Case Law[2026] ZAGPPHC 12South Africa
Dialstat Trading 115 (Pty) Ltd v Save the Maize Belt Society and Others (098869/2023) [2026] ZAGPPHC 12 (30 January 2026)
Headnotes
Summary:
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Dialstat Trading 115 (Pty) Ltd v Save the Maize Belt Society and Others (098869/2023) [2026] ZAGPPHC 12 (30 January 2026)
Dialstat Trading 115 (Pty) Ltd v Save the Maize Belt Society and Others (098869/2023) [2026] ZAGPPHC 12 (30 January 2026)
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FLYNOTES:
CIVIL LAW – Juristic personality –
Universitas
personarum
–
Test
for juristic personality is determined by examining constitution
or rules of juristic entity – Key characteristics
are
two-fold – Perpetual succession and capacity to own property
separately from its members – Conduct over a
long period
showed no meaningful compliance with characteristics of perpetual
succession or independent financial and property
capacity –
Not operating as a true juristic entity – Not a universitas
personarum.
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)
Case
No. 098869/2023
(1) REPORTABLE:
YES
/
NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/
NO
(3) REVISED
DATE:
30 January
2026
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
DIALSTAT
TRADING 115 (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
And
SAVE
THE MAIZE BELT SOCIETY
FIRST
RESPONDENT
OMAR,
ZEHIR
SECOND
RESPONDENT
OMAR,
YASMIN
THIRD
RESPONDENT
OMAR,
ABU BAKR
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
OMAR,
EBRAHIM
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
OMAR,
SULAIMAN
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
MAHLANGU,
MOHAMED
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
MAHLANGU,
WILLIAM
EIGHTH
RESPONDENT
MLOMBO,
CONSTANCE
NINTH
RESPONDENT
MAHOLWANA,
FLORENCE
TENTH
RESPONDENT
VAN
DER SCHYFF, SORAYA
ELEVENTH
RESPONDENT
PREUSS,
CLIVE
TWELFTH
RESPONDENT
Coram:
Millar
J
Heard
on:
14
October & 5 November 2025
Delivered:
30
January 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email,
by being
uploaded to the
CaseLines
system of the GD and
by release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed
to be 09H00 on 30 January
2026.
Summary:
Universitas
personarum
—
Juristic
personality — Requirements for
universitas
personarum
—
Perpetual
succession — Capacity to own property—
Locus
standi —
The constitution
reflects a
universitas personarum
—
Subsequent conduct does not reflect
intention to form a
universitas
personarum
—
The Society
does not hold any property in its own name — Members
repudiated proposal that they contribute to the
Society - Cost
orders unsatisfied — Society is nothing more than a
vehicle to litigate without consequence —
The Society is
not a
universitas personarum.
ORDER
It
is Ordered:
[1]
It is declared that the first respondent, the “Save the
Maize Belt Society”
is not a
universitas personarum
.
[2]
It is declared the first respondent, the “Save the Maize
Belt Society”
may not litigate in its own name.
[3]
The second, seventh, eighth, nineth and tenth respondents are
jointly
and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved,
ordered to pay the costs of the applicant for the postponement on
14 October 2025, on the scale as between party and party together
with the costs of counsel on scale C.
[4]
The second to eleventh respondents, jointly and severally, the one
paying
the others to be absolved, are ordered to pay the
applicant’s costs of the application on the scale as between
party
and party which costs include the costs of counsel on scale
C.
JUDGMENT
MILLAR J
[1]
The applicant (Dialstat) seeks an order declaring that the first
respondent (the Society)
is not a
universitas
personarum
in
the true sense, and in consequence thereof has
no
locus standi
to
pursue or take part in further disputes or litigation against it.
[2]
The issue for determination is primarily a legal one. Dialstat does
not take issue with
any of the individual members of the Society, the
second to twelfth respondents, or for that matter anyone else, save
for the Society,
litigating against it. The reasons for this
will become apparent.
[3]
The respondents for their part oppose the application on two broad
fronts. The first
is that Dialstat has failed to establish that the
Society is not a true
universitas personarum
. The second, are
a number of other procedural defences.
BACKGROUND – THE
LITIGATION HISTORY
[4]
Dialstat applied in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources
Development Act
[1]
to
obtain the right to mine for coal on various properties in the
district of Delmas in the province of Mpumalanga. The
application
was granted.
[5]
One of the properties adjacent to the proposed mining area is portion
43 of the Farm
Dwarsfontein. This farm, besides being owned by
the Omar family, is also the residence and place from which they (who
are
the second to the sixth respondents) conduct business. After
the granting of the application and in 2013, the Society was
formed
and an appeal submitted by it against the decision. Dialstat
has since then and for some fourteen years, been engaged
in
litigation against the Society regarding the proposed mining
operation.
[6]
It is not in issue that the Society has, since its
formation, litigated exclusively regarding the proposed mining
operation against
Dialstat and others.
[7]
The Society has litigated some 8 applications
together with counter applications which have been opposed by
Dialstat. The Society
has opposed five applications instituted by
Dialstat, and two of those five have already been decided. Dialstat
was successful
in those two cases and the Society was ordered to pay
costs.
[8]
Dialstat is also owed costs for two other
occasions: one resulting from a postponement in 2018 relating to an
Environmental Authorization
review, and one relating to an
unsuccessful application for leave to appeal. The amount due and
outstanding in respect of the four
costs orders is R359 703.34.
These remain unsatisfied.
[9]
Insofar as the Society is concerned, it obtained a
costs order which was duly paid by Dialstat. Payment was made
when it was
due into the trust account of the Society’s
attorneys.
THE
CASE FOR DIALSTAT
[10]
Dialstat has unsatisfied costs orders in its
favour and is unable to execute on them, because the Society has no
discernable property
against which this execution may be effected.
The Society does not take any contributions from its members, nor
does it apparently
hold any funds of its own. The Society’s
ability to litigate is owed solely to contributions to its costs made
by private
and undisclosed sources.
[11]
In essence, the argument is that the Society, is
not a properly constituted or true
universitas
personarum
. It is being used
solely and impermissibly as a vehicle by means of which the members
of the Omar family and associated persons
can litigate against
Dialstat. This litigation is without any of the risks ordinary
litigants bear of having to pay adverse
costs orders.
[12]
Dialstat
does not seek to fetter any genuine opposition to its application for
the mining right but also does not want to be in
the position that it
currently is where it bears all the risk and costs, even where it is
successful. The existence or otherwise
of the Society as a juristic
entity is a matter for the court to decide
[2]
and
until this issue is decided, Dialstat is compelled to litigate
against the Society.
[13]
Besides seeking an order that the Society is
declared as not possessing
universitas
personarum
and able to litigate in its
own name, Dialstat also seeks an order that the second to eleventh
Respondents be ordered to pay the
costs of this application.
THE RESPONDENTS’
OPPOSITION
[14]
The respondents’ opposition to this
application is on two broad fronts. The first is that Dialstat
has failed to establish
that the Society is not a true
universitas
personarum.
The second,
encompasses several defences. These are:
[14.1]
That this Court lacks jurisdiction/ The application is brought for
improper motives.
[14.2]
Res judicata
.
[14.3]
Non-joinder.
[14.4]
Disputes of fact.
[15]
Central to and perhaps determinative of this
dispute, is whether the Society is a true
universitas
personarum
. For this reason, I
will deal with this issue first and thereafter with the further
defenses raised by the respondents.
WHAT ARE THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR A
UNIVERSITAS PERSONARUM
?
[16]
In
Ex
Parte Johannesburg Congregation of the Apostolic Church,
[3]
the
Court held that an association does not need to be created by statute
or registered under any piece of legislation for it to
qualify as a
juristic person. It need not even have a written constitution but may
arise from the agreement of the founding members
alone.
[4]
It can acquire juristic personality from the common law alone.
[17]
The test for juristic personality is determined by
examining the constitution or rules of the juristic entity at hand.
The key characteristics
are two-fold: firstly, perpetual succession –
that is, that the association continues to exist despite the
individual members
or governing body changing over time and secondly,
the capacity to own property separately from its members, the
constitution must
provide for (either expressly or by necessary
inference) that the association itself can hold property – not
merely its members.
[18]
In
Interim
Ward S19 Council v Premier, Western Cape Province, and Others,
[5]
the
Court in this matter held that a voluntary association only has
locus
standi
if
it qualifies as a
universitas
personarum
and
re-iterated the two requirements set out in
Ex
Parte Johannesburg Congregation of the Apostolic Church
[6]
.
[19]
In
Molotlegi
and Another v President of Bophuthatswana and Others,
[7]
the issue of
universitas
personarum
is
addressed by the Court in the context of the
locus
standi
of
a women’s club, an unincorporated voluntary association and
registered welfare organisation.
[20]
The Court applied the traditional, common-law test
for a voluntary association to sue in its own name and held that the
club did
qualify as a
universitas
personarum
. The constitution of the
association as well as the subsequent conduct of the members, in
relation to both membership and management
were considered. While the
association’s constitution was, however, silent on the right to
sue, the court found this power
was implied from the association’s
activities, objectives and aims as well as the express powers granted
to its office-bearers.
[21]
On the issue of authorisation to sue, a resolution
by the executive committee of the association was challenged for a
lack of quorum.
Yet the Court held that unanimous assent of those
present eliminated the need for quorum protection. The authority to
institute
proceedings was incidental to the necessary and proper
management of the association and therefore implied, even without
express
provisions.
[22]
Additionally, because the association itself had a
real, direct and substantial interest in the subject matter and
outcome of the
application this in itself constituted an independent
ground for its
locus standi
.
This case effectively allowed for a degree of flexibility in implying
powers (such as to sue) from the constitution’s overall
scheme,
aims, and practical necessities.
[23]
In
Ahmadiyya
Anjuman Ishaati-Islam Lahore (South Africa) and Another v Muslim
Judicial Council (Cape) and Others
[8]
,
a case decided on exception, it was held that:
“
If
the constitution of an association makes it clear that such an
association has the characteristics of a universitas, then that
would
be decisive of the issue. It would only be in those instances where
the constitution is not clear that one could have regard
to the
activities of an association in order to determine whether those
activities are such to constitute the association as a
universitas.”
[24]
In the
case of
Rail
Commuter Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and
Others
(No
1).
[9]
In this case the Court held “
that
a voluntary association formed to protect the rights of a vulnerable
constituency should not be subjected to unnecessary restrictions
before being heard by the Court.”
[25]
In
Ex-TRTC
United Workers Front and others v Premier, Eastern Cape Province
[10]
it was
held that—
“
What
the intention of the founding members was, is a factual question and,
where the constitution is equivocal, or there is no written
constitution, it may be determined with reference to other
considerations, such as the nature of the association, its objects
and its activities.”
[26]
Supplementary considerations as set out in
Ex-TRTC
United Workers Front and Others
can
only be assessed after the establishment of the association. The
subsequent conduct of the association should reflect the nature
of
the association, its objects and activities as set out in the
constitution.
[27]
It is upon this basis having regard to the
requirements considered holistically that the assessment of whether
or not the voluntary
association is a true
universitas
personarum
is made.
THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE SOCIETY
[28]
The Society was constituted by way of a written
Constitution in April 2013. This Constitution provides
inter
alia
specifically for the following:
[28.1]
That the purpose of the Society is to “
protect and maintain
the environmental integrity of the Maize Belt Mpumalanga and its
environs for current and future generations”
and to
“
prevent mining prospecting
and Associated
activities in the region of the Mpumalanga Maize Belt.”
[28.2]
That it may “
take necessary action, legal or demonstrative
or such measures as its members may from time to time deem fit, with
the aim of protecting
the Maize Belt. The Society may take all
or any legal steps including mediation, arbitration, litigation,
appeals, reviews,
settlement discussions or other such legal steps as
the executive may deem appropriate.”
[28.3]
That the “
Association shall be capable in its own name of
suing and being sued and of purchasing or otherwise acquiring,
holding or alienating
property, whether moveable or immovable, and/or
any interest therein and open a banking account in its own name.
If and where
necessary it may appoint one or more of its members to
hold any property in trust for it or to act for it in any matter
including
legal proceedings.”
[28.4]
That the fin
ancial year of the Society “
shall terminate
on 31 March of every year” and further that “
the
annual general meeting of the Association shall take place annually
at 10h00 within a period of two months after the financial year
end. “
[28.5]
In regard to the finances of the Society, its constitution provides
that:
[28.5.1]
“
All the income of the association
shall be deposited into an account at a bank and/or another approved
financial institution.”
[28.5.2]
“
Proper account (s)(sic) shall be
kept of all finances of the Association as set out in the regulations
published in terms of the
Fund-Raising Act 1978
.”
[28.5.3]
“
A financial report shall be
produced by the treasure (r)(sic) at the annual general meeting or
upon request from the committee.”
[28.5.4]
“
Financial contributions will be
collected from all persons and/or organisations world-wide who
support the object of the Association.”
[28.5.5]
“
Funds available for investment
may be registered only with financial institutions.”
[28.5.6]
“
All property shall be registered
in the name of the Association.”
[28.5.7]
“
On dissolution, the Assets of the
Association shall be realized by a liquidator appointed by the
general meeting or the Court, as
the case may be, and the proceeds
shall be distributed equally amongst such Associations which is (sic)
registered in terms of
the
Fund-Raising Act, 1978
with similar
objects as may be nominated by the last committee of the
Association.”
[29]
The Constitution of the Society also contains an
indemnity provision in favour of the members which provides that:
“
Every
member of the committee or sub-committee, officer, member, agent or
servant of the Association shall be indemnified out of
its funds
against all costs, charges, expenses, losses and liabilities incurred
by him in the conduct of the Association’s
business or in the
discharge of his duties and no such person shall be liable for the
acts or omissions of any other such person
by reason of his having
joined in any receipt of money not received by him personally, or any
loss on account of defect in title
to any property acquired by the
Association, or on account of the insufficiency of any security in or
upon which any monies of
the Association shall be invested, or for
any loss incurred upon any ground whatever, fraudulent activities
excluded.”
IS THE SOCIETY A
UNIVERSITAS PERSONARUM
?
[30]
It is readily apparent from the Society’s
Constitution that the common law requirements of perpetual succession
and ability
to own property in its own name are present in the
Constitution.
[31]
Regarding the requirement for perpetual
succession, the provision as set out in the Constitution and quoted
in paragraph [28.1]
above where it refers specifically to
“
current
and future generations”
.
This is clearly a reference to the future and if not explicit,
certainly implies perpetual succession.
[32]
Regarding the second requirement of being able to
own property separately from its members, paragraph [28.3] quoted
above explicitly
provides for this.
[33]
Both Dialstat and the respondents agree with
regards to these two requirements. It is at this juncture that
they part ways.
It is the case for Dialstat that while the two
requirements may well have been met, these two requirements are
neither the beginning
nor the end of the enquiry. The present
case is distinguishable from all the authorities referred to above
because it does
not deal with a situation where there was an
ab
initio
direct challenge or exception
taken to the
locus standi
as
has now been brought.
[34]
The
present case requires consideration of not only the two requirements
which must be present on day one when the Society is constituted
and
it enters the fray for the first time, without the benefit of the
passage of time through which intention can be measured against
conduct. It also requires a consideration of the other
provisions in the Constitution and whether these have also been
complied
with.
[11]
This
is the case for Dialstat.
[35]
The respondents for their part would have it that
mere fulfilment of the two requirements and a disregard of the
conduct of the
Society and it of its members over the last thirteen
years are the lens through which this matter is to be viewed.
[36]
The Constitution of the Society provides that any
person who
“
subscribes to the
objects of the Association”
may
be a member. However, this membership is not open to anyone who
may do so. The Constitution provides that besides
subscribing
to the objects of the Association, any member must be “
approved
by the committee.”
[37]
It is not in issue that the only identified
members of the Society are the second to twelfth respondents.
Almost all of these
are members of the Omar family or are connected
to them either through employment relationships or reside on the
farm.
[38]
The membership of the committee of the Society has
rotated over the last thirteen years in various iterations between
the family
members and connected respondents. Dialstat has on
several prior occasions requested the names of the members of the
Society.
In 2013, the Society claimed to have twenty-nine
members. Of the twenty-nine members, five were not members and
two were
businesses. Of the remaining twenty-two, nineteen were
members of the Omar family or connected to them.
[39]
In 2021, a list was again requested by
Dialstat, and it was again furnished with the 2013 list.
Dialstat was thereafter in
May 2022, furnished with a list of
forty-seven persons who were alleged to have joined the Society
“
during early April 2022”.
Somewhat confusingly, the names on the
2022 list do not list any of the members who were on the 2013 list.
[40]
The membership of the Society is something that is
peculiarly within the knowledge of the Society. While Dialstat
requested
an updated list of all the members of the Society, this was
never furnished. The current respondents are all persons who
attended the 2023 AGM of the Society and are the only persons that
Dialstat has been able to identify as members of the Society.
[41]
It is not in issue that the Society has not held
annual general meetings every year notwithstanding the specific
requirement in
the Constitution that this takes place.
Furthermore, no bank account was ever opened for the Society in the
period 2013 until
the AGM held on 20 May 2023. At that AGM, it
was held that
“
members unanimously
agreed that a bank account be opened for Society.”
Additionally, notwithstanding the
requirement in the Constitution for the provision of annual financial
statements and the deposit
of all income into a bank account opened
in the name of the Society, none have ever been produced.
[42]
Although the Society is entitled to own property
in its own name and to hold assets, it has not done so. Until
May 2023, it
had no bank account. It is not in dispute that
there are no financial statements for the Society despite its
Constitution
specifically providing for these annually.
Tellingly and regarding the finances of the Society, it was recorded
in the minutes
of the 2023 AGM that:
“
Contributions
– Abu proposed that each member pay a yearly contribution of
R100. Yasmin and Ebrahim objected to this,
Resolved 11-1
majority that members
will
not be required to pay contributions
.
It is not obligatory. If members wish to continue that may do
so – its voluntary.”
(My
underlining)
[43]
Despite
some thirteen years of litigious engagement with Dialstat and various
costs orders having been won but also lost,
[12]
the
Society failed, at least until 2023, to open a bank account to
receive payment of the costs order in its favour or any contribution
for that matter which would be utilized for the business and
obligations for the Society. The attitude of the members of
the
Society at its AGM, to its funding, within the context of ongoing
litigation is clear and unequivocal.
[44]
When
the Society was constituted, it was specifically provided as set out
in paragraph [27.5] above that the provisions of the
Fund-Raising Act
[13
]
would
be of application. The Constitution refers to the regulations
but there are no relevant regulations with regards to
finances.
However, s 12 of that Act provides that financial statements are to
be audited by an accountant or auditor
[14]
and
that reports, returns, and financial statements should lie for
inspection by the public
[15]
.
In the present circumstances, there are simply no audited financial
statements.
[45]
What is readily apparent from consideration of
whether there was compliance with the Constitution of the Society, is
that compliance
with the Constitution and the breathing of life into
the Society whether by initiating or defending legal proceedings
occurred
on as and when this was required.
[46]
The Society only has life when it is needed for
purposes of litigation against Dialstat. While this in and of
itself is no
objectionable, what is objectionable, at least from a
perspective of Dialstat, is that the consequences of litigation are a
one-way
street into which it must drive facing the oncoming traffic.
[47]
In
Motaung
v Mukubela and Another NNO
[16]
,
the court held that—
“
In
considering whether there has been a material breach of the
constitutional provisions of a voluntary association, a court of
law
should not, however, view the matter as if under a strong magnifying
glass and should not carpingly ferret out and unduly enlarge
every
minor deviation from the strict letter of the constitutional
provision being examined.
Much
rather should it adopt a practical, commonsense approach to the
matter
,
constantly bearing in mind that the persons called upon to administer
such a constitution are usually laymen who are unversed
in the ways
of the law”
[48]
It is on this basis that together with the failure
by the Society or its members to comply with its Constitution, that
it is argued
that the ineluctable inference that is to be drawn is
that the Society was established for no other purpose than to stymie
and
otherwise harry Dialstat in the litigation with it. The
fact that the Society, although having the ability to own property
in
its own name has failed to acquire any such property or even a bank
account (for ten years until 2023) is corroborative of the
argument
that the Society is not a true
universitas
personarum
.
[49]
Mere lip service to the requirements set out in
the authorities is insufficient on its own for the Society to be a
universitas personarum
.
The Constitution of the Society and the way in which its affairs are
and continue to be conducted must as a matter of necessity
be
considered in deciding whether it is or is not a
universitas
personarum.
The effluxion of 12 years
and the conduct of the Society during that time provides a definitive
insight into the parties true intention
and suggests otherwise.
[50]
While the establishment of a
universitas
personarum
is a permissible way in
which groups of people may come together in order to address a matter
of common concern such as mining in
the present case or
transportation as in the case of
Rail
Commuter Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and
Others (No.1),
it does not confer upon
the persons establishing the universitas an unqualified right to
litigate against whom so ever they wish
without legal consequence.
[51]
For the reasons set out above, I am compelled to
the conclusion that the Society was established for no other purpose
than to litigate
against Dialstat without fear of legal consequence.
This is an abuse of the separate juristic personality conferred by a
universitas personarum
and
it is for this reason that I intend to make the order that I do.
RESPONDENTS FURTHER
DEFENCES
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE /
IMPROPER MOTIVE
[52]
None of the respondents, save for the twelfth
respondent have their addresses situated within the jurisdiction of
this court.
The property on which Dialstat wishes to mine, the
farm Dwarsfontein and all the respondents, save for the twelfth
respondent,
are situated within the jurisdiction of the Mpumalanga
High Court.
[53]
The first, third, fifth and sixth Respondents
respectively argue that (in addition to not submitting to the
jurisdiction of this
Court themselves) because no relief is sought
against the twelfth Respondent, that this Respondent is irrelevant
and is thus not
to be considered in the determination of
jurisdiction.
[54]
The second, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and,
twelfth Respondents argue that there must be a sufficient nexus
between the suit
and the area of jurisdiction of the Court in
question for the disposal of the matter by the Court to be both
convenient and appropriate.
[55]
It is well established that jurisdiction is
determined at the time at which the proceedings are instituted –
the party initiating
the litigation chooses a court of competent
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Appeal in
Standard
Bank of South Africa and Others v Mpongo and Others,
held
that:
“
Litigation
begins by the Plaintiff initiating a claim. Axiomatically, it must be
the Plaintiff who chooses a court of competent
jurisdiction in just
the same way that a game of cricket must begin by a ball being
bowled.”
[17]
[56]
Dialstat chose to institute proceedings in this
court. When it did so, it sought an order
inter
alia
against the twelfth respondent.
The fact that it subsequently and during the proceedings elected not
to pursue an order against
him does not divest the court of the
jurisdiction it had when the proceedings were instituted.
[57]
There
is no suggestion that the present application has been brought in the
way that it has or in this Court for some ulterior purpose
other than
the explicitly stated orders sought.
[18]
Since
this Court had jurisdiction when the proceedings were instituted it
has jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter.
There is for
this reason, in my view, no merit in this point.
RES JUDICATA
[58]
It was
argued by the respondents that in March of 2015, in a judgment of the
High Court, a finding was made about its status as
a
universitas
personarum.
This
finding put the issue of its locus standi to rest and it was for that
reason not open to Dialstat to raise it again.
[19]
In
other litigation between the parties, the Society raised this defence
and in a judgment of the Mpumalanga High Court handed down
on 10
March 2023
[20]
,
it was pertinently held that:
“
[31]
Furthermore, the Court in July 2013 had awarded costs against
Dialstat in proceedings where Dialstat had contested the existence
and locus standi of the Society. In 2015, the Court reasoned
that the costs order award against Dialstat was sufficient
demonstration that the Society was a universitas personarum.
The decision of the Court in 2015 was reached without any evidence
that the RMDEC or the Court in 2013 had assessed evidence of
the
status of the Society.”
[59]
The
High Court in Mpumalanga in relying on
Democratic
Alliance v Brummer,
[21]
found
on the facts before it, which are also the facts before this Court,
that the issue of whether the Society was a
universitas
personarum
had
not finally been decided by the Court in 2015 and for that reason,
the defence of
res
judicata
did
not find application.
[60]
On the
facts before me, I find the reasoning of the High Court in Mpumalanga
unimpeachable and so for the same reasons also find
that the defence
of
res
judicata
finds
no application in the present case.
[22]
NON-JOINDER
[61]
It is simply not open to the Society to raise
non-joinder of parties who are its members, in circumstances where it
has failed,
even after having been requested to do so, as it was in
this case, to provide a list of all the members of the Society.
Nothing
more need be said on this aspect.
[62]
Regarding
the claim that certain State Parties were not joined, Dialstat
contends, and it must be accepted that in respect of those
parties,
they are
functus
officio
.
It is well established that the party alleging joinder of a party
must lay a basis for this.
[23]
The
respondents in this case have failed to do so. The claim of non-
joinder was a “shotgun”
[24]
claim
in which the net was cast so wide that hopefully one of the parties
referred to would require joinder.
DISPUTES OF FACT
[63]
There are no disputes of fact. This
application was decided on the common cause series of events over the
last thirteen years
between Dialstat and the Society together with
the Constitution of the Society and the documents disclosed by it
evidencing the
manner or otherwise in which it has conducted its
affairs over that period.
COSTS
[64]
This application was set down for hearing on 14
October 2025. On that date, Dialstat applied for and was
granted a postponement
together with leave to file further heads of
argument regarding the question of jurisdiction. The costs were
reserved on
that occasion.
[65]
The postponement was brought about by the fact
that some three court days before the hearing, on 8 October 2025, six
of the respondents
appointed a different attorney to represent them
from the one who had represented the Society and themselves all along
and filed
heads of argument in which the point of jurisdiction was
taken. Since jurisdiction alone may have been dispositive of
the
application if the point had been upheld, it was appropriate that
Dialstat be given an opportunity to file further heads dealing
with
this issue.
[66]
This occurred in circumstances where the main
heads of argument of all parties had already been filed some ten
months before.
[67]
The postponement was directly occasioned by the
eleventh-hour appointment of a new attorney and filing of heads in
which a new point
was raised and for that reason, the respondents
concerned should bear the costs.
[68]
The parties all filed comprehensive heads of
argument which were helpful, particularly on behalf of Dialstat and
it is for this
reason that I intend to order that the costs include
the costs of preparation of such heads of argument.
[69]
Since Dialstat has been successful in the
proceedings, the costs will follow the result. Given the
importance, nature and
complexity of the matter, it is appropriate
that the costs of counsel be taxed on scale C.
ORDER
[70]
In the circumstances, it is ordered:
[70.1]
It is declared that the first respondent, the “Save the Maize
Belt Society”
is not a
universitas personarum
.
[70.2]
It is declared the first respondent, the “Save the Maize Belt
Society” may
not litigate in its own name.
[70.3]
The second, seventh, eighth, nineth and tenth respondents are jointly
and severally,
the one paying the others to be absolved, ordered to
pay the costs of the applicant for the postponement on 14 October
2025, on
the scale as between party and party together with the costs
of counsel on scale C.
[70.4]
The second to eleventh respondents, jointly and severally, the one
paying the others
to be absolved, are ordered to pay the applicant’s
costs of the application on the scale as between party and party
which
costs include the costs of counsel on scale C.
A MILLAR
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
HEARD ON:
14 OCTOBER & 5
NOVEMBER 2025
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
30 JANUARY 2026
COUNSEL FOR THE
APPLICANT:
ADV. M WESLEY SC
INSTRUCTED BY:
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
SA INC.
REFERENCE:
MR. A VOS/MR. S LAHRI
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST,
THIRD TO
SIXTH AND ELEVENTH
RESPONDENTS:
ADV. T STRYDOM SC
ADV. G EGAN
INSTRUCTED BY:
ZEHIR OMAR ATTORNEYS
REFERENCE:
MR. Z OMAR
COUNSEL FOR THE
SECOND,
SEVENTH TO TENTH
RESPONDENTS:
ADV. L KOTZE
INSTRUCTED BY:
CORA VAN DER MERWE
ATTORNEYS
REFERENCE:
MS. C VAN DER MERWE
[1]
Section
22 of Act 28 of 2002.
[2]
Airports
Company of South Africa v Big Five Duty-Free (Pty) Ltd and Other
s
2019 (5) SA 1
(CC) at para [2].
[3]
1968
(3) SA 377 (W).
[4]
Ex-TRTC
United Workers Front and Others v Premier, Eastern Cape Province
2010
(2) SA 114
(ECB) at paras [18] – [19].See also
Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs
1960
(3) SA 291
(A) at 304 – 305.
[5]
1998
(3) SA 1056 (C).
[6]
Ibid
n 2.
[7]
1989
(3) SA 119 (BG).
[8]
1983
(4) SA 855 (C).
[9]
2003
(5) SA 518
(C).
[10]
2010 (2) SA 114
(ECB) at
para [19].
[11]
De
Lange v Presiding Bishop, Methodist Church of Southern Africa and
Another
2015
(1) SA 106
(SCA) at para [52].
[12]
There
have been 12 cases between the parties since the inception of the
Society.
[13]
107
of 1978.
[14]
Section
12(2).
[15]
Section
12(3).
[16]
1975
(1) SA 610
(O) at 626H – 627A.
[17]
Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others v Mpongo and Others
2021
(6) SA 403
(SCA) at para 25.
[18]
Nedbank
Limited v Gqirana NO
2019
JDR 1379 (ECG) at para 35.
[19]
Ascendis
Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Merck Sharp Dohme Corporation and Others
2020
(1) SA 327
(CC) at para [111].
[20]
Save
the Maize Belt Society v MEC for Agriculture, Rural Development,
Land and Environmental Affairs, Mpumalanga Province and
Others
2023
JDR 1756 (MM).
[21]
2021
(6) SA 144
(WCC) at paras [84]-[85].
[22]
Hyprop
Investments Ltd and Others v NSC Carriers and Forwarding CC and
Others
2014
(5) SA 406
(SCA) at [23].
[23]
Gordon
v Department of Health
[2008] ZASCA 99
;
2008
(6) SA 522
(SCA) at paras [9] – [10].
[24]
The
respondents claimed, besides the unnamed members of the Society that
some 8 State entities ought to have been joined –
The Minister
of Minerals and Energy, The Department of Minerals and Energy
(DMRE), The Regional Manager, Mpumalanga of the DMRE,
The MEC for
Agriculture, Rural Development, Land and Environment Affairs in
Mpumalanga, The Chief Director: Integrated Environmental
Authorizations, Department of Environmental Affairs, The Director:
Appeals and Legal Reviews Department of Environmental Affairs,
The
Department of Water Services and The Water Tribunal.
sino noindex
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