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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2022] ZAGPJHC 91
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## Modise v S (A050/2021)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 91 (16 February 2022)
Modise v S (A050/2021)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 91 (16 February 2022)
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sino date 16 February 2022
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: A050/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED
DATE:
16/02/2022
In
the matter between:
MODISE
EPHRAIM SAMSAM
APPELLANT
And
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MATJELE
AJ:
1.
The appellant was
charged
and convicted, in the Regional Court, Soweto, on two charges:
1.
Count one: kidnapping
2.
Count two rape of a six years old child.
2.
The appellant was sentenced to four
years imprisonment on the charge of kidnapping and fourteen years
imprisonment for the rape
charge. The four years’ imprisonment
on the charge of kidnapping was ordered to run concurrently with the
first term of fifteen
years imprisonment on the charge of rape.
and
was further declared unfit to possess a firearm in terms of Section
103(1) of Act 60 of 2000.
The effective
term of imprisonment is thus a period of fourteen years direct
imprisonment. The appellant now appeals against conviction
and
sentence with leave of the Court
a
quo
.
3.
Heads of argument were filed and arguments
by both counsel were heard on the 17
th
January 2022.
Facts
4.
The State led the evidence of three
witnesses, the complainant, first report and the medical practitioner
Dr Thompson. The complainant
who was 6 years old at the time of the
incident, and 7 years old when she testified before the trial court
that Friday the 23
rd
January 2015 when she came out of school, the Appellant met her at
the main gate of her school, N[....] Primary School in Moletsane
around 13h30, and asked her to go with him but she refused stating
that she has been taught that after school she must go home
to wash
her socks, polish her shoes, and eat before taking her bath. When she
refused to go with him, the Appellant then held her
by hand and
walked with her by force against her will. They went pass a tavern,
and he went with her into a yard with a red gate
next to the tavern,
where he took her into a shack. It is her evidence that no one
witnessed this. When inside the shack he removed
her clothes and
panty, and he also removed his own. He made the complainant to lie on
her back on the cement floor of the shack,
climbed on top of her and
then penetrated her vagina with his penis. He made up and down
movements while on top of her, and she
was feeling pain inside her
vagina or “kookoo” as he did so, the pain caused by his
penis or “pee-pee”.
After he finished he let her go. She
dressed herself and left going to her home. After the Appellant told
her not to tell anyone.
He also gave her R2.
5.
The second witness called was M[....]
M[....], the first report, who is the complainant’s stepmother.
She confirmed the age
of child being 7 years old, born on the 18
th
August 2008. Her evidence is that on the 23
rd
January 2015 she was woken up by her husband, the complainant’s
father, who handed her the complainant’s panty from
the laundry
basket. It was having whitish substance, and he wanted her enquire
from the complainant what happened to her. She woke
up and asked the
complainant, who told her she got hurt by a swing at school. The
child confirmed that she did not tell her about
this when she got
home from school, and also that she did not tell the teachers or her
friends about this injury, from the swing.
She tried to open her legs
to examine her, but the complainant tightened her thighs, not
allowing her. She left her, but the following
day as she was bathing
her the complainant continued tightening her thighs.
6.
When she enquired why she was doing so she
stated that she got hurt at the swing, pointing at her buttocks. She
then took her and
placed her on the bed, and opened up her thighs
with the assistance of her father. She noticed that she was “
swollen
on both sides in between her private part or inside the private part,
she was swollen”
. Also she
noticed that on the opening or mouth of the vagina “it was a
bit wider and it was swollen as well”. She only
noticed these
injuries but never touched her private part. Even after her discovery
she asked her to tell her the truth, but the
child maintained that
she fell on the swing. Later that day as they went to the salon she
recalled that the complainant and her
friend Palesa while playing
outside the house the previous day, they had R2 with them. She
decided to go ask Palesa in front of
her mother and in the presence
of the complainant. Palesa said it was from her own uncle, but the
complainant corrected her that
is was from the appellant, Karabo’s
uncle. Asked where he lives, she said he stays “there”,
without being specific.
But later as she disclosed she realised
appellant lived where they previously rented, and that is where they
were fetching their
mail from. On their way back home she asked and
pleaded with the complainant to tell her the truth as to why the
Appellant gave
her money and also what happed to her. She then told
her she and Palisa went to where Appellant’s stays to get the
money
he had promised to give her after school.
7.
After a lot of probing, after being
asked why he had promised her money, that’s when he stated to
her what she testified in
court that he met the appellant at the
gate, who asked if the school was out, and upon her confirming he
asked her to go with him,
to which request she refused and told him
that her mother’s instructions are that after school she must
proceed straight
home to wash her socks and polish shoes. He then
provided her R2 if she went with him and that it won’t take
long. However,
she also later said they went to fetch the R2 where
the appellant stays, when she was with Palesa. She promised to show
the mother
the following day when they go to church where they had
gone to with the appellant.
8.
The following day, Sunday the 25
th
January 2015 as they went to Church she reminded her what she
promised. The child pointed to her to a spot not far from the school
gate, where there was some polony plastic, and said that’s
where the appellant raped her. She was adamant, and as she
interrogated
her further she changed and said it was not there, but
did not say where, but rather kept quiet as they went to church. She
was
not satisfied with the complainant’s answers as she was “…
.
saying one thing after the other”.
9.
On Monday the 26
th
January 2015 both parents decided to get her examined by a medical
practitioner, and were referred to Nthabiseng clinic in Baragwanath
hospital. While there Ms. M[....] further pleaded with the child to
speak the truth, indicating she didn’t believe what she
had
told her earlier, and telling her that such things don’t just
happen to kids but for other reasons. She begged her for
the truth,
and it was then the child gave her a different version that from the
main gate of the school they went to a house next
to where people sit
outside drinking alcohol. She pointed out to her a yard with a white
gate, with shacks within, and said they
went into one shack that is
not occupied or owned by any person. In that shack he pulled up her
dress up, pulled down her panty
and made her lay down, and slept on
top of her. She did not want to hear further, stopped her and said
the child must show her
the yard. The child showed her the yard, but
she didn’t go in the yard. The following day they went Jabulani
Police Station
where the child was interviewed away from the mother.
When they returned with her they told the mother that the child knows
what
is happening, the only thing is that she is only scared the
parents will give her a hiding if she told them.
10.
Dr Lloyd Darosum Thompson from Nthabiseng
TC situated in Baragwanath Hospital testified that he examined the
complainant, then 6
years old on the 26
th
January 2015 at about 20h15. The child said an identifiable man took
her to a nearby house, undressed her and subjected her to
virginal
penetration. There was no visible injury on her body. He conducted a
gynaecological examination, and discovered that the
labia majora was
red; the hymen was not torn but angular with a swelling at 9o’clock
area; and there was irregular bruising
at about 6 o’clock area
on the perineum. His conclusion was that it was consistent with
vaginal penetration. He could not
comment whether it was penis or
finger, but he was certain something had entered there because
9o’clock is quiet high. The
were no other injuries or tears
anywhere else. The J88 Medico-legal report was accepted as Exhibit
“A” and the DNA
paediatric sexual assault evidence
collection kit information was accepted as Exhibit “B” of
panty taken for DNA analysis.
11.
For the defence the Appellant testified
first, followed by Marry Samsam, his siter in law and Roland Hill,
the owner of the yard
where the incident allegedly took place. The
appellant testified that he was arrested on the 27
th
January 2015, while at his home. He knows the complainant and his
father whom he refers to as Mr. Maratha. The father and the child
were in the company of 3 police officers. He says on the 23
rd
January 2015 he got home at 7am in the morning coming from work, as
he was working night shift the previous day. He prepared food,
ate
breakfast and went to sleep and only woke up at 14h00, when he rushed
to Jabulani Mall to buy school stationery for his child.
The people
present at home were his brother Tsetse, his grandmother, and Mary
Samsam, his sister in law. It was on his way to the
mall he saw the
complainant and her friend in front of the school’s small gate.
They were not in school uniform. The complainant
greeted him and he
greeted back. When the complainant heard he was going to the mall she
asked him to buy her ice-cream. He promised
that he will buy it,
though he did not mean it.
12.
After he returned home, and resting in his
outside room, he was woken by a knock on the door, from his nice,
Karabo, presenting
the complainant and Palesa. They had come for the
ice cream he had promised the complainant during the day. He laughed
and placed
the hand on the mouth. The record says he did so on her
mouth, which does not make sense, as he was apologising not to buying
her
the promised ice cream. She then asked for R1, and since they
were two he gave her R2, in the presence of Tsetse, Mary, Thabang
his
younger brother; and Mary’s friend. The two children then left
happy. He never saw the child after that. He denied the
complainant’s
version that he met the complainant at 1h30 pm at the school gate,
dragged her to a shack. He denied there’s
a home with red gate
next to the tavern. Also denied that he took her into the shack and
vaginally penetrated. His blood sample
was taken a month later while
in custody
13.
He attacked the credibility of the
complainant alleging she is a liar, who does even at school to her
teacher, according to the
complainant’s friend, Palesa. He got
to know this after he was in custody from his sister, Masekwala Mary
Samsam, who had
gone enquire from Palesa’s mother why he the
accused had been arrested. He also made an allegation that there was
another
teenage boy who had sexual intercourse with the complainant,
and this information as well was from Masekwala. Confronted with the
findings of the doctor that had the child had sex before he would
have stopped his examination and called the police, he said he
does
not know about that. Also he was surprised as to why this child who
was comfortable with him would make such allegations against
him.
14.
Roland Hill, the owner of the yard with
shacks, where the rape incident allegedly happened testified that he
knows the complainant
because she came to his house with the police
and her father pointing one of the three shacks in his yard.
According to him this
pointed shack has always been occupied by two
brothers Vusi and Mzwanzi, for the last 10 years, inclusive of the
period of the
alleged incident. One of them was present when the
child pointed out the shack. He testified that the shack has proper
locks and
remains locked when neither one of them is present, as they
each have a set of keys. The shack is furnished with a bed, wardrobe,
fridge, kitchen unit and a television contrary to what the child
testified before court. Also there are people in the yard all
the
time, even when he is absent. He denied his gate was ever red in
colour, but always black and white. He alleged he was at home
on the
23
rd
January 2015 cleaning the house, the yard, including cutting the
grass, took a bath and the watered his lawn with a hosepipe, which
contradicted what he said in examination in chief that he was
suffering from flu and sat next to the kitchen door. He maintained
he
did both. He has never seen the complainant in his yard ever before.
15.
The last defence witness was Mary Masekwala
Samsam, who corroborated the accused about the time he arrived at
home on the 23
rd
January 2015 in the morning, going to sleep in his outside room and
waking up at 14h00 before going to the mall. She also confirmed
that
is the one who told the accused about the complainant’s
tendency to lie according to M[....] M[....] her step mother,
which
information she had received from Palesa’s mother who was
relating deliberations of how the complainant and her step
mother
came to her to enquire from her about what had happened to the
children on the 23
rd
January 2015. She heard how the complainant kept interrupting and
trying to stop Palesa from talking truth until M[....] told her
to
stop it as she knows the complainant talks a lot of lies. She got
this information when she went to enquire why the accused
got
arrested.
16.
About the allegations that the complainant
had been caught red-handed with a teenage boy having sex, she got the
story from the
complainant’s father, Maratha, who informed him
he found them in the rented garage. He found the boy on top of the
complainant
and her dress was lifted and the boy on top of her. He
took his daughter away and reported that boy to his parents. At home
the
mother apparently asking the child where did she see what they
were doing, she said from TV. She also confirmed being present when
the accused gave the complainant money while in the company of
Palesa. What reminded her was the noise they made as they entered
the
yard, due to their fear for the dog. She also corroborated the
accused that when he returned from the mall he had plastic bags
carrying stationery with him. Tested with her recollection of dates
under cross examination, she was so ever accurate and never
contradicted herself.
17.
The
Court a quo reconciled itself with the fact that the it relies on the
evidence of a single witness who is a very young child
implicating
the appellant. He was also alive to the cautionary rules applicable
in relying on the evidence of a single witness,
and the need for some
required corroboration he should apply to reduce the possibility of
wrongful conviction. Also relying on
the case of
Woji
vs Samtam Insurance Company Ltd
.
[1]
the Court showed that it was also alive to the danger of accepting
the evidence of child witnesses, and the need to ensure it is
trustworthy. Relying on the child’s ability to identify the
accused accurately as the incident happened during the day and
she
knows the accused well.
18.
The court also concluded that there is
no
difference in the versions of the child and that of the appellant
,
except for the person who raped the child. It acknowledged the fact
that there were contradictions in the evidence of the child
witness.
These were not on how she was raped and who raped her, hence the
Court a quo considered them immaterial. The Court was
also alive to
the inadmissibility of evidence where it was induced by intimidation,
and concluded that in this case there was none,
and the complainant
was not subjected to
interrogation
as
to the name of the accused as perpetrator. Based on confirmation of
vaginal penetration by medical evidence
the Court concluded that was sufficient corroboration of the
complainant’s evidence. The court a quo found the Appellant
guilty of both counts as charged.
The
Issues, the law and reasons.
19.
I will now deal with the issues raised on appeal by the
appellant, the counter-arguments and my ruling, per issue raised.
20.
The first issue raised by the appellant is whether the
complainant was raped at all. The arguments on behalf of the
respondent cited
the evidence of the complainant and Dr. Thompson’s
evidence. It is my conclusion that based on the evidence of Dr.
Thompson
it is clear there had been some penetration of the vagina of
the complainant to an extent, based on the redness of the
labia
majora
, the swelling of the hymen at 9 o’clock and the
bruising of the perineum at 6 o’clock area that he discovered
through
his gynaecological examination. He confirmed that something
did go in there, whether a finger or penis he was not sure.
21.
Pointedly, in my view, the question should be whether the
complainant was penetrated by the Appellant? One has to consider the
evidence
of the complainant and Dr. Thompson in totality and compare
it with reasonable probabilities. The appellant is an adult male who
has his own child, for whom on the 23
rd
January 2020 he
had gone to Jabulani Mall buy school stationery. It begs the
question, whether if he had penetrated the complainant
as per her
evidence, including making movements up and down, her hymen would
still be intact and not torn, and would her vagina
remain be without
any tears? Logically speaking, if I have to accept the child’s
evidence as true regarding the sexual act
she explained, we would not
be talking about the minor injuries as discovered by Dr. Thompson. I
believe that something happened
or “silly things” did
happen between her and some other possibly younger inexperienced
male. For instance, there is
somewhere in her evidence she mentions a
certain “Tshediso”, which is a male person’s name,
and which is not
the accused’s name, though the complainant
said it is his other name. This was not followed up sufficiently.
22.
Also
as argued by the appellant’s counsel, that based on the Dr.
Thompson’s evidence in order to inspect a child for
vaginal
injuries, gentle labia traction has to be practiced to pull the labia
apart as the area there is close or tight, or else
the person
inspecting can cause injuries. Yet evidence before us is to the
effect that while the child was resisting to open her
legs the mother
with the assistance of the father forcefully opened her thighs apart
and she “…
noticed
that she was swollen on
both
sides just between
her private part
or
inside her the private part
,
she was swollen”
[2]
(my
emphasis). Even though she denied touching her in her evidence, but
in terms of Dr. Thompson’s evidence it would have
been
impossible for her not to touch in order to see what she observed.
23.
The
second ground of appeal raised is that the complainant’s
version should be approached with caution as she is a single
witness.
It is clear that in terms of
Section 208
of the
Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977
the accused can be convicted of any offence on the
single evidence of any competent witness. A final evaluation can
rarely be made
without considering whether such evidence is
consistent with the probabilities.
[3]
In
S
v Sauls and Others
[4]
Diemont
JA stated:
“
There
is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a
consideration of the credibility of a single witness…
The
trial judge will weigh his evidence,
will
consider its merits and demerits and, having done so will decide
whether there are shortcomings or defects or contradictions
in his
testimony
, he is satisfied that
the truth has been told. The cautionary rule referred to by De
Villiers JP in 1932 (in R v Mokoena), may
be a guide to a right
decision but it does not mean “that the appeal must succeed if
any criticism, however slender, of the
witnesses’ evidence
where well founded ….” It has been said more than once
that the exercise of caution must
not be allowed to displace the
exercise of common sense.”
(my
emphasis)
24.
In
Stevens
v S
[5]
it
was stated that:
“
In
terms of
s 208
of the
Criminal Procedure Act, an
accused can be
convicted of any offence on the single evidence of a competent
witness. It is, however, a well-established judicial
principle that
the evidence of a single witness should be
approached
with caution, his or her merits as a witness being weighed against
factors which militate against his or her credibility
.”
(my emphasis)
25.
In light of these cases, the main question in this matter is
whether the
child’s evidence was substantially satisfactory in
all material respects, when considering the probabilities, her
credibility,
merits and demerits of that evidence
in order to decide whether there are shortcomings or defects or
contradictions in her testimony.
26.
Firstly, there are three versions from the complainant and her mother
regarding
when and how she received the R2 the mother saw her and
Palesa playing with it. The first one is that the appellant gave it
to
her when they were playing on the grass inside the school yard.
The second one is that he gave it to her immediately after the rape
incident after telling her not to say what happened. The third
version one that tallies with the accused’s version that the
child and her friend Palesa went to the accused’s place of
residence and he gave it to them there.
The
last version, which was also confirmed by Mary Samsam, raises the
question as to how probable is it that the child who was sexually
molested a few hours earlier would be comfortable to go to her
perpetrator’s yard later on just to ask for R2 or ice cream?
While the Court a quo may have seen this contradiction as immaterial,
I hold a different view, because it is the consistent enquiry
about
this R2 by the mother that ultimately made the child to pin-point the
appellant as the perpetrator.
27.
Secondly, what is the probability of there being no children at all
after school
around 13:30 when the classes ended at 13:00. Is it
really probable that in a township there would be no people to see
the appellant
pulling the child against her will, kidnapping her, and
not intervene? It does not make sense that the complainant is pulled
against
her will even pass a usually busy tavern where people sit
outside to drink alcohol, but on that day there is no one to see this
unusual occurrence, till they even reach the house with shacks.
Throughout, there is no one to witnessing or reprimanding the
appellant.
28.
Thirdly, as I have stated above, the kind of injuries suffered by the
child
are they consistent with penetration by a sober adult male,
with sexual experience, considering the evidence of the complainant
that he was moving up and down on top of her with his penis inside
her vagina. How probable is this version in comparison with
Dr.
Thompson’s evidence of injuries he discovered? It is my
conclusion that this is not probable that the hymen and the vagina
would be without tears on a 6 years old child. There is probably
another explanation out there, but not the one supplied by the
complainant.
29.
Fourthly, the State’s failure to call the evidence of either
the arresting
officer or the child’s father about the condition
of the shack where the incident allegedly happened, especially in
light
of the evidence of the defence witness, Roland Hill, that the
shack has never been empty in the last 10 years, having been occupied
by two brothers and fully furnished, contrary to the complainant’s
evidence. This leaves much to be desired and it is a failure
to put
relevant safeguards by the state to avoid wrongful conviction.
30.
The
third ground of appeal is the fact that the complainant is a 7 years
old child. The appellant argues that such evidence should
be
approached with caution and a guarantee should be found that it is
truthful and correct in all material facts. A balanced approach
was
expressed in
S
v K
[6]
as follows:
“
Judicial
officers ought to be vigilant in the assessment and the evaluation of
evidence to
eliminate a risk of conviction on the basis of
evidence of doubtful quantum
. The complainants in matters
of this nature, unfortunately, happen to be the most vulnerable
members of our society. …
the vulnerability of this
section of our society should not be allowed to be a substitute for
proof beyond reasonable doubt or to
cloud the threshold requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Judicial officers ought
to and are expected to evaluate evidence properly and objectively as
a whole and against all probabilities
in order to arrive at a just
and fair conclusion. Anything falling short of this test is nothing
other than a miscarriage of justice.”
(my emphasis)
31.
In
Woji
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd
[7]
it
was stated:
“
Trustworthiness
… depends on factors such as the child’s power of
observation, his power of recollection, and his power of narration
on
the specific matter to be testified …
There
are other factors
as well which
the Court will take into account in assessing the child’s
trustworthiness in the witness-box.
Does
he appear to be honest
–
is there a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth?”
(my
emphasis)
32.
Section
60
of
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment
Act 32 of 2007
provides that a
Court
may not treat evidence of the complainant with caution only on
account of the nature of the offence (sexual offence). However,
the
circumstances of each will have to be considered based on its merits.
In S v Dyira
[8]
the following
was stated that:
“
Our
courts have laid down certain general guidelines which are of
assistance when warning themselves of the danger of relying upon
a
single witness who is also a child witness. In the ordinary course
(a) a court will articulate the warning in the judgment, and
also the
reasons for the need for caution in
general and with reference to
the particular circumstances of the case; (b) a court will examine
the evidence in order
to satisfy
itself that the evidence given by the witness is clear and
substantially satisfactory in all material respects
;
(c) although corroboration is not a prerequisite for a conviction, a
court will sometimes, in appropriate circumstances,
seek
corroboration which implicates the accused before it will convict
beyond reasonable doubt; (d) failing corroboration, a court will look
for some feature in the evidence which gives the implication
by
a
single child witness enough of a hallmark of trustworthiness to
reduce substantially the risk of a wrong reliance
upon her evidence.” (my emphasis)
33.
In this matter, from the evidence of the mother it is clear
the child was reluctant over several days to say what happened. In
fact,
it is clear that her confession followed an extensive
interrogation, even in front of her friend and the friend’s
mother
enquiry about who gave her the R2; coupled with the whitish
substance that was found on her panty, it was clear the said
interrogation
was based on a strong suspicion that the person who
gave the complainant the R2 should be the one who was responsible for
the whitish
substance on her panty. This goes without reason. The
questioning was not without purpose, but a reasonable suspicion. The
length
of time and the probing it took for her to confess to her
mother as to who sexually abused her. All these factors create the
need
for the Court to tread with caution to avoid a wrongful
conviction when accepting the evidence of this child witness.
34.
The contradiction about what the child was wearing on that
Friday of the 23
rd
January 2015 cannot be downplayed. The
child testified about how he undressed her black tunic and white
jersey, whereas as a fact
on that day she was not wearing the uniform
she explained how it was removed from her body, and how she dressed
it up again after
the rape. The fact that the appellant and the
complainant’s mother state that she was not wearing uniform is
important. I’m
of the view that the court a quo made an error
in considering this contradiction among others as immaterial. Could
the child not
creating things in her mind, or re-playing what
happened in another incident, and decided to protect the real
perpetrator with
the appellant, adding some spices along the way, of
things that did not happen. Even if I am wrong with this proposition,
the evidence
presented by the State are full of contradictions that
no reasonable court could convict on that evidence alone.
35.
The
dictum in
Blom
[9]
remains relevant, that the two cardinal rules of logic must be
applied if the court seeks to reach a conclusion in reasoning by
inference, namely, that:
a.
the inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all facts,
and if not,
the inference cannot be drawn; and
b.
the proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable
inference,
except the one sought to be drawn. If not, then there must
be doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn is correct.
36.
As stated above there are at least two other inferences that
could be drawn, other than that the accused raped the complainant,
vis, the first report and the child’s father could have caused
those injuries when she inspected the child on the 24
th
January 2020. The second possibility, is that the complainant did
“silly things” with another child a little older
than
her, but inexperienced, hence she kept on referring to falling on a
swing, pointing at her buttocks, yet refusing to be examined
on her
vagina. She was clearly hiding something, and correctly avoiding to
be beaten by her parents, considering she had been found
with a boy
before.
37.
It
is very telling that she remained adamant that she fell on the swing
for three days, until she was asked about where she received
the R2
she and Palesa were playing with on Friday the 23
rd
January
2021. After the mother promised she won’t assault her and won’t
tell the father, she clearly began alleging
the accused is the one
who did “silly things” with her, instead of some possible
Tshediso or another boy around her
age. More so that she had
previously been caught red-handed with another young boy in the room
both naked or having attempted to
do what she informed her mother she
had seen on TV. The accused became a scapegoat, to protect the real
culprit, just for the parents
to stop asking her any further and to
avoid a hiding. The interrogation about the R2 could easily have
amounted to the suggestibility
[10]
and an easy way out for her as it was clear her lie about falling
from the swing, for reasons unknown to her, was accepted by her
parents.
38.
In addition, it must be remembered that the accused’s
defence was that of alibi, that at the time the complainant alleges
she was kidnapped and ultimately raped, around 13h30 he was at home
sleeping as he had been working night shift the night before.
This
story was corroborated by the defence witness, Masekwala Samsam. This
alibi was never proven to be false, except that it is
evidence that
is mutually destructive to that of the complainant.
39.
When it comes to the defence of alibi the SCA in
S
v Shabalala
stated:
“
It
is trite law that, where an alibi is raised there is no burden on the
accused to prove his alibi. The onus rests on the state
to prove his
alibi is false. ... The effect of the falseness of an alibi on an
accused’s case is to place him in a position
as if he had never
testified at all.”
[11]
40.
But
in applying this test, the alibi does not have to be considered in
isolation but with regard to the totality of evidence in
the case. If
on all evidence there is a reasonable possibility that this alibi
evidence is true then that means there is a possibility
he did not
commit the crime, and should therefore be acquitted.
[12]
While very much alive to the fact that the court of first instance
has the benefit of seeing, hearing, appraising a witness
[13]
and watching the demeanour of witnesses, It is my view that
considering the evidence in its totality, the court a’ quo
erred
in its conclusion that, the state had discharged the onus on it
to prove the case beyond any reasonable doubt, and the appellant’s
version was not reasonably possibly true.
41.
In all the circumstances I am of the view
that the State failed to discharge the onus of proving the guilt of
the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
ORDER
42.
The following order is made.
(a)
The appeal is upheld and the conviction and sentence are set aside on
both counts.
_____________________
L
M A Matjele
Acting
Judge of the High Court, Johannesburg
I
agree and it is so ordered
_____________________
M Senyatsi
Judge
of the High Court, Johannesburg
Appearances:
On
behalf of the applicant : Adv. S Simpson
Instructed
by: Legal Aid Board
On
behalf of the respondent : Adv A M Williams
Instructed
by : DPP
Date
of hearing: 17
th
January 2022
Date
of judgment: 16
th
February 2022
[1]
1981 (1) SA 10 (A)
[2]
Page 148 Line 20-25.
[3]
Texeira
1980 (3) SA 755 (A) 761
[4]
1981
(3) SA 172
(A) at 180E-G
[5]
2005
[1] All SA 1 (SCA) 5d-e
[6]
2008 (1) SACR 84
(CPD) para [6].
[7]
1981
(1) SA 1021
(A) 1028B-D
[8]
2010
(1) SACR 78
(ECG) at para 10
[9]
1939 AD 188
at 202.
[10]
S
v
S
1995
(1) SACR 0 (ZS)
Ebrahim JA 55i-j – 56a: “Suggestibility – Among
the most important is a child’s propensity to give an
answer
other than the one he knows to be correct because it suits him to do
so. There are numerous reasons for so doing: the
child, for example,
may want to be finished with the examination; or he may wish to
please the questioner; or he may agree with
the suggested answer
because he assumes that the questioner, being an adult, is correct.
In connection with the last two examples,
it must be remembered that
children are taught from an early age that adults know best, that
adults should not be contradicted,
and that they ought to be polite
to strange adults. These are desirable social attributes but they
ill-prepare a child for the
ordeal of giving evidence in court.”
57a-b:
“It is true that a child’s existence is more centered
around his or her imagination than is adult existence,
but anyone
who has watched children at play will have noticed that their play
fantasies reflect their experience derived from
hearing stories, as
when small boys play soldiers. Children do not fantasize over things
that are beyond their own direct or
indirect experience.”
[11]
1986
(4) SA 734
(A) at 736 B-C.
[12]
R
v Hlongwane
1959 (3) SA 337
(A) at 340H – 341A; R v Biya,
1952
(4) SA 514
(AD) at 521.
[13]
S v Francis
1991 (1) SACR 198
(A) at 204E.
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