Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1391South Africa
Engen Petroleum Limited v DAV Distribution t/a Willowcrest Convenience Centre (39469/20) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1391 (29 November 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
29 November 2023
Headnotes
under Deed of Transfer No. T27880/95[1] situated at corner Judges and Republic Avenue, Cresta, Randburg, (premises). The respondent took occupation of the premises pursuant to a lease agreement entered into with the applicant. The respondent brought a counter application on 30 March 2022 for a stay of the eviction application pending adjudication of the arbitration lodged in terms of section 12B of the Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977 (Petroleum Act).
Judgment
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## Engen Petroleum Limited v DAV Distribution t/a Willowcrest Convenience Centre (39469/20) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1391 (29 November 2023)
Engen Petroleum Limited v DAV Distribution t/a Willowcrest Convenience Centre (39469/20) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1391 (29 November 2023)
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sino date 29 November 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 39469/20
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
NOT REVISED
29/11/23
In
the matter between:
ENGEN
PETROLEUM LIMITED
Applicant
and
DAV
DISTRIBUTION ta WILLOWCREST
CONVENIENCE
CENTRE
Respondent
## JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
NOKO
J
Introduction
[1]
The
applicant brought an application to evict the respondent from the
immovable property,
to
wit
,
Erf 59, Cresta Ext 1 Township, held under Deed of Transfer No.
T27880/95
[1]
situated at corner
Judges and Republic Avenue, Cresta, Randburg, (
premises
).
The respondent took occupation of the premises pursuant to a lease
agreement entered into with the applicant. The respondent
brought a
counter application on 30 March 2022 for a stay of the eviction
application pending adjudication of the arbitration lodged
in terms
of section 12B of the Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977 (
Petroleum
Act
).
[2]
The
application for a stay was granted on 02 November 2020.
[2]
The said order for a stay stated that
“
[T]he present
application, the application to have the respondent evicted, is
stayed pending the final determination of the arbitration
between the
parties before the Arbitrator, Adv T Goldbe SC, instituted in terms
of section Petroleum Products Act, Act 120 of 1977”.
[3]
The
documents uploaded on CaseLines includes a judgment by Windell J
dated 28 April 2022.
[3]
The
learned judge was adjudicating over a
lis
in which the applicant sued the respondent for certain sum of moneys
due in terms of the lease agreement. Windell J held that the
lis
for monetary claim should be adjudicated upon together with the
eviction proceedings. The parties did not make submissions to me
regarding the claim for money and this judgment will therefore make
no finding on the said monetary claim.
[4] The arbitrator
dismissed the respondent’s claims with costs on 17 March 2023.
The applicant then set down the eviction
proceeding which served
before me. The respondent is on the other hand aggrieved at the
outcome of the arbitration proceedings
and has launched a review
proceeding and therefore contends that the arbitration is not
finalised. I am therefore invited to declare
that the order for the
stay of the eviction proceedings is extant and as such since the
respondent has launched review application
the arbitration between
the parties is not finally determined.
Background
[5]
Though the
issues to be decided are narrow it is imperative that detailed
background of the matter as viewed through parties’
prism
should be presented. The parties
[4]
entered into a lease and operation of service station agreement
(lease agreement) in respect of the premises. The lease agreement
was
for the respondent to conduct a business as an Engen branded
automotive fuel filling and service station. The tenancy in
accordance
with the Lease Premium Addendum, as submitted by the
respondent, would obtain for a period ending on 31 March 2023.
[5]
[6]
The lease
agreement enjoins the respondent to only purchase Engen branded
products and further provides that should the filling
station stand
dry in respect of one or types of automotive fuel without reasonable
cause or mistake the applicant would be entitled
to forthwith cancel
the lease of on a written notice to the respondent.
[6]
[7]
The
respondent conveyed its intention to sell the business in 2015 August
but took a
volte
face
stance notwithstanding that the process was already at an advanced
stage. The respondent further conveyed to the applicant that
it is
experiencing loss of profit, and this was due to,
inter
alia
,
theft by the employees. The applicant commissioned an investigation
and the report pointed to the lapses on the management of
the
respondent’s business.
[7]
[8]
It came to
the attention of the applicant that during November 2017, and for a
period exceeding 10 days, the petrol filling station
remained dry
which conduct was proscribed in the lease agreement. The applicant
issued a letter of cancellation of the lease agreement
predicated on
the breach of this material term of the agreement. The breach was
admitted
[8]
by the respondent
who pleaded with the applicant not to evict the respondent and would
ensure that there is compliance with letter
of the agreement. In
retort the applicant being aware of the possible sale of the business
on the horizon agreed to extend the
lease agreement on a
month-to-month basis, but still subject to compliance with the terms
and conditions of the lease agreement.
[9] During July 2019 the
respondent conveyed to the applicant its intention again to sell the
business due to ongoing operational
challenges which negatively
impacted the ability to profitable run the business. The applicant
accepted the proposal and commenced
the process of facilitating
procuring interested buyers of the business. This process included
the advertisement of the sale of
the business on its online platform
called Neptune. This ended in the applicant securing an acceptable
purchaser with whom a purchase
agreement was signed with the
respondent. Mr Jacqueson represented the purchaser, K2017468720 (Pty)
Ltd, and the agreement was
subject to certain conditions which
included conducting the due diligence. The purchase price was 7.8
million rands.
[10]
During this
period the respondent still breached the material term of the
agreement by not keeping the filling station wet with
the last
purchase being in November/ December 2019.
[9]
This led to the applicant issuing another letter of cancellation on
30 April 2020.
[11] The respondent
further conveyed to the applicant that he vacated the premises and
recommended that the applicant should
place the security company on
site to secure the premises. The applicant in retort conveyed to the
respondent that its conduct
amounted to the repudiation of a
month-to-month lease agreement and the said repudiation was accepted.
Later the respondent took
a
volte face
stance and insisted
that he is in possession of the business and disavowed his
declaration that the premises is vacated.
[12]
In the
meantime, and on 8 July 2020, the respondent referred a dispute for
arbitration in terms of section 12B of the Petroleum
Act. The
referral was predicated on the ground that the applicant committed
unfair and unreasonable contractual practices by wrongfully
cancelling the lease agreement
[10]
and further failing to cooperate in relation to the sale of the
business.
[11]
The applicant
contended that the reason for the sale agreement not proceeding was
because the purchaser has after conducting due
diligence reverted to
the respondent stated,
inter
alia
,
that since the business was not operating and stood dry for a period
in excess of 8 months there is no longer goodwill and then
offered to
pay 5,5million. This counter-offer was acceptable by the respondent
provided that the applicant should pay the difference
between the
initial amount of 7.8 million and the 5.5 million offered by the
purchaser. The applicant did not accept the proposal.
The purchaser
stated that despite several attempts the respondent has never
communicated its position.
[13]
The
applicant launched eviction process and in addition, sued for the
respondent for the sum due for,
inter
alia
,
the unpaid levies and utilities. The certificate of balance reflected
the amount due in the sum of R1 228 431.26.
[12]
The respondent in turn successfully applied for the stay of eviction
proceedings pending arbitration.
[14]
The
respondent has since not vacated the premises and contends that on
the proper interpretation of the court order of 2 November
2020
[13]
it remain operative until the reviews and/or appeals challenging the
award have been exhausted. To this end the respondent launched
application for review which will be served on the applicant on the
same date when I was hearing this application. In any event,
the
respondent submitted, that the lease agreement was for a period
ending on 31 Mach 2023
[14]
and
the cancellation is wrongful.
Issues
[15] Issues for
determination are whether the order to stay the eviction proceedings
of 2 November 2020 transcend the final
arbitration before Advocate T
Goldbe SC and secondly, whether applicant has made out a case for the
eviction of the respondent.
The parties though raised issues against
each other for the late filing of other pleadings they both did not
pursue arguments to
resist the late filing.
Submissions and
contentions by the parties
[16] The parties
agreed that, subject to leave of the court, the respondent be the
first to address the court on a specific
and limited point on which
the counsel has been briefed to argue. The respondent’s counsel
contended that on proper interpretation
of the order granted on 2
November 2020, the eviction proceedings would remain stayed until the
final determination of the dispute
between the parties. The
respondent has on the date of hearing before me launched application
to review and set aside the decision
of the arbitrator and to that
end the final determination of the arbitration has not been reached.
As a result, the adjudication
of the eviction application should
remain stayed until the review proceedings and/or appeal proceedings,
if applicable, are finalised.
[17]
The counsel
for the respondent referred me to the Western Cape High court
judgment in
Auction
Alliance (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of Police and Others
[15]
(
Auction
Alliance
)
where it was held that the final determination does not end with the
outcome of the adjudication of the first stage of adjudication.
The
respondent’s counsel quoted the judgment where it was stated
that “… ‘
final
determination’ of an application must therefore be read to mean
something distinct from the mere determination of the
application. In
my view the word final… can and must on its ordinary meaning
only mean to include determination on review
or appeal.”
[16]
In this
regard, so counsel continued, once the review application was
launched challenging the award of the arbitrator the dispute
which
has been referred for arbitration has therefore not yet finally
determined.
[18]
The
applicant in retort contended that the order was very specific that
the eviction proceeding is stayed until the final determination
of
the arbitration proceedings before the arbitrator, Goldbe SC. In
addition, the
Auction
Alliance judg
ment
[17]
was inconsistent with the approach adopted in this division in
Royal
AM v NSL
[18]
where
the court held that filing application for leave to appeal the
judgment (in terms of which the review application of the award
was
dismissed) would not
ipso
facto
suspend the implementation of the award. Further that it is a
trite principle of
stare
decisis
that the court is bound by the decision of its division unless the
court is persuaded that the said decision was wrong.
[19] In addition,
the review application was brought late, and condonation has not been
granted and besides that the respondent
did not specifically bring a
fresh application for the stay of the eviction proceedings pending
application for the review.
[20] The applicant
further contended that it is trite that once the applicant has
demonstrated the right of ownership and
further withdrew the consent
to occupation by the respondent it is incumbent on the latter to
either challenge the ownership or
to demonstrate the legal basis for
the continued occupation. The respondent has in this case failed to
demonstrate either of the
two. In addition, so went the argument, the
position of the respondent is aggravated by its failure to make
payments or even to
operate the business.
Legal principles and
analysis
[21]
I had
regard to the
Auction
Alliance
judgment
and noted that the quotation by the respondent left out a portion of
the order which paints a different picture. As a result,
thereof that
judgment is distinguishable to the
lis
before me. Paragraph 4 of the order reads thus “…
Smiedt
and Associates will retain the returned items … until Friday 7
September 2012 or until the final determination
on any application(s)
brought before that date for a subpoena(s) or a search warrant(s)
pertaining to the returned items.”
[19]
(underlining
added). The court order specifically reads thus
“
(1)
Declaring
that on a proper interpretation of paragraph 4 of the Order of this
court dated 23 August 2012 (coram Stelzner AJ), the
words “
final
determination of
any
application”
include the outcome of any review of such application, including
the final determination of
any
appeal
processes which any of the parties may pursue in respect of any
decision given on review, provided such review or appeal processes
are brought in terms of the rules of any applicable court.”
(underling and emphasis added)
(2)
Declaring
that on the proper interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Order of this
Court, dated 23 August 2012 (coram Stelzner, AJ),
the first and/or
second respondent may not execute the search and seizure warrant
issued on 2 May 2014 by the district magistrate,
Cape Town, pending
the final determination of the review application launched by the
applicants in this court on Monday 12 May
2014, including the final
determination
of any appeal
processes
which any of the
parties may pursue in respect of any decision given on review,
provided such review or appeal processes are brought
in terms of the
rules of any applicable court; (underlining added).
[22] The facts in
the said case referred to the determination of
any
application
and in contrast the
lis
serving before did not extend the stay
to
any process (application)
beyond the arbitration process.
To this end the judgment in
Auction Alliance
does not serve as
authority for the argument advanced by the respondent that final
determination before the arbitrator included
determination of issues
beyond the decision by the arbitrator.
[23] In the end and
consistent with the decision in
Auction Alliance
had it been
the intention that the stay should go beyond arbitration the
respondent should have specifically request to order to
clearly that.
The contention that I should read into the order that
any
application would be stayed is untenable, gratuitous, and bound to be
dismissed.
[24]
That
notwithstanding the respondent’s relief before the arbitration
included the damages
[20]
against the applicant and to this end there is no need to hold on to
the premises. In addition, such a relief is competent before
court of
law and not within jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
[21]
The respondent appears to have acquiesced with the conclusion by the
prospective purchaser who stated that the business has lost
goodwill
due to,
inter
alia
,
effect Covid 19 on businesses and that the business having been kept
dry for a period more than 8 months. To this end the purchaser
made
an offer of 5,5 million. The respondent was prepared to accept the
offer provided the applicant pays the difference. If the
respondent
felt differently, it would have clearly rejected the counter-offer
and look for a purchaser who could pay the requested
sale price.
[25]
The review
application does not automatically cause a stay of the proceedings
and the respondent should have therefore formally
brought a fresh
application for an order to stay the eviction proceedings pending the
review application without which I am not
barred to consider the
application for eviction or ejectment. It was held by the SCA in
SABC
v DA
[22]
that
“
[I]t
is well settled in our law that until a decision is set aside by a
court in proceedings for judicial review it exists in fact
and has
legal consequences that cannot simply be overlooked. It is clear from
the above that any advice to the effect
that
a review application stays the implementation of the remedial action
is incorrect
and is a sheer display of cluelessness on the person giving such
advice.”
(underlining
added)
.
As
it would demonstrated below, I would not have found in favour of the
respondent as circumstances of this case militates against
staying of
the eviction proceedings. The effect thereof would be prejudicial to
the applicant. The sanguine and a fixated view
that the previous
order to stay shall inevitable transcend the arbitrator’s
decision award vitiated the respondent’s
wherewithal to have
regard to launch a fresh application to stay as an option.
[26] Once the
argument for stay which is hinged on the order of 2 November 2022
fails then
cadit questio
and the order for eviction should
follow. The applicant has demonstrated its title to the immovable
property and further proved
that the lease agreement has been
terminated alternatively that the repudiation was accepted.
[27]
I also
opine that the prospects of the court directing that the lease be
continued to allow the respondent to sell the business
is very
remote. In any event the respondent has not prayed for an order
extending the agreement in order to sell the business to
a purchaser
willing to accept the sale price.
[23]
The
respondent has conveyed his wishes at least in two occasions to sell
the business, the filing station has been dry since 2019,
the
business has been struggling though the respondent blames the
applicant and the later attributing blame to bad management,
the
agreement was on a month to month contract terminable on a month
notice, even on the respondent’s contention the agreement
lapsed through effluxion of time in March 2023 - all these factors
militates against a possible wish to extend the agreement or
event to
stay the eviction. It also implies that the goodwill (also referred
to in the lease agreement as the entrenched value)
is being
negatively affected. The appropriate option for the parties may be to
sue for damages
[24]
(if either
of the parties believe that there are good prospects) rather than to
insist that the lease agreement remain extant or
be extended (which
was not before the arbitrator) as no practical purpose would be
served for either of the parties.
Other issues
[28]
It is
disconcerting that the importance and value to refer matters to
arbitration is to achieve costs effective and expedited resolution
of
disputes
[25]
but in this
instance the dispute was referred in 2020 and award was only issued
in 2023. In the meantime, the applicant is not
realising the object
of the business as a result of the respondent not purchasing
petroleum products (and or even paying rentals)
and at the same time
the respondent is not realising the profit from the filing station.
The very important object of arbitration
as a stratagem to achieve
swift justice appears to have been derailed and the delay the
finalisation of the dispute such
that parties end up in a worse off
position.
Costs
[29] The applicant
is seeking costs order on attorney and client scale as envisaged in
terms of the lease agreement and I
harbour no qualms with such a
request.
Conclusion
I grant the following
order:
1.
It is
declared that the order to stay granted on 2 November 2022 lapsed on
17 March 2023.
2.
The
respondent is ordered to vacate the immovable property, to wit, Erf
59, Cresta Ext 1 Township, held under Deed of Transfer No.
T27880/95
situated at corner Judges and Republic Avenue, Cresta Randburg,
within 7 days of the order.
3.
The
respondent is ordered to pay applicant’s costs on attorney and
client scale.
Mokate Victor Noko
Judge of the High
Court
Delivered: This judgement
was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose name is reflected
and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the Parties /
their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter
on CaseLines. The date of the judgment
is deemed to be 29 November 2023.
Counsel
for the applicant: Adv S Aucamp
Instructed by: DM5
Incorporated
Counsel
for the Respondent: Adv JM Butler
Instructed
by: Des and Naidoo Attorneys
Date
of hearing: 15 August 2023
Date
of Judgment: 29 November 2023
[1]
See
copy of the Deed of Transfer at CL 003-28.
[2]
See
Caselines (
CL
)
000-1.
[3]
CL
19-1.
[4]
The
applicant carries on a business as a manufacturer, marketer and bulk
distributor of petroleum, diesel and chemical products
and also a
franchisor of,
inter
alia
,
The Quick Shop Convenience Store chain operated at Engine Service
Stations. See Applicant’s Heads of Argument, para 6,
CL 102-3.
[5]
The
applicant averred that this addendum was subject to terms and
conditions of the main lease.
[6]
Vide clause 34.1(3) of schedule 2 of the operating lease.
[7]
See
applicant’s Replying Affidavit, CL 008-12 t para 16.
[8]
See
Respondent’s letter annexed to the Applicant’s Replying
Affidavit at CL 008-30 where the respondent stated that
“…
I
can positively state that DAV has remedied the position. As you are
aware, before and even during the dry period, we were already
engaging with Engine to remedy the situation.”
[9]
See
Applicants Heads of Argument, CL 102-7 at para 18.2.
[10]
As
it was valid until 31 March 2021.
[11]
By
failing to issue letter of intend within 30 days of the sale
agreement with the purchaser.
[12]
See
certificate of balance marked AA10, CL 008-71.
[13]
In
terms of which eviction was stayed pending the arbitration.
[14]
See Respondent’s Heads of Argument, para 7, CL 102-23, the
respondent stating that it has right of occupation till 31 March
2023. “…
Respondent
has a legitimate entitlement to remain on the premises as the
respondent concluded a Lease Premium Addendum on 14 September
2009,
securing the respondent’s tenancy up until 31 March 2023.”
[15]
(8324/2014)
[2014] ZAWCHC180 (3 December 2014).
[16]
At
54.
[17]
A
decision of the Western Cape High Court.
[18]
(21/27854)
[2021] ZAGPJHC (21 July 2021).
[19]
Para
3 of the judgment.
[20]
The
applicant having stated that the respondent has claimed compensation
to the tune of 36 million. See
Applicant’s
Replying Affidavit at CL 008-7, para 5.
[21]
See
Engen Petroleum Ltd v Mfoza Service Station (Pty) ltd and Another
(17400/2019) [2020] ZAGPJHC (5 October 2020).
[22]
2016(2) SA 522 SCA.
[23]
This
makes the judgment in
Rissik
Street One Stop cc t/ Rissik Street Engine v Engine Petroleum
Limited
(CCT 196/21)
[2023] ZACC 4
;
2023 (4) BCLR 425
(CC) 91 February 2023)
distinguishable.
[24]
The
respondent having claimed 36 million and the applicant having
claimed amount due which may have increased over time.
[25]
See
Lufuno
Mphaphuli & Associates Pty Ltd v Andrews
2009 (4) SA 459
(CC). on the advantages of arbitrations.
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