Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 773South Africa
Silver Birch Estate Homeowners Association NPR (RF) and Others v Heyneke and Others (2022/17525) [2022] ZAGPJHC 773 (21 September 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
21 September 2022
Headnotes
this matter was not ripe for hearing and lacked urgency. Furthermore, the Court did not award punitive costs against them, instead there was no order as to costs. The aforesaid is irrelevant to the instant case before the Court and reference to the aforesaid cases are misguided.[1] 13. According to the Applicants in this matter, it was argued that the punitive costs order which was awarded by this Court: “22. … has a serious practical effect in setting a legal precedent that effectively goes against the provisions of Section 77 of the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 regarding when and under which circumstances company directors bear liabilities when dispensing their duties. Furthermore, the
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAGPJHC 773
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Silver Birch Estate Homeowners Association NPR (RF) and Others v Heyneke and Others (2022/17525) [2022] ZAGPJHC 773 (21 September 2022)
Silver Birch Estate Homeowners Association NPR (RF) and Others v Heyneke and Others (2022/17525) [2022] ZAGPJHC 773 (21 September 2022)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2022_773.html
sino date 21 September 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
CASE
NO: 2022/17525
REPORTABLE:
No
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
REVISED:
No
21
September 2022
In
the matter between:
THE
SILVER BIRCH ESTATE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
NPR (RF)
(Registration
Number: 2005/003035/08)
First Applicant
MARY
FISHER
Second Applicant
KELEBONGILE
NTSANE Third Applicant
AVRIL
COUNTER
Fourth Applicant
and
JOHAN
JOCHIMUS HEYNEKE
First Respondent
ROBERT
JOHN
CRAIG
Second Respondent
LIREN
PILLAY
Third Respondent
COMMUNITY
SCHEMES OMBUD SERVICE
“
CSOS”
COMMUNITY
SCHEMES OMBUD SERVICE
Fourth Respondent
“
CSOS”
T
S LEKOKOTLA
Fifth Respondent
Judgment
of Application for Leave to Appeal
Reasons
for judgment (handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email) and by being
uploaded
to the Case Lines system of the Gauteng Division, Johannesburg.
The
date and time for hand-down of judgment is deemed to be 10h00 on 21
September 2022
Matter
heard on:
Thursday, 15 September 2022
The
matter was by consent between the parties, heard via electronic
videoconference on Microsoft Teams.
CONSTANTINIDES
AJ:
Background
Facts:
1.
This is an application for leave to appeal by the First to Fourth
Applicants (“the Applicants”) to the Full Bench of this
Court,
alternatively
, to the Supreme Court of Appeal, against
the Judgment granted by me in the Urgent Court which was handed down
on the 6
th
June 2022. The following order was made:
“
1. The matter
is struck off the roll due to self-created urgency;
2. The Applicants are
to pay the costs on the attorney and client scale.”
2.
For purposes of convenience the parties shall be referred to
as in
the Urgent Application.
3.
The matter was set down and argued in the Urgent Court on the
24
th
May 2022. The Second, Third and Fourth Applicants were lay litigants
and did not have legal representation. The First, Second and
Third
Respondents were represented by Counsel who opposed the urgent
application. There is a pending application between the same
parties
in the Gauteng Division, Pretoria.
4.
The reasons for judgment relating to the Urgent Application
are
detailed in my reasons for Judgment which will not be repeated herein
and must be read as if incorporated herein.
5.
The Applicants, have at the outset placed on record that the
application for leave to appeal is
only sought in respect of the
attorney client costs order.
(Emphasis added). They are not
seeking leave to appeal in respect of the order striking the matter
off the roll due to lack of
urgency.
6.
Both in the urgent application and in the present application
the
Second Respondent (“Ms Fisher”) was the spokesperson for
the Applicants who confirmed in person that that was in
order.
7.
Regrettably Ms Fisher failed to convince the court that the
matter
justified an urgent hearing and therefore the court based on the
reasons detailed in the reasons for judgement, struck the
matter off
the roll and awarded punitive costs against the applicants.
8.
The urgent application papers were exceptionally voluminous
for a
matter of this nature and in the Applicant’s Heads of Argument
in this matter at paragraph 23.2, the following was
stated :
9.
“ ……
the volume of papers in the matter sought
to be appealed totalled about 288 pages, which were mostly annexed
evidence.”
10.
It was argued that another Court may come to a different conclusion
to the present
Court in regard to costs. Ms Fischer cited and read
various cases wherein she states there were similar facts to her
matter and
despite the fact that the Court struck the matter off the
roll, the Court did not award punitive costs against the parties and
instead made no order as to costs.
11.
According to Ms Fischer on the 3
rd
November 2020, the
First, Second and Third Respondents and Another launched an urgent
application against the First Applicant and
Another in the South
Gauteng High Court under Case Number 2020/32119 to,
inter alia,
be declared Directors of the First Applicant.
12.
The Court
allegedly held that this matter was not ripe for hearing and lacked
urgency. Furthermore, the Court did not award punitive
costs against
them, instead there was no order as to costs. The aforesaid is
irrelevant to the instant case before the Court and
reference to the
aforesaid cases are misguided.
[1]
13.
According to the Applicants in this matter, it was argued that the
punitive
costs order which was awarded by this Court:
“
22.
… has a serious practical effect in setting a legal precedent
that effectively goes against the provisions
of
Section 77
of the
Companies Act No. 71 of 2008
regarding when and under which
circumstances company directors bear liabilities when dispensing
their duties. Furthermore, the
judgment being appealed will have the
practical result of setting a legal precedent for punishing company
directors seeking relief
from any court in good faith; who acted
rationally, with due care and skill, for proper purpose and in the
best interest of the
company. ….”
[2]
14.
The aforesaid argument is irrelevant to the Court’s finding
that the matter
was struck off the roll due to lack of urgency. The
Court refused to hear an argument on the merits. The aforesaid
argument in
the Applicants’ Heads of Argument is an attempt by
the Applicants to re-argue the merits in the urgent matter. They did
not
pass the hurdle of proving to the Court that the matter was
urgent. Therefore, to argue the merits at the stage of the
application
for leave to appeal does not assist the Applicants in any
way.
15.
The Applicants’ further argument that despite the fact that a
matter totalling
403 pages came before the Gauteng Division, Pretoria
under Case No.: 5930/2022 and was merely struck off the roll with no
order
as to costs despite the fact that the present matter allegedly
totalled approximately 288 pages which was allegedly mostly annexed
evidence in fact is indicative of the Applicants’ refusal to
comply with the rules of court that require clear and concise
applications which ensure that matters are dealt with expeditiously
in cases of urgency.
16.
During the hearing for the leave to appeal application, Ms Fischer
persisted
in attempting to argue the merits of the main application
and the Court had to repeatedly caution her that the Court had not
heard
the merits in the Urgent Application and was not going to hear
the merits in the application for leave to appeal. The merits of
the
main application had not been canvassed and this is evidenced by the
facts that the matter was struck off the roll due to self-created
urgency.
17.
The Applicants furthermore attempted to side track the Court with
arguments
that they were not afforded an opportunity to argue the
punitive costs order that was made and that the Judicial Officer
stood
up and left the Court not enabling them to argue the matter.
18.
Ms Fischer was cautioned that to make allegations which are not
candid purely
for purposes of discrediting the Judicial Officer had
serious repercussions, Ms Fischer then did not persist in regard to
the aforesaid
allegation.
19.
The constant interruptions of the Applicant in the Urgent Application
was to
stop the Applicants from presenting the merits of the case to
the Court as they had not passed the hurdle of showing the Court that
the matter was urgent.
20.
The Applicants have stated that the Second to Third and Fourth
Applicants have
indicated in their Heads of Argument and in argument
that they have not obtained legal aid as they do not qualify
according to
the means test as they earn more than the means test
requires. Therefore, this in itself is an admission that they are not
in financial
dire straits as they have indicated to the Court in the
Heads of Argument in the Application for Leave to Appeal.
21.
The Second, Third and Fourth Applicants allege that they are merely
trying to
assist the non-profit organisation and they did not have
funds to employ legal representation. The crux of the argument is
that
the parties are lay persons and therefore the impression created
is due to the fact that “they are lay persons”, they
should not be held accountable for legal costs in this matter.
22.
The Applicants filed a Supplementary Affidavit wherein they took
issue with
the fact that the Respondents were opposing this matter
and requested that they not be heard in this matter. It is trite that
a
party need not file a Notice of Intention to Oppose an Application
for Leave to Appeal.
23.
The parties were given a directive to all file Heads of Argument and
the Respondents
filed their Heads of Argument to comply with the
courts directive. Nevertheless, the Respondents indicated that they
had no objection
to the Supplementary Affidavit being entertained by
the Court. The Supplementary Affidavit once again is an abuse of the
process
of Court in that the Applicants again attempt to re-argue the
merits of the Urgent Application at the Application for Leave to
Appeal stage, which is untenable.
24.
The reasons for granting a punitive costs order appears in my reasons
for judgment
in the urgent application and shall not be repeated in
this Judgment.
25.
According to the Respondents Counsel, in terms of
Rule 49
, there is
no requirement to file a Notice of Intention to Oppose an Application
for Leave to Appeal. It was argued that the Applicants
had not
specified the grounds of appeal and that the Applicants should stand
or fall by what they have stated in their Application
for Leave to
Appeal.
26.
It was placed on record that the main application is pending before
the Pretoria
High Court and that the Respondents are out of pocket
due to the alleged vexatious litigation which the Second to Fourth
Applicants
have launched in this Court.
27.
Furthermore, the Respondents have had to employ legal representation
to oppose
the present application for leave to appeal, thereby
incurring further costs.
28.
I am in agreement with the Respondents’ argument that the Court
Orders
relating to other applications between these parties and
others are irrelevant to the present application. According to the
Respondents’
Counsel the facts for the relief sought are
different to the facts of the present case. Nevertheless, as stated
above, the merits
of the case were not canvassed and are not relevant
to the present matter. It was merely the fact that the matter was not
urgent
that was ruled upon and not the merits of the case.
29.
The
Applicants have stated that the Respondents had refused to accept
service of the Urgent Application. However, the Respondents
took
issue with this and stated that the Applicants were not being candid
with this Court and that in fact the Office of the Respondents’
Attorneys had closed for the day when the Applicants had attempted to
serve the papers on the Respondent’s Attorneys of record.
Nevertheless, the urgent application afforded the Respondents one
Court day within which to give notice of intention to oppose
and to
file their papers two days thereafter.
[3]
30.
The Respondents’ Counsel indicated that she was unaware of the
Judicial
Officer standing up and not allowing the Applicants to
address the Court on costs. The court was adjourned in the proper
manner
and this is evidenced from the record of the proceedings.
31.
The Applicants stated that irrespective of the fact that the
Respondents were
not afforded proper time limits within which to file
their papers in the urgent application, they were aware of what the
contents
of the application were. This argument is not sustainable
and does not absolve the Applicants conduct in not complying with the
rules of court or the directives and is indicative of their lack of
bona fides.
32.
I have had regard to the cases referred to by the Applicants in terms
of which
no costs orders were granted. These cases do not support the
Applicants’ arguments and do not appear in line with the
present
arguments and issues raised in this application.
Applicants
Grounds for leave to appeal
33.
The Applicant’s application for leave to appeal has stated that
the Court
erred and misdirected itself in the following respects,
that the court:
“
6. …
erred in concluding that the Applicants’ urgent application for
interim relief was an abuse of court processes,
given that there was
a pending application in the North Gauteng High Court, in respect of
the same parties. (at para 6).”
[4]
and
:
“
7.
… erred at paragraph 24, in concluding that the Applicants’
application was ‘ a text
book case of an abuse of the court
process where the parties fail to comply with the uniform rules of
court and launch unsustainable
applications which basically amount to
frivolous and vexatious litigation.’”
[5]
and
34.
Did not afford the Applicants:
“
8.
… a fair opportunity to argue their matter …”
[6]
35.
The parties
submit that “…
another
Court could reasonably have come to a different conclusion
.”
[7]
36.
The
Applicants have made scurrilous and vexatious allegations against the
judicial officer both in argument and in the papers and
amongst those
scurrilous allegations have argued that they were not afforded an
opportunity to address the Court either in relation
to the urgent
application or in regard to the award of punitive costs on the
Attorney and client scale at the hearing. The Applicants
furthermore
state that the Court’s finding in paragraphs 13 and 14
“…..
regarding
irreparable harm, and that the
Appl
icants
made unsubstantiated statements “both in argument and in the
papers
”,
and allege the court’s decision in finding that the parties had
not substantiated their statements was erroneous.
[8]
The
Law
37.
The Applicants who launch urgent applications must indicate to the
Court why
they cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in
due course. Where a Court finds that the application lacks the
requisite
degree of urgency, the Court can refuse to hear the matter
and in those circumstances can strike the application from the roll.
Where
a Court strikes off a matter from the roll due to lack of urgency,
does this constitute a final judgment and is this order
appealable?
38.
It is trite when a matter is struck off the roll, it is not
appealable. The
urgent court did not entertain or rule on the merits
of the matter.
39.
Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act, 10 of 2013 (“the
Act”)
states:
“
Leave to
appeal may only be given where a Judge or Judges concerned are of the
opinion that –
(a)(i)
The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii)
There is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting
judgments on the matter under consideration;
(b)The decision sought
on appeal does not fall within the ambit of Section 16(2)(a); and
(c)
Where
the decision sought to be appealed against does not dispose of all of
the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just
and prompt
resolution of the real issues between the parties;
40.
The grounds upon which the Applicants seek leave to appeal are
unclear and those
grounds are not set out properly in terms of the
rules. Once again the Applicants hide behind the fact that they are
“lay
persons”. The parties were requested to file Heads
of Argument and to address the Court as to why they have not
approached
the Legal Aid Board for legal aid. Based on the Heads of
Argument, they state the following in regard to legal aid:
15.
Having consideration for Legal Aid South Africa’s qualifying
criteria and means test, the First to Fourth
Applicants did not and
do not qualify for legal aid assistance. Specifically, that the First
Applicant is a juristic person and
not a natural person and its
directors do not meet the means test requirements.”
[9]
41.
Based on the aforesaid it is evident that the Second to Fourth
Applicants have
“elected” not to seek legal
representation and on their own papers it is evident that they can
afford legal representation
but choose to approach the Court in
person. Despite the aforesaid the Second and Third Applicants indeed
did address the court
relating to the courts intention to grant
punitive costs against them by stating that they could not afford to
pay the costs yet,
in the heads of argument and in argument in this
matter Ms Fisher indicated that the parties did not qualify for legal
aid as their
earnings and assets were above the minimum threshold
required by legal aid. From the aforesaid the parties misinformed the
urgent
court that they “could not afford” to pay the
costs that the court was going to order against them. Furthermore,
the
court in the application for leave to appeal is once again
mislead with the allegation that the parties were not afforded a
proper
hearing or an opportunity to address the court relating to the
matter or the costs issue.
42.
The courts order of punitive costs against the Applicants in which
the Applicants
seek leave to appeal would not have a prospect of
success in another Court and there is no other compelling reason why
the appeal
should be heard and the decision sought to be appealed
against does not dispose of all the issues in their case and an
appeal would
not result in the just and prompt resolution of the real
issues between the parties as there is a pending case in the Pretoria
High Court in this regard.
43.
Regarding
the question of leave to appeal, it has been held that if the
judgment or order sought to be appealed against does not
dispose of
all the issues between the parties, the balance of convenience must,
in addition, favour a piecemeal consideration of
the case. In other
words the test laid down was : “
whether
the appeal – if leave were given – would lead to a just
and reasonably prompt resolution of the real issue between
the
parties”.
Piecemeal consideration of a case was, therefore, allowed if an
appeal necessarily led to a more expeditious and cost-effective
final
determination of the real issue between the parties, and, as such,
contributed decisively to its final solution.
[10]
44.
In terms of
Section 17(1)(a)(i) the criterion as to whether there would be a
reasonable prospect of success in determining the conclusion
to which
the Judge or Judges must come before leave to appeal can be granted.
There must be a sound rational basis for the conclusion
that there
are prospects of success on appeal.
[11]
45.
In the Mont
Chevaux Trust (IT 2012/28) v. Tina Goosen the Land Claims Court held
(in an obiter dictum) that the wording of this
subsection raised the
bar of the test that now has to be applied to the merits of the
proposed appeal before leave should be granted.
[12]
46.
In
Notshokovu
v. S
[13]
it
was held
at
paragraph 2
that an Appellant faces a higher and stringent threshold, in terms of
the Act (i.e. this sub-section), compared to the provisions
of the
Repealed Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959.
47.
The court has to consider each application for leave to appeal on its
own facts
and the Applicant must demonstrate to the Court that there
is a compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.
48.
The facts in this case do not demonstrate that the appeal would have
a reasonable
prospect of success or that there is some other
compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The decision in
this matter which
the applicants seek leave to appeal does not fall
within the ambit of Section 16(2)(a) and the decision sought in the
appeal does
not dispose of all the issues in the case.
49.
Given the history of this matter it has become evident that the
Applicants have
failed to accept the seriousness of their failure to
comply with the uniform rules of court relating to affording their
opponents
sufficient time frames or the practice directive of this
division relating to urgent applications.
50.
The general rule is that costs which have been unnecessarily incurred
should
be borne by the party responsible therefor hence the costs
order granted against the Applicants in the urgent application.
51.
In the leading case concerning attorney and client costs Tindall JA
stated:
“
The true
explanation of awards of attorney and client costs not expressly
authorised by Statute seems to be that, by reason of special
considerations arising either from the circumstances which give rise
to the action or from the conduct of the losing party, the
court in a
particular case considers it just, by means of such an order, to
ensure more effectually than it can do by means of
a judgment for
party and party costs that the successful party will not be out of
pocket in respect of the expense caused to him
by the litigation.”
[14]
In
essence this Court must try to achieve fairness to both sides.
[15]
52.
Despite the fact that the Applicants abandoned the application for
leave to
appeal in respect of the striking off of this matter due to
lack of urgency at the commencement of the hearing of this matter
they
nevertheless continued to present argument in respect of the
entire matter and repeatedly attempted to argue the merits of the
urgent application before this court. The aforesaid is indicative of
the total disregard for the time and scarce judicial resources,
and
once again is an abuse of the process. The fact that the parties are
lay persons does not absolve them from complying with
the rules and
directives of the court and a failure and/or refusal to do so under
the guise of ignorance of the law is untenable
and vexatious.
The
following order is made:
1.
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.
Each party is to pay their own costs.
H
CONSTANTINIDES
Acting
Judge of High Court
Gauteng
Local Division
JOHANNESBURG
Date
of Hearing: 15 September 2022
For
the 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
and 4
th
Applicants (“the Appellants):
Applicants
in person
Counsel
for the 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
Respondents: Adv. N Breytenbach
Attorneys
for the 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
Respondents: Maybery Attorneys Inc.
[1]
Paragraphs 18, 19, 20 – 082-8 Case Lines ref, Applicants’
Heads of Argument
[2]
Paragraph 22 – 082-9 Case Lines, Applicants’ Heads of
Argument.
[3]
Case Lines 001-1 to 001-3 and 001-4.
[4]
Case Lines 075-7, paragraph 6 of the Application for Leave to
Appeal.
[5]
Case Lines 075-9, paragraph 7 of the Application for Leave to
Appeal.
[6]
Case Lines 075-10, paragraph of the Application for Leave to Appeal.
[7]
Case Lines Ref: - page 075-2, application for leave to appeal.
[8]
Case Lines 075-6, paragraph 5, application for leave to appeal.
[9]
Case Lines 082-7, Applicant’s Heads of Argument on Leave to
Appeal.
[10]
Superior
Court Practice Vol. 1, Service 11, 2019 A2 – 58.
[11]
Four
Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v. Rattan N.O.
2019 (3) SA 451
(SCA) at 463 F
Superior
Court Practice, vol. 1 and A2 – 55, Service 12 [2020]
[12]
Superior
Court Practice, vol. 1 and A2 – 55, Service 12 [2020]
[13]
Unreported,
SCA Case No.: 157/15 dated 7 September 2016
[14]
Nel v
Waterberg Landbouwers Ko-operatieve Vereeniging
1946 AD 597
at 607.
[15]
Ward v
Sulzer
1973 (3) SA 701
(A) at 706G
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
Silverstone Body Corporate v Ntlama (2024/068432) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1209 (21 November 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1209High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Silverbird Property Development CC t/a Signet Terrace Shopping Centre v Khans Tyres and Exhaust CC t/a Super Wheel and Tyre (04863/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 303 (3 March 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 303High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
South African National Civil Organisation v Ramosie and Others (7016/2019) [2022] ZAGPJHC 323 (6 May 2022)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 323High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
South African Reserve Bank v Chauke (2021/40383) [2022] ZAGPJHC 162 (18 March 2022)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 162High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
South African Municipal Workers Union National Medical Scheme (SAMUMED) v City of Ekurhuleni and Others (5068/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 701; [2022] 4 All SA 878 (GJ) (25 August 2022)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 701High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar