Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 16South Africa
Prudential Authority of South Africa v Financial Services Tribunal and Others (2023/058536) [2025] ZAGPPHC 16; 2025 (3) SA 597 (GP) (15 January 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Prudential Authority of South Africa v Financial Services Tribunal and Others (2023/058536) [2025] ZAGPPHC 16; 2025 (3) SA 597 (GP) (15 January 2025)
Prudential Authority of South Africa v Financial Services Tribunal and Others (2023/058536) [2025] ZAGPPHC 16; 2025 (3) SA 597 (GP) (15 January 2025)
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sino date 15 January 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
Number: 2023-058536
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED
DATE
:
2025-01-15
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
PRUDENTIAL
AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA
Applicant
and
FINANCIAL
SERVICES TRIBUNAL
First Respondent
LAND
BANK INSURANCE COMPANY SOC LIMITED
Second Respondent
LAND
BANK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Third Respondent
SOC
LIMITED
This
judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to
the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for
handing down is deemed to be 15 January 2025.
JUDGMENT
POTTERILL
J
I
was asked to pay tribute and I do so willingly thus I commence this
judgment with a tribute to counsel who in this matter represented
the
Prudential Authority together with Advocate Aslam Bava SC and
Advocate Nassir Ali. I was informed that he was a hard-working
member
of this legal team and participated in every aspect of this matter on
behalf of the Prudential Authority. This counsel is
Advocate Matodzi
Mavhungu who sadly passed away in a fatal vehicle collision on the
morning of 4 August 2024 at the age of 26.
He
was the youngest of 8 children and his family members lovingly called
him “Ntsako” and considered him a beacon of
joy. He
excelled at school earning him a full scholarship to study at the
University of Limpopo [Turfloop campus]. At University,
Advocate
Mavhungu was both an academic tutor and a student activist, and he
co-founded the African Law Projects alongside Advocate
Zondeka
Makondo, advocating against the financial exclusion of disadvantaged
students. He was also a key figure in a landmark case;
Matshidiso and
Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
[1]
which underscored his commitment to social justice.
He
completed his LLB with distinction in 2019. He interned at MES Legal
Solutions and did his articles serving as a candidate attorney
at
Melo Attorneys in Pretoria. He was called to the bar in 2021 and
completed his pupillage at the Johannesburg Society of Advocates
under the mentorship of Advocate Nkhosikhona Gama. He was also
trained by Advocate Aslam Bava SC and Advocate Sandile Khumalo SC
as
part of the Duma Nokwe education programme for pupils –
ironically, these two Senior Counsel are the lead Counsel on opposite
sides in the current review application before me.
He
was a proud member of the Duma Nokwe Group of Advocates, where he
established his practice in 2022. Despite his brief career,
he made
significant contributions, notably arguing in the case of President
of the Republic of South Africa v Zuma and Others
[2]
and earning four additional reported judgements in such a short space
of time where he acted as lead Counsel.
I
am informed that he was a shining star of the Duma Nokwe Chambers and
was known for his deep knowledge of the law, education and
unwavering
humility. His chamber was a refuge for many pupils and juniors as he
was always willing to assist those who knocked
on his door in every
possible way. He was admired by his fellow students at the
University of Limpopo, and many of his former
classmates consequently
trusted him to successfully move their applications for admission as
legal practitioners and usher them
into the legal profession.
“Another Turfie on the roll” soon became his signature
phrase, signifying a successful involution
from being
classmates/friends to becoming colleagues/“learned friends”
- a victory for the University and the legal
profession. He also
continued to mentor many students and legal practitioners. At the
time of his passing, Matodzi was pursuing
a Master of Laws in Human
Rights Advocacy and Litigation at the University of the
Witwatersrand.
I
am informed that he insisted and practised a good work-life balance
and one of his favourite lines was “life is more than
pleadings”. Fluent in at least six of the official South
African languages, he took pride in being a linguist.
He
was a kind, open-minded person who loved learning about different
cultures and interacting with people from all walks of life.
I am
told that one of his nicknames, “MuAfrika” (meaning
African), could not be a more fitting representation of the
kind of
person he was: kind, compassionate, humble, altruistic and overall, a
true embodiment of Ubuntu. One of his favourite African
proverbs
(which ironically still stands as his last status update on
WhatsApp), “maa a mutukana a si vhumatshelo hawe”,
meaning “your background does not determine your destiny”
in his mother tongue of Tshivhenda, should serve as an important
life
lesson to us all.
I
trust this tribute to a counsel and his legacy, whose name I see on
the papers, but who is sadly not before me, will continue
to inspire
many more.
Introduction
[1]
The Prudential Authority of South Africa [the PA] is seeking the
review and setting aside of the findings
of the Financial Services
Tribunal [the FST] that was granted in favour of the Land Bank
Insurance Company SOC Limited [LBIC] and
the Land Bank Life Insurance
Company SOC Limited [LBLIC]. Where both the LBIC and LBLIC are
relevant I will refer to them as the
respondents. The FST abides the
Court’s decision.
[2]
The PA is a statutory body established in terms of section 32 of the
Financial Sector Regulation Act
9 of 2017 [the FSR-Act] and under the
administration of the South African Reserve Bank. Of relevance in
this matter is that it
performs the prudential and regulatory
supervision of Insurance companies. The LBIC is a short term insurer
which was registered
in terms of the since repealed Short Term
Insurance Act 53 of 1998 [STIA]. The LBLIC was registered as a long
term insurer in terms
of the since repealed
Long Term Insurance Act
52 of 1998
. Both are still so registered in terms of the Insurance
Act 18 of 2017 [Insurance Act]. The respondents are wholly owned
subsidiaries
of the Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South
Africa SOC limited with the Government being the only shareholder.
[3]
The PA imposed administrative penalties on the LBLIC and LBIC for
contraventions of s14(1) and s16(1)
of the Insurance Act and on LBIC
for contravention of s23(1)(a) of the Insurance Act. These sections
are discussed later on in
the judgment. The penalty imposed on LBLIC
was R2,064,000.00, with R1,376,000.00 of that suspended for a period
of three years
from the date of imposition subject to the respondents
not committing a similar offence during this period. The balance of
the
penalty, R688 000.00 was to be paid within 14 days of the
imposition. LBIC was also imposed a penalty of R5 million of
which R3 million was suspended for a period of three years for
imposition on condition that LBIC did not commit a similar offence
during the period of suspension. The balance of R2 million was to be
paid within 14 days of the imposition.
[4]
In terms of s230(1) of the FSRA the respondents approached the FST to
reconsider the decisions of the
PA. In a nutshell the FST found that
the respondents did not contravene s14 of the Insurance Act.
Pertaining to the contravention
of s23(1)(a) it found the PA was not
entitled to take any regulatory action against LBIC rendering the
PA’s decision
ultra vires
. The LBLIC did not seek a
reconsideration of the decision pertaining to s16, but submitted the
penalty imposed was unreasonable.
The FST reduced the penalty to
R250 000.
[5]
The PA brought this legality review against the decisions of the FST
submitting that the findings were
irrational, influenced by an error
of law and the FST exceeded its powers and/or exercised its powers
incorrectly. Furthermore,
that the findings were so unreasonable that
no other Tribunal could come to such findings. It was also submitted
that there was
no rational connection between the findings made and
the purpose of the FSR-Act, the Insurance Act and the PA’s
standards
captured in GO1 4.
Locus
standi
of PA
[6]
On behalf of the respondents it was argued that the PA does not have
locus
standi
to bring a review. It contended that the FST was the successor to the
Financial Services Appeal Board [FSAB] and has the same powers
as the
FSAB. Since it has the same powers the finding in
Registrar
of Pension Funds v Howie NO and Others
[3]
[Howie-matter] is applicable and the PA, akin to the registrar of the
FSBA, has no
locus
standi
to
review the FST’s decision. Reliance was placed on paras [23]
and [24] of the judgment that reads as follows:
“
[23]
In order to determine the nature of that interest one must go back to
the purpose behind the establishment
of the Appeal Board and its
powers under s 26B(15) of the FSB Act. The purpose is clear.
It is to enable persons affected
by decisions of the Registrar to
challenge those decisions before a specially constituted body.
The Appeal Board is to decide,
on the information before the
Registrar, what decision the Registrar should have made. And,
once the Appeal Board has spoken,
either the Registrar’s
decision stands, because it has been confirmed, or it is substituted
by the Appeal Board’s decision.
In the latter event the
Appeal Board’s decision stands in the place of the decision of
the Registrar. In effect it
becomes the Registrar’s
decision. That much is clear from the fact that it does not
direct the Registrar to act differently,
but directs that its own
order be given effect.
[24]
Recognising that the Registrar has
locus standi
to challenge
the decision by the Appeal Board would upset the statutory
relationship between the two as set out in the FSB Act.
It
would be inconsistent with the purpose of creating the Appeal Board
and has the potential to undermine it in performing its
function.
If one of the parties affected by it is unhappy with a decision by
the Appeal Board they are free to review it.
Recognising an
independent right in the Registrar would permit of challenges to a
decision accepted by the parties affected thereby.
The
Registrar does not point to any aspect of her regulatory functions
that would be detrimentally affected if she cannot challenge
decisions by the Appeal Board. Whilst the absence of authority
to support the Registrar’s position is not of itself
fatal it
provides a further pointer to the conclusion that the Registrar does
not have
locus standi
in this situation.”
[7]
The wording of s235 of the FSB-Act that “any party”
unhappy with a decision of the Registrar
did not include the
“decision-maker” [the Registrar] and the PA, as the
decision-maker, likewise cannot bring a review
as it would upset the
statutory relationship between the PA and the FST by potentially
undermining the FST and negating the purpose
for which the FST was
created affecting its ability to function. The Act provides that when
an aggrieved party brings a reconsideration
application to the FST it
is exercising an internal remedy as provided for in
s7(2)
of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
[PAJA].
[8]
On behalf of the PA it was submitted that the PA has
locus standi
because in the FSR-Act, unlike the FSB-Act, it specifically includes
“the decision-maker” as a party that can bring
a review.
Attention was drawn to the fact that
s26(2)
of the FSR-Act reads as
follows:
“
Any person
aggrieved by a decision by the executive officer [the Registrar]
under a power conferred or a duty imposed upon him by
or under this
Act or any other law may within in the period and in the manner and
upon payment of the fees prescribed by the Minister
by regulation,
appeal against such decision to the board of appeal.”
Contrary
to this wording, the FSR-Act provides in s235 as follows:
“
Any party to
proceedings on an application for reconsideration of a decision who
is dissatisfied with an order of the Tribunal may
institute
proceedings for a judicial review of the order in terms of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act or
any applicable law.”
[9]
It was further contended that if one then has regard to the
definition of “party” in the
FSR-Act it is clear that the
PA has the
locus standi
to bring a review application.
Section
1
defines party as:
“
party to
proceedings on a reconsideration of a decision by the Tribunal,
means-
(a)
the person who applied for the reconsideration: and
(b)
the decision-maker that made the decision.”
In
terms of
s218
a decision maker includes the “financial sector
regulator “ with
section 1
of the FSR-Act defining a financial
sector regulator as including the PA.
[10]
The Court was implored to find that it is undeniable that the
Legislator intended that the decision-maker can institute
review
proceedings.
Decision
on
locus standi
[11]
The FSB-Act provided for an appeal whereas the FSRA provides for a
reconsideration. Furthermore, the Acts regulating
the two bodies are
vastly different. The FSB-Act had 30 sections and its purpose was
defined in one sentence. The FSRA has close
to 300 sections and its
purpose is not only to “provide for the establishment of
a board to exercise supervision over
the business of financial
institutions; and for matters connected therewith” as provided
for in the FSB-Act. It was promulgated
to
inter alia
“
establish a system of financial regulation
by establishing the Prudential Authority and the Financial Sector
Conduct Authority,
and conferring powers on these entities …”
It was seen as a new dawn for the financial services sector as the
new
“Twin Peaks” regulators were established; the
PA and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority [FSCA].
[12] The fact
that a reconsideration is seen as an internal appeal in terms of
s7(2)
of PAJA confirms that a party can, if dissatisfied with a
decision of the FST, review the decision in terms of PAJA. The
question is who is this party that can bring a review in terms of
PAJA or any other law. When comparing the FSB-Act and the FSRA-Act
the wording of
s26
made it clear that a party dissatisfied can appeal
against the decision of the Registrar, thus excluding the Registrar
as the Registrar
would be hard pressed to be dissatisfied with its
own decision. In contrast the wider wording of
s236
of the
FSB-Act has not limited it to other parties reviewing the PA’s
decision, but a “party to proceedings”
of the
reconsideration. Parties to the proceedings in terms of the Act
includes the decision-maker, herein the PA and thus it can
also bring
a review application.
[13] The
Legislature chose to include the decision-maker thus widening who can
apply to review a decision of the FST.
The question is whether
despite this express provision I must adhere to the ratio in the
Howie-matter. The Supreme Court of Appeal
therein distinguished
between a Registrar appealing and a review and found that a review by
a Registrar is possible; as in this
matter. But, herein the
legislature has expressly included the Registrar which was not the
factual situation in the Howie-matter.
I have no reason or legal
basis not to adhere to the express provisions of the FSR-Act.
[14]
Furthermore, in the Howie-matter “the Registrar did not point
to any aspect of her regulatory functions that
would be detrimentally
affected if she cannot challenge decisions by the Appeal Board.
Whilst the absence of authority to support
the Registrar’s
position is not of itself fatal it provides a further pointer to the
conclusion that the Registrar does not
have
locus
standi
in
this situation.”
[4]
In
the matter before me the PA set out that the “unintended
consequence of the Tribunal Ruling is that section
14 of the
Insurance Act is rendered factually unenforceable and only serves to
undermine the standards that the Applicant
is mandated to uphold, as
per section 105 of the FSRA.” And, “As it stands, an
offending party may choose to delay
reporting any changes to the
applicant with no adverse consequence attributable.” On behalf
of the PA it was argued that
the ruling of the FST has the unintended
effect of stripping the PA to wield the necessary tools to enforce
sections 14 and 16
of the Insurance Act and section 23 of the STIA.
This unforeseen consequence has rendered these statutory provisions
factually
unenforceable.” Thus, in terms of the Howie-matter,
this is a further basis to conclude that the PA has
locus
standi
.
[15] I
accordingly find that the PA has
locus standi
to bring the
review application.
Did the LBLIC and LBIC
contravene s14 of the Insurance Act?
[16] Section
14(1) provides:
“
The
appointment of any of the following key persons must be approved by
the Prudential Authority and takes effect only if the Prudential
Authority approves the appointment.”
In terms of section
14(1)(a) a director is a key person.
In terms of section 63 of
the Insurance Act the Prudential Authority is empowered to prescribe
prudential standards and it has done
so in terms of Prudential
Standard GO1 4 with 4.4 reading as follows:
“
Notwithstanding
that primary responsibility for assessing fitness and propriety of
key persons and significant owners resides with
the insurer, the Act
requires the Prudential Authority to approve significant owners and
certain key persons. Under section
114 of the Act, the
Authority is required to approve directors and auditors before they
are appointed. Fitness and propriety
is the central
consideration of any such approval. In the case of other key
persons, insurers are required to notify the
Authority within 30 days
of an appointment, or of changes in circumstances that may adversely
affect the fit and proper status
of a key person (see section 15 of
the Act). Insurers are also required to notify the Authority
within 30 days of the termination
of an appointment of a key person
(see section 16 of the Act).”
[17]
It was common cause at the reconsideration hearing that 4 directors
had been appointed to the boards of the respondents
between March and
April 2020. This was done without the approval of the PA. The
respondents sought retrospective approvals for
the appointments a
year later which the PA granted retrospectively in June 2021.
[18]
The PA set out that they granted approval as “condonation”
purely to prevent unbusinesslike results;
i.e. to solve a practical
problem. The respondents set out that the COVID lockdown had
interfered with their functioning as well
as the fact that it had
lost all members of their Compliance Control Function which created
gaps in its compliance processes. It
also had extended certain
directors appointments to avoid a lack of a quorum. All of these
factors caused the delay in complying
with s14.
[19]
The FST in 5 short paragraphs dealt with this issue. It set out the
stances of the parties and then provided the
reasons for its decision
as follows:
“
The PA submitted
that the wording of the section does not support the Applicants’
interpretation that the appointment only
takes effect on approval but
can occur earlier.
The PA’s submission
is undermined by its willingness to grant retrospective approval,
more than a year later, of the appointments.
Assuming, as we must,
that the approvals were properly granted by the PA, this approach
undermines the contention that the approvals
must be granted prior to
appointment and supports the Applicants’ argument on this
issue. In these circumstances, the PA’s
approach has the result
that the appointments and their approvals coincide.”
The
FST found that there was no contravention of s14 of the Insurance
Act.
[20]
On behalf of the PA it was argued that s14 has the purpose to ensure
that persons holding key positions meet the
necessary standards of
necessary prudential oversight. This cannot be obtained if these key
persons are allowed to serve in positions
before the PA grants
approval. This leads to a factual appointment but without having
legal effect. This fundamentally undermines
the regulatory framework
designed to protect the integrity of financial institutions.
[21] It was
submitted that PA’s position has consistently been that
approval must be sought prior to the appointment
of key persons as
required by section 14 in conjunction with the GO1 4. It was conceded
that such compliance may not always be
achievable or practical with
the result that key persons may be appointed without seeking the
necessary approval from the PA. This
practically would happen when,
as with the respondents, their internal organisational processes were
not structured in a way that
facilitates the seeking of prior
approval. In those cases the PA will then on the facts and
considering the practicalities of the
situation, ratify the
appointment.
[22] It was
argued that if retrospective approval is sought it must be done
within a reasonable period and if regard
is had to the time periods
in the Insurance Act then 30 days would constitute a reasonable
period. The conclusion was that if an
insurer fails to seek the PA’s
approval before appointing key persons and further fails to seek
retrospective approval within
a reasonable must be deemed to have
contravened s14 of the Act.
[23]
Furthermore, when retrospective approval is granted it does not cure
the respondents’ breach of s14 but merely
gave effect to the
purpose of s14(1)(a) to prevent unbusinesslike results. It was argued
that retrospective approval may be granted
to regularise an
appointment after the fact, but is did not retrospectively legitimise
a period during which a key person served
without proper approval.
[24] On
behalf of the respondents the argument was simple. There can only be
approval after an appointment was made.
The PA cannot approve a
non-existent appointment. An appointment was not to be confused with
the legal effect of the approval.
Section 14 simply does not set out
that before an appointment is made there must be approval. In this
matter the Minister, as the
shareholder of the respondents, appoints
members to the board of the respondents. It could never be argued
that the Minister must
first approach the PA for approval before the
appointments are made.
[25]
Moreover, a retrospective approval, deems the approval to have been
granted on the date of the approval and therefore
there can be no
breach of s14 of the Insurance Act.
[26] The PA
had admitted that s14 did not expressly provide that there must be
approval from the PA before appointment.
It now relies on a
reasonable period within which approval must be sought. This argument
renders the point made that GO1 4 states
prior approval must be
obtained moot. Furthermore, the argument now raised about a
reasonable period was not argued before the
FST and boils down to
ex
post facto
rationalisation.
Decision on s14
[27] The
SFT’s short reasons for its decision on this issue is for good
reason. S14, on no interpretation, reads
that there must be approval
of directors by the PA before appointment. GO1 4 ascribes wording to
s14 that simply does not exist
and does not aid the PA. But,
logically and practically, there cannot be approval before
appointment.
[28] The
argument now raised, that was not before the FST, that approval must
be sought within 30 days, is arbitrary.
The fact that approval was
not sought within 30 days cannot be deemed to be a contravention of
s14; there is no such provision
in the Act or in the GO1 4. But, even
more damning is that approval was granted retrospectively. The effect
of this is that approval
and appointment occurred in conjunction.
[29] I
understand that the PA is aggrieved that the respondents only after a
year sought approval and that it seeks
to guard against this becoming
a practice with directors being appointed and resigning, or being
removed, as in this matter, with
no regulatory control in that time.
The only way to achieve this is by amending s14 via the Legislator,
this Court cannot fulfil
this function and overreach into that
domain. The argument of within a reasonable time was not raised
before the FST and there
was no decision taken by the FST hereon;
there is no decision to review. The Legislator had set out time
periods in the Act, for
instance s16, but had not resorted to doing
the same in s14.
[30] The FST
correctly found that the respondents did not contravene section 14 of
the Insurance Act.
Could the FST substitute
the amount of the administrative penalty for the contravention of
s16(1) of the Insurance Act?
[31] Section
16(1) of the Insurance Act provides:
“
Termination
of appointment of key persons
16(1)
An insurer ... must notify the Prudential Authority of the
termination of the appointment of a key
person within 30 days of the
termination of such a person."
It was common cause the
respondents had not complied with s16(1) in that the respondents had
terminated four directors without notifying
the PA within 30 days.
Before the FST the respondents conceded that s16(1) was contravened
in that they only notified the PA in
March 2021 while termination
occurred during April, August and October 2020. However, the
respondents sought reconsideration of
the penalty imposed. It was
submitted that the penalty was excessive and inappropriate.
[32] The FST
found and reasoned as follows:
“
27.
The problem we are faced with is that these penalties were imposed in
respect of all the contraventions,
and it is, accordingly, impossible
to determine which portion was to be allocated to the contravention
of section 16(1) only. If
one has regard to the penalty imposed in
the Life Company's case, one would, however, be justified to assume
that the amount would
have been about R1 million per company, half of
which was suspended.
28.
The problem with that amount is, though, that taken in isolation, it
is excessive. There
is no indication that the PA, the company, its
shareholder or policyholders were in any way affected by the breach.
It is apparent
that the PA was more concerned about the general
problems with the administration of the Applicant than with the
seriousness of
the particular contravention. (Even the contravention
of sec 23 had no external effect because it did not affect the
shareholder,
creditors, policy holders, the PA or whoever.) In
addition, the two Applicants, in effect, were twice penalised for the
same omission.
29.
Since the decision to impose an administrative penalty is ‘a
decision in terms of
Chapter 13’ as contemplated in section
234(1)(b)(i) of the FSRA, the Tribunal is entitled to set aside the
decision and substitute
the PA's decision with the decision of the
Tribunal. We believe that this is an appropriate instance to do so.
30.
Without working through the checklist of sec 167 and considering the
respective submissions
of counsel, we have decided that a financial
penalty is justified but in an essentially lower amount. Penalties
are discretionary
matters and are not subject to calculation, and in
our estimation, a penalty of R250 000.00 would be appropriate.”
[33] On
behalf of the PA it was argued that although in terms of s234(1)(a)
the FST could substitute the PA’s
penalty determination with
its own, that in terms of the law the FST was obliged to remit the
penalty determination back to the
PA. The FST should not have
usurped the powers of the PA and estimated an amount. This led to an
arbitrary penalty and it
was not rationally connected to the purpose
sought to be achieved. The FST thus exceeded it powers and acted
improperly by not
referring the penalty back to the PA.
[34] It was
submitted that from the decision of the FST it was evident that the
FST did not comprehend how the PA had
calculated and determined the
penalties. Furthermore, the contraventions were inherently serious
and can therefore be penalised
administratively and criminally.
Enforcement of these laws is essential to uphold the integrity of
financial markets and protect
stakeholders. If not upheld, it could
erode public trust in the financial institutions and even compromise
the overall stability
of the financial system.
[35] It
matters not that the contravention of s16 did not directly impact the
shareholders, creditors and policy holders.
Allowing the respondents
to flout these prescripts without consequences could have broader
adverse implications for the financial
sector. This “external
effect” was in any event not a relevant consideration when
determining the quantum of the penalty
because the impact of these
contraventions is often not readily perceivable or palpable, until
it’s too late.
[36] On
behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the FST acted in
complete compliance with the powers it had.
In terms of s234(2)(b)
the FST can:
“
in the case of a
decision of any of the following kinds, also make an order setting
aside the decision and substituting the decision
of the Tribunal:
(i) A
decision in terms of Chapter 13:
(ii) …
(iii) …”
Administrative penalties
are imposed in terms of Chapter 13 of the FSR-Act. Submitting that
the FST exceeded its powers is simply
wrong.
[37] The PA
had not in terms of rule 13 of the Rules of the Tribunal provided the
facts and the method of how the penalty
was computed. All that was
clear was that the PA imposed a penalty comprising a global figure
for all the contraventions without
stating what penalty was imposed
for which contravention.
[38] The FST
exercised it discretion taking into consideration the factors set out
in s167(2)(b) of the FSR-Act: the
nature of the contravention; that
the shareholders, the respondents and the PA were not affected; the
contraventions did not have
an external affect. It found that a
penalty was to be imposed but at a lower amount. The FST also
considered the arguments of the
parties before it.
[39] This
Court cannot review the penalty imposed simply because it would have
imposed another penalty. Furthermore,
remitting it back to the PA
without informing this Court what factors it would consider when
considering the penalty is wrong.
The decision pertaining
to the penalty imposed for the contravention of s16 of the Insurance
Act.
[40] The FST
acted in accordance with the powers confirmed on it in terms
s234(2) of the FSR-Act read with Chapter
13. These sections confer
the power to substitute the PA’s imposed penalty and impose a
new penalty. I was not referred to
which “law” the PA was
referring that rendered the FST to have exceeded its powers and I
know of none. I find the FST
did not exceed its powers by
substituting the quantum of the penalty, but in fact, acted in
accordance with its derived powers.
[41] The
question then is whether the FST acted irrationally, or as argued
improperly, by not remitting the decision
pertaining to the penalty
to the PA. because in not doing so the FST usurped the powers of the
PA. That while the FST did not have
information before it to come to
a determination of the amount of the penalty.
[42] I find
it prudent to repeat the penalties as imposed. For contravening
section 23(1)(a) of STIA and ss 14(1) and
(16)1 of the Insurance Act
the PA imposed on the LBIC the administrative penalty of R5 million
of which R3 million was suspended
on certain conditions. The balance
of R2 million was to be paid within 14 days from the order.
[43] For
contravening ss14(1) and 16(1) of the Insurance Act the LBLIC was
imposed a penalty of R2,064,000.00. R1,376,000.00
was suspended for
three years on certain conditions and the balance of R688 000.00
was to be paid within 14 days from the
order.
[44] The PA
did not before the FST, or in the papers before me, divulge what
amount of the globular penalty is for which
contravention. This is
problematic because if, like in this matter, the respondents are
found not to have contravened s14(1) what
portion of the penalty
falls away? The same problem lies with determining which portion of
the penalty is to be allocated to s16.
There was no argument from the
PA that the FST’s reasoning in arriving at a penalty of
R250 000 incorrectly accepted
that if regard was taken of the
penalty imposed on the LBLIC one would be justified to assume that
the amount would have been about
R1 million per company, half of
which was suspended.
[45] There
was also no argument from the PA that the FST was wrong in finding
that an administrative penalty is a discretion
exercised and not
subject to calculation. Unless the argument raised for the first time
in oral argument before me, that the PA
has a table, or formula, as
to how to calculate the penalties addressed this point. This was not
argued before the FST and it was
not in the affidavits of the PA
before me. The respondents had no opportunity to answer thereto and
the FST was not asked to consider
this “formulation.” I
cannot under review now take this into account. The PA had not
provided the facts and the method
of how the penalty was computed.
I cannot find that the FST acted irrationally when considering the
amount of the penalty
imposed by the PA for the contravention of s16.
[46] The next
question would be whether the PA had taken into account all the
factors it should have done and whether
it took irrelevant
considerations into account when exercising its discretion in
imposing a penalty. The FST took into account
the factors set out in
s167 of the FSR-Act. In argument before the FST counsel for the PA
admitted that those are the factors on
which it exercised it
discretion.
[47] I am
satisfied that the FST took into account all the factors necessary
when considering the penalty. The external
effect is a factor to
consider and the PA could not refer to a single negative external
impact of this contravention two years
after s16 was contravened.
[48] I
understand the PA’s submissions that these contraventions are
serious and that enforcement of the laws
is essential to protect
stakeholders. There is however no evidence that stakeholders herein
were not protected. The argument that
the respondents’
non-compliance with s16 cannot have any consequences is incorrect; an
administrative penalty has been imposed
it may not be to the liking
of the PA, but under the circumstances it is rational to what was
contravened, the factors to be considered,
the argument before the
FST and the reasons for the contravention.
[49] I am
very aware of the case-law on PAJA cautioning Courts to adhere to the
separation of powers principle and to
only in exceptional
circumstances grant the remedy of substituting the decision-maker’s
decision with its own decision instead
of deferring it back to the
decision-maker. Just as such intrusion is provided for in PAJA, the
FSR-Act also makes provision that
the FST can substitute the penalty.
However, contrary to PAJA the FSR-Act has no pre-script that it only
be done in exceptional
circumstances. In
Trencon Construction
(Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa
Limited and Another
(CCT198/14)
[2015] ZACC 22
;
2015
(5) SA 245
(CC) (26 June 2015) the Court found that when a court is
in as a good a position as the administrator to make a decision it
can
substitute the order. A court can also exercise its discretion
when the administrator’s decision is a foregone conclusion.
A
court must consider bias, delay and incompetence of the
decision-maker.
[50] This
case-law relates to the decision itself. Herein it was common cause
that s16 was breached. With the PA not
setting out what skill and
expertise is necessary to impose a penalty, or what factors were
considered the FST acted within its
powers to substitute the amount
of the penalty and acted rationally. The matter of
New
Clicks
[5]
relied on by the PA, albeit in another context found as follows:
“
They must give an
explanation of how the appropriate fee was calculated. This
explanation is crucial to the process of determining
an appropriate
fee. It explains to the public and the pharmaceutical industry the
manner in which the fee was arrived at. It discloses
the reasoning
process of the Pricing Committee. And it enables those who have an
interest in the fee to assess whether the Pricing
Committee has
properly discharged its statutory duty. This explanation should
generally be contained in the report of the Pricing
Committee making
a recommendation to the Minister.”
[6]
The PA should have placed
facts before the FST as to how the penalty was determined.
Could the PA impose a
penalty on the LBIC for contravention of the now repealed s23(1)(a)
of the Short Term Insurance Act [STIA]?
[51] LBIC had
admitted that it had increased its share capital in 2015 but due to
the time that had elapsed it did not
know whether regulatory approval
had been sought and obtained in terms of s23 of STIA. PA imposed a
penalty for this contravention.
[52] Before
the FST LBIC raised that the transitional provisions in Schedule 3
item 5 of the Insurance Act either barred
the PA from commencing an
investigation or taking regulatory action against it. This reads as
follows:
“
Continued
investigation and enforcement of previous Act.
5(1)
Despite the partial repeal of the previous Act –
(a)
any investigation or inspection under the previous Act (the STIA) by
the
Registrar in respect of compliance with the previous Act and
pending immediately before the effective date of 1 July 2018 may be
continued by the Prudential Authority, and the Prudential Authority
may take any regulatory action under those Acts that the Prudential
Authority deems appropriate in respect of any non-compliance; and
(b)
for a period of three years after the effective date, the Prudential
Authority
under those Acts that the Prudential Authority deems
appropriate in respect of that non-compliance.”
[53] The FST
found that
item 5
of the Transitional Provisions permitted the
taking of regulatory action under the repealed STIA, but that the
STIA
“
contained no
provision for the imposition of an administrative penalty for a
contravention of section 23. To the extent that section
167 of the
FSRA provide otherwise, the item is a
lex specialis
which
overrides the general provisions of section 167. As a result, no
administrative penalty could competently have been imposed
by the
Prudential Authority on the insurance company for contravention of
section 23 of STIA.” It thus found that the PA
could not take
any regulatory action against the LBIC and the PA’s decision
was
ultra vires
.
[54] On
behalf of the PA it was argued that during STIA’s tenure it was
a financial sector law as defined in section
1 of the FSRA and as
listed in Schedule 1 thereof. The PA was thus entitled to impose an
administrative penalty for the contravention
of a provision thereof
in terms of 167(1) of the FSRA. Furthermore, section 167(4) of the
FSRA reading as follows:
“
The responsible
authority may not impose an administrative penalty on a person if a
prosecution of the person for an offence arising
out of the same set
of facts has been commenced."
It was submitted that the
wording of this section implies that a person contravening a
financial sector law can either be charged
criminally or be penalised
administratively. Section 65 of the STIA, as amended by section
140(c) of Financial Services Laws General
Amendment Act,45 of 2013
contained such a provision which read:
“
(2)
A short-term insurer who contravenes or fails to comply with a
condition contemplated in 9(2)(a)
or a provision of a notice under
section 12(12)(c) or 13(2), or if section 7(1)(a), 15(1), (2), (4) or
(5), 19(1) or (3), 23, 25(1)
or (2), 28(1), (3) or (4) [,] or 33 [or
49(4) or (6)], shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction
to a fine not exceeding
[R1,000,000] R1 million.”
Although there was no
penalty for a contravention of s23 of the STIA the PA was entitled to
impose a penalty in terms of s167(1)
of the FSR-Act. The PA was
obliged to follow another legal route otherwise a breach of a law
would go unpunished. There was no
criminal proceedings so it could
proceed administratively.
[55] The
FST’s finding that the Transitional Provisions constituted a
lex specialis
that overrides the general provisions of section
167 is at odds with the language and purpose of the transitional
provisions. This
common law principle of interpretation sets out that
when two laws govern the same situation laws governing a specific
subject
matter supersedes a law that governs general matters only.
But, it was argued a subsequent general enactment is not intended to
interfere with special provisions unless it manifests such intention.
Transitional provisions often address the application of
the repealed
statute to existing situations at the commencement of the new statute
and the transitional provisions ought to be
interpreted in this
light. Prior to the repeal of STIA the PA imposed administrative
penalties for contraventions of STIA.
[56] The
transitional provisions provide that the PA may initiate an
investigation, within a period of three years after
the effective
date of the transitional provisions, into any suspected
non-compliance with the STIA that occurred during the period
of three
years immediately before the effective date. There was no reasonable
basis upon which the FST ought to have interpreted
the phrase
“regulatory action under the STIA" to exclude regulatory
action that the PA is empowered to take in respect
of any financial
sector law; not only STIA. If not so interpreted it would lead to a
situation where for three years the PA can
pursue an investigation
but cannot impose an administrative penalty. This would not be a
reasonable or sensible interpretation.
Support for this contention
was to be found in
Eksteen
v Road Accident Fund.
[7]
The FST’s decision was thus influenced by a material error of
law and irrational.
[57] The PA
could competently have imposed a penalty because there were
jurisdictional facts allowing same; the investigation
into the
Insurance Company's contravention of s23 of the STIA was commenced
within the three-year period after the transitional
provisions came
into effect and it was found there was a contravention of s23.
Furthermore, the FSR-Act read, with the STIA, made
provision for an
administrative penalty to be imposed for non-compliance with section
23(1)(a) of the STIA. The PA did not act
ultra vires.
The PA
could also impose a penalty in terms of ss65 of STIA.
[58] In the
supplementary heads and in oral argument counsel for the PA also
argued that in a penalty could be imposed
in terms of s66 of STIA.
Although it was not raised in the papers, or before the Tribunal,
submitted it could do so in terms of
the law.
[59] On
behalf of the respondents the argument went that they were informed
by the PA that the penalty was imposed in
terms of s167. This was
also the argument before the FST. The PA could not on review shift
the goal posts and now rely on other
sections as foundation for the
penalty imposed.
[60] It is
common cause that the FSR-Act commenced on 1 April 2018 and that the
LBIC was no longer registered under
STIA when the penalty was imposed
in 2022 for a breach in 2015. It could not impose a penalty in terms
of s167 as the Act itself
does not allow for retrospective
application. In fact, counsel for the PA conceded as much at the FST
hearing that no Act has retrospective
effect when the general
principle of no Act having retrospective application was canvassed
with counsel for the PA.
[61] Section
66 of STIA has no application because the contravention there is for
documents not submitted and not for
not obtaining approval to
increase share capital. Reliance on s65 is also misplaced
because it simply does not provide for
an administrative penalty but
only for a fine if a party is found guilty of an offence.
Decision on the penalty
imposed in terms of a contravention of s23 of STIA.
[62] From the
record of the proceedings before the FST it seems that it was
accepted that LBIC had breached s23 in not
seeking approval to
increase its share capital. The only issue the FST had to decide was
whether the penalty imposed was done in
terms of the applicable law
at that time that the penalty was imposed.
[63] There is
no doubt that the letter informing the LBIC of the penalty expressly
states that the penalty is imposed
in terms of s167 of the FSR-Act.
It is undeniable that the FSR-Act cannot be applied retrospectively.
The question then is whether
the transitional arrangements provided
that the PA could penalise for contraventions of the repealed STIA in
terms of s167 of the
FSR-Act. I find it prudent to repeat the
transitional provisions:
5(1)
Despite the partial repeal of the previous Act –
(c)
any investigation or inspection under the previous Act (the STIA) by
the
Registrar in respect of compliance with the previous Act and
pending immediately before the effective date of 1 July 2018 may be
continued by the Prudential Authority, and the Prudential Authority
may take any regulatory action under those Acts that the Prudential
Authority deems appropriate in respect of any non-compliance; and
(d)
for a period of three years after the effective date, the Prudential
Authority
under those Acts that the Prudential Authority deems
appropriate in respect of that non-compliance.”
“
Those Acts”
thus require interpretation and can only be interpreted as being the
repealed STIA still applicable for regulatory
action by the PA for
three years. The PA simply did not make use of this in the three
years. But, the transitional provisions are
not the fly in the
ointment; the problem is that STIA did not have provision for the
imposition of an administrative penalty for
a contravention of s23.
On no interpretation of ss 65 or 66 of STIA could an administrative
penalty be imposed. S 65 does not relate
to a contravention of s23
and s66 refers to a penalty imposed for a criminal sanction. But,
more importantly the PA made it clear
to the LBIC that it imposed the
sanction in terms of s167 of the FSR-Act.
[64] Section
167 cannot be utilised retrospectively. As already stated, even if
the STIA was not repealed, the PA would
be confronted with taking
administrative action but not being authorised to impose an
administrative action. This unfortunate scenario
cannot be blamed on
the Transitional Provisions with a plea to ascribe some
interpretation thereto to assist the PA. To solve this
lacuna is not
the utilisation of s167 against the entrenched principle that Acts
have no effect retrospectively. There was no argument
that s167 could
have been utilised retro-actively.
[65] I am
satisfied that the FST was correct in finding the PA acted
ultra
vires
when it imposed the penalty for the contravention of s23.
[66] I make
the following order:
The application is
dismissed with costs, with costs to include the costs of three
counsel. Senior Counsel on scale A and the other
two counsel on scale
B.
S.
POTTERILL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE
NO: 2023-058536
HEARD
ON: 30 October 2024
FOR
THE APPLICANTS: ADV. A.A.S.A. BAVA SC
ADV. N.S.H. ALI
INSTRUCTED
BY: GMI Attorneys
FOR
THE 2
ND
AND 3
RD
RESPONDENTS:
ADV. S. KHUMALO SC
ADV. L. MBATHA
ADV. M. MTSHALI
INSTRUCTED
BY:
Malatji & Co Attorneys
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
15 January 2025
[1]
[2016] ZAGPPHC 902 (12 October 2016)
[2]
2024 (1) SACR 32 (GJ)
[3]
(222/2015)
[2015] ZASCA 203
;
[2016] 1 All SA 694
(SCA) (2
December 2015)
[4]
Par 24 of the Howie-matter
[5]
Minister
of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others
(Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici
Curiae
2006
(2) SA 311 (CC)
[6]
Para [532] of
Minister
of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others
supra
[7]
(873/2019)
[2021] ZASCA 48
;
[2021] 3 All SA 46
(SCA) (21 April 2021)
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