Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1166South Africa
Prioste v Edelstein Faber Grobler Inc and Another (2022 / 031631) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1166 (16 October 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
8 June 2023
Headnotes
Summary
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Prioste v Edelstein Faber Grobler Inc and Another (2022 / 031631) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1166 (16 October 2023)
Prioste v Edelstein Faber Grobler Inc and Another (2022 / 031631) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1166 (16 October 2023)
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sino date 16 October 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2022 / 031631
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
In the application by
PRIOSTE, MARIA DA
CONCEICAO FREITAS
Applicant
and
EDELSTEIN FABER
GROBLER INC
First
Respondent
GROBLER, RONEL
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MOORCROFT AJ:
Summary
Application for leave
to appeal – Reasonable prospects of success
Mandate –
Instruction – Not irrevocable
Order
[1] In this matter
I make the following order:
1.
The
application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.
The
applicant is ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.
[2] The reasons for
the order follow below.
Introduction
[3]
This is an
application by the applicant for leave to appeal to the Full Court of
the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg against a decision
[1]
I handed down on 8 June 2023.
[4] Section
17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts Act provides that leave
to appeal may only be given where the judge
or judges concerned are
of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of
success or there is some other compelling
reason why the appeal
should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration.
[5] An appellant
must convince the court of appeal that the prospects of success are
not remote but have a realistic chance
of succeeding. A mere
possibility of success is not enough. There must be a sound and
rational basis for the conclusion that there
are reasonable prospect
of success on appeal.
[6]
In
Ramakatsa
and
others v African National Congress and another
[2]
Dlodlo JA dealt with the authorities
[3]
as follows:
“
[10] Turning
the focus to the relevant provisions of the Superior Courts Act (the
SC Act), leave to appeal may only be granted where
the judges
concerned are of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable
prospect of success or there are compelling reasons
which exist why
the appeal should be heard such as the interests of justice. This
Court in Caratco
[4]
,
concerning the provisions of s 17(1)(a)(ii) of the SC Act pointed out
that if the court is unpersuaded that there are prospects
of success,
it must still enquire into whether there is a compelling reason to
entertain the appeal. Compelling reason would of
course include an
important question of law or a discreet issue of public importance
that will have an effect on future disputes.
However, this Court
correctly added that ‘but here too the merits remain vitally
important and are often decisive.’
I am mindful of the
decisions at high court level debating whether the use of the word
‘would’ as opposed to ‘could’
possibly means
that the threshold for granting the appeal has been raised. If a
reasonable prospect of success is established,
leave to appeal should
be granted. Similarly, if there are some other compelling reasons why
the appeal should be heard, leave
to appeal should be granted. The
test of reasonable prospects of success postulates a dispassionate
decision based on the facts
and the law that a court of appeal could
reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial
court. In other words,
the appellants in this matter need to convince
this Court on proper grounds that they have prospects of success on
appeal. Those
prospects of success must not be remote, but there must
exist a reasonable chance of succeeding. A sound rational basis for
the
conclusion that there are prospects of success must be shown to
exist.”
[5]
The mandate, or
instruction
[7] I turn to the
facts and the applicable law. The applicant and her husband
instructed the respondents to see to the transfer
of immovable
property and to pay the balance of the proceeds into the applicant’s
bank account. The applicant’s husband
subsequently changed the
instruction and as a result his 50% share of the proceeds were paid
directly to him.
[8] The applicant
claimed the amount of money that was paid to her former husband from
the transferring attorneys. She chose
not to claim from her former
husband who was the recipient of the money.
[9] The language
used in the instruction documents do not create an irrevocable
instruction to the attorney nor is it the
applicant’s case that
she was entitled to payment because of a cession or an underlying
tripartite agreement in terms of
which the attorneys bound themselves
to pay the money into her bank account and not to accept an
instruction from her husband to
change the details of the recipient
account.
The attorneys would of
course not be bound by an agreement between the applicant and her
former husband unless they undertook obligations
in terms of the
agreement. They would also not be bound to give effect to a cession
unless they undertook obligations on behalf
of one or more parties.
[10] The
applicant’s counsel argued that the instruction documents
constitute a mandate rather than an instruction.
In my view on the
facts and in the context of the meaning of the words in this case
the distinction is a semantic distinction
only.
Conclusion
[11] I am of the
view that the intended appeal would not have a reasonable prospect of
success.
[12] For the
reasons set out above I make the order in paragraph 1.
J MOORCROFT
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
Electronically
submitted
Delivered: This judgement
was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose name is reflected
and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the Parties /
their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter
on CaseLines. The date of the judgment
is deemed to be
16 OCTOBER 2023
.
COUNSEL
FOR THE APPLICANT:
H
P WEST
INSTRUCTED
BY:
ST
ATTORNEYS
COUNSEL
FOR RESPONDENTS:
R
SHEPSTONE
INSTRUCTED
BY:
FAIRBRIDGES
WERTHEIM BECKER ATTORNEYS
DATE
OF ARGUMENT:
12
OCTOBER 2023
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
16
OCTOBER 2023
[1]
Prioste
v
Edelstein Farber Grobler Inc and Another
[2023] ZAGPJHC 666
[2]
Ramakatsa
and
others v African National Congress and another
[2021] JOL 49993
(SCA), also reported as
Ramakatsa
v ANC
[2021] ZASCA 31.
[3]
See
Dexgroup
(Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd and Others
2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA) para 24,
KwaZulu-Natal
Law Society v Sharma
[2017] JOL 37724
(KZP) para 29,
Lakaje
N.O v MEC: Department of Health
[2019] JOL 45564
(FB) para 5,
Member
of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha and
another
[2016] JOL 36940
(SCA) para 16,
Nwafor
v Minister of Home Affairs
[2021] JOL 50310
(SCA), 2021 JDR 0948 (SCA) paras 25 and 26;
Lephoi
v Ramakarane
[2023] JOL 59548
(FB) para 4,
S
v Smith
2012 (1) SACR 567
(SCA) para 7,
Shinga
v The State and another (Society of Advocates (Pietermaritzburg Bar)
intervening as Amicus Curiae); S v O'Connell and others
2007 (2) SACR 28
(CC),
South
African Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of the South African
Revenue Services
[2017] ZAGPPHC 340 para 5,
The
Acting National Director of Public Prosecution v Democratic Alliance
[2016] ZAGPPHC
489, JOL 36123
(GP) para 25. See also Van
Loggerenberg
Erasmus:
Superior Court Practice
A2-55.
[4]
The reference in footnote 7 is to
Caratco
(Pty) Ltd v Independent Advisory (Pty) Ltd
2020 (5) SA 35 (SCA), [2020] ZASCA 17.
[5]
Footnote 9 in the judgment reads as follows: “
See
Smith v S
[2011] ZASCA 15
;
2012 (1) SACR 567
(SCA); MEC Health,
Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
[2016] ZASCA 176
para 17.”
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