuhlic, .Jaercinccused perso:i to he presul!lE'd innoent until proved cruilty ;;is 13ufter to be refer11:erl t9. :5irn:?"1lf a!'.: the Cons ti tu tio·n. That was tle.a.r.ly 11· matter fdling within Artir:les 12 to 2:1 of the C . Constitution, and· the pel"tinen.t que!'tibn that follnws is: Whgt 'w.:; ·.t)le PJ:'.'.Oedur-to he- a'doJtte,d in Ji.andliJ,g that question. Thatucstion was raised squrely in the High Courturing the firt A:r"!'el\l. T•ere •it WM sul"mi tted that the trial magistrate had no competence t0 consider the issuA of the egnstitutionRlity of section 148 (5) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and tht once that isue was rtiised before hime waohliged to refer it to the Hi~h Court for.~etermination in terms of section 9 (1) of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement AcL That provisiori says that:-
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n9 - ( 1) When" in any roceedin"I s in a
suot'dinate court any ustion arises as to
the contrvention of any of the provisions
of section 12 to 2!1 of the Constitutioti,
th2 ptesirling magistratF shall, unl2ss
the parti0 s to. th; 0 procP.edinJs :1grP.P. to
the contrary or.thP Magistrate is of the
opinion that the raisin, of the qve stion
is me.re·ly frivol0us or vexatious, refer
th questior\ t0 thP- H:i.h Cour.t f::ir
decision; save that if thE>,. question arises
before a.Primary Court the magistrate shall
r0fer th 0 :qustioP to the court of a
resirlent maqistrat-::: which shall determine
whethPr or not there exists a matter for
rP.f P. renCl~ to thP High Court.
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ThE learned Jud·e, howe,ver, rejectect the submission, proceeded
to consider th2 constitutionality of section 148 (5) (a) and
eventu.lly uphE>ld the decision of the tri.:l magistrate which had
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t•- -,ranted :..il hold.i:ng., iJI! the process, sP-ction 14n (5) (,.) to
•e· inconsistent with th"! Constitution.
In rejecting thP sur-mission the learned judge refer.red
to sections 4, 5 and 1r '.)f the Jiasic !'>iahts ancl Duties
Enforcement Act.
Section 4 provides:-
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4. If any prson allege.s that any of
thP provisions of sections 12 to 2, of
the Constitution has een, is bein, or is
likPly to b contravene.ct in relation to
him
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hP may, without preju0ice to any
other. ac'don wJth r<?s11ect to the same
matter that is lawfully available,
npply to• t)10-, . .-Hi!h Court for ·redress."
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section 5 provies in effect that nn ss pursu0nt to srction 4,
shall do so ly'filir.g c ,etition t~ thct cggrieved person
wJ10 goe to th0 HiQh Court for rParur.t. Thn sPction
"10 (1) F.or thP purpos 0 s of ht:.:=1r.ing 2rC1
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etnrmining ny jetition mde unrler this
ct including r0f0r0ncRs made to it under
s'?ct:i.on VP that th; th? Hih Court shall :t,c.
compOSf>d 0£ three Judl!i.::?S of thP High
Court setrmir3ti0n whethet
an epplicRtion is frivolous, v
0
atious or
otherwisP fit .£0:r h1?3rirg may be' mad<-" by
2 singl0 Judg'?. of trir- High Court.
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The learnH jurle, therefr~ tok th viw that although the
matter b,?fre him w,:is not 1an 2!f,plic,ation by way of a .etition
under sectin S, he was nev0rthel~~s, r<:?PY th'? ;:igntitlfd to de2l with it
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pursu 3nt to. the opt ion under sec tin ti whr.J.r,?Vd
party could t3ke any 0thi2r acti0n, lib~ the ppeal in the
ihstant case. And since he was dealig with th~ mattr as an
th
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r4\Uiremnt of thr~~ juges under section 10 (1) dio not
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arise.
With nue respect \ve cannot a,-r20,.with the construction
,ut y· the jur:lge on section 4 of the Act. We do not think
that the expr2ssion "····· e.ny oth.,:,r action ""•o•
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in th;:it
provision ii,cluns r.n ap•!?al lying to the Hi~}:l Court. In the
instar-t case, for P:l{amplP, the ag~,r;-ived person w;=:,s Mrs. Ojare
on:whose •E>half
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it Wc,t ;:illegf'c! that section 1".J.e (5) (a) of thel
Criminal Procedure Act was violativr-- of her basic right as
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g1..1arc.ritee>d i.,,y Articles 13 (I) ... (•) .and 11, (_1) of thr-; Constituti:mo
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tcrs of section 4, thrfnre,'.it was Mrs. Ojare who had the
ortj_on wh,:::,ther to go to thf.: High Cnurt or t:, b,;ki:: any oth!"r.
action lawfully .cJVailahh to h€r for redrss. When tJlle matter
•went to thP High Court, how0ver, this w=is not at the inst0.nce of
Mrs. ejare. It was at the instanc<:: of the _Director of Public
Pros'2'cutions who was alleing, not th::;t s0ction 148 (5) Ca) w2s
violative of Mrs. ojare: shasic ri1ht but, that the district
court had no competence to consir,er 2nd decide on th-2 consti tutio-
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nali ty of· that sPction. In other worrl s t.he allegation or complaint
Basic Riy•Mrs. Ojare and that by the 'r. In the circumstances,
therefore, it is plain that Mrs. irector of Public Prosecutions
differed c0mpletly from Pach othjar0 has nither applied to tha
Hig• C'.'ourt for redress under. section 4 of thhts and
DU ties Enf orceri-10nt Ac tl which would involve filing . petition. to
that court under section 5 of·the same ct, nor has she exercised
any other option which was lawfully availahle to her. In other
words the appeal ta the High Court cannot be rgardAd as any
other actiofi which was lawfully availhr to Mrs. Ojare as the
learl"J,:;a judge thought, bec2.use the nJtJ.Hal ws not at th0 instance
of Mrs. Ojare and it was not alleging any infri~~~m2nt of hGr
•asic ri~ht. Even.•assumin, .. that Mrs. Ojare had lost in the
istrict court arl then appealed to the High Court, this could
n?t have arr:ounted to hPr r-x.-:,rcisino an_othe-r action or option
lawfully available to her in terms of section 4. · Because at
that ela4Je Mrs. Oj,arP., havin9 thtJs lost the action in the
district court., w0uld hav'? only or:_e option L,wfull y open b::i
her, anywey,. and th.-~t J.s to ,:i::ip-=-l to th0. High Court... No other
option would -= J.aw-.f1Jlly open lo her and therefore the provision
woul4•ie meaninglss.
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·;,J.-=-, think that th,'3 expression ''any oth.-,r action •••• lowfully
availal,le •••• " as used in. section 4 ?,pplies to situations wh;:ire
an alleged wrong, .. th0ugh capable of ··he:i,ng · rec1r-essd as a violation
of a basic right ·unrlPr thP. Constitution, the victim of it,
ni':'verth(?.1°ss, 0pts to seP.k rsdrsss under thr-- ordinary law. Take,
for instance, the wrong- of unlawful confinem2nt. P.. person wh0
complains of it may, ir. terms of section 4 a>.pply to the Hi1h
c·o1,.1rt for redress or institute crimiral or c:i.vil proceedi:r:-.gs
undr the brijin8.ry law.
Thus we are sntisfieo that there was non-compliance with
thA provisions of sectj_on 4 of the Basic Rights and nuti,'?.s
EnforcmAnt Act. The complainant on whose· •ehalf it was alleged
that section 148 (5) (") of the Criminal Proced1,.1re Act was
violative of h'?r basic right as guarant.i; failing t8 hold that there was such non-compliance.
T)\e view we take of the matter is that when· the issue of
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constitutionality of section 148 (5) (a) was raised in the
dj_stric t court, the. trial P..agi.str;::ate should have proceeded in
accordance with the procedure laid down under section , ( 1)
of th~ Bash Rights .and Duties EnforcE;ment r.ct reprorluced
earlier iT) this judgement. Und,:.r that pr.ocP.dure the magistrate
hacl a du'cry t0 r.e·f,,,r that issuP to th0 High Court for ·aeci·sion
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unless:-
(a) the :parti.<?s a-gred under Articles 13 (8)
(:.) and 15 (1)° of the Constitution :r,eithP.r applied to th2 High
Court, 'nor 1=xercis,;,:a ,,,.any other option which was 1awfully
availahl!':' to h•=8:-' for ·rcdrss. The learned judge therefore
erreded t'J thr-:> contrary,
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(b) the magistrate was of the opinion
that the raisin~ of that question
before him wag merely frivolous or
vexatious.
Neither (a) nor (b) was appliccibl'= in this case, and so the
trial magistrate hr, no otion but to rfer the 1uestion to the
High Court for decision. This h0 di not cto; he considerAd
the uestion hinself and necided on it. Ol,_viously, in terms of
section (1) bf the Act he had no competence or jurisdiction
to o so. To that extent,_ therefore the proceedings were
null anc-. voirl, and thi:- learned judge should have held so.
Mr. Mgwai submitt.=.,rJ that section 9 ( 1) of the Basic·
Ri,hts and Enforcernnt Act was not applicable •ecause it was
i»c::msistent with so.ction 4 of the same Act quoted above.
He contend0.d that thr-> use of the word "mayn in that section
meant that an aqgrir-ved per son has the option whether to go
to the High Court or to a subordinate court for redress and
that his client harl opterl t,J IP to the :'li.strict court. We
noted, hy th way, that this line of ariument is ifferent
from that adopterl hy the larned judge who maintained that
the complainant had referred the matter to the Hiqh Court
throuh an appea::. Th true position however, is that fVirso O_jare
dl~ ot go to thP residsnt magistrate court to seek redress of
a violaticin of h0-r basic riqht. 3he had simply applied for bail
in that court, anrl. ir, the course of 148 (5) (a) of th,,c Criminal Pr-:1c':'rl1Jr" i'>.ct 2rose. Then
the point is that c-ncs the r.cs~.dent rna_gistrate court had taken
cognizance that a c·:msti tutional uuestion had thus ariser,., it had
to n,£er such questi0n· ta the !-ii~b Court for dec:i sion
.. - .r.guing the aprlicati·:m ;by
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the parti0s or thP.ir r""pnsentati VE•s, the i_s sue of cons ti tutionali ty
of sect,io
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because, as has been rlemonstratd above, the conditions
specifie un<ler s. ~ (1) for displacing that duty were non-
existent.
In yet another attempt to show that sction 9 (1) had no
application _here, Mr. Mgwai contenc'led that in any Cnse that
provision sought to clerogat<;:: from ;\rticle 30 ( 3) of the
Consti tution4 The unofficial English wrsion of that provision
says thi:!t:-
n3iq (3) Any person allegin~ that any
?revision in this Part of this Chapter
or in any law concerning his right or
duty owed to him has beeq, is being
or is likely to be violated •Y any
person any where in the United
RepuJcilic, may institute proc'$edings
for redr€,SS in the High Courto"
Counsel rei teri'lh:<'l the contertion that the word "may" as used
in the provision meant that the aggrieved person haa the option
or discretion whther to go to the High Court or to the district
court f-:>r redress, and consistPnt therf:"with his cliP.nt oted
,r
to go t0 the district court. Therefore, in his viPw, sction
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·"' (1) of the Act cannot now be invoked to defeat or deroate
from Article 30 (3) of the Cons ti tu Uon, the supreme law of the
land.
The answer to this is that ~uh-Article (3) of Article 30
of the Constitution must not.ere.ad in i.solation. It has to
·,e re-:id together with -'ub-/1.r'ticle 4 (a) of th•2 same.Article,
,:_!gain the unofficial En<Jlish version of which rearis:-
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)
"30 (4) Subject to the other provisions
of this Constitution, th,;, High Court
shall have original jurisdiction to
hear and detP.rmine any mattF.r brought
before it pursuant tq this Article;
and the state authority may enact
le.-;islation for th2 purpose of -
(a) reguiating procedure for
ins ti tu ting proceedings
pursuant to this l\rt;i..cle;
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Pursuant to this sub-/1rticlP., .Parliament enacted the Basic
Ri1hts and outi.es Enforc12ment Act, so that su.b-Articles (3)
and 4 (a) of th€ Constitution have now to be read together with
this Act. When that is done, the import is that a :pe:r,:son 0 ._
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who comp·lains of a violation of his basic right has the oi,ton
whether to seek redress in the High Court by filing a peition
in that court, or to take any othr-:r action· lawfully available
to him such as instituting _a civil suit under the ordinary law
to recover aamagP.sf say, for unlawful confinement. But where
in the cour?e of any proceedings in the subo.,:-dina te court the
issue of violation of a basic right of a party arises, then the
trial na,is_trate must refer such q:u_estion to the· Hi13"h. Court for
detrmination. However if thi?. parties agree tha·t the ..-ustion
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shold not be referred t.") thP High Court, then th": magistrate
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may prOCe":'d- under - th€' ordinary law to dispose. of the suit or
preedings he fore him. Again if, on th,"Jt question hf ing rai ssod L--,
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thF:: dis tric't court. thP magistrate is of th'::· opiriion ti,a t the
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raising of it is oerely frivolous or vexatious, thP.n he can overru].E::
it .and proceed- to conclucte the proceedings under the ordinary
law. His decision· on whther the raising. of thE'· ).E- ,- r.:--- 1::.1.
to t!1e High Court.estion was
fri'Volous or v.:cxatious is appealable or refra
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It follows, theref0re, that tha trial magistrate had
no comptence or jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
constitutionality .of section 148 (5) (a) of the Crimir.cil
Procedure Act which was raised before hime That was a matt•2r
to h<::> r.;:,,fered to the Hi;h Court for decisj_on, which was not
done. To the xtP.nt of such omission or error, the proceedins
in th<? district court were null and void.
TAat then settlo.s the fir.st ground of appeal. Since
the other grounds -:,f appeal arise from matt":'rs which were
purportedly decirled oh Y the district court and affirmed by
<
the Hi'h Court, it follows that the·decision of the High
Court was had in law in as much as it was based on a nullity.
It purported to , of the
ma.tter accordin1 to law from the stcTI~P. immediately followin!
the raisin! of the c0nstitutional issue :.,:?fore that court.
However, such -c--:,urse of ~ction is now overtaken by the event
in the=:- light of the nolle prosi=:"fUi which was c::nter.e·d in .this
case.
· D1\TED at DAR. SS SALM,M this 1st day of
July,
••• /12e based on a matter which was not •r of Public
Prosecution is allowed. The judgf;rtJEnt of the. High Court is
.fore the
court, and to uphold a decision which was no decision at all or
which did not exist in law. It is, therefore, not necessary to
cor.sider the other grounds of app€al.
I the result the appeal by the Directashed, and the ruling/orer of the district court is declared
null and void. Ordinartly we would have sent the matter back
to the 0istrict court for continuation of the heari
J ·.· .12 RoH. KISi-\NGA JUS.TICE OF APPEAL D~·Za LUBUVA JU STICE OF APPEAL att, ~1is is a true copy of the original. ~ .. \ .. ~ ' ·' I .,t{ l . ( fl' ~ 'Y .o, ENIOR DEPUTY REGISTRAR J