Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 885South Africa
Mofokeng v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (21/17928) [2022] ZAGPJHC 885 (31 August 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
31 August 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Mofokeng v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (21/17928) [2022] ZAGPJHC 885 (31 August 2022)
Mofokeng v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (21/17928) [2022] ZAGPJHC 885 (31 August 2022)
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sino date 31 August 2022
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 21/17928
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
31/08/2022
In
the matter between:
MOFOKENG
KEMMONE ISAAC
PLAINTIFF
AND
PASSENGER
RAIL AGENCY OF SOUTH AFRICA
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
OOSTHUIZEN-SENEKAL
CSP AJ:
Introduction
[1]
On 21 November 2018 the plaintiff, Mr
Kemmone Isaac Mofokeng was injured when he fell from a moving South
African Rail Commuter
train, which had left Dallas station with the
doors of the carriage open. As a result of the accident the plaintiff
suffered certain
injuries namely; a left distal femur fracture, deep
cut on the head, bruises and abrasions on his knee and elbow.
[2]
At the commencement of the trial the
parties agreed that only the defendant’s liability be dealt
with and the question of
the plaintiff’s quantum claim be dealt
with later.
[3]
I made a ruling in terms of Rule 33(4) that
the merits and the quantum be separated and that this court deal with
the issue of whether
or not the defendant is delictually liable to
compensate the plaintiff for whatever damages he may prove to have
suffered as a
result of the accident.
[4]
In the particulars of claim, it is alleged
that on 21 November 2018, the plaintiff boarded a train at Dallas
station, which was
heading to Mpilisweni Station. The coach that he
boarded was overcrowded and its doors were open when the train
departed from the
station. As the train was leaving the station, the
plaintiff was ejected out of the moving train through its open doors
“due
to a fight /commotion among the passengers of the
overcrowded coach”. He fell on the platform and sustained a
fracture on
the left femur and other injuries. At the time of the
incident, he was in possession of a valid train ticket.
[5]
Further allegations,
inter
alia,
included that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty
alternatively a duty of care to ensure his safety whilst making use
of the rail commuter
services provided by the defendant, which
include, amongst other, taking reasonable steps and implementing
reasonable measures
to ensure the safety of passengers travelling on
trains operated by the defendant.
Common Cause
[6]
The common facts in this matter are as
follows: The plaintiff was a regular commuter on the defendant’s
train, travelling
from his residence in Katlehong to various
destinations. On 21 November 2018 he boarded the train at Dallas
station to Katlehong.
The plaintiff sustained injuries as the train
was departing from the station. After the incident he was taken to
Natalspruit Hospital
by ambulance where he was admitted.
Issues
in dispute
[7]
The main issue to be decided upon is the
liability of the defendant. The factual dispute is whether the
plaintiff was accidentally
pushed by other commuters through the open
doors of the moving train, or whether he was attempting to illegally
board the train
by jumping on the link between the coaches,
whereafter he lost his balance and was injured. It is also in dispute
whether the plaintiff
was in possession of a valid ticket for the
trip from Dallas station to Katlehong station.
Evidence at Trial
[8]
The plaintiff and Mr Bosman testified in
the plaintiff’s case. The defendant called three witnesses,
namely Mr Mokwena, Mr
Harvey and Mr Phaswane.
Plaintiff’s
Evidence
[9]
The plaintiff testified that on the day of
the incident he was in the company of a co-worker, Mr Bosman, when
they both boarded
a train at Dallas station, after having completed a
gardening job in the area. He and Mr Bosman loaded the lawn mower and
gardening
tools they had in their possession when and they boarded
coach 7/8.
[10]
He stated that he was standing in the
middle of the coach across the open door when the train pulled away
from the station. According
to him the train was crowded. As soon as
the train started moving, a quarrel broke out between unknown
commuters, inside the coach.
As a result of the scuffle, he was
pushed out of the train, through the open doors.
[11]
The plaintiff testified that he managed to
hold on to the side handle of the train, one of his legs was hanging
outside the coach,
between the platform and the moving train. An
unknown commuter attempted to assist him; however, he fell from the
coach, landing
on the platform at Dallas station.
[12]
The plaintiff stated that he was in
possession of a valid train ticket, which was a monthly ticket for
commuters traveling between
Mpilisweni and Kempton Park.
[13]
During cross examination the plaintiff
testified that his girlfriend usually purchases his train ticket at
Angus Station.
[14]
The plaintiff conceded during questions by
counsel on behalf of the defendant that he informed Mr Harvey, the
Security Guard, that
he was not in possession of a valid train ticket
on the day. He further stated that he never informed Mr Harvey that
he attempted
to board the train by jumping on the link between the
coaches, and as a result of losing his balance he fell on the tracks
and
was injured.
[15]
During re-examination the plaintiff
explained that he informed the security guard that he was not in
possession of a valid train
ticket, because he was afraid that if he
told the security guard he had a valid train ticket, the security
guard would take the
ticket from him. He would then have no proof
that he was in possession of a valid ticket on the day of the
incident.
Evidence of Mr
Tshediso Innocent Bosman
[16]
Mr Bosman corroborated the evidence of the
plaintiff in all material aspects.
[17]
He stated that after the plaintiff was
pushed from the train, he proceeded to the next station, Wattles,
where he disembarked. He
testified that when the plaintiff was pushed
from the train, he was unable to help the plaintiff. After
disembarking at Wattles
station, Mr Bosman boarded a train and
returned to Dallas station. On his return the plaintiff was not at
the station and he was
informed that the plaintiff was transported to
the hospital by ambulance services.
[18]
During cross examination by the defendant
the witness did not deviate from his evidence in chief examination.
Defendant’s
Evidence
Mr Raymond Jabulani
Mokwena
[19]
Mr Mokwena testified that he was employed
by PRASA and was appointed to investigate the incident.
[20]
The witness testified regarding the
following:
1.
Two types of train tickets, namely
commuters can buy train tickets at a kiosk window at stations, which
tickets when issued are
larger in size. Secondly, commuters can buy
train tickets at mobile ticket machines at stations, which tickets
will be smaller
than those issued at station kiosks.
2.
According to his investigations, the train
ticket in question in this matter was purchased at Angus Station at a
mobile ticket machine.
3.
Train tickets are not issued in the name of
a commuter, and are not issued to a specific person, therefore he was
unable to indicate
to whom the ticket in this matter was issued to.
4.
Ms Lebotsa was stationed on the train as
train guard on the day of the incident. Unfortunately, she is
deceased. Prior to her passing
he interviewed her regarding the
incident, whereafter she made a statement, which statement formed
part of his investigation report.
5.
The witness referred to the daily train
roster of the train and stated that according to information received
by him the train was
running on time at the time of the incident.
6.
He also had insight in the daily occurrence
book and entries relevant to the incident were included in his
investigation report.
[21]
During cross examination by counsel on
behalf of the plaintiff, Mr Mokwena stated that train tickets are
“not transferable”
and therefore if a commuter uses a
train ticket bought by another person, the use of the said ticket can
be revoked by PRASA. He
however, agreed that on face value train
tickets are not issued to a specific person, in name.
Mr Jacob Harvey
[22]
Mr Harvey testified that he is employed by
PRASA Protection Services as a Protective Official. On the day of the
incident, at around
13h10, he received a call from the Joint
Operational Centre Johannesburg (
“
JOC”
)
that a person was injured after falling from a train. He was further
informed that the injured person was lying on Platform 1
at Dallas
Station.
[23]
The witness testified that according to the
information he received the injured person was attempting to board a
moving train.
[24]
He then proceeded to Dallas station where
he found the plaintiff being attended to by paramedics. Mr Bosman
stated that he enquired
from the plaintiff as to what had happened.
The plaintiff informed him that he attempted to board a moving train
when he slipped
and fell. The plaintiff also told him that he was not
in possession of a valid train ticket.
[25]
Mr
Bosman testified that he drafted a report concerning the incident.
[1]
The witness drafted a second report on request of the attorneys.
[2]
He also compiled a Liability Report.
[3]
He conceded that in the Liability Report, he stated that the
plaintiff told him that he was in possession of a valid train ticket.
The witness explained that he made a human error in omitting the word
“not” in possession of a valid train ticket.
[26]
During cross examination by the plaintiff,
Mr Harvey conceded that during his testimony he relied on the
information contained in
the reports compiled on the day of the
incident.
[27]
The witness further stated that the
plaintiff told him that he fell underneath the train, and he did not
tell him who assisted him
to get on the platform after he was
injured.
[28]
Mr Harvey agreed that the information in
his reports regarding injuries sustained by the plaintiff varied. He
conceded that the
reporting of the incident was not accurate.
Mr Tendai Robert
Phaswane
[29]
Mr Phaswane testified that on the day of
the incident he was employed by Thlakalani Protection Services, a
sub-contractor to PRASA.
On the day of the incident, he was stationed
as a security guard conducting duties in the area of Dallas station.
While conducting
his duties, he was informed by an unknown truck
driver, employed by Spoornet, that an incident occurred at Dallas
station where
a person was injured.
[30]
After receiving the report, he and his
colleague Mr Manopi, proceeded to Dallas station. On their arrival
they found the plaintiff
lying on Platform 1. Mr Phaswane asked the
plaintiff what had happened and the plaintiff told him that he
attempted to board a
moving train by jumping in between the two
coaches. The plaintiff further said that he slipped and fell between
the train and the
platform.
[31]
The ambulance services were summonsed. On
their arrival they attended to the plaintiff’s injuries. Mr
Harvey also arrived
on the scene.
Evaluation
[32]
It
is trite that for the plaintiff to succeed in a case that involves
negligence, he must prove there was a duty of care owed to
him by the
defendant, which the defendant has breached and that the breach has
caused harm to occur which resulted in damages.
Only once the
plaintiff has discharged the onus, the defendant will have to rebut
the inference of negligence by adducing evidence
relating to the
measures it took to avert harm.
[4]
[33]
Therefore,
the plaintiff must prove his case on a balance of probabilities and
where there are factual disputes, in resolving those
factual
disputes, the court will apply the technique which was summarised in
Stellenbosch
Farmers’ Winery Group Limited and Another v Martel & Cie SA
and Others
[5]
as
follows:
“
On
the central issue, as to what the parties actually decided, there are
two irreconcilable versions. So too on a number of peripheral
areas
of dispute which may have a bearing on the probabilities. The
technique generally employed by court in resolving factual
disputes
of this nature may conveniently be summarised as follows. To come to
a conclusion on the disputed issues a court must
make findings on (a)
the credibility of various factual witnesses; (b) their reliability;
and (c) the probabilities. As to (a),
the court’s finding on
the credibility of a particular witness will depend on its impression
about the veracity of the witness.
That in turn will depend on a
variety of subsidiary factors, not necessarily in order of
importance, such as (i) the witnesses’
candour and demeanour in
the witness-box; (ii) his bias, latent and blatant; (iii) internal
contradictions in his evidence; (iv)
external contradictions with
what was pleaded or put on his behalf, or with established fact or
with his own extra curial statements
or actions; (v) the probability
or improbability of particular aspects of his version; (vi) the
calibre and cogency of his performance
compared to that of other
witnesses testifying about the same incident or events. As to (b), a
witness’s reliability will
depend, apart from the factors
mentioned under (a)(ii), (iv) and (v) above, on (i) the opportunities
he had to experience or observe
the event in question and (ii) the
quality, integrity and independence of his recall thereof. As to (c),
this necessitates an analysis
and evaluation of the probability or
improbability of each party’s version on each of the disputed
issues. In the light of
its assessment of (a), (b) and (c) the court
will then, as a final step, determine whether the party burdened with
the onus of
proof has succeeded in discharging it. The hard case,
which will doubtless be the rare one, occurs when a court’s
credibility
findings compel it in one direction and its evaluation of
the general probabilities in another. The more convincing the former,
the less convincing will be the latter. But when all factors are
equipoised probabilities prevail.”
[34]
The central issue in this case is whether
the defendant, through its employees, is to blame for the incident
which caused the plaintiff
injuries.
[35]
In
Kruger
v Coetzee
[6]
the
Supreme Court of Appeal stated the following;
a)
“
a
diligens
paterfamilias
in the position of the
defendant-
(i)
Would foresee the reasonable possibility of
his conduct injuring another in his person or property and causing
him patrimonial loss;
and
(ii)
Would take reasonable steps to guard
against such occurrence; and
b)
The defendant failed to take such steps.
[36]
In
Le
Roux and Others v Dey
[7]
the
Constitutional Court stated the following:
“
In
the more recent past our courts have come to recognise, however, that
in the context of the law of delict: (a) the criterion
of
wrongfulness ultimately depends on a judicial determination of
whether – assuming all the other elements of delictual
liability to present – it would be reasonable to impose
liability on a defendant for the damages flowing from specific
conduct;
and (b) that the judicial determination of that
reasonableness would in turn depend on considerations of public and
legal policy
in accordance with constitutional norms. Incidentally,
to avoid confusion it should be borne in mind that, what is meant by
reasonableness
in the context of wrongfulness has nothing to do with
the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, but it concerns
the
reasonableness of imposing liability on the defendant for the
harm resulting from that conduct.
[37]
In
Country
Trading CC v MEC Department of Infrastructure Development
[8]
the
Constitutional Court said:
“
Wrongfulness
is an element of delictual liability. It functions to determine
whether the infliction of culpably caused harm demands
the imposition
of liability or, conversely, whether ‘the social, economic and
other costs are just too high to justify the
use of the law of delict
for the resolution of the particular issue’. Wrongfulness
typically acts as a brake on liability,
particularly in areas of the
law of delict where it is undesirable and overly burdensome to impose
liability.”
[38]
The plaintiff and Mr Bosman made a good
impression during their testimony in court. Their evidence
corroborated each other where
expected. They both provided the court
with a coherent version namely, that on the day of the incident they
boarded the train at
Dallas station with a lawn mower and garden
tools. Shortly after the train started moving the plaintiff was
pushed from the train
by commuters fighting inside the coach.
[39]
It is evident that the incident occured as
the train was leaving the station and the doors were still open. The
plaintiff’s
version is not only corroborated by Mr Bosman, but
also by external facts. The plaintiff stated that he grabbed onto the
side of
the train when he was pushed, his leg was hanging outside the
train between the train and the platform. After letting go of the
train, he fell and landed on the platform. This version is more
probable when looking at the evidence that the plaintiff was lying
on
his back on Platform 1.
[40]
The
witnesses called in the defence case confirmed that the plaintiff was
found lying on the platform. Mr Phaswane testified there
were no
other people present when he arrived on the scene. According to the
hospital record
[9]
the plaintiff
sustained a left femur fracture, a break of thigh bone just above the
knee. Undoubtedly, the plaintiff would have
been in extreme pain, and
therefore, unable to walk, unassisted from the tracks to the
platform. The version that the defence placed
before court, in that
the plaintiff informed Mr Harvey and Phaswane that he fell on the
tracks is improbable due to the fact that
the plaintiff was most
probably unable to move.
[41]
The
plaintiff testified that he was in possession of a valid train
ticket.
[10]
He provide
undisputed evidence that his girlfriend bought the ticket on his
behalf at Angus station. There is no evidence place
before the court
to contradict the version by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was an
honest witness, he conceded that he informed
the security guard that
he was not in possession of a valid train ticket. The explanation by
the plaintiff for not telling the
truth is satisfactory. He stated
that he was afraid that the ticket would be taken from him and he
would be unable to prove he
was in possession of a valid train
ticket. None of the witnesses called in the defence case testified
that they searched the plaintiff
in order to confirm that he was not
in possession of a valid train ticket. Therefore, there is no
evidence before me to reject
the explanation by the plaintiff. I
accept the evidence that the plaintiff was in possession of a valid
train ticket on the day
of the incident.
[42]
The defendant’s case is that the
plaintiff attempted to board a moving train and thereby placed
himself in danger of sustaining
an injury. In other words, by
attempting to board a moving train the plaintiff voluntarily assumed
the risk of sustaining an injury
or causing harm to himself.
[43]
The defence did not call any eye witnesses
pertaining to the incident. The defence relied on the evidence of Mr
Mokwena, Mr Harvey
and Mr Phaswane, all of whom arrived at the scene
after the plaintiff was injured.
[44]
I have to evaluate their evidence with
caution, because all the witnesses called by the defence are
employees of PRASA and as such
are not independent witnesses. I have
to consider that their versions may be subjectively influenced due to
their employment relationship
with the defendant.
[45]
According
to the information contained in the investigation report compiled by
Mr Mokwena
[11]
the following
version was provided to him by the plaintiff as to how the accident
occurred;
“
According
to the injured person confirmed that he was trying to embark on a
moving train, he slipped and fell
underneath
the train, however when I arrived, I found the injured on the
platform and the injured did not disclose who or how he was removed
from the tracks.
The injured also informed
me that he was traveling with a
relief train ticket
...”
[emphasis]
[46]
When considering the above, I am of the
view that if a person fell and ended up underneath a moving train, as
Mr Mokwena would like
the court to believe, chances are that the
person would have been fatally injured. Furthermore, according to the
information referred
to above the plaintiff told Mr Mokwena that he
was in possession of a relief ticket and not that he had no valid
ticket.
[47]
Furthermore, the improbability with the
testimony of the defence witnesses is that they did not only
contradict themselves regarding
the information contained in their
reports, but they also contradicted each other on various aspects.
These include the time of
the incident, when they arrived on the
accident scene, the disclosures of the plaintiff as to how he was
injured and lastly the
injuries that the plaintiff sustained. Their
versions as to exactly what the plaintiff told them are contradictory
to wit;
1.
how he boarded the train, jumping through a
door or jumping on the link between the coaches, and
2.
he fell from the train, did he hit the wall
of the platform, or did he end up underneath the train.
[48]
These contradictions in the evidence of the
defence witnesses are material and go to the root of their
credibility. In a nutshell,
the evidence of the defence witnesses is
unreliable because of the contradictions. The improbabilities in
their evidence are clear
when considering that if the plaintiff fell
and landed underneath the train of the tracks, he would have been
fatally injured.
Mr Phaswane testified the plaintiff was lying on the
platform on his arrival and there were no other people present. The
question
has to be raised; how did the plaintiff move from the tracks
to the platform.
[49]
As stated, the defence did not present any
eye witness testimony as to what transpired on the day. Evident from
the fact is that
I have to find that there were no security guard/s
stationed at Dallas station of the day of the incident. The train
guard, Ms
Lebotsa was not present in the coach which the plaintiff
boarded. If she was present, she would have signalled the train
driver
to stop the train after the incident, which was not done, the
train proceeded on its route without delay.
[50]
It is telling that security and train
guards are employed by the defendant specifically to observe what is
happening on its platforms,
stations and inside the train coaches.
They are there to protect the defendant’s customers and
passengers from harm or injury.
In the matter before me no evidence
was proffered by the defence as to what steps it has taken in order
to protect commuters, and
more specifically the plaintiff on the day
of the incident. On this basis alone the defendant was negligent.
[51]
I therefore conclude that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty of care and has breached that duty which
breach has caused harm
to the plaintiff as a result whereof the
plaintiff has suffered damages.
[52]
The uncontroverted evidence by the
plaintiff which is corroborated by his co-worker, Mr Bosman, is that
the train doors were open
as from the time they boarded the train at
Dallas station and even at the time the train started moving to the
next station. The
plaintiff and Mr Bosman maintained that the
plaintiff was pushed from the train due to a commotion inside the
coach. It is undisputed
that at that time the doors of the coach were
still open and as such were not closed prior to the train started
moving.
[53]
In
Mashongwa
v Prasa
[12]
the
Constitutional Court said:
“
It
bears yet another repetition that there is a high demand for the use
of trains since they are the arguably the most affordable
mode of
transportation for the poorest members of our society. For this
reason, trains are often packed to the point where some
passengers
have to stand very close to or even lean against doors. Leaving doors
of the moving train open therefore poses a potential
danger to
passengers on board.”
[54]
The
Court continued to state the following:
[13]
“
Doors
exit not merely to facilitate entry and exit of passenger, but also
to secure those inside from danger. PRASA appreciated
the importance
of keeping the doors of a moving train closed as a necessary safety
and security feature. This is borne out by a
provision in its
operating procedures requiring that doors be closed whenever the
train is in motion. Leaving them open is thus
an obvious and well
known potential danger to passengers.”
[55]
The testimony of the plaintiff is clear and
unambiguous that he boarded the train at Dallas station and as the
train started moving
the doors of the coach were not closed as a
result he was pushed from the train. There is no merit in the
contention by the defendant
as to why the plaintiff was not seated
after the train start moving.
[56]
Based on the facts which I have found to be
proved the defendant’s conduct was wrongful in not providing
security guards on
the station, who could have assisted and prevented
the train from proceeding out of the station with the doors open.
Furthermore,
the defendant’s failure to provide guards or
sufficient marshals inside the train was a neglect of the defendant’s
duty to provide protection and security for its passengers, including
the plaintiff.
[57]
In the circumstances, I make the following
order:
1.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover from
the defendant 100% of his proven damages;
2.
In terms of Rule 33 (4) of the Uniform
Rules of Court the issue of quantum of damages is postponed
sine
die.
3.
The defendant is ordered to pay the cost
incurred by the plaintiff.
CSP
OOSTHUIZEN-SENEKAL
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, by being uploaded to
Case
Lines
and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 16h00 on 31 August 2022.
DATE OF
HEARING:
10 – 11 August 2022
DATE JUDGMENT
DELIVERED:
31 August 2022
APPEARANCES
:
Attorney
for the Plaintiff:
Med Attorneys
Counsel
for the Plaintiff:
Mr M Fisher
Attorney
for the Defendant:
Ngeno and Mteto Inc
Counsel
for the Defendant:
Mr N K Msindo
[1]
Case
Lines 005/8.
[2]
Case
Lines 005/47.
[3]
Case
Lines 005/16.
[4]
South
African Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd v Thwala [ZASCA] 170 at
paragraph 18.
[5]
2002
(1) SA 11 (SCA).
[6]
1966
(2) SA (A) 433.
[7]
[2011]
(3) ZACC SA 274 (CC) at paragraph 122.
[8]
[2014]
ZACC 28, 2015 (1) SA 1 (CC).
[9]
Case
Lines 005/5.
[10]
Case
Lines 005/2.
[11]
Case
Lines 005.
[12]
[2015]
ZACC 36
;
2016 (2) BCLR 204
(CC);
2016 (3) SA 528
(CC) at paragraph
[46]
.
[13]
See
paragraph [48].
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