Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 896South Africa
Freeman and Another v Beckett and Another (17570/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 896 (11 August 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
11 August 2023
Headnotes
Summary: Application for summary judgment – plaintiffs claimed liquidated damages as a result of defendants’ breach of contract – such claim held to be ‘for a liquidated amount in money’, as envisaged by rule 32(1)(b) – Amended Uniform Rules of Court 32(2)(b) and 32(3)(b) discussed – the Court not satisfied by the defendants’ affidavit that they have a bona fide defence to the action – summary judgment granted.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Freeman and Another v Beckett and Another (17570/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 896 (11 August 2023)
Freeman and Another v Beckett and Another (17570/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 896 (11 August 2023)
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sino date 11 August 2023
FLYNOTES:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT –
Liquidated amount –
Breach
of contract
–
Sale of immovable property cancelled –
Damages claimed for reduced purchase price, water, electricity and
occupational
rent – Addendum expressly providing for
defendants to be liable for liquidated damages and the manner of
calculation
– Provision in addendum on the final price
equating to the reasonable market value – Plaintiff’s
claim
is one “for a liquidated amount in money” –
Summary judgment granted – Uniform Rule 32(1)(b).
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
case
NO
:
17570/2022
DATE
:
11
th
AUGUST 2023
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED
Date: 11th August 2023
In
the matter between:
FREEMAN
,
VAUGHAN MICHAEL
First
Plaintiff
FREEMAN
,
CORRINNE JEAN
Second
Plaintiff
and
BECKETT
,
HAYLEY MARGARET
First
Defendant
VAN
NIEUWKERK
, PIETER MASKEW
Second
Defendant
Neutral
Citation
:
Freeman
and Another v Beckett and Another (17570/2022)
[2023]
ZAGPJHC ---
(11 August 2023)
Coram:
Adams J
Heard
:
02 August 2023
Delivered:
11 August 2023 – This judgment
was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
representatives by email, being
uploaded to
CaseLines
and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed
to be 10:00 on 11 August 2023.
Summary:
Application for summary judgment –
plaintiffs claimed liquidated damages as a result of defendants’
breach of contract
– such claim held to be ‘for a
liquidated amount in money’, as envisaged by rule 32(1)(b) –
Amended Uniform
Rules of Court 32(2)(b) and 32(3)(b) discussed –
the Court not satisfied by the defendants’ affidavit that they
have
a
bona fide
defence to the action
–
summary
judgment granted.
ORDER
(1)
Summary judgment is granted in favour of
the first and the second plaintiffs against the first and the second
defendants, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, for: -
(a)
Payment of the sum of R773 193;
(b)
Payment of interest on the above amount of
R773 193 at the applicable prescribed legal rate of interest of
7.75% per annum
from 23 May 2022 (the date of service of the summons)
to date of final payment; and
(c)
Payment of the plaintiffs’ costs of
suit.
JUDGMENT
Adams J:
[1]
I have before me an opposed application by
the first and the second plaintiffs for summary judgment against the
first and the second
defendants, whose main defence to the
plaintiffs’ claim is to the effect that the said claim is not
for a liquidated sum,
which means, so the defendants contend, that
the provisions of Uniform Rule of Court 32(1)(b) does not find
application.
[2]
The main action relates to a failed
agreement between the parties for the purchase and sale of the
immovable property of the plaintiffs
in Fourways (‘the
property’). The first sale agreement was concluded between the
plaintiffs and the first defendant
on 15 December 2019 for a purchase
price of R4 600 000, payable as and when the first
defendant had the funds available.
Transfer of the property was to
take place once the purchase price, together with all other charges
due by the first defendant
had been paid in full or secured to the
satisfaction of the plaintiffs. In terms of the said agreement the
first defendant was
liable to pay occupational rental in the amount
of R40 000 per month from the date on which they took occupation
until such
time as the property was registered into her name,
together with electricity, water and refuse charges actually levied
by the local
authority. The defendants took occupation of the
property during February 2020.
[3]
This agreement was breached by the first
defendant, as was a subsequent ‘amended agreement’
concluded between the parties
on 7 December 2020, in that the first
defendant failed to pay the purchase price or any part thereof as and
when it fell due. In
the ‘amended agreement’ the agreed
purchase price had been increased to R5 000 000, payable
within seven
days from date of conclusion of the said agreement. In
terms of the amended agreement of sale, the Defendants remained
liable for
occupational rental in the amount of R40 000 per
month from 1 January 2021, together with electricity, water and
refuse charges
during the occupational period in terms of the amended
agreement.
[4]
During October 2021, the first defendant,
as purchaser, and the second defendant, as guarantor, concluded yet
another addendum agreement
with the plaintiffs, in terms of which the
plaintiffs became entitled to continue marketing the Property. The
said agreement further
provided that, should the plaintiffs at any
time, prior to the purchase price and transfer costs being secured /
paid by the defendants,
receive another arms-length
bona
fide
offer, at reasonable current
market value (willing buyer, willing seller), to purchase the
property, which offer contains no suspensive
conditions,
alternatively, where all suspensive conditions have been fulfilled
and wherein the purchase price has been secured,
which the plaintiffs
find favourable and wish to conclude, then the defendants were to be
notified of same in writing and be simultaneously
provided with a
copy of the offer. The defendants would then be afforded an
opportunity to secure the purchase price of R5 000 000
within a specified period of time, failing which, the first and the
second plaintiffs would be entitled to accept the competing
offer and
cancel the amended agreement of sale, as further varied by the
addendum.
[5]
The crucial provision of the addendum
agreement is clause 3, which, in the relevant part, reads as follows:
-
‘
(3)
Should the agreement be cancelled and the sellers [plaintiffs] accept
the competing
bona fide
offer, the purchaser [first defendant] & guarantor [second
defendant] hereby acknowledge and undertake that they will be jointly
and severally liable for payment of damages due to the seller, the
purchaser and guarantor to such extent in their personal and
or
business and holdings capacities.
The
basis for same is irrevocably agreed as the difference in the
reasonable market value received as the final price versus the
purchase price agreed between the Parties in their agreement
.
… … … . Any unpaid rental, utilities or items
that are required to be repaired if at all applicable and confirmed
at the exit inspection shall also be considered and are agreed as
fair damages. Should the Seller need to litigate in respect of
same,
said costs shall also form part of the liquid amounts ascertained and
agreed to form part of damages. Losses due to commitments
made by the
Seller off the back of the original agreement shall also be
considered where so applicable. Any reasonable dispute
in respect of
same the Conveyancers shall first attempt to mediate if so required
to resolve where possible without the need for
legal intervention,
failing which Parties will take the necessary steps to enforce same.’
(Emphasis added).
[6]
The addendum further provided that, in the
event of the agreement being cancelled in such instance, the first
defendant would vacate
the property within thirty days from
cancellation as aforesaid.
[7]
On 30 November 2021, the plaintiffs
notified the defendants that they had received a
bona
fide
offer to purchase the property and
were invited to secure the purchase price and transfer costs, as per
the amended agreement,
read with the addendum, within five days of
receipt thereof. All suspensive conditions had been fulfilled and the
purchase price
of R4 400 000 had been secured. The
defendants failed to secure the purchase price and the transfer costs
of the property,
which meant that the plaintiffs became entitled to
cancel the sale agreement, which they duly did. On 31 December 2021
the first
and the second defendants vacated the property, which was
then sold, as per the
bona fide
offer alluded to
supra
,
for R4 400 000.
[8]
The damages claimed by the plaintiffs,
arising from the first and the second defendants’ breach of the
agreements, amount
to R773 193, calculated as follows: (1)
Occupational rental for the months of February 2020 to December 2021
= R905 000,
less
ad hoc
payments made by the defendants, amounting in total to R365 374,
leaving a balance of R539 626 for unpaid occupational
rental.
R400 000 of this sum was in fact incorporated, by agreement
between the parties, into the new purchase price of R5 000 000
in the amended sale agreement, leaving a balance R139 626. (2)
Water and electricity charges for the months of February 2020
to
December 2021 in the amount of R82.836.00, less
ad
hoc
payments R49 279 made by
the defendants, leaving a balance of R33 557; and (3) R600 000
in respect of the reduced
purchase price received by the plaintiffs
for the property.
[9]
In their
affidavit
resisting summary judgment, the first and the second defendants
raise,
in limine
,
the legal point that the first plaintiff ‘
makes
the bald allegation in his verifying affidavit’ that he is duly
authorised to depose to the affidavit in support of
summary judgment
on behalf of the second plaintiff. The defendants contend that no
basis for this authority is alleged in support
of this alleged bald
allegation and that no factual foundation is laid for the alleged
knowledge possessed by the first plaintiff
on behalf of the second
plaintiff to depose to on her behalf. There is no confirmatory
affidavit, so the submission on behalf of
the defendants goes, or
even some other document, such as power of attorney, put up in
support of the allegation.
[10]
The effect of the aforegoing, so the
argument is concluded, is that any and all allegations concerning the
second plaintiff should
be disregarded, which, in turn, renders the
application for summary judgement defective and to be dismissed out
of hand. There
is no merit in this contention for the simple reason
that the first plaintiff verifies the facts in support of the
application
for summary judgment, most of which are not seriously
challenged by the defendants.
[11]
On the merits of the plaintiffs’
claim and their application for summary judgment, the main defence
raised by the defendants
is that the claim by the plaintiffs is one
for damages arising allegedly from the defendants’ breach of
contract. A ‘damages
claim’, by definition and by its
nature, so it is contended by the defendants, is not susceptible to a
summary judgment application.
[12]
In that regard, the defendants rely on the
provisions of Uniform Rule of Court 32(1)(b), which provides as
follows: -
‘
(1)
The plaintiff may, after the defendant has delivered a plea, apply to
court for summary judgment on each of such claims
in the summons as
is only –
(a)
… … …
.
(b)
for a liquidated amount in money;
(c)
… … …’
[13]
The defendants furthermore submit that the
allegations made by the plaintiffs in the particulars of claim, with
respect to the damages
suffered by them, are bald and vague. There is
no indication, according to the defendants, of how, for example, the
municipal charges
are arrived at as no vouchers have been submitted
or any reconciliation prepared in terms of which payments were
allocated. There
is no merit in this contention by the defendants.
The simple fact of the matter is that the plaintiffs’ claim
relating to
the water and electricity and other municipal charges
were for actual charges by the municipality. Moreover, the defendants
do
not seriously challenge the allegation made by the plaintiffs in
that regard.
[14]
As regards the plaintiffs’ claim for
R600 000 in respect of the reduced purchase price received on
the final sale of
the property to a third party, the submission made
by the defendants is that the said claim, being a ‘damages
claim’,
is not susceptible to summary judgment.
[15]
I disagree. The submission by the
defendants conveniently loses sight of the fact that the addendum
expressly provides that, in
the event of cancellation of the amended
agreement as a result of the defendants not complying with their
obligation to raise the
purchase price, they will be liable for
liquidated damages calculated on the basis of the difference between
the price for which
the property was ultimately sold and the purchase
price in terms of the agreement with them. It also does not avail the
defendants
to contend that the plaintiffs have not made out a proper
case in that they have failed to allege and prove that the R4 400 000
represents the fair market value of the property. This submission
flies in the face of the provision in the addendum to the effect
that
the ‘final price’ received would, as per agreement
between the parties, equate to the reasonable market value.
[16]
‘
A
liquidated amount in money’ is an amount which is either agreed
upon or which is capable of speedy and prompt ascertainment.
In that
regard see
Lester
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Narshi
1951 (2) SA 464 (C)
[1]
;
Fatti’s
Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd v Vendick Spares (Pty) Ltd
[2]
.
In
Botha
v W Swanson & Company (Pty) Ltd
[3]
Corbett
J puts the test as follows:
‘
[A]
claim cannot be regarded as one for “a liquidated amount in
money” unless it is based on an obligation to pay an
agreed sum
of money or is so expressed that the ascertainment of the amount is a
mere matter of calculation.’
[17]
Moreover,
in
Pick
'n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd h/a Hypermarkets v Dednam
[4]
,
it was held that, ‘although the amount claimed from defendant
was termed “damages” in plaintiff's particulars
of claim,
which term didn't usually denote a liquidated sum of money, it
appeared from the particulars of claim as a whole that
it was in fact
only the purchase price of the vehicle, which the two parties had
agreed upon, and which was therefore a liquidated
sum of money, that
was being claimed from the defendant as damages’.
[18]
Applying these principles
in
casu
, I conclude that the claim of the
plaintiffs is indeed one ‘for a liquidated amount in money’.
This ground of opposition
to the application for summary judgment is
therefore without merit.
[19]
The new Subrule 32(2)(b), introduced by the
Amendment to the Rules which came into effect on the 1
st
of July 2019, requires the plaintiffs, in their affidavit in support
of the summary judgment application, also to explain briefly
why the
defence as pleaded by the defendants does not raise any issue for
trial. The plaintiffs comply with this requirement by
stating the
following in their affidavit in support of the summary judgment
application
: -
’
(12)
In my opinion, the respondents [defendants] have no
bona
fide
defence to the applicants'
[plaintiffs’] claim, have not raised any issue for trial, and
have entered an appearance to defend
solely to delay the matter..
(13) In the
plea, the respondents admit the conclusion of the Offer to Purchase
and the Amended Offer, that they took
occupation of the property
during February 2020, and that they vacated the property on 31
December 2021.
(14) The
respondents further deny breaching the Amended Offer, but they do not
aver:
(14.1) When
they paid the deposit;
(14.2) When
they paid the balance of the purchase price;
(14.3) When
they paid the occupational rent and utilities in full in terms of and
in compliance with the Amended Offer.
(15) Had they
not breached the Amended Offer in the circumstances claimed and set
out above, surely they would have
consequently owned the property in
terms of the Amended Offer and not vacated it? This is unexplained.
(16)
Therefore, the Respondents have failed to plead why they have not
breached the agreement, leading to the above
absurdity. Their defence
accordingly constitutes a bare denial.
(17) The
Respondents also do not explain why they deny the conclusion of the
Addendum, as their signature is contained
thereon (whether it be for
fraud or another reason), and why they vacated the property (if not
due to the Applicants' cancellation
thereof based on the terms of the
Addendum). These two simultaneous averments are, without explanation,
rendered contradictory.
(18)
Moreover, it is probable that the parties did conclude the Addendum
as the Offer to Purchase, and the Amended Offer,
did not contain a
vacation date - only the Addendum did. The Offer to Purchase, and the
Amended Offer, only provided for vacation
upon breach, which the
Respondents deny. Furthermore, the Addendum stated that the
Respondents must vacate the property within
thirty days of
cancellation, of the agreement, which they duly did. Therefore, the
common cause facts lead to the deduction that
the parties concluded
the Addendum.’
[20]
Not only does the aforegoing comply with
the provisions of rule 32(2)(b), but it also demonstrates that the
defendants do not have
a
bona fide
defence to the plaintiffs’ claim. The defendants have not
satisfied the court by affidavit, as they are required to do in
terms
of rule 32(3)(b), that they have a
bona
fide
defence to the plaintiffs’
action, the point simply being that their affidavit resisting summary
judgment does not disclose
fully the nature and grounds of their
defence and the material facts relied upon therefor.
[21]
For all of these reasons, the plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment.
Order
[22]
Accordingly, I make the following order: -
(1)
Summary judgment is granted in favour of
the first and the second plaintiffs against the first and the second
defendants, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, for: -
(a)
Payment of the sum of R773 193;
(b)
Payment of interest on the above amount of
R773 193 at the applicable prescribed legal rate of interest of
7.75% per annum
from 23 May 2022 (the date of service of the summons)
to date of final payment; and
(c)
Payment of the plaintiffs’ costs of
suit.
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
HEARD
ON:
2nd
August 2023
JUDGMENT
DATE:
11th
August 2023 – judgment handed down
electronically.
FOR
THE FIRST AND THE SECONDS PLAINTIFFS:
Advocate
C Louis
INSTRUCTED
BY:
Emile
Myburgh Attorneys, Fourways, Randburg
FOR
THE FIRST AND THE SECOND DEFENDANTS:
Advocate
Nel
INSTRUCTED
BY:
David
Hugo Attorneys, Highlands North, Johannesburg
[1]
Lester
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Narshi
1951 (2) SA 464 (C);
[2]
Fatti’s
Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd v Vendick Spares (Pty) Ltd
1962 (1) SA 736 (T);
[3]
Botha
v W Swanson & Company (Pty) Ltd
1968 (2) PH F85 (CPD);
[4]
Pick
'n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd h/a Hypermarkets v Dednam
1984
(4) SA 673
(O);
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