Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 679South Africa
TUHF Limited v 266 Bree Street Johannesburg (PTY) Ltd and Others (2020/39800) [2022] ZAGPJHC 679 (9 September 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
9 September 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## TUHF Limited v 266 Bree Street Johannesburg (PTY) Ltd and Others (2020/39800) [2022] ZAGPJHC 679 (9 September 2022)
TUHF Limited v 266 Bree Street Johannesburg (PTY) Ltd and Others (2020/39800) [2022] ZAGPJHC 679 (9 September 2022)
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sino date 9 September 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE
NO
:
2020/39800
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED: NO
9.09.2022
In the matter between:
TUHF
LIMITED
Applicant
and
266
BREE STREET JOHANNESBURG (PTY) LTD
First Respondent
10
FIFE AVENUE BEREA (PTY)
LTD
Second Respondent
28
ESSELEN STREET HILBROW
CC
Third Respondent
68
WOLMARANS STREET JOHANNESBURG (PTY) LTD
Fourth Respondent
HILLBROW
CONSOLIDATED INVESTMENTS CC
Fifth Respondent
MARK
MORRIS
FARBER
Sixth Respondent
JUDGMENT
SENYATSI J:
[1]
In this opposed application the applicant, TUHF Limited (“TUHF”)
seeks
enforcement of the terms of the loan agreement by way of
cession of any rental pertaining to Metro Centre. TUHF seeks that
rental
be paid to it in accordance with the cession provisions in the
mortgage bond registered in its favour on Metro Centre.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The parties concluded a loan agreement in terms of which TUHF funded
the purchase
and refurbishment of the Metro Centre, downtown
Johannesburg City Centre during 19 October 2016 to 2 November 2016.
[3]
The loan facility was for the sum of R20 937 842 and the amount was
disbursed in favour
of the first respondent, 266 Bree Street
Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd.
[4]
The second to fifth respondents stood as surety in favour of TUHF for
the fulfillment
of the loan repayment obligations by the first
respondent.
[5]
All the respondents are related entities operated and controlled
the by the sixth
respondent, Mr. Farber. In almost all of them,
he is the sole director and shareholder and their mind.
[6]
As further security for the fulfilment of their obligations by the
first respondent
to TUHF, the first respondent registered a covering
and continuing security by way of mortgage bond on the Metro Centre.
The mortgage
bond which made provision for cession of rental payments
by the tenants of the first respondent in favour of TUHF in the event
of any breach of loan agreement terms.
[7]
The common facts are that the loan agreement provided that certain
events would constitute
an event of default, namely:
7.1. The first
respondent's failure to pay any amount due by it in terms of the
loan agreement on the due date for payment
thereof or breached any
other provision of the loan agreement and fail to remedy any such
breach within any applicable cure period;
7.2. The first respondent
or any surety committing a breach of any of the terms and conditions
of a loan agreement or security to
which it is a party;
7.3. The first
respondents’ failure to comply with all and any municipal
by-laws;
7.4. Any representation,
warranty or statement made, or repeated deliberately in connection
with the loan agreement or the security
or in any document delivered
by or on behalf of the first respondent, or any surety, is incorrect
in any respect when made or deemed
to be made or repeated,
7.5. Any written
undertaking or warranty made by the first respondent and /or any
surety is breached;
7.6. The first
respondent, or any surety breaches or repudiates or evidences and
intention to repudiate any of the provisions of
the agreement or
security to which it is a party and fails to remedy any such breach
within any applicable notice or cure period
calling upon it to do so;
and
7.7. Any security or any
part thereof for any reason ceases to be in full force and effect
under any applicable law, or any part
thereof otherwise ceases to
constitute valid security, and the first respondent fails to restore
or procure the restoration of
such security or fails to provide
additional security to the satisfaction of TUHF within 10 business
days of being required to
do so.
[8]
The loan agreement also provided that, in Common Terms thereof, that
upon the occurrence
of an event of default and at any time
thereafter, if such event continues, TUHF would be entitled by notice
to the first
respondent, amongst other things to:
8.1. suspend any
amounts available but undrawn under the loan facility or declare any
amounts available but undrawn under the
loan facility to be
automatically cancelled and to declare that no further advance be
made available for drawn down under the loan
facility; and /or
8.2. accelerate and
declare all amounts owing in terms of the loan agreement immediately
due and payable, notwithstanding that such
amounts may not otherwise
have been due and payable, whereupon the same shall become
immediately due and payable including any
fees, penalties, costs and
charges, and /or
8.3. Charge penalty
interest at the highest interest rate applicable to any part of the
outstanding indebtedness under the loan
agreement.
[9]
In addition, the second to fourth respondents also concluded
unlimited suretyship
agreements in favour of TUHF for the fulfilment
of the repayment obligations by the first respondent in favour of
TUHF.
[10]
The suretyship agreements provided,
inter alia
, as follows:
10.1. sureties bound
themselves irrevocably as surety for and co-principal debtor in
solidium
with the first respondent, for the due and proper
performance by the first respondent of all its obligations in terms
of and arising
from the loan agreement;
10.2. sureties warranted
that the suretyship agreements are in all respects binding and valid.
(“the warranty”);
10.3. if there were to be
a breach of warranty, the sureties in the suretyship agreements
assumed unlimited liability of the first
respondent; and
10.4. the sureties in the
suretyship agreements indemnified TUHF against any loss of whatsoever
nature which TUHF may suffer as
a result of any breach of the
warranty.
[11]
The mortgage bond provides for essentially similar terms as the loan
agreement in respect to
warranties and events of default. For that
reason, those warranties and events of default will not be repeated.
[12]
In addition and especially clause 4 of the mortgage bond read
together with the loan agreement
(Clauses 11 and 15) provides amongst
others, as follows:
12.1. that the first
respondent irrevocably and in
riem suam
(but as a severable
undertaking given for the purpose of facilitating the enforcement of
the right) cedes, assigns and transfers
to TUHF all the respondent’s
rights, title and interest in and to any rent which is due in respect
of the tenancy,or otherwise
over the Metro Centre.
12.2. the first
respondent irrevocably authorizes TUHF to let the Metro Centre and to
receive rent due from any present and future
tenants of the Metro
Centre and to give valid receipts in respect thereof; and
12.3. that TUHF will be
entitled to charge 10% on any amount collected in terms of 13.2
above;
12.4. the amounts
collected by TUHF shall be appropriated as follows:
12.4.1. to any due and
unpaid penalty fee, to the extent applicable;
12.4.2. to any due or
unpaid initiation fee, to the extent applicable;
12.4.3. to any due and
unpaid interest charges; and
12.4.4. in reduction of
the outstanding indebtedness.
[13]
TUHF avers that due to earlier breaches, it issued legal proceedings
against the respondents
during May 2020 in respect of money judgment
for R26 475 404.32. The money judgment action is still to be
finalised.
[14]
Following the proceedings referred to above, the respondents in their
pleas raised a defence
that the first to fourth suretyship agreements
concluded by the respective sureties have ceased to be in full force
and effect
under any applicable law and ceased to constitute valid
security. This defence, so avers TUHF, constituted an intention to
repudiate
the provisions of the loan agreement and the mortgage bond.
TUHF also contends that the security breach has also occurred as a
result of the breach of the written warranty by the second to fifth
respondent suretyship agreements are valid and binding.
[15]
Following the alleged breaches TUHF demanded through its attorneys’
written notice on 2
October 2020 that the respondents remedy their
breach of the loan agreement and suretyship agreements by retracting
their allegation
that the suretyship agreements are void, remedying
their breach of the warranty and paying the arrear undisputed
municipal installments.
With respect to the latter, it must be stated
that this was also a term of the agreement, that the municipal rates
and taxes would
be paid and be up to date, especially if the amount
is not disputed.
[16]
The respondents replied to the demand through their attorneys and
confirmed that payment to the
municipality had recently been made and
denied a breach of the loan agreement and suretyship agreements.
[17]
The respondents failed to retract that the surety agreement had
ceased to be valid and of any
force and effect.
[18]
TUHF avers that as a consequence of the respondents breach, it is
entitled to collect rentals
which would otherwise be owed to the
first respondent by any tenants of the Metro Centre in terms of any
agreements concluded between
the first respondent and its tenants.
[19]
TUHF seeks the intervention of this court to give effect to the
cession of rental by the tenants
of Metro Centre in terms of the loan
agreement and the mortgage bond.
[20]
The first respondent in its defence prays that the proceedings should
be stayed because of the
fact that at the hearing of this matter, the
initial application instituted during May 2020 had not yet been
finalised. This is
raised as a
lis pendens
defence. The
respondents contend that the court should exercise its discretion by
staying the present application.
[21]
The respondents also contend that the cession provision in terms of
the mortgage bond which permits
TUFH to take cession of and to
appropriate Metro Centre tenants prior to it being
determined that the first
respondent is indebted to TUHF is contrary
to public policy, unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and unduly
harsh. The first respondent
contends furthermore that the cession
amounts to an unjustifiable limitation of the first respondent’s
Constitutional right,
inter alia
, not to have its property
deprived in the manner sought by TUHF in terms of the section 25 (1)
of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa. The respondents
also contend that the mortgage bond is ancillary to the loan
agreement.
[22]
The respondents further contend that since there are two actions all
instituted by TUHF against
the respondent, namely, an application
instituted in March 2020 and another one instituted in May 2020, the
current one instituted
in November 2020, TUHF
has engaged in the abuse of the process of court as an effort to
“out- spend"
the respondents in the litigation. The
respondents argued that the action should not be continued with. They
also argued that the
loan agreement has lapsed due to
fulfillment of a suspensive condition provided for in clauses
6.1 and 43.3 of the loan
agreement.
[23]
Clause 6.1 and 43.3 of the loan agreement provides as follows:
"6.1. Subject to
the fulfilment or waiver, as may be , if they Advance Conditions,
and/ the Special Conditions, and subject
to there being no event of
default, the borrows shall, at any time during the drawdown period,
be entitled to request an advance
against the facility amount by
delivering to the lender a drawdown request.
43.3.
It is a condition of this loan agreement that the borrowing entities
as referred to enclose 43.2 comply with certain conditions;"
ISSUES FOR
DETERMINATION
[24]
The respondents also issued a counter- application for the stay of
the main application and raised
defence is relevant to:
24.1. whether the
mortgage-bond is ancillary to the loan agreement, and if so, whether
the indebtedness of the first respondent
in terms of the loan
agreement first has to be proven;
24.2. whether the matter
is list pendants due to the action;
24.3. whether closes 6.1
and 43.3 of the loan agreement provide for suspensive
conditions;
24.4. whether the
application is an abuse of court process; and
24.5. whether provisions
in the mortgage-bond are contrary to policy.
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK AND REASONS
[25] I
now deal with each issue raised in the defence in relation to the
legal framework.
The
loan agreement vs the mortgage bond
[26]
The respondents contend that the mortgage bond is ancillary to the
loan agreement, and that the
first respondent's indebtedness to TUHF
needs to be proven in terms of the loan agreement.
[27]
The express wording used in the mortgage bond, which was registered
as continuing covering security,
and an event of default in terms of
the mortgage bond would occur if the first respondent " ...
commits a breach of any of the provisions
" in the loan
agreement or if the first respondent is at "...
any time in
breach of any obligation whatsoever
".
[28]
The approach on how our courts deal with the effect of cession of
rights is settled in our law.
In
Picardi
Hotels Ltd v Thekwini Properties (Pty) Ltd
[1]
court
considered the cession provision in a mortgage bond and held
that :
"[7]
The phrase ’cedes, transfers and assigns' incorporates all
of the constituent elements of a cession and is
sufficient to
constitute an effective transfer of rights. The use of the present
tense is also a strong indication that an immediate
transfer of
rights was intended."
[29]
It is therefore settled law that unless otherwise agreed, a cession
in
securitatein
debiti
results in the cedent being deprived of the right to recover the
ceded debt, retaining only the bare
dominium
or a reversionary interest therein.
[2]
In the present case, there is no talk of the rental having been ceded
to anyone else other than TUHF and by so doing and provided
the
cedent being the first respondent has indeed transferred its rights
over the rental to TUHF provided that any breach of the
loan
agreement is established by TUHF.
[30]
It is also settled law that the relevant provisions in the mortgage
bond must be construed in
accordance with "...
sound
commercial principles and good business sense so that it receives a
fair and sensible application
."
[3]
[31]
If any other interpretation of the plain language used in the
mortgage bond on cession, such
as that the cession can only be
enforced if the indebtedness is proven in the pending action, would
lead
to a conflict with the plain meaning, the court will not give the
wording used other than the one intended by the parties.
[4]
[32]
The
enforcement of TUHF's cession of rental rights is founded by the
events of default provided for in clauses 18.1.6 to 18.1.
10 in
the loan agreement read with clause 14.1.2 in the mortgage bond. The
parties agreed to these terms at the conclusion of the
agreement. The
agreement was not conditional on proving the indebtedness of the
first respondent to TUHF but on the occurrence
of any of the events
of default.
[33]
I am of the view that the contention that the mortgage bond is
ancillary to the loan agreement
is without factual merit. The terms
of the loan agreement and mortgage bond were agreed to by the parties
when the agreements was
concluded. The enforcement of the cession
provision was not dependent on default in payment only but breach of
any term whatsoever.
My reading of the loan agreement and mortgage
bond does not reflect what the respondents contend, which is that
cession of rental
repayment will only be enforced if the indebtness
is first proved. This in my respectful view, is the reason there are
various
of defaults provisions as well as warranty provisions the
breach of which will entitle TUHF to enforce its rights including
giving
the right to insist that the cession of rental payments by the
tenants of the first respondent on the Metro Centre be given effect
to.
Abuse
of court process
[34]
The
respondents contend that TUHF is abusing the court process and its
actions are designed to harass the respondents, and as already
stated
to 'out-spend' the respondents prior to the determination of their
legal proceedings. They contend that the present application
should
be stayed.
[35]
The
legal framework on the principles to stay civil proceedings to
prevent an abuse of the process of the court is settled. In
Clipsal
Australia (Pty) Ltd and Others
[5]
the court held as follows:
"[
17]
it is clear that the court does have the power to stay civil
proceedings in certain circumstances, e.g. to prevent an abuse
of the
process of the court (see Corderoy v Union Government (Minister of
finance)
1918 AD 512
at 517) and if an action is already pending
between the same parties on the same cause of action
"
[36]
In the
present case, although the pending action is against the same
parties, the cause of action is not the same. The present case
deals
with the enforcement of cession provisions in the mortgage bond. The
pending action deals with non-repayment of the loan
advanced to the
first respondents in which the second to the fifth respondents stood
surety for the due fulfillment of all obligations
by the first
respondent to TUHF.
[37]
It follows
that I am not persuaded to exercise discretion in favour of the
respondents by staying the proceedings on the enforcement
of the
rights pertaining to cession of rental payments on the Metro Centre.
[38]
I therefore
hold the view that the current application does not constitute an
abuse of court process.
Pactum
Commissorium
[39]
The
respondents contend that clause 14.2.3 of the mortgage bond is
illegal and invalid to the extent that it permits TUHF to appropriate
rentals prior to a determination of the first respondent to TUHF.
[40]
The
submission made by counsel for the respondent is not supported by any
evidence, for instance that the loan repayments are
up-to-date. For
that reason alone, I fail to understand why this court should declare
illegality on a term of the agreement that
was agreed to by the
parties. It should be remembered that it is not denied that TUHF an
advanced over R20 million to the first
respondent to acquire and
refurbish the Metro Centre. If any prejudice is suffered, TUHF is
heavily prejudiced because of the financial
exposure to the first
respondent.
[41]
The
respondents also contend that cession of the rentals as contained in
the mortgage-bond is contrary to public policy and invalid
in as much
as it amounts to an unlawful
pactum
commissorium
.
I do not see how the cession provisions in the mortgage bond in this
agreement can be equated to
pactum
commissorium
.
First, the cession provisions do not authorize TUHF to be the owner
of the Metro Centre but on the contrary, as agreed to by the
parties
permits rentals to be ceded and paid to TUHF. The cedent being the
first respondent has agreed to divest itself the right
to collect
rental from the tenants, if it commits any event of default which
included stating that the securities provided by it
and its sureties
cannot be enforced in law because of the alleged failure to meet the
requirements of section 45 of the Companies
Act. The exercise of the
cession rights as agreed does not amount to TUHF becoming the owner
of Metro Centre as ownership still
remains with the first respondent.
[42]
It is also important to restate the legal principles applicable when
interpreting the express
provisions of the contract, in this case,
the cession provision in the mortgage bond. In
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[6]
held as follows on the contract interpretation:
"…
the present state of the law can be expressed as follows:
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaningful to the words
used
in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory
instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by
reading
the particular provision or provisions in light of the
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its meaning
into
existence…Whatever the nature of the document,
consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the
ordinary
rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and
the material
known to those responsible for its production. Where
more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed in
the
light of all these factors. The process is objective not
subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads
to insensible or unbusiness like results or undermines the apparent
purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard
against,
the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible
or businesslike for the words actually used. To
do so in regard to a
statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between
interpretation and legislation. In a contractual
context it is to
make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact made.
The ‘inevitable point of departure
is the language of the
provision itself’, read in context and having regard to
the purpose of the provision and the
background to the preparation
and production of the document.”
[43]
The
rules of contract interpretation were also considered in
Diener
NO v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others
[7]
where the court held that:
“
[51] Given
that some ambiguity arises when sections 135(4) and 143(5) of the
Companies Act are read together, it is necessary
to interpret the
sections having regard to their purpose and context.”
[44]
In the
present case, the mortgage Bond was registered as continuing covering
security and an event of default in terms of the mortgage
bond would
occur if the first respondent, "...
commits
a breach of any provisions
"
of the loan agreement or if the first respondent is at "...
anytime
in breach of any obligation whatsoever
."
The context of the language used is clear. The enforcement of any
right that TUHF is not dependent on the determination
of a dispute
relating to payment. It follows therefore that the rights accorded to
TUHF in terms of the cession provision in the
mortgage bond are not
ambiguous. Consequently, the provisions relating to the enforcement
of the cession are not
contra
bonos mores
.
In fact public policy encourages business to conduct its affairs in
any manner as long as it is lawful. Courts cannot be expected
to
substitute their own terms of agreement to what the parties in the
conduct of their business have agreed to.
Lis
Pendens
[45]
The respondents contend that the present application is
lis
pendens
due to the pending action for the recovery of the loan
amount. I have already ruled that this cannot be so because in the
pending
action proceedings cause of action is default in the loan
repayment whereas in this present case, action is the enforcement of
the cession of rental from the Metro Centre tenants, which cession
has been agreed to by the parties.
[46]
In
Nestle
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Mars Incorporated
[8]
the court considered the
principles of
lis
alibi pendens
and held as follows:
“
[16]
The
defence of lis alibi pendens shares features in common with
the defence of res judicata because they have
a common
underlying principle which is that there should be finality in
litigation. Once a suit has been commenced before a tribunal
that is
competent to adjudicate upon it the suit must generally be brought to
its conclusion before that tribunal and should not
be replicated (lis
alibi pendens). By the same token the suit will not be permitted to
be revived once it has been brought to its
proper conclusion (res
judicata). The same suit, between the same parties, should be brought
only once and finally.
[17]
There
is room for the application of that principle only where the same
dispute, between the same parties, is sought to be placed
before the
same tribunal (or two tribunals with equal competence to end the
dispute authoritatively). In the absence of any of
those elements
there is no potential for a duplication of actions. In my view none
of those elements is present in this case. Indeed,
it is difficult to
see how they can exist where the matters in issue have been placed
before two quite different tribunals (as
in this case), the one
operating consensually and the other by force of statute, each having
its own peculiar functions, powers
and authority. For in such a case
each tribunal will, by definition, be inquiring into and ruling upon
different matters, and neither
will be capable of ruling
authoritatively on the issue that falls within the competence of the
other.”
I
am unable to exercise the court's discretion to stay the proceedings
for reasons already provided.
The
validity of the loan agreement
[47]
I
have
already made reference to both clauses where in this judgement. When
consideration is given to the context of both clauses,
it is apparent
to me that the clauses relate more to the drawdown conditions of the
amount of the loan facility to the first respondent.
In fact clause
4.3 is more to do with cession of the loan facility to a third-party
without the prior permission of TUHF. I hold
the view that an
averment by the respondents that the suspensive conditions of the
loan agreement we never fulfilled and that led
to the lapse of the
loan agreement is without factual basis.
[48]
TUHF has in
my respectful view, succeeded in proving its case.
ORDER
[49]
The following
order is made:
1.
The Applicant is with immediate effect authorized to take cession of
any rental amounts payable by every
tenant occupying the immovable
property known as Metro Centre (“Metro Centre tenants”)
to 266 BREE STREET JOHANNESBURG
(PTY) LTD (“the First
Respondent”), alternatively the Respondents, further
alternatively its duly authorized agent,
(“the cession”);
2.
The Respondents sign all documents necessary to facilitate the
cession in 1 above, failing which the
Sheriff is authorized to sign
all documents
necessary to give effect
to the cession;
3.
The Respondents furnish the Applicant, within 15 days of this order,
with the names and contact information
of the Metro Centre tenants
together with:
3.1.
Copies of any written lease agreements concluded between the First
Respondent, alternatively the Respondents,
further alternatively its
duly authorized agent, and the Metro Centre tenants;
3.2.
Particularity in respect of the terms of any implied and/or oral
terms of any lease agreement concluded
with the Metro Centre tenants;
and
3.3.
Particularity and copies of any existing property management mandates
for the management of and rental
collection at the Metro Centre.
4.
The Applicant may take steps necessary for purposes of collecting
rental amounts from the Metro Centre
tenants; and
5.
The respondents are ordered to pay the costs jointly and severally
the one paying the other absolved
on the scale as between attorney
and client.
ML SENYATSI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
DATE
APPLICATION HEARD:
27 October 2021
DATE
JUDGMENT DELIVERED:
9 September 2022
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the
applicant:
Adv A Botha SC
Adv
E Eksteen
Instructed
by:
Schindlers Attorneys
Counsel for the first to
sixth respondents:
Adv G Wickins SC
Adv
M De Oliveira
Instructed by:
Gavin Simpson Attorneys
[1]
[2008] ZASCA 128
;
2009
(1) SA 493
(SCA) at para 7
[2]
See
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v The Matser
1987 (1) SA 276
(A)
at 294C; Standard Genera; Insurance Co Ltd v SA Brake CC
[1995]
ZASCA 46
;
1995 (3) SA 806
(A) AT 814 I- 815 B
[3]
See
Bothma- Botha Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport
(Edms) Bpk
2014 (2) SA 494
(SCA) at [10]
[4]
See
Grobler v Oosthuizen
2009 (5) SA 500
(SCA) at [24]
[5]
2010
(2) SA 289
SCA at [17]
[6]
2012
(4) SA 593
(SCA) at para [18]
[7]
2019
(4) SA 374
(CC) at para 51
[8]
[2001]
4 All SA 315
(A) at [16] to [17]
sino noindex
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