Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1278South Africa
Corragri SA (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ekkerd and Others (27373/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1278 (19 October 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
19 October 2023
Headnotes
to have acquiesced in it. But the conduct relied upon must be unequivocal and must be inconsistent with any intention to appeal. And the onus of establishing that position is upon the party alleging it. In doubtful cases acquiescence, like waiver, must be held non-proven.”[3]
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Corragri SA (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ekkerd and Others (27373/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1278 (19 October 2023)
Corragri SA (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ekkerd and Others (27373/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1278 (19 October 2023)
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sino date 19 October 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO:
27373/2022
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
19.10.23
In the matter between:
CORRAGRI
SA (PTY) LIMITED
FIRST
APPLICANT
CORRUSEAL
GROUP (PTY) LIMITED
SECOND
APPLICANT
And
ERNUSTUS
JACOBUS EKKERD
FIRST
RESPONDENT
E
J EKKERD
SECOND
RESPONDENT
MICKY
WAYNE SCHWARTZ
THIRD
RESPONDENT
GUSTAAF
EKKERD
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
BENTLEY
DANIEL
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
INTEGRATED
PACKHOUSE SOLUTIONS
(PTY)
LIMITED
(REGISTRATION
No: 2022/636881/07)
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
TWALA, J
[1] The first and second
applicants previously sought, on urgent basis, and obtained an
interim interdict against the first to fifth
respondents on the 2
nd
of November 2022 pending the final determination of Part B of the
notice of motion in which the final interdictory relief is sought.
Before this Court is the determination of Part B of the notice of
motion.
[2] The first to
fourth and the sixth respondents did not file any opposition to the
application. Although the fifth respondent
filed a notice to oppose
the application, an order was granted against him by agreement. The
order effectively granted the second
applicant the interdictory
relief it sought against the fifth respondent as prayed for in Part A
of the notice of motion pending
the final determination of the relief
sought in Part B. The fifth respondent has now filed a
substantial answering affidavit
in opposition to the final relief
sought against him by the second applicant.
[3] Given that the
first to fourth respondents did not oppose the application and that
the period of restraint against the
first to third respondents has
expired, the first applicant sought an order for the final
interdictory relief only against the
fourth respondent, with an order
for costs against the first to fourth respondents, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other
to be absolved, including the
costs of senior counsel. It should be noted that the interim order
provided for the issue of costs
to be determined together with Part B
of the notice of motion.
[4] The genesis of
this case is that the first to fifth respondents were the employees
of the applicants. The first to fifth
respondents left the employ of
the applicants between July and August 2022 and took employment with
the sixth respondent in different
capacities. When the fifth
respondent left his employment with the second applicant, he was
employed as new product development
manager. He was employed under a
contract of employment which contained restraint of trade provisions.
[5] When the fifth
respondent left his employment with the second applicant, he became a
director of the sixth respondent
in flagrant disregard of the
restraint provisions contained in his employment contract with the
second applicant. Although he later
resigned as director of the sixth
respondent, he continued to work for the sixth respondent in other
capacities. This galvanised
the second applicant to institute these
proceedings. I propose to refer to the second applicant, as the
applicant, and the fifth
respondent as the respondent going forward
in this judgment.
[6] As indicated
above, on the 2
nd
of November 2022, the respondent agreed
with the applicant that an order be granted against him in the
following terms:
“
1. Pending the
final determination of the relief sought in part B of the notice of
motion, the fifth respondent is interdicted and
restrained, for a
period of 24 months from 31 July 2022, and within the province of
Gauteng, from:
1.1
whether
directly or indirectly:
1.1.1
carrying on any business or activity directly or indirectly
similar to or in competition with that being carried on by the second
applicant during the currency of the contract of employment concluded
between the second applicant and the fifth respondent on
11 August
2016 (“the agreement”);
1.1.2
being employee in any way in any such business (which would
include the sixth respondent);
1.1.3
being employed in any such business or activity as
principle partner, director, agent, shareholder, member of the close
corporation,
beneficiary or trustee of a trust, consultant, lecturer,
employee or otherwise;
1.1.4
Financing or guaranteeing the obligations of any such business
or activity; and
1.1.5
Otherwise breaching any of the provisions of the agreement;
2. costs shall
stand over for determination at the hearing of the relief sought in
part B of the notice of motion.”
[7] Counsel for the
respondent contended that the Court should ignore the court order
dated 2 November 2022 for it was meant
as an interim order. Although
the respondent filed an intention to oppose the application, so it
was contended, due to the voluminous
application and the truncated
times that come with the urgent court, it was almost impossible for
the respondent to meaningfully
file an opposing affidavit –
hence he agreed to the order as it stands. It was contended
further that the sixth respondent
is not a competitor of the
applicant and therefore, the respondent has not breached the
restraint provisions of his employment
contract.
[8] It is trite
that all court orders are binding unless they are overturned on
appeal or through rescission proceedings.
There is no merit in the
argument that the order of 2 November 2022 is interim and should
therefore be ignored when a final order
is sought. Since the interim
order was granted on 2 November 2022, the respondent has not made any
attempt to challenge its validity
and it remains valid until it is
set aside by the due process of the court. It does not lie in the
mouth of the respondent to say
the order should be ignored since he
filed an answering affidavit to deal with the issues when Part B of
the matter is for determination
before this Court.
[9] In
Dabner
v South African Railways and Harbours
[1]
which
was quoted with approval by this Court in
Venmop
275 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Cleverlad Projects (Pty) Ltd and
Another,
[2]
the court stated the following:
“
The rule with
regard to peremption is well settled and has been enunciated on
several occasions by this Court. If the conduct
of an unsuccessful
litigant is such as to point indubitably and necessarily to the
conclusion that he does not intend to attack
the judgment, then he is
held to have acquiesced in it. But the conduct relied upon must be
unequivocal and must be inconsistent
with any intention to appeal.
And the onus of establishing that position is upon the party alleging
it. In doubtful cases acquiescence,
like waiver, must be held
non-proven.”
[3]
[10] The interim
order was obtained by agreement between the parties and the
respondent does not dispute that. It is my respectful
view that the
respondent cannot now in his answering affidavit challenge or raise
issues which have been settled between the parties
and made an order
of court. The order is clear and unambiguous in paragraph 1.1.2
in that the respondent is interdicted from
being an employee in any
way in such a business which competes with the applicant and that
would include the sixth respondent.
The respondent cannot come to
court now and say that the sixth respondent is not a competitor of
the applicant when he agreed with
the terms of the order that the
sixth respondent is a competitor of the applicant. If the respondent
had an issue with the order
that was obtained by agreement, he should
have challenged the order and has not done so.
[11] The respondent
contended further that the restraint is unreasonably long since it is
for a period of two years starting
from the 31
st
of July
2022. I am unable to disagree with counsel for the applicant
that, except to say that the respondent is presently
unemployed, the
respondent has failed to take this Court into his confidence and
state what efforts he has made to find a job within
the Province of
Gauteng and what challenges he has encountered in the process.
[12] In
Esquire
System Technology (Pty) Ltd t/a Esquire Technologies v Cronje and
another,
[4]
the
court quoted with approval the principles on restraints of trade
enunciated in
Magna
Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis
[5]
thus:
“
1. Prima facie
every restraint agreement signed by a restrainee is enforceable.
Where a restrainee wishes to be released from his
restraint
obligations, the onus lies on the restrainee to show that the
restraint is not only unreasonable, but contra bonos mores
that is,
contrary to public policy.
2. In determining
whether a restraint is contra bonos mores, a court will look at the
facts and circumstances at the time that the
restrainor is attempting
to enforce the agreement against the restrainee and weigh up two main
considerations. The first is that
the public interest requires, in
general, that parties should comply with their contractual
obligations even if these are unreasonable
or unfair (pacta sunt
servanda). The second consideration is that all persons should, in
the interests of society, be permitted
as far as possible to engage
in commerce or the professions freely. Expressing this differently,
it is detrimental to society if
an unreasonable fetter is placed on a
person’s freedom of trade or a person’s freedom to pursue
a profession.”
[6]
[13] It is a trite
principle of our law that where parties voluntarily enter into a
contract, courts must be slow in interfering
with the terms of the
contract unless they are against public policy. The principle of
pacta sunt servanda
forms the strong basis of our law of
contract and should be observed at all times.
[14] Recently the
Constitutional Court in
Beadica
231 and Others v Trustees, Oregon Trust and Others
[7]
also had an opportunity to emphasise the principle of
pacta
sunt servanda
and stated the following:
“
[84]
Moreover,
contractual relations are the bedrock of economic activity and our
economic development is dependent, to a large extent,
on the
willingness of parties to enter into contractual relationships. If
parties are confident that contracts that they enter
into will be
upheld, then they will be incentivised to contract with other parties
for their mutual gain. Without this confidence,
the very motivation
for social coordination is diminished. It is indeed crucial to
economic development that individuals should
be able to trust that
all contracting parties will be bound by obligations willingly
assumed.
[85]
The fulfilment of many of the rights promises made by our
Constitution depends on sound and continued economic development
of
our country. Certainty in contractual relations fosters a fertile
environment for the advancement of constitutional rights.
The
protection of the sanctity of contracts is thus essential to the
achievement of the constitutional vision of our society. Indeed,
our
constitutional project will be imperilled if courts denude the
principle of pacta sunt servanda.”
[15] It should be
recalled that the respondent was a senior employee of the applicant
and held a managerial position. The
respondent was manager for new
product development which exposed him to private information and or
trade secrets of the applicant
and was working in direct contact with
the clients of the applicant. Although it is in the interests of the
society that people
should be productive and engage in trade and
commerce, the privity of contract must prevail. The respondent has
failed to demonstrate
that the provisions of the restraint are
contrary to public policy.
[16] It is my
considered view therefore that the restraint of trade agreement is
valid in that the applicant has an interest
to protect and the
restraint clause is enforceable as it is reasonable considering that
the respondent was a senior employee in
the employ of the applicant.
Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence of the third respondent in his
confirmatory affidavit is that
the fifth respondent was doing work
for the sixth respondent and continued to do so even after the
interim interdict was granted
against him. The fifth respondent has
displayed a flagrant disregard not only of the restraint provisions
of his employment contract
but also the interim order of the Court.
The unavoidable conclusion is therefore that the applicant has
established a case
against the respondent and is entitled to the
relief as sought in the notice of motion.
[17] In the
circumstances, I make the following order:
As regards the
first to fourth respondents:
1. The fourth
respondent is interdicted and restrained, for a period of 24 months
from the 13
th
of July 2022, and within the geographical
area of the Republic of South Africa, from:
1.1 whether as
proprietor, partner, director, shareholder, member, employee,
consultant, contractor, financier, agent, representative,
assistant
or otherwise, and whether for reward or not, directly or indirectly
carrying on being interested in or engaged in or
concerned with or
employed by any company (which would include the sixth respondent),
close corporation, firm, undertaking or concern
carried on which
performs or makes available services of the type offered by the first
applicant, including but not limited to
packaging manufacturing,
directly or indirectly in competition with the first applicant;
1.2 after termination of
his employment with the first applicant, or any companies within the
Corruseal Group, being interested
or concerned with, in any capacity
whatsoever, any person, company or association, organisation or
concern in relation with any
related companies and the first
applicant’s direct competitors;
1.3 either personally, or
through any company, close corporation, firm, undertaking or concern
in or by which he is, directly or
indirectly interested or employed,
directly or indirectly:
1.3.1 encouraging or
enticing or inciting or persuading or inducing any employee of the
first applicant to terminate his or her
employment with the first
applicant;
1.4 either personally or
through any company, undertaking or concern in or by which he is,
directly or indirectly, interested, engaged,
concerned or employed,
directly or indirectly, whether as proprietor, partner, director,
shareholder, employee, consultant, contractor,
financier, agent,
representative, assist or otherwise, and whether for reward or not:
1.4.1 soliciting orders
from customers who were customers of the first applicant at the end
of the termination of the employment
of the fourth respondent, or who
were a prospective customer of the first applicant, within a year of
the employment of the fourth
respondent, or which had purchased
Proscribed Services, or Proscribed Suppliers for Proscribed Services,
as those terms are defined;
1.4.2 canvass business in
respect of the Proscribed Services from Proscribed Customers or
Proscribed Suppliers, as those terms are
defined; and
1.5 otherwise acting in
breach of the provisions of the contract of employment concluded
between him and the first applicant on
the 1
st
of April
2021.
2. The first to fourth
respondents, jointly and severally, shall pay the costs of this Part
B of the application, including the
costs of senior counsel.
As regards the fifth
respondent:
3. The fifth
respondent is interdicted and restrained, for a period of 24 months
from the 31
st
of July 2022, and withing the Province of
Gauteng, from:
3.1 whether
directly or indirectly:
3.1.1 carrying on
any business or activity directly or indirectly similar to or in
competition with that being carried on
by the second applicant during
the currency of the contract of employment concluded between the
second applicant and the fifth
respondent on 11 August 2016 (“the
agreement”);
3.1.2 being
employee in any way in any such business (which would include the
sixth respondent);
3.1.3 being
employed in any such business or activity as principal partner,
director, agent, shareholder, member of
the close corporation,
beneficiary or trustee of a trust, consultant, lecturer, employee or
otherwise;
3.1.4 financing or
guaranteeing the obligations of any such business or activity; and
3.1.5 otherwise
breaching any of the provisions of the agreement.
4. The fifth
respondent shall pay the costs of this application, including the
costs of senior counsel, and including the
costs of Part A of the
application which were reserved on the 2
nd
of November
2022.
TWALA M L
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION
Delivered
: This
judgment and order were prepared and authored by the Judge whose name
is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation
to
Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on Case Lines. The
date of the
order is deemed to be the 19
th
of October 2023.
For the Applicants:
Advocate AM Smallberger
SC
Instructed by:
Werksmans Attorneys
Tel: 021 405510
bboshof@werksmans.com
For the fifth
Respondents:
Advocate Darby
Instructed by:
Naidoo & Associates
Inc
Tel: 011 431 1970
shaheen@jlaw.co.za
Date of Hearing: 9
th
of October 2023
Date of Judgment:
19
th
of October 2023
[1]
1920 AD 583
(“
Dabner
”).
[2]
2016
(1) SA 78 (GJ).
[3]
Dabner
above
n 1
at
594.
[4]
(2011) 32 ILJ 601 (LC) (
Esquire
System
”).
[5]
[1984] ZASCA 116; 1984 (4) SA 874 (A).
[6]
Esquire
System
above
n 4 at para 15.
[7]
[2020] ZACC 13
;
2020 (5) SA 247
(CC);
2020 (9) BCLR 1098
(CC).
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