Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 128South Africa
MNB v MMP (9368/2019) [2022] ZAGPJHC 128 (3 March 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
3 March 2022
Headnotes
Summary: Husband and wife - Grounds for divorce - Irretrievable breakdown- Forfeiture of the benefits of the marriage - Act 70 of 1979 section 9 (1) - Factors to be considered in deciding whether to order such forfeiture. The factors to be considered in determining whether to order forfeiture of the benefits of the marriage in terms of section 9 (1) of Act 70 of 1979 are the duration of the marriage, the circumstances which gave rise to its breakdown and any substantial misconduct on the part of either of the parties.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## MNB v MMP (9368/2019) [2022] ZAGPJHC 128 (3 March 2022)
MNB v MMP (9368/2019) [2022] ZAGPJHC 128 (3 March 2022)
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sino date 3 March 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 9368/2019
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
3 MARCH 2022
In the matter
between:
MNB
PLAINTIFF
And
MMP
DEFENDANT
Delivery:
Transmitted
by email to the parties’ legal representatives. The judgment is
deemed to have been delivered on 3 March 2022.
Summary:
Husband
and wife - Grounds for divorce - Irretrievable breakdown- Forfeiture
of the benefits of the marriage - Act 70 of 1979 section
9 (1) -
Factors to be considered in deciding whether to order such
forfeiture. The factors to be considered in determining whether
to
order forfeiture of the benefits of the marriage in terms of section
9 (1) of Act 70 of 1979 are the duration of the marriage,
the
circumstances which gave rise to its breakdown and any substantial
misconduct on the part of either of the parties.
J U D G M E N T
MOLAHLEHI J:
Introduction
[1]
The
plaintiff instituted these divorce proceedings against the defendant
seeking a decree of divorce and forfeiture of defendant's
rights to
share in the benefits of the marriage which is in community of
property.
[2]
The
defendant defended the claim and filed a counterclaim in which he
also claimed for a decree of divorce, full parental responsibilities
and rights pertaining to the minor child, division of the joint
estate, payment of 50% of the plaintiff’s pension fund interest
and spousal maintenance by the plaintiff.
[3]
The
parties were married on 26 June 2000 and two children were born from
the marriage of which one of them is a minor, and the other
is a
major, but not yet self-sufficient. The plaintiff came into the
marriage with the child from a previous relationship.
[4]
At
the time of the marriage, the plaintiff had an immovable property
which she occupied with the eldest child. She was responsible
for the
payment of the mortgage bond towards that property. After the
marriage, the defendant moved in and stayed with the plaintiff
in
that property until 2006.
[5]
Both
parties were at the time of the marriage employed in the public
service; the plaintiff as a teacher and the defendant as a
police
officer with the South African Police Service (the SAPS) until his
resignation due to health reasons in 2017.
[6]
It
is common cause that the parties sold the property at number 35 Cedar
Creek and the proceeds thereof were used, to purchase the
motor
vehicle, (currently used by the plaintiff) the payment of the
improvement and furniture for the Ormonde property.
[7]
In
2017, the parties purchased the property at Barbet Street, Extension
9 Meredale, Johannesburg for R1 570 000,00. The payment
for the
property was made from the Government Pension Fund (GEPF) of the
defendant. The plaintiff and the children are currently
residing at
this property.
[8]
It
is common cause that the parties were before the institution of these
proceedings married for 21 years. Although there is a dispute
as to
when the defendant left the common home, it is not disputed that he
left during 2019. The case of the plaintiff is that he
left the
common bedroom on 24 December 2018 and left the common matrimonial
home on 26 March 2019. The defendant's version is that
he left the
common home on 8 May 2019.
[9]
The
plaintiff’s assets and liabilities are set out in the financial
disclosure form attached to her papers as follows:
“
6.7.1
The matrimonial property situated at Meredale with a current market
value of approximately R1 574 000.00 based
on the municipal
evaluation and Lightstone Valuation which can vary as the Lightstone
Valuation is a computer-generated valuation.
6.7.2
Bank accounts with a value of R13054,52 and liabilities of R172
296,22.
6.7.3
Policies with a value of R60 663,95 which includes the funeral
policies and therefore only leaves the value
of the Retirement
annuity of R22 497,00.
6.7.4
Personal assets including the (Toyota) Camry vehicle, furniture, and
wedding ring to a total of R 218 718,47.
6.7.5
Pension fund interest to a value of R 2 921 908,00.”
[10]
The
defendant states in his disclosure form that he has no assets or
liabilities.
The issues in dispute.
[11]
The
following issues are in dispute between the parties:
[11.1] Whether an order of
forfeiture of certain assets should be granted against the defendant.
[11.2] Whether the defendant should
be ordered to pay maintenance for both the minor and major children.
[11.3] Whether the defendant should
be granted an order for the payment of 50% of the plaintiff’s
pension fund.
[11.4] Whether
costs of the action should be granted against and of the parties.
[12]
It
is apposite to deal first with the request of the decree for divorce
by both parties. They both seek a dissolution of their marriage
on
the ground that the relationship between them has irretrievable
broken down.
[13]
The
plaintiff has raised several grounds for seeking an order dissolving
the marriage. The essence of such grounds is that there
is no love,
no communication between the parties and that the parties have not
lived together for some time as husband and wife.
The other complaint
by the plaintiff is that the defendant has had several extramarital
affairs with other women, including fathering
a child with one of
those women.
[14]
In
the plea and counterclaim the defendant concedes that the
relationship with the plaintiff has irretrievably broken down. He
blames the plaintiff for the cause of the breakdown and alleges that
she continued with the relationship with the father of her
child
after the marriage. He also alleges that the plaintiff was abusive
towards him.
It is clear from the above
that the marriage of the parties has irretrievably broken down.
Maintenance of the
children
[15]
The
plaintiff indicated during the hearing that she was no longer
pursuing her claim for the sole parental responsibility and rights
and supervising contact of the minor child by the defendant.
[16]
There
is thus consensus between the parties that full parental
responsibilities and rights pertaining to the care, contact,
maintenance
and guardianship of the minor child should be granted to
both parties. However, the primary residence is to be retained by the
plaintiff, subject to the defendant having contact rights with the
minor child as may be arranged between the parties.
[17]
The
plaintiff claims maintenance for both the minor child and the major
child. It has not been disputed that the major child is
not
self-sufficient and thus both parties have in law, the duty to
support her.
[18]
The
defendant has tendered to contribute R3 000.00 per month as a
contribution towards the maintenance for both children.
Spousal maintenance
[19]
In
the counterclaim the defendant claimed spousal maintenance. In my
view, regard being had to the evidence before this court, no
case has
been made for such a relief and thus the claim stands to fail.
The forfeiture of
benefits
[20]
There
are two main relief sought by the plaintiff as concerning the prayer
for the forfeiture order. She seeks forfeiture of the
matrimonial
home which was purchased by the defendant’s pension fund. She
further seeks forfeiture of the interest in her
GEPF pension money.
She has no objection in sharing the movable assets of the joint
estate with the defendant.
[21]
The
parties being married in community of property, means that the
universal partnership between them was concluded at the time
of
concluding the marriage, resulting in all the property, movable and
immovable, forming a joint estate. Thus the consequence
of marriage
in community of property is that the parties to the marriage becomes
owners of the undivided half share in all the
assets, irrespective of
whatever contribution each one of them may have made.
[22]
It
is trite that upon dissolution of a marriage in community of property
the parties share equally both the movable and immovable
assets of
the estate. The exception to this rule is provided for in section
9(1) of the Divorce Act (the Divorce Act) which provides
as follows:
“
(1)
When a decree of divorce is granted on the ground of the
irretrievable break-down of a marriage
the court may make an order
that the patrimonial benefits of the marriage be forfeited by one
party in favour of the other, either
wholly or in part, if the court,
having regard to the duration of the marriage, the circumstances
which gave rise to the break-down
thereof and any substantial
misconduct on the part of either of the parties, is satisfied that,
if the order for forfeiture is
not made, the one party will in
relation to the other be unduly benefited.”
[23]
It
is clear from the above that section 9(1) of the Divorce Act provides
the court with a discretion to make an order for forfeiture
after
having regard to the following factors:
(a) duration
of the marriage,
(b) the
circumstances that gave rise to the breakdown of the marriage
relationship, and
(c) substantial
misconduct on the part of the party against whom the order is sought.
[24]
The
onus is on the party seeking forfeiture to show that in the event an
order of forfeiture is not granted the party against whom
the order
is sought will unduly benefit from the benefits derived from the
marriage.
[25]
It
is trite that the court has a discretion to make an order of
forfeiture of benefits if satisfied that the party against whom
the
order is sought would be unduly benefited in relation to the other
party if the order is not made.
[26]
The
party claiming forfeiture of benefit is in terms of the decision in
Engelbrecht
v Engelbrecht
[1]
,
required to prove the nature and extent of the benefits sought to be
forfeited. This involves proving the value of the property
as at the
date of the marriage.
[27]
In
Smith
v Smith
[2]
,
the court explained the word "
"…
what the defendant forfeits is not his share of the common property
but only the pecuniary benefits that he would
otherwise have derived
from the marriage. It is not uncommon to refer to division and
forfeiture as alternative remedies upon the
plaintiff. On this view
forfeiture means that each party keeps what he or she brought into
the community. … . An alternative
interpretation, of an order
for forfeiture is that it is really an order for division of the
estate plus, an order that the defendant
is not to share in any
excess that the plaintiff may have contributed over the contribution
of the defendant."
[3]
(Footnotes omitted)
[28]
The
relief of forfeiture of benefits as envisaged in section 9(1) of the
Divorce Act does not provide an opportunity for a party
that may have
made a greater contribution to seek a deduction from such
contribution. To succeed in a claim for forfeiture, the
party making
such a claim has to, as indicated earlier, show the nature and extent
of the benefit and that the benefit would be
undue to the other party
if the order of forfeiture is not made.
[29]
The
main ground upon which the plaintiff basis her claim for forfeiture
is the conduct of the defendant, more particularly after
he vacated
the matrimonial home. She contends that the defendant committed a
substantial misconduct in having extramarital affairs
with other
women and fathering one child with one of them.
[30]
In
Klerck
v Klerck,
[4]
the court held that in considering a forfeiture of benefits in
marriage in community of property, regard should be had to the
duration of the marriage, the circumstances which led to the
breakdown and substantial misconduct on the part of one of both of
the parties.
[31]
In
Binda
v Binda
[5]
,
the court held that the legislature in section 9(1) of the Divorce
Act required that each of the factors should be given due
consideration without requiring the presence of each one of them,
including their accumulative effect.
[32]
In
Wijker
v Wijker
[6]
,
the court adopted the following approach in dealing with the issue of
forfeiture claim:
"It
is obvious from the wording of the section (section 9) that the first
step is to determine whether or not the party against
whom the order
is sought will in fact be benefited. That will be a purely factual
issue. Once that has been established the trial
court must determine
having regard to the factors mentioned in the section, whether or not
that party will in relation to the other
be unduly benefited if a
forfeiture order is not made. Although the second determination is a
value judgment, it is made by the
trial court after having considered
the facts failing within the compass of the three factors mentioned
in the section."
[7]
(Emphasis added)
[33]
In
KT
v MR,
[8]
the court in dealing with the marriage that broke down within 24
months, where the issue of misconduct did not arise, held that:
"…
the longer the marriage, the more likely it is that the benefit will
be due and proportionate, and conversely, the
shorter the marriage,
the more likely the benefit will be due and disproportionate.”
[9]
[34]
Substantial
misconduct, as envisaged in section 9(1) of the Divorce Act, is a
factor to consider in weighing whether the forfeiture
of benefits
should be granted. This notion has to be understood in the context of
the general principle confirmed in our jurisprudence
as far back as
1904. In this regard, the court in
Celliers
v Celliers,
[10]
held that it was generally accepted that a spouse could not forfeit
that which he or she brought into the marriage. It must also
be
considered in the context of the development of our jurisprudence
regarding the consequences of infidelity and cheating with
third
parties. Whilst in
DE
v RH
[11]
the Constitutional Court dealt with a delictual claim against a third
party for adultery; I am of the view that the element of
wrongfulness, consequent cheating and adultery between the spouses
should be weighed in a similar way in case such as the present.
In
that case the Constitutional Court held that the claim for damages
against a party that committed adultery with one of the spouses
was
no longer part of our law.
[12]
The Constitutional Court further held that the court cannot be held
responsible "to shore up or sustain an otherwise ailing
marriage.”
[13]
[35]
In
Tsebe
v Tsebe,
[14]
the case with similar facts as those of the present, Mr. Tsebe had
extramarital affairs with various women and fathered two children
with two of them. He left the matrimonial home and went to live in
Limpopo after losing his employment. The difference between
that case
and the present matter is that Mr. Tsebe spent his pension money
alone and did not use it for the benefit of the joint
estate or share
it with his wife.
[36]
For
the purpose of emphasis, in that case the court found that Mr Tsebe
committed substantial misconduct as envisaged in section
9(1) of the
Divorce Act in that he used the pension he received exclusively for
himself to the exclusion of the joint estate and
his wife.
[15]
It was for this reason that the court found that the conduct of Mr
Tsebe amounted to substantial misconduct and that he would be
unduly
benefited if the forfeiture order was not granted.
[37]
In
the present matter, the plaintiff seeks the forfeiture of the
immovable property which was, as indicated earlier purchased from
the
monies received from the defendant’s pension fund. It is not in
dispute that the amount used for the purchase of the
property is a
significant amount of R1 570 000.00. The plaintiff did not dispute
during cross examination that the total expenditure
used in the joint
estate using the defendant’s pension fund is well above
R2 700 000.00. This means that the largest
portion of the
defendant’s pension money was used for the benefit of the joint
estate.
[38]
In
relation to the movable property, the plaintiff testified that she
was suspicious that the plaintiff purchased such items for
other
women he had extramarital affairs with. She, however, did not deny
that the defendant did purchase numerous movable assets
and
consumables for the use of the joint households until he vacated the
matrimonial home in 2019. Some of the examples of the
assets which
the defendant purchased, is a fridge for R11 999.00, a bed for
R2 200.00, and a trailer for R10 500.00. The plaintiff
also admits
that the defendant paid the amount of R314 003.08 towards the
mortgage bond for the immovable property at Ormonde.
[39]
The
other ground upon which the plaintiff seeks forfeiture of benefits is
that she wished to retain the immovable property, where
she is
currently residing, as it is conveniently located for the children
because it is near a school. In applying the principles
set out in
the authorities above, I find no merit in this contention.
[40]
The
plaintiff testified that her suspicion that the defendant had
extramarital affairs was confirmed by a letter from the church,
confirming that the defendant was given permission to go away and
apparently on church business but that would be without her.
[41]
The
other incident relating to the infidelity of the defendant, relates
to a woman claiming that she had a child with the defendant
and that
the defendant was expected to attend a DNA testing. There was however
no evidence presented as to whether the DNA test
was conducted and
what its results were. Be that is it may be, it would appear to me
that if substantial misconduct was to be determined
from the
relationships with third parties, then both parties as the evidence
reveals are not innocent. It should also be noted
that the plaintiff
also testified that she forgave the defendant for the alleged extra
marital affairs.
[42]
In
my view to penalise the defendant in the circumstances where the
relationship has, even on the version of the plaintiff, broken
down
would amount to depriving him of freedom of association. He has in
the circumstances walked away from the relationship that
had, even on
the plaintiff’s version, broken down. To cast aspersions on him
having relationships with other women and having
a child outside of
the marriage amount to undermining his dignity and even stereotypes
the innocent child.
[43]
The
other complaint raised by the plaintiff is that the defendant made a
payment of R350 000,00 to Ms Nene and that he retained
the
proceeds from the sale of the Toyota Fortuner.
[44]
In
relation to the payment to Ms Nene the defendant testified that the
payment was for a loan he had received from Ms Nene. In support
of
this version he introduced the letter demanding payment for the loan
by Ms Nene. He stated that the money was used for
certain debts
and the rest was used to renovate the property at Ormonde. He
disputed having had an intimate relationship with Ms
Nene.
[45]
Ms
Nene was never called as a witness. The plaintiff argued that an
adverse inference should be drawn against the defendant.
[46]
As
concerning the sale of Toyota Fortuner the defendant stated that he
used the proceeds for the household. It should be stated
that at that
stage the defendant was unemployed.
[47]
In
my view, the totality of the evidence reveals that the defendant made
a significant contribution to the joint estate, in particular,
with
regard to the purchase of the immovable property for which the
plaintiff seeks forfeiture thereof. Accordingly, I find no
basis to
conclude that the defendant will unduly benefit if an order of
forfeiture of benefit is not made against him. I am thus
not
persuaded that I should exercise my discretion in favour of granting
an order for forfeiture of benefits against the defendant
in respect
of both the immovable and immovable properties including the pension
interest of the defendant in the GEPF. And
concerning the
payment made to Ms Nene it seems to me that the appropriate remedy
available to the plaintiff was the adjustment
upon the division in
terms of section 15 of the Divorce Act.
Costs
[48]
Section
10 of the Act provides that:
"In
a divorce action the court shall not be bound to make an order for
costs in favour of the successful party, but the court
may, having
regard to the means of the parties, and their conduct in so far as it
may be relevant, make such order as it considers
just, and the court
may order that the costs of the proceedings be apportioned between
the parties
."
Order:
[49]
The
following order is made:
1
The
decree of divorce is granted.
2
The
joint estate shall be divided equally between the parties including
the plaintiff’s pension fund.
3
The
plaintiff's pension administrator, the Government Employers Pension
Fund is ordered to pay the defendant an amount of 50% of
the
plaintiff’s pension interest held under membership number
96445223 which will accrue to the Defendant at the date of
this
order.
4
The
plaintiff's pension fund administrator is ordered to make the said
50% of the plaintiff’s pension interest thereof to
the
defendant within sixty (60) days from the date of this order.
5
Parental
responsibility and rights, specifically in respect of care and
guardianship, in respect of the minor child is awarded to
the
plaintiff.
6
The
minor child’s primary care and residence is to remain with the
plaintiff.
7
The
defendant is entitled to contact with the minor child as and when
agreed with the minor child.
8
The
defendant is to pay the plaintiff the sum of R3 000,00 per month
as contribution towards the maintenance of the children
until such
time as each become self-sufficient.
9
Defendant's
claims in reconvention are dismissed
10
Each
party shall pay his or her own costs.
E Molahlehi
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng,
Johannesburg
Representations:
For the Applicant: Adv T Engelbrecht
Instructed by: Coetzee Duvenage
For the Defendant: Adv Z Marx Du Plessis
Instructed by: Shapiro Ledwaba Inc
Date of hearing: 17 Nov 2021 and 13 Dec 2021
Delivered: 3 March 2022
[1]
1989
(1) SA 597
(C).
[2]
1937
WLD 126.
[3]
Id at
127-128.
[4]
1991
(1) SA 265
(W).
[5]
1993
(2) SA 123
(W) at 124.
[6]
1993
(4) SA 720
(A).
[7]
Id at
727.
[8]
2017 (1) SA 97
(GP).
[9]
Id at
105.
[10]
1904
T.S. 926.
[11]
2015
(5) SA 83
(CC).
[12]
Id at
para 63.
[13]
Id at
para 71.
[14]
[2016] ZAGPPHC 575 (24 June 2016).
[15]
Id at
para 15.
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