Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 953South Africa
Gouws v Eraki Trading 12 CC t/a Timmermans Kitchens and Others (2944/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 953 (16 August 2023)
Headnotes
Summary: Business Rescue Application – s 131 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act) – definition of business rescue - s 128(1)(b) of the Companies Act – requirements thereof – business rescue vs liquidation – “reasonable prospect”- onus on the applicant to prove that there is a reasonable possibility of achieving a rescue of the business or a reasonable prospect that business rescue will result in a better return for creditors compared to a liquidation – applicant provided unsubstantiated and uncorroborated evidence – no solid information – applicant therefore failed to discharge onus.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Gouws v Eraki Trading 12 CC t/a Timmermans Kitchens and Others (2944/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 953 (16 August 2023)
Gouws v Eraki Trading 12 CC t/a Timmermans Kitchens and Others (2944/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 953 (16 August 2023)
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sino date 16 August 2023
THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2944/2022
(1) REPORTABLE:
NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED
In the
matter between:
GOUWS,
DERICK
APPLICANT
and
ERAKI TRADING 12 CC
T/A TIMMERMAN’S
KITCHENS
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE COMPANIES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COMMISSION
(CIPC)
SECOND RESPONDENT
CALGRO M3
PROCUREMENT SERVICES (PTY) LTD THIRD
RESPONDENT
Delivered:
16 August 2023 – This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives by
email, being
uploaded to
CaseLines
and by release to SAFLII.
The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:00 on 16 August
2023.
Summary
:
Business Rescue Application –
s 131 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act) – definition of
business rescue -
s 128(1)(b)
of the
Companies Act –
requirements
thereof – business rescue vs liquidation –
“reasonable prospect”- onus on the applicant to prove
that there is a reasonable possibility of achieving a rescue of the
business or a reasonable prospect that business rescue will
result in
a better return for creditors compared to a liquidation –
applicant provided unsubstantiated and uncorroborated
evidence
– no solid information – applicant therefore failed
to discharge onus.
JUDGMENT
PG LOUW, AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application to place the first
respondent (Eraki) under supervision and to commence business rescue
proceedings in terms
of s 131 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008
(Companies Act).
[2]
The applicant (Mr Gouws) is the sole member
of Eraki.
[3]
The third respondent (Calgro) was granted
leave to intervene in the business rescue application.
[4]
On 10 October 2019, Calgro instituted
liquidation proceedings in this division, against Eraki, under case
number 34440/2019.
[5]
On 25 October 2021, Wright J granted an
order placing Eraki under provisional liquidation. The return date
was 31 January 2022.
[6]
The business rescue application was
instituted on 27 January 2022.
[7]
I was informed that on the return date, 31
January 2022, Windell J granted an order suspending the liquidation
proceedings pending
the adjudication of the business rescue
application.
Background facts
[8]
Eraki and Calgro have a long-standing
business relationship. Eraki and Calgro concluded a written supplier
agreement during January
2017 for the manufacturing and installation
of kitchens and built-in cupboards for a development known as
Fleurhof Development
Extension 37, to the value of approximately 11.2
million rands. Eraki would supply goods and/or services to Calgro in
terms of
the supplier agreement.
[9]
Eraki is a timber company specialising in
the production and installation of kitchen cabinets and cupboards in
the property development
and construction industry.
[10]
Calgro has been Eraki’s biggest
source of income for a number of years.
[11]
According to Eraki, Calgro paid it a total
amount of R 2 113 531.83 in terms of the supplier agreement, and
it also has a damages
claim against Calgro for an amount of
approximately R 2 889 114.96.
[12]
In
granting the provisional winding-up order, Wright J stated,
inter
alia,
the following in his judgment:
[1]
“
3.
Eraki raises many disputes of fact and it raises a counterclaim.
These defences notwithstanding,
Eraki is in the all too comfortable
position that it has, or perhaps more probably had, the money but has
never delivered the kitchens
despite it having been given the choice
by Calgro to repay money or deliver the kitchens.
4.
The failure by Eraki to do either is strong evidence that it can’t
repay. The admission in Eraki’s email that it diluted the early
pre-payments from Calgro is further proof of inability to
pay. It
underscores the lack of a serious defence to the claim of Calgro.
5.
Nowhere does Eraki seriously dispute the debt to Calgro. Such a line
of defence would need convincingly to deal with the admitted dilution
of Calgro’s funds. It does not.”
Business rescue
[13]
“
Business
rescue” is defined as:
[2]
“
[P]roceedings
to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially
distressed by providing for-
(i)
the temporary supervision of the company,
and of the management of its affairs, business and property;
(ii)
a temporary moratorium on the rights of
claimants against the company or in respect of property in its
possession; and
(iii)
the development and implementation, if
approved, of a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its
affairs, business, property,
debt and other liabilities, and equity
in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing
in existence on a solvent
basis or, if it is not possible for the
company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for
the company’s
creditors or shareholders than would result from
the immediate liquidation of the company;”
[14]
Mr
Gouws states the following in the founding affidavit:
[3]
“
I propose a
business rescue plan that would focus on the diligent and effective
litigation of its claim against Calgro (and other/potential
claims
that Eraki could still bring). The business rescue plan will likely
result in a better return for Eraki’s creditors
than would
result from a final liquidation”.
[15]
Mr
Gouws relies on the allegations that, if Eraki is placed under
business rescue, a manufacturer and installer of kitchen granite
tops
and counters, namely Turaco Granite Services (Pty) Ltd (Turaco), is
“
willing
to subcontract to Eraki the manufacturing and installation of kitchen
cupboards at approximately 1,452 residential units
in respect of new
property development in Ga-Rankuwa … This will generate an
income stream for Eraki of approximately R1,4
million.”
[4]
[16]
Mr
Gouws also relies on a “
firm
undertaking”
by Turaco that it would also sub-contract Eraki in the next
development phase entailing the building of 2,200 units to be
utilised
for student accommodation. According to Mr Gouws:
[5]
“
The
entire project, including the first and second phases, must be
completed within 18–36 months. The estimated net profit
margin
equates to R3,452,000.00 for the entire project. In confirmation, I
attach hereto a letter from the accounting officers
of Turaco dated
27 January 2022 and marked annexure “
FA9”
.”
[17]
This
would mean that Mr Gouws anticipates the business rescue proceedings
to endure for a period of at least 18 to 36 months, which
is contrary
to the purpose of business rescue proceedings.
[6]
[18]
Annexure
“FA9” to the founding affidavit
[7]
appears to be a letter signed by what appears to be Turaco’s
accountant and states,
inter
alia,
that:
“
I
have been instructed by Mr Gouws to state that Eraki Trading 12 CC
Trading as Timmermans has been awarded the subcontractor contract
for
the Garankuwa Project, however, this can only be awarded to
Timmermans with the company is (
sic
)
a going concern and not under liquidation. This project totals 1 452
units. Timmermans has calculated that the projected nett
income from
this project will be R 1000 per unit, with an estimated total profit
of R 1 452 000.00.”
[19]
The author of this letter has not filed a
confirmatory affidavit. The statement that he has been
instructed
to state that Eraki has been awarded a subcontract, is not
satisfactory.
[20]
The director and shareholder of Turaco is
Mr Gouw’s son. He did not depose to a confirmatory affidavit
either.
[21]
Mr
Gouws also states that other developers who previously subcontracted
to Eraki “
are
willing to consider to employ Eraki again if placed under business
rescue …”
.
[8]
These allegations are not corroborated at all.
[22]
Premised
on these uncorroborated sources of Eraki’s “
potential
income stream”
,
Mr Gouws alleges that if Eraki is now liquidated, a dividend of 21
cents in the rand will be realised, whilst if Eraki is placed
in
business rescue “
and
is successful in its claim”
its assets will be R 3 669 144.96 and its liabilities R 1 600
851.57 and, with the sub-contracting work, “
the
likelyhood
(sic)
of
restoring the business again into a profitable entity is reasonably
certain”
.
[9]
[23]
In
so far as Eraki’s claim against Calgro is concerned, Mr Gouws
contends that it is unlikely that Eraki’s claim will
be
effectively litigated if Eraki is placed in liquidation because a
liquidator would need a contribution from Eraki’s creditors
to
fund the litigation, but that Calgro is unlikely to fund such
litigation. However, if Eraki is placed under business rescue,
so the
contention goes, the income generated from the sub-contracting work
will enable the business rescue practitioner to effectively
litigate
Eraki’s claim.
[10]
[24]
Whilst there may be merit in the submission
that Calgro, as major creditor of Eraki, will not fund litigation
against itself by
a liquidator, Calgro will probably not vote in
favour of the proposed business rescue plan either –
as submitted by Mr Pottas, who
appeared on behalf of Calgro.
[25]
The
counterclaim is faced with challenges. Firstly, Wright J has already
expressed a
prima
facie
view on its prospects. Secondly, the supplier agreement contains a
clause which expressly precludes liability for a damages claim.
[11]
[26]
Be that as it may, a liquidator will be in
a position to consider and persist with the claim if it has merit.
[27]
In so far as the sub-contracting work is
concerned, in my view, Mr Gouws has not discharged his onus.
[28]
Speculative
and uncorroborated evidence has been put up in support of the
business rescue application. I am not satisfied that there
is a
reasonable prospect that business rescue will result in a better
return for Eraki’s creditors compared to a liquidation.
In
Oakdene
Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami)
(Pty) Ltd and Others,
[12]
the court stated the following:
“
[29]
This leads me to the next debate which revolved around the meaning of
'a reasonable prospect'. As a starting point, it is generally
accepted that it is a lesser requirement than the 'reasonable
probability' which was the yardstick for placing a company under
judicial management in terms of s 427(1) of the 1973
Companies Act
(see
eg
Southern Palace Investments 265
(Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd
2012 (2) SA 423
(WCC) para 21). On the other hand, I believe it
requires more than a mere
prima facie
case or an arguable possibility. Of even greater significance, I
think, is that it must be a reasonable prospect — with the
emphasis on 'reasonable' — which means that it must be a
prospect based on reasonable grounds. A mere speculative suggestion
is not enough. Moreover, because it is the applicant who seeks to
satisfy the court of the prospect, it must establish these reasonable
grounds in accordance with the rules of motion proceedings which,
generally speaking, require that it must do so in its founding
papers.”
[29]
Ms
Jooste appeared for Mr Gouws. She referred me to
Propspec
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Specific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and
Another
[13]
where Van der Merwe J stated that:
“
[12]
In my view, a prospect in this context means an expectation. An
expectation may come true
or it may not. It therefore signifies a
possibility. A possibility is reasonable if it rests on a ground that
is objectively reasonable.
In my judgment, a reasonable prospect
means no more than a possibility that rests on an objectively
reasonable ground or grounds.
[13]
… I refer especially to the underlying philosophy thereof,
that, in order to prevent
unnecessary negative economic and social
impact, business rescue is to be preferred to liquidation, and to the
fact that judicial
management under the previous
Companies Act failed
mainly because of the high threshold of proof required …”.
[30]
These trite principles do, however, not
assist Mr Gouws in the business rescue application because he has not
met the threshold
of proof required.
[31]
In
Absa
Bank Ltd v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd and another related matter
[14]
Sutherland J (as he then was) said the following in this regard:
“
[20]
First, a decision must be made whether to grant or refuse a
business rescue order. The appropriate test has been extensively
considered
in several decisions, and it is unnecessary to traverse
the jurisprudence yet again. (
Southern Palace Investments 265
(Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 (Pty) Ltd
2012 (2) SA 423
(WCC at [20]–[24]; Koen & Another v Wedgewood Village Golf
and
Country Estate
2012 (2) 378 (WCC) at [13] –
[19]; and
Oakdene Square Projects (Pry) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd
(GSJ) at [12] – [18]). The upshot
of these decisions, as I understand them, renders the law to be as
follows:
20.1
The purpose of a business rescue is that set out in
section 128(1)(b)
of the
Companies Act, 2008
and it is these statutory objectives which
is the aim of an order. These objectives are defined as follows:
'business rescue' means
proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation
of a company that is financially distressed by providing for-
(i)
the temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of
its affairs, business and property;
(ii)
a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the
company or in respect of property in its possession; and
(iii)
the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue
the company by restructuring its affairs,
business, property, debt
and other liabilities, and equity in a manner that maximises the
likelihood of the company continuing
in existence on a solvent basis
or, if it is not possible for the company to so continue in
existence, results in a better return
for the company's creditors or
shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the
company.
20.2
The threshold standard for deciding that an order is
appropriate is whether there is a reasonable prospect or reasonable
possibility
of achieving a rescue through those statutory objectives;
and in this regard, the point of departure is that it is preferable
to
rescue a company than to let it drift, or sometimes plummet, into
extinction. (e.g.
Oakdene
at [12];
Southern Palace (supra))
20.3
A close scrutiny of the factual platform presented and the
rationale mounted on that platform is required in order to decide if
the threshold standard has been met. This assessment must be made on
solid information presented to the court, not upon conjecture
.
20.4
Moreover, in this regard, the risk of abuse or manipulation of the
rescue application process, through
‘un-genuine’
applications to procure an illegitimate immunity must be guarded
against.” [Underlining added.]
[32]
I am not persuaded that the business rescue
application is based on
solid
information
. The potential
sub-contracts with Turaco have not been corroborated. One would
expect, at least, confirmation thereof by Mr Gouws’
son on
behalf of Turaco. No evidence of the
willingness
of other developers who previously subcontracted Eraki to again
employ the services of Eraki has been presented. Eraki’s
counterclaim against Calgro appears,
prima
facie
, to have slim prospects of
success. It is in any event something which a liquidator can
investigate and pursue.
[33]
In the premises, Mr Gouws has not met the
threshold standard of showing that there is a reasonable possibility
of achieving a rescue
of Eraki or that business rescue will likely
result a better return for Eraki’s creditors or shareholders
compared to liquidation.
Order
[34]
In the circumstances, the following order
is made:
1.
The application is dismissed, with costs.
_______________________
PG LOUW
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Counsel for Applicant:
Adv MF Jooste
Instructed by:
DF Oosthuizen Attorneys
Counsel for Third
Respondent: Adv R Pottas
Instructed by:
Barnards Inc
Date of hearing:
17 May 2023
Date of judgment:
16 August 2023
[1]
Annexure
“FA2” to the founding affidavit.
[2]
S
128(1)(b)
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
.
[3]
Para
14.
[4]
Founding
affidavit: para 39.
[5]
Id.
[6]
See
Koen
and Another v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd
and Others
2012
(2)
SA 378 (WCC) at para 10; and
Gormley
v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and
Another, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct
Properties
(Pty) Ltd and
Another
(19075/11, 15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33 (18 April 2012) at para
11.
[7]
Page
A193.
[8]
Founding
affidavit: para 42.
[9]
Founding
affidavit: para 43 to 47.
[10]
Founding
affidavit: para 51 to 53.
[11]
Clause
11 of the supplier agreement.
[12]
2013
(4) SA 539 (SCA).
[13]
2013
(1) SA 542 (FB).
[14]
[2013]
3 All SA 146
(GSJ).
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