Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1512South Africa
S v Motaung and Another (SS54/2016) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1512 (20 November 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## S v Motaung and Another (SS54/2016) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1512 (20 November 2023)
S v Motaung and Another (SS54/2016) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1512 (20 November 2023)
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sino date 20 November 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case
No: SS54/2016
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
In
the matter between
THE
STATE
versus
MOTAUNG
LLOYD THATO
FIRST ACCUSED
And
MOKUBUNG
MONKI DAVID
SECOND ACCUSED
JUDGMENT
[ SENTENCE]
SIWENDU J
[1]
This judgment is in respect of the sentencing of the two accused.
They were arraigned before this
Court and convicted on 14 charges of
(a) k
idnapping; (b)two counts of robbery with aggravating
circumstances; ( c) house breaking with intent to rob, ( d) two
counts
of murder; ( e) attempted murder; ( f) assault, (g) unlawful
possession of fully automatic firearms;(h) unlawful possession of a
9mm parrabellum;(i) unlawful possession of 5.56 x45mm calibre Vector
R4 Assault Rifle; (j) unlawful possession of ammunition and
possession of explosives and (k) theft of a motor vehicle in respect
of accused 1.
[2]
The court convicted the accused based on common
purpose. It found that they were p
art of a group that hatched
and participated in a deadly plan to rob Kariah Chemicals CC at
Roodekop Industrial, Leondale. Two people
died following a shooting
of members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) by the armed
robbers.
[3]
Their conviction is based on statements made by the accused to the
police, accepted as admissible
evidence following a trial within a
trial. In addition, and independently of the statements, the court
convicted them based on
the DNA and ballistic evidence pointing to
their presence, participation, and association with the fatal robbery
incident at the
scene. The ballistic test results of the R4 Rifle
found inside the stolen BMW, driven by Accused 1 was linked to
cartridges fired
and found at the scene of the robbery. Moreover,
despite a denial by Accused 1 that he knew Accused 2, and the denial
by Accused
2 that he was with Accused 1 at the time of their arrest,
DNA belonging to Accused 2, was found in a balaclava of the stolen
BMW
gathered at the time of their arrest. His presence inside the
vehicle was confirmed by the arresting officers.
[4]
The security officer, Kabo John Letlotlo (Mr Letlotlo) employed to
guard the premisses testified
that he was kidnapped at the business
premises and driven around in a white BMW. He was not assaulted or
harmed. This evidence
correlated with the statement by Accused 1.
Accused 1 was part of the group responsible for kidnapping Mr
Letlotlo from the gate
of the premises and for driving him out of the
way so the robbery could proceed unhindered. Accordingly, other than
in respect
of the stolen BMW, t
he accused were
found guilty and convicted based on common purpose as aforesaid.
[5]
The
Criminal
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act) applies to the offences. At
commencement of the trial, the State had expressed
its intention to
rely on the Act, if the accused were found guilty. They were warned
of the consequences of the application of
the provisions
[1]
.
[6]
At the hearing of the proceedings
on sentence, the accused did not testify in mitigation. It was
submitted on behalf of Accused
1 that he regrets the loss of life
caused by the incident. Accused 2, elected not testify in mitigation,
instead applied for a
reservation of certain questions of law, in
terms of s 319 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA), a matter I return
to later in the
judgment.
[7]
In considering a just and appropriate
sentence, the applicable principles have been articulated in
various
decisions by the Courts. The starting point is the often-cited case
and triad consisting of the crime, the offender, and
the interests of
society' in
S
v Zinn.
[2]
The
court endeavours to strike a correct balance between the nature and
seriousness of the offences, the personal circumstances
of the
accused and the interests of society.
[3]
In
S
v Mhlakaza
[4]
,
the
Court nevertheless cautioned that sentences of imprisonment ought to
be realistic and should not be open to the interpretation
that they
have been designed to appease a rightly indignant public.
[8]
In the present case, the court directed an investigation into the
personal circumstances of the
accused. It has the benefit of the
pre-sentencing reports compiled by the probation officers, Mr
Buthelezi
and by Ms.
Mabuyangwa in respect of accused 1 and 2 respectively. In addition,
three victim impact reports were presented to the
Court by Ms Budaza
and Mr Ndobe in respect of Moswang’s family and Mr Dludlu, both
of whom were killed at the scene. In addition,
the court received a
report from by Ms Thobejane in respect of Const Lerato Monyane who
survived the shooting incident.
Personal
Circumstance
[9]
Accused 1 has no previous convictions. He was born is the first born
of three children and is
39 years of age. He was predominantly raised
by his mother. His father worked in the mines and was the only source
of support.
He matriculated in 2003 and has had a checkered
employment history post matric. He worked as a teller, an assistant
driver and
later as a driver, a merchandiser, a vehicle car parts
salesman until he became self- employed in 2012, buying and selling
cars.
He took up gambling and could earn an estimated R20 000
from winnings per week.
[10]
Accused 1 has three children born in 2007, 2014 and 2016 from
different mothers. He had been married by customary
law, but the
marriage ended in 2016. His last child was born of a different mother
while he and the mother of the child were incarcerated.
She has since
been released from prison but left this child in the care of the
deceased’s mother. She has not returned.
[11]
The probation officer reported that his mother and brother were
‘shocked by the offences’
committed by Accused 1. They do
not correlate them with his general behaviour. They described him as
a person of a ‘good
character’ who was responsible and
had a good relationship with his family.
[12]
Accused 2, he is 47 years old and the first born amongst three
children. His father died in 1989 when he
was 14 years old. He
had a good upbringing by his mother as a single parent. Even though
he did not recall when he matriculated,
Accused 2 reported that he
enrolled for N6 in Marketing Management while detained at Leeuwkop
Prison between 2007 and 2008. He
is not a stranger to a life of crime
and prison. Even though he grew up in Tokoza Township at the height
of political unrest and
violence, there was no correlation found
between that exposure and his behaviour. He was not exposed to abuse.
His parents moved
him to Limpopo to protect him.
[13]
He has been married but divorced in February 2017. He and his ex-wife
bought a house in Vosloorus where they
lived until his arrest. There
were two children from the marriage. A dispute emerged about the
paternity of the other in the throes
of the divorce. One of the
children is deceased. He has one grandchild. He has had an unstable
employment history between 2009
and 2010 as a packager, a taxi driver
and later a taxi owner. He is survived by his brother as his mother,
daughter, cousin, and
maternal aunt have since deceased. The loss of
immediate and significant family members significantly impacted him.
He was diagnosed
with depression and anxiety and insomnia, and at
some point, received counselling and is reported to be on and off
medication.
[14]
The State proved the previous
convictions against
Accused 2, namely - (a) robbery in terms of
51(2)(a) of Act
105 of 1997
(b) kidnapping and (3) possession of
dangerous weapons committed in January 2003 in Vosloorus. He was
sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 15 years for the robbery, 5
years for kidnapping and 1 year for the possession of dangerous
weapon and was declared unfit to
possess a firearm. He appealed
against the conviction and the sentence. His conviction was confirmed
on appeal, but the sentence
was reduced from 15years to 13 years,
with all sentences ordered to run concurrently. On 24 April 2009, he
was released on parole
supervision which endured until 21 July 2017.
On 27 April 2012, he was released on special remission of sentence 21
January 2015.
He confirmed these convictions. The offences for which
he is now convicted were committed either while the parole
supervision conditions
were applicable, alternatively within a few
months after the special remission.
[15]
T
he report by the probation officer refers to
other incidents of robbery in 2011 where he was involved. The State
contends that he
has tried to mislead the court about these
incidents. The SAP69 states that the cases are pending against him.
However, since there
are no convictions, they are disregarded for the
purposes of the sentence.
Victim Impact
[16] Mr
Ndobe filed a report after investigating circumstance of Mr Dludlu,
the security officer who died at the
scene while responding to an
alarm signal triggered by the robbery at the business premises. Mr
Ndobe obtained an account from
Mr Bongani Dludlu. The deceased was
his uncle. The rest of the family members refused to talk about the
incident, indication that
they were confused and hurt. The deceased
was the sole breadwinner for his family and is survived by his mother
and 5 children.
The family lives in poverty and has been left
destitute and traumatized by the death. They had to obtain support
from the surrounding
community to bury the deceased.
[17]
Ms Budaza presented the report in respect of Constable Moswang, the
police officer who died in hospital approximately
two months after
the shooting incident. His customary law wife with whom he had two
children is no longer in contact with the family.
He is survived by
his mother, three children, two sisters, a brother, and a cousin. His
eldest son is in matric. The family did
not want him disturbed by an
interviewed, understandably as that would trigger him. Here too, the
family had to borrow money from
family members to cover some of the
funeral costs. None of them are employed. They relied on the deceased
for support. The deceased’s
mother lives off the social grant
and support from one of the siblings. The deceased was “a
leader, provider, supporter and
protector’ of his family.’
The family has been left with unresolved questions about the death
and expressed a wish
to engage the perpetrators. They expressed
appreciation at being engaged by the courts.
[18]
Mrs Thobejane interviewed Constable Lerato Monyane who survived the
shooting directed at the police vehicle
by the assailants. She was on
duty with Constable Moswang and had called for backup. The aggression
of the accused towards the
police officers left a lasting impression
on her. The incident has had an emotionally devastating and lasting
impact on her life
and family. She had to receive treatment causing
shortfall on her financial resources She has become withdrawn, is
less trusting
of others and exhibits a disturbance which often
impacts her ability to work. She resigned her employment and was
unemployed for
18 months before she secured employment with the
Ekurhuleni Metro Police.
[19]
At the trial. Mr Mosikatsana, the owner of the BMW stolen months
earlier had informed the Court of the consequence
arising from the
high jacking of his vehicle when he was driven around in the boot of
the car. That evidence still stands. Understandably,
the
victims and their families have been traumatised by what occurred.
The
Law
[20]
There are two schedules to the Act which are applicable in this case.
The first is Part I of Schedule 2 under
section 51(1), and the
second, Part II of Schedule 2 under section 51(2). Part I of Schedule
2 prescribes a minimum sentence
of life imprisonment in respect
of a murder conviction in certain circumstances. It reads as
follows:
"The
obligatory life sentence is to be imposed for murder when
(a)
it was planned or premeditated.
(b)
the victim was–
(i)
a law enforcement officer performing his/her functions as such,
whether on duty or not;
or
(ii)
a person who has given or was likely to give material evidence with
reference to any offence referred to in Schedule
1 to the
Criminal
Procedure Act, 1977
, at criminal proceedings in any court.
(c)
the death of the victim was caused by the accused in committing or
attempting to commit or after having committed or attempted
to commit
one of the following offences:
(i)
rape; or
(ii)
robbery with aggravating circumstances as defined in section 1 of
the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977);
or
(d)
the offence was committed by a person, group of persons or
syndicate acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose
or conspiracy."
[21]
Part II of Schedule 2 prescribes, in the case of first offender, a
minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment
for, the offence
of robbery where there are ‘aggravating circumstances’
Section 1
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1
977 defines
‘aggravating circumstances’ in relation to robbery
to mean–
"(i)
the wielding of a firearm or any other dangerous weapon;
(ii)
the infliction of grievous bodily harm; or
(iii)
a threat to inflict grievous bodily harm,
by
the offender or an accomplice on the occasion when the offence
is committed, whether before or during or after the commission
of the offence."
[22]
The offences for which the accused were convicted were a preplanned,
well organised crime of a violent nature.
The accused had access to
dangerous explosives which they used to cause damage to property.
They deployed the use guns and an assault
rifle generally reserved
for armed conflict. The actions fall squarely into the provisions of
the Act.
[23]
My assessment is that the attack was gratuitous and disproportionate
to any disturbance or threat Mr Dludlu’s
arrival at the
premises may have posed. He was alone when the first shots were
fired. It was before Constables Moswang and Lerato
arrived. These
police officers were not spared.
Substantial
and compelling circumstances
[24]
The question then, is whether there are substantial and compelling
circumstances warranting a departure from
the prescribed minimum
sentence and what those are. The starting point is court’s
decision and injunction in
S
v Malgas
[5]
that the specified sentences were not to be departed from lightly and
for flimsy reasons is apposite in this case. With the same
breath, as
held by the court in in
Director
of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v P
[6]
,
the
court must also have regard to the main purposes of punishment,
namely, ‘it’s deterrent, preventive, reformative
and
retributive aspects.'
[25]
There is nothing compelling and substantial in the personal
circumstances of the accused which would persuade
the court to depart
from the sentence. There aggravating factors have not `been mitigated
by any plausible explanation from them.
They have instead been met by
silence, and as is evident from the record, persistence attempts to
gridlock and stymie the consequences
of the law. Over and above the
death of innocent lives, police officers on duty, and who are
responsible for safeguarding the whole
community against lawlessness
and crime, were attacked in the manner described at the trial.
[26]
Their life conditions are not unique and cannot be singled out as the
reason for their behaviour. The probation
officer found
Accused
1’s upbringing has no correlation with the current offence.
Both
accused have had children who have grown up with their guidance. The
court was informed in so far as Accused 1 that t
he
arrest will have a negative effect on his children.
That
is hardly a compelling circumstance nor a reason not to impose a
custodial sentence
[7]
. Although
Accused 1 ‘acknowledged’ of the actions on the lives of
the survivors of the deceased through his legal representative,
he
showed no remorse or a genuine
consideration
for the impact of the offences, and in fact failed to take
responsibility for his actions. I agree with the findings
by the
probation officer that the prognosis for rehabilitation for Accused 1
is poor and, a sentence of direct imprisonment in
terms of s 276 (1)
(b) of the CPA necessary. Nevertheless, the court considers that he
is a first offender.
[27]
The circumstances relating to Accused 2 stand on a different footing.
The report from the probation officer
indicates that Accused 2
anticipated the offences could attract what was referred to as a
‘double life sentence’. He
has a previous conviction
involving robbery with aggravating circumstances, and a use of a
firearm, which apart from the absence
of murder is not too dissimilar
to the current case. What is more is that from the observation of the
court throughout the proceedings,
Accused 2 lacks the ability to
introspect and take responsibility for his actions. These qualities
are in any event a foundational
hallmark for capacity for remorse,
which he wholly lacks. A second impression Accused 2 made on the
court, is that he is hardened,
lacks integrity, has no interest in
the truth and is adept at creating confusion to exploit consequent
loopholes for personal gain.
[28]
The record of proceedings bears testimony to his (a) penchant to
impugn all his legal representatives whenever
it appeared from the
evidence or the proceedings the shoe would pinch (b) change legal
representation often (c) misrepresent the
truth of his financial
position and (d) impugn the court to engineer further delays or
perception of irregularities.
[29]
T
here
are multiple offences arising from the same incident, which gave rise
to separate convictions involving separate victims. The
dicta in
Muller
and Another v S
[8]
about the aggregate penalty
in such a case is apposite that:
‘
When
dealing with multiple offences, a sentencing court must have regard
to the totality of the offender's criminal conduct and
moral
blameworthiness in determining what effective sentence should be
imposed in order to ensure that the aggregate penalty
is not too
severe. In doing so, while punishment and deterrence indeed come to
the fore when imposing sentences for armed robbery,
it must be
remembered, as Holmes JA pointed out in his inimitable style, that
mercy and not a sledgehammer is the concomitant of
justice.
2
And
while a judicial officer must not hesitate to be firm when necessary
"he should approach his task with a humane and compassionate
understanding of human frailties and the pressures of society which
contribute to criminality".
3
In
addition, although it is in the interest of the general public that a
sentence for armed robbery should act as a deterrent to
others, an
offender should not be sacrificed on the altar of deterrence.’
[30]
In addition, given the cumulative effect of the sentences, it is
fitting that they be served concurrently
to prevent the accused from
undergoing an unjustifiably lengthy effective term of imprisonment.
Section 280(2) grants me the discretion
to direct that such sentences
run concurrently. T
he
accused were also found guilty of unlawful possession of fully
automatic firearms, an assault rifle used in the robbery as well
as
live ammunition, the risk of a disproportionate sentence is apparent.
Accused 2 is a second offender in this regard. On this
score, I have
had regard to the helpful analysis by the court in
S
v Delport.
[9]
Although I do not depart from the prescribed minimum sentence given
the use of the unlawful arms, I am of the view that the severity
of
the sentences will be ameliorated by an order that they be served
concurrently, and where appropriate, considered together.
[31]
Lastly,
the
time spent in custody awaiting trial enunciated in
Radebe
and Another v S
[10]
is but a factor going ‘into the basket’’ for
consideration. The accused were arrested in September 2015,
they
pleaded in February 2018. Even though a substantial part of the delay
was occasioned by Accused 2 and what in the view of
the court was
designed to frustrate the proceedings (dealt with in the conviction
judgment), the Covid – pandemic which prevented
the case from
proceedings, contributed to part of the delay and must go into the
reckoning of the period. For this reason, a period
of 5 years will be
taken into the reckoning for the purpose of computing the sentences
imposed.
Reservations
of Questions of Law
[32]
As stated earlier, the second day of the proceedings on sentence,
Accused 2 approached the court with an
application for a reservation
of certain questions of law in terms of s319 of the CPA. He informed
the Court that he took advice
from his inmates who advised him to
make the application. The reason for the application is the court’s
refusal of a postponement
during the trial proceedings, which refusal
precipitated his application for the recusal of the Court. The
grounds for the refusal
are evident from the separate written
judgment therein.
[34]
Accused 2 also contended that the Court relied on hearsay evidence in
dismissing his application for postponement.
His constitutional
rights as well as his rights to a fair trial were breached. I decline
the application on the grounds that the
application is not competent
as such a question ought to have been raised during the trial or at
conviction. I in addition found
it misconceived. It is not based on a
desire to vindicate legitimate Constitutional rights and must be
considered in the light
his obstructive and dilatory conduct.
[35]
In the result, the following order is made:
Accused
1 and Accused 2 are sentenced as follows:
a. Kidnapping,
being Count 1- 3 years imprisonment.
b. Robbery
with aggravating circumstances (Counts 2 and 4) and Housebreaking
(Count 3) are considered
as part of the same enterprise for the
purpose of the sentence –
(i)
Accused 1 is sentenced to 15 years.
(ii)
Accused 2 is sentenced to 20 years.
c.
Murder in Count 5 and Count 7 (which shall include the assault in
count 7)
(i)
Accused 1 is sentenced to Life imprisonment in respect of each life
in Counts 5 and 7
(ii)
Accused 1 is sentenced to Life imprisonment in respect of
each life in Counts 5 and 7
d.
Attempted murder in Count 6 - Both Accused are sentenced to 10 years’
imprisonment.
e.
Unlawful Possession of fully automatic firearms R4 Assault Rifle in
Count 8, the parrabellum Calibre
CZ model 75 semi- automatic pistol,
being Counts 8, 9 and 10 are considered together for the purpose of
the sentence.
(i)
Accused 1 is sentenced to
15 years'
imprisonment.
(ii)
Accused 2 is sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
f.
Unlawful possession of ammunition being 5.56mm x 39 calibre
ammunition (live rounds)
and 9mm parabellum (live rounds) without a
license in Count 10 as well as possession of 70 x 5.56 39 cartridges
in Count 13 are
considered together for the purpose of the sentence.
(i)
Accused 1 is sentenced to
15 years'
imprisonment.
(ii)
Accused 2 is sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
g.
Possession of explosives in Count 14
(i)
Accused 1 is sentenced to 5
years’
imprisonment.
(ii)
Accused 2 is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.
h.
Sentences in (e), (f) and (g) above are ordered to run concurrently.
i.
Count 11 in respect of the theft of a motor vehicle from
May 2015
to September Accused 1 is sentence to 5 years imprisonment.
j.
Sentences in (a), (b) and (d) are ordered to run concurrently with
the sentence
in (i) above.
k.
A period of 5 years in which the accused were awaiting trial which
also takes account of
the delays caused by the Covid Pandemic shall
be considered for the purpose of computing sentence.
NTY SIWENDU
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date
of hearing: 09 October 2023
Date
judgment delivered: 30 November 2023
Appearances:
Accused
1
Mr Makhubela
Instructed
by: Bongani Zulu
Attorneys
Accused
2:
In person.
[1]
.
S
v Ndlovu
2003
(1) SACR 331 (SCA)
[2]
1969
(2) SA 537
(A) ([1969]
3 All SA 57)
at 540G
[3]
S
v Tshefu
2014
JDR 2359 (ECG)
[4]
1997
(1) SACR 515
SCA at 519 g
[5]
2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA);
(2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA)
[6]
[7]
S
v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae
)
[8]
[2012]
JOL 28276
(SCA) para 10
[9]
2016
JDR 0491 (WCC)
[10]
(726/12)
[2013] ZASCA 31
(27 March 2013) para 14
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