Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 26South Africa
Khumalo v Brompton Court Body Corporate and Others (Leave to Appeal) (11061/2014) [2022] ZAGPJHC 26 (14 January 2022)
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Khumalo v Brompton Court Body Corporate and Others (Leave to Appeal) (11061/2014) [2022] ZAGPJHC 26 (14 January 2022)
Khumalo v Brompton Court Body Corporate and Others (Leave to Appeal) (11061/2014) [2022] ZAGPJHC 26 (14 January 2022)
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sino date 14 January 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
No. 11061/2014
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
REVISED:
Date:
14/01/2022
In
the matter between
KHUMALO,
CF
Applicant
and
BROMPTON
COURT BODY CORPORATE
First Respondent
PROF
R
SCHLOSS
Second Respondent
THE
SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT RANDBURG WEST
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
LEAVE TO APPEAL
MAHOMED,
AJ
1.
This is an application
for leave to appeal the whole of the judgment which I handed down on
30 September 2021, in which I dismissed
an application for
condonation and review of an arbitration award. I awarded costs on an
attorney client scale in terms of the
rules of the first respondent
as well as the rate of interest charged.
2.
Section 32
of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965
allows a party 6 weeks to apply for a
review from the date the award is published.
3.
The award was published
on 21 December 2012.
4.
On 13 April 2018, a
writ of execution was authorised for the judgment debt in the sum of
R87 349.48, for arrear levies and
electricity. The first
respondent, who represents a body corporate, holds the writ in
abeyance, given the litigation instituted
by the applicant.
5.
The applicant served
her review application on 22 June 2018, when the first respondent
argued that she had not applied for condonation.
6.
On 22 August 2018, the
applicant served and filed her condonation application.
7.
Although the applicant
served her replying affidavit to the review application in October
2018, she served her heads of argument,
practice note and chronology
only in March 2020. Based on the facts the applicant had no sense of
urgency in finalising this matter.
8.
I dismissed the
application for condonation when the applicant failed to fully
address the court on the long delay in prosecuting
this matter since
she allegedly knew of the award back in 2014. Although, on her
version, she “ knew on the date of the arbitration
hearing
which way the matter was going to be decided,” having heard the
arbitrator.
9.
The applicant failed to
show “good cause” to enable a court to understand, “what
caused the long delay and why
her non-compliance can be condoned.”
10.
The applicant bears the
burden of “actually proving” as opposed to merely
alleging, the good cause.
11.
If she had good reasons
for a long delay, she should surely have presented them to this
Court, to assist the court in applying its
discretion. No explanation
was proffered, other than reference to the fact that she engaged in
litigation to order the award had
prescribed.
12.
At paragraph 50.1 of my
judgment, I noted the various occasions when the applicant could have
brought her review application, when
she failed to do so. The delay
is effectively over almost 9 years since the award was made.
13.
Another court will
require the same details for it to apply its discretion in condoning
the delay and ensuring that the applicant
is not in flagrant
disregard of the rules. To overlook this critical test, would be to
set a poor precedent for litigants in the
future and undermines the
very basis of an effective and efficient judicial system. Litigants
must bear in mind that condonation
is not a right, but an indulgence,
when a decisionmaker, must apply her or his discretion to the facts
presented.
13.1.
The challenge in casu
is that no such details are presented for any judicial authority to
work with to exercise that discretion
in fairness to all parties
whist being mindful of the basic rule of natural justice, a right to
a fair hearing.
13.2.
The evidence is that
the applicant “became active” only in 2014, when first
respondent served papers and she realised
that the first respondent
was about to execute against her rental property in a housing
complex, which it manages. But even at
that date, she failed to bring
her application for review of the arbitrator’s award, until
only in 2018 when she properly,
served her review application.
14.
The applicant has
raised several grounds of appeal, inter alia,
14.1.
amounts awarded failed
to include payments made previously,
14.2.
disputing the first
respondent’s issue of summons for recovery of outstanding
levies for a different period,
14.3.
the exorbitant legal
costs awarded by the arbitrator,
14.4.
the arbitrator failed
to order the first respondent to repair a structural defect in her
unit and disputing the amount he awarded
as a gratuitous payment,
14.5.
the percentage interest
charged on outstanding levy,
14.6.
an award of costs on a
punitive scale,
14.7.
the award was mala
fide, and the arbitrator was biased, he conspired and colluded with
the legal representatives of the first respondent,
the arbitrator
considered the wrong documents in determining the award,
14.8.
that this court stated
that she had brought her review application before several courts
when this is the first review she had brought
before a court.
15.
The applicant appeal
against “punitive costs” I granted, is incorrect. The
costs on a higher scale, is awarded as provided
for in the rules of
the second respondent, the costs were not punitive costs. The rate of
interest on outstanding levies is also
according to the Rules of the
Body Corporate which she signed up to as its member, albeit she may
not agree with that rate.
16.
The applicant in her
oral submissions, agreed she was incorrect that this court stated
that she had taken her review application
before several courts.
16.1.
The history of her
hearings before several courts appears in the judgment and is clear,
it is not necessary to repeat the history
at this point, save to
state that a claim for damages against the first respondent is
pending before the Magistrate’s Court
Randburg for the repair
for the structural damages to her unit, albeit, that this dispute has
been resolved when the arbitrator
compensated her for same. During
that period, she still failed to launch a review application and
alleged in evidence that she
had “always intended to do so.”
17.
Furthermore, the
applicant alleged bias, collusion, conspiracy, and mala fides on the
part of the arbitrator and the legal representatives
of the second
respondent.
18.
On the evidence before
this Court, it was clear that the applicant had failed to prepare and
present a proper case to the arbitrator
and persists in her belief
that it was not her onus to prove her damages, but the first
respondent’s job to assess and prove
her loss.
19.
The applicant is
unhappy with the award made in 2012 and seeks to “review”
the award almost 9 years later.
19.1.
However, she fails to
inform of the Court details of why and how she failed to bring her
matter for review within of 6 weeks as
provided for in the
Arbitration Act or
within any reasonable time of the award being
published. She does not proffer evidence to support why her late
filing should be
condoned.
19.2.
She fails to provide
any evidence of the various allegations of bias, collusion, mala
fides and other allegations to support her
“review” of
the award. Her argument relates to the award itself which cannot be
her grounds of review.
20.
Another court will
require evidence to exercise its discretion on the condonation and
certainly to determine the allegations of
bias, mala fides and the
like. A court cannot make findings on general and bald allegations. A
litigant must be able to quantify
a claim and present supporting
evidence to prove his or her claim.
21.
See
AARON’S
WHALE ROCK TRUST v MURRAY & ROBERTS LTD
[1991] ZASCA 184
;
1992 (1) SA 552
(C ) at
656 B-D
, where a
court can only use the evidence before it, that is, there must be
sufficient evidence for a court to make a proper assessment
of
damages, as it cannot embark on conjecture in assessing damages
without a factual basis for it, nor can a court award an arbitrary
approximation to a claimant who has failed to produce evidence to
support a claim.
21.1.
The evidence is that
documents purported to support her claim are dated “after”
the arbitration award was published
and were clearly not before the
arbitrator at that hearing.
22.
In terms of the
s17
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
, leave to appeal may only
be given, where the judge concerned is of the opinion that:
22.1.
the appeal “would”
have a reasonable prospect of success,
22.2.
where there is a
compelling reason, the appeal should be heard, including conflicting
judgments on the matter under consideration.
23.
In
MONT
CHEVAUX TRUST v GOOSEN 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) PARA 6, ACTING NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND OTHERS v DEMOCRATIC
ALLIANCE
(19577/09) [2016] ZAGPPHC 489 at para 25
,
the threshold for the granting of leave to appeal against the
judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act, where the
court stated:
“
the
use of the word would indicates a measure of certainty that another
court will differ from the court’s judgment sought
to be
appealed against.”
24.
I am not
persuaded that the applicant has proffered any cogent reasons to
condone her late filing of her application. Furthermore,
another
court will itself require reasons to arrive at a different
conclusion. No reasons for the long delay have been presented
to this
Court. If the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay,
it ought to have been presented. The applicant alleged
that she
“always intended” to review the award, and that her
review was included in her answering papers to the second
respondent’s application to make the award an order of court.
However, this argument cannot assist her, in that she, failed
to
bring a proper application, as provided for in Rule 6(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court and within the time allowed or any reasonable
time. The applicant was unable to discharge the burden of “actually
proving” good cause.
24.1.
Her evidence that she
was not obliged to bring her review application whilst the matter was
before the Supreme Court of Appeals
and the Constitutional Court,
cannot assist her, as to the reasons for her long delay nor with her
allegations of bias collusion
and the like. She has not proffered any
explanations for her failure to launch the review proceedings
“before” the
matters appeared before those courts, and
besides the Constitutional Court was seized only with the issue of
her leave to appeal,
the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals, on
the validity of the award.
25.
Furthermore, another
court will also require “evidence” of bias, collusion,
conspiracy, as alleged, for it to review
the award.
26.
I am not persuaded that
another court, due to the paucity of evidence, will arrive at a
different conclusion in this matter and
accordingly, the application
must fail.
I
make the following order:
1.
Leave to appeal is
refused.
2.
The applicant is to pay
the costs on an attorney client scale.
________________________
S
MAHOMED
Acting
Judge of the High Court
This
judgment was prepared and authored by Acting Judge Mahomed. It is
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
or their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic
file of this matter on Caselines. The date for hand-down
is deemed to
be 14 January 2022.
Date
of hearing: 13 December 2021
Date
of Judgment: 14 January 2022
Appearances:
For
Applicant: Ms Khumalo
Tel.
011 782 3111
Khumalo
Attorneys & Associates
For
First Respondent: Adv C Gordon
Cell
No. 083 9660
550
Instructed
by:
Jordaan & Wolberg Attorneys
Tel:
011 485 1990
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