Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 197South Africa
Sefako v PRASA (61254/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 197 (25 February 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Sefako v PRASA (61254/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 197 (25 February 2025)
Sefako v PRASA (61254/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 197 (25 February 2025)
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sino date 25 February 2025
SAFLII
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO
: 61254/2020
DATE
:
30-09-2024
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE
:
2025.02.25
SIGNATURE
:
In
the matter between
DANIEL
PITSO SEFAKO
Plaintiff
and
PRASA
Defendant
JUDGMENT
MABUSE,
J:
[1]
This is a claim for payment of money. This claim is resisted by the
Defendant. This
claim is brought by the plaintiff in his
personal capacity.
[2]
The parties.
[2.1] The Plaintiff,
Daniel Pitso Sefako, is an adult male who resides at house […],
M[...] Street, Atteridgeville in Pretoria.
[2.2] The Defendant, the
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), is a company with
limited liability registered as such in
terms of the Company Statutes
of this country with its registered offices situated at 1040 Burnett
Street, Hatfield, Pretoria,
Gauteng Province.
[2.3]
In terms of section 23(11) of the Legal Succession to the South
Africa Transport Service Act No 9
of 1989, the main object and
business of the Defendant is to ensure that rail commuter services
are provided within, to and from
Republic of South Africa, in the
public interest.
[3]
The Particulars of claim are set out in the summons as follow. At all
material times
hereto and in particular on 7 August 2019, the
Defendant was the lawful owner of certain rail commuter assets or
trains as envisaged
in section 25 of the Act 19 of 1989(the Act), and
was in particular the legal owner of the train that operated between
Saulsville
and Schutte railway stations.
[4]
According to the Plaintiff, at all material times and in particular
on 7 August 2019,
the Defendant:
[4.1] was trading as
Metro Rail
[4.2] operated or
continued to operate railway commuter services as move fully set out
in terms of the Act.
[4.3] On that day
conducted its affairs through the actions or omission of its
employees in the course and scope or their employment
with the
Defendant;
[4.4] operated and
provided rail commuter services to members of the public between
Atteridgville and Schutte stations using trains
consisting of
locomotives
[4.5] In so operating and
providing the rail commuter services aforementioned, controlled and
administered all passenger or commuting
by members of the public in
respect of the said trains.
[5]
Initially the Defendant admitted this allegation.
[6]
The Defendant, however denies the following allegations.
[6.1] The Plaintiff and
the Defendant contemplated that such rail commuter services would be
used by members of the public, including
the plaintiff, to travel
along the routes designed by the Defendant.
[6.2] In providing and
operating the rail commuter service aforementioned, had a legal duty,
alternatively a duty of care to ensure
the safety of the public,
including the plaintiff making use of such services as passengers or
otherwise,
[6.3] The Defendant
denied all these allegations and called upon the Plaintiff to prove
them.
[7]
The Plaintiff continued, in his particular of claim, as follow:
[7.1] on 7 August 2019,
the Plaintiff waited to board a commuter train which left
Atteridgeville station and travelled to Schutte
station,
[7.2] The Plaintiff
boarded the train at Atteridgeville rail station when it was
stationary,
[7.3] The train left
Atteredgeville rail station. As the train arrived at Schutte station
the doors opened and as the plaintiff
was busy disembarking from the
train, the train took off while the Plaintiff was busy disembarking
and thereby causing the Plaintiff
to fall down onto the platform,
[7.4] At the time of the
incident, the Plaintiff was in possession of a valid train ticket
with number 61256.
[8]
The allegations are dined by the Defendant. The Defendant contends in
its plea that
events set out by the Plaintiff in his particulars of
claim, especially in paragraph [6] of the particulars of claim, did
not occur
and the Defendant breached its obligation as set out in
paragraph [5] above, which breach amounted to negligent conduct on
his
part in one or more of the following respects'.
[8.1] The Defendant
failed to ensure the safety of the members of the public in general,
and the plaintiff, in particular, on the
coach compartment of the
train in which the plaintiff travelled.
[8.2] Defendant failed to
make any or adequate steps to avoid the incident in which the
Plaintiff was injured whereby the exercise
of reasonable care, it
could and it should have done,
[8.3] The Defendant
failed to take any adequate precaution to prevent the Plaintiff from
being injured. The Defendant failed to
an employ adequate number of
employees to guarantee the safety of passengers in general, and the
plaintiff in particular on the
coach compartment in which the
plaintiff travelled.
[8.4]
The Defendant failed to employ employees alternatively, adequate
numbers of employees to prevent passengers
in general and the
Plaintiff in particular, from being injured in the manner he was, or
sustaining injuries and/or bodily harm.
[8.5] The Defendant
allowed a train to be set in motion without ensuring that the doors
of the train and coach compartment in which
the Plaintiff was
travelling, were closed before the train was set in motion.
[8.6] The Defendant
allowed the train to move with open doors and failed to take any
alternatively adequate steps to prevent the
train from moving with
open doors.
[8.7] The Defendant
failed to keep the coach safe for use by the public in general and
the Plaintiff in particular,
[8.8] The Defendant
failed to ensure all and /or certain coach compartment were not
overcrowded,
[8.9] The Defendant
neglected to employ security staff, alternatively adequate security
staff on the platform and/or
the coach in which the Plaintiff
was travelling, to ensure the safety of the public in general and the
Plaintiff in particular.
[9]
The Defendant disputes all these allegations that it breached its
obligations as set
out in the particulars of claim. It required the
Plaintiff to prove them and further pleaded contributory negligence
on the part
of the Plaintiff.
[10]
In Paragraph [8] the Plaintiff avers that as a consequence of the
said incident, he sustained
certain bodily injuries, namely, he:
[10.1] Experienced pain
and suffering and will in future experience such pain and suffering,
[10.2] He suffered loss
of amenities of life, and will in future suffer such amenities of
life,
[10.3] He will in future
incur hospital and medical expenses,
[10.4] He was disfigured
and disable,
[10.5] He suffered
emotional stress and shock and he will suffer lower earnings and
earnings capacity.
[11]
To these allegations the Defendant pleaded that it had no knowledge
of those allegations and
required proof thereof.
[12]
At the inception of the trial, the Court was informed that the only
issue before the Court were
the merits. In terms of Rule 33 (4) of
the Uniform Rules of Court, the merits were separated from the
quantum and the quantum related
issues were postponed
sine die
.
[13]
The second issue that this Court was called upon to determine was
whether the incident that forms
the basis of the Plaintiff's claim.
Ever took place. It would be recalled that the plaintiff set out in
paragraph [6] of his particulars
of claim, how the incident took
place. It will be recalled furthermore that in paragraph [9] of his
plea the Defendant pleaded
that the incident did not take place.
[14]
The further issue that this Court is required to decide was as
pleaded by the Defendant, is whether
there was any contributory
negligence on the part of the Plaintiff.
[15]
In support of the allegations contained in the particulars of claim,
Mr van Ryneveld, who appeared
for the Plaintiff called two witnesses.
The first of these witnesses was Daniel Pitso Sefako, the Plaintiff
in this matter, and
the second was Mr Precious Monwabisi Gcanga. I
will call him Xanxa for a lack of a proper pronunciation.
[16]
Mr Sefako the Plaintiff, testified that on 7 August 2019 he was
working at Tshwane Mail Pretoria.
At the time of the accident, he was
working nightshift. He boarded a train on that particular day on his
way to work and he was
supposed to go off at Barracks railway
station.
[17]
On that particular day the train dropped him at Schutte railway
station because there was an
incident that had taken place in the
normal route of the train, as a result the trains left their normal
route. He had a train
ticket, and the train ticket number 61256 It
was shown to this Court on the day he testified. That ticket was a
monthly ticket.
[18]
He was shown some pictures and he identified those pictures that they
consisted of Schutte train
station and these pictures were referred
to as exhibit "C" and furthermore, he showed a platform of
railway station.
[19]
The doors of the train, as he continued to testify, were not working
properly. Sometimes the
doors would close and at times would not. The
people at the back would close the doors.
[20]
As the train was moving towards Schutte railway station, he was
standing on the side of the door,
holding onto the handling or
overhead straps, at Schutte railway station the door open. They
waited for the people to get off the
train. As he was about to
disembark, the train pulled off. The doors were open when it was
still in the presence of pulling away,
he fell. He saw himself on the
ground. There were no securities at the station.
[21]
As he was on the ground, somebody came to assist him. He walked with
one of the people who came
to assist him and the other one was an
acquaintance of his. He tried to stand up, he could not for it was
difficult. Tebogo came
to pick him up. He was nearby. He called an
ambulance, and documents relating to an ambulance were shown to him.
The ambulance
report was also handed in as exhibit "E".
[22]
And the second witness, as I have indicated, who testified, was a Mr
Precious Monwabisi Xanxa.
In brief he said
he remembered the incident of 7 August 2019 at Schutte railway
station.
He was going to Atteridgeville and he was still waiting for
his train. The time was about 17:00. There were many people on the
platform. The train arrived at the station. He does not remember what
time it was but he was at a distance of about two metres.
After it
had arrived at the platform it did not stop there for a long time. It
was a short time, about two minutes. He knows the
Plaintiff fell. He
does not know what caused the plaintiff to fall on the platform.
[23]
The train never stopped once it started moving. There were many
people. The Plaintiff was in
the middle of the people who were
disembarking the train. He was the only one who fell.
[24]
The witness testified that Schutte station is small, and before the
train moved away, there was
no signal by any of the train officials
and that concluded the evidence of the witness.
[25]
Mr Lukele, who appeared for the Defendant, applied for absolution
from the instance at this stage
and the Court refused it. He called
two witnesses, Mr Joyce Lebo Kheswa, the first witness that he called
and the witness is a
Metro train guard and his duty is to help the
driver with preparations.
[26]
He testified but his evidence does not relate to the incident at all;
it does not help the Court.
[27]
The second witness was Miss Lulama, I think for purposes of the
record I will repeat the whole
evidence. She is the train driver
which has been working there since 18 September 2000. On that
particular day, she was the driver
of the train that travelled
between Saulsville and Pretoria and Pretoria and Mamelodi and
Pretoria and Johannesburg. She is now
based at Wolverton somewhere in
Pretoria North.
[28]
In operating the train as the driver, she does so with Metro Rail
Train Guard, that is, the Defendant's
first witness. The Metro Rail
guard will open the doors. The train will be stationary. Once the
people have gotten off or on the
train, the Metro guard gives a
signal. The Metro guard will then give a signal to the commuters that
the train is about to depart.
[29]
After that she will give her a signal that the train may leave the
platform. She gives her that
signal by way of a button. She presses a
button. That is not the only signal that she gives. If she wants her
to stop the train,
she presses the signal three times. This happens
when the Metro Guard sees a person who is rushing to board that
train.
[30]
The train guard will always give her signal when the train has to
stop. She was on duty on the
date in question, he was the train
driver. She was shown on page 9 and she confirmed that page
represented a daily journal. This
journal shows that she reported for
duty at about 5 o'clock in the morning. She drove the train. It was
one train but different
numbers. There are other trains on the line.
[31]
On that particular day she did not see any incident, she worked on
that day with the first witness
Joyce Kheswa. She does not recall who
took over from her. It was Masheleng Mulindane, and she says she
knows nothing about the
incident of 7 August 2019. If it happened, it
did not do so on that train or at the time when she was the driver of
the train.
[32]
Now, in terms of the law the duty in on the Plaintiff to prove what
he states in the particular
of claim. The duty to do so in this case
is made more easier by the fact that the Defendant has denied that
the incident that took
place as that he claimed. The Plaintiff
claimed that the incident took place in accordance with this
particulars of claim taka
place and the Plaintiff was called upon to
prove it.
[33]
All that I can say at this stage is that the evidence of the
Plaintiff as not been disputed.
Apart from the Plaintiff, the
Defendant pleaded that the incident did not take place, the Plaintiff
has told the Court how he got
injured, and how the incident took
place, how he got injured, and how he was taken to hospital by
an ambulance.
[34]
His evidence that this incident took place is supported
by the evidence of his
witness, the second witness, who
testified in this matter, who said he was at the railway station. He
saw the train come. He was
there when it stopped. He was there when
people came out of the train and he was there and sow the Plaintiff
when he fell on the
platform. He does not know what caused the
Plaintiff to fall but the fact is the Plaintiff fell on the
platform.
[35]
This evidence cannot be disputed. There is no other version that has
been placed before the Court
other than the plea that the incident
did not take place.
[36]
In his argument, and in his desire to obtain a dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim, Mr Lukhele
referred the Court to the judgment of
Howard and Dekker Witkoppen Agencies and Fourways Estate (Pty)
Limited v De Sousa
1971 (3) SA 937
(T)
. This was in
connection with the statement made by one Tebogo Thobejane who had
claimed that after the incident he had spoken to
the plaintiff and
the plaintiff had given him the different direction. There was a
dispute as to whether the statement should be
admitted. In his view
the statement had to be admitted in terms of this judgment. The
judgment read as follows:
"The law in relation
to the proof of private documents is that the document must be
identified by a witness who is either (i)
the writer or signatory
thereof, or (ii) the attesting witness, or (iii) the person in whose
lawful custody the document is, or
(iv) the person who found it in
possession of the opposite party, or (v) a handwriting expert, unless
the document is one which
proves itself, that is to say unless it:
(1)
is produced under a discovery order, or
(2)
may be judicially noticed by the Court, or
(3)
is one which may be handed in from the Bar, or
(4)
is produced under a subpoena
duces tecum
, or
(5)
is an affidavit in interlocutory proceedings, or
(6)
is admitted by the opposite party."
Mr
Lukhele hang his case on the statement which was produced under a
discovery order. The problem was the word order, the presence
of the
word "order" in number 1.
[37]
His argument, that is Mr Lukhele's, was that the statement of Tebogo
Thobejane was discovered
by the plaintiff during the discovery
process and as such the principle established in the said case
dictates what the statement
can be allowed by the Court as it was
produced under discovery. In this statement that he made in paragraph
[50] of his heads of
argument, he left out the word discovery.
[38]
A notice requiring a party to make discovery may not be given until
after
litis contestatio
or after the close of the proceedings.
Such a request, which request a party to disclose is made in terms of
Rule 35(2) of the Uniform
Rules of Court.
[39]
A request which requires a party to disclose is made in terms of Rule
35(2) by Rules of Court,
a party who discovers following such a
request, does not, in terms of the said rules and in terms of the -
discover on the basis
of court order. At this stage there is no
court order as required by the requirements under discussion, to
produce a document.
But Rule 35(11) makes provision for a court
order. follows:
Rule
35(11) of the Rules of Court provides as
"The court may,
during the course of any proceedings, order the production by any
party thereto under oath of such documents
or tape recordings in his
power or control relating to any matter in question in such
proceedings as the court may think meet,
and the court may deal with
such documents or tape recordings when produced, as it thinks meet."
In
my view the word "order" as set out in that judgment of Da
Sousa comes from Rule 35(1) because it is in terms of Rule
35(1) that
a party may be required to produce the documents or discovered
documents and when that is done it is in terms of number
1, it is
produced under a discovery order.
[40]
In this case, as I already have pointed out, the statement of
Thobejane was not discovered under
the circumstances envisaged in
that rule. Therefore, the statement of Thobejane could not be
admitted and it served no useful purpose
in pursuance of the
defendant's case.
[41]
My view is therefore that the evidence of the plaintiff cannot be
contradicted. After he had
dealt with that case of
Discovery
affidavit Sousa
, he turned his attention to what you call the
evidence of the plaintiff's only independent witness, which in view
directly contradicted
the plaintiff's version. He stated that in this
case ...[indistinct] which is highly destructive of the plaintiff's
version.
[42]
The plaintiff's version was that he fell when he tried to disembark;
that he was the last person
who disembarked from the train and that
the other commuters disembarked normally whereas independent witness,
that is Mr Xanxa
in other words, testified that in fact the plaintiff
came out of in the midst of the group of people who were pushing and
pulling
and that is how he fell. Despite the fact that he could
not explain why it took two minutes for his group to leave the train
from the moment that he saw them, it is irrelevant how long it took
him to see these people. The fact is that his evidence
is not
denied.
[43]
Now according to Mr van Ryneveld's heads of argument, the claimant
indicates that once the train
arrived at Schutte station, the
plaintiff waited for the other passengers before him to disembark. As
he was still in the process
of disembarking and without my warning,
the train pulled away from the Schutte station with the doors open.
This evidence is also
confirmed or corroborated by the evidence of
the plaintiff's witness.
[44]
Before the train started moving, the plaintiff fell on the ground.
There were not security officers
employed by the defendant at that
time at the station. The plaintiff was assisted by his witness and
Tebogo.
[45]
Mr Gcangu testified that the platform at Schutte rail station was
quite busy. He was about two
metres away from the train and about two
to three metres away from the train doors. He himself had intended to
board a train to
Atteridgeville. He did not recall whether the
doors of the train opened automatically or whether they were opened
by the
passengers or whether they were opened when the train arrived
at the Schutte rail station. He testified that the train did not stop
for a very long time and he estimated the time of two minutes before
the train left the platform.
[46]
He testified further that he saw the plaintiff and that he could see
the plaintiff fall out of
the train after departure. Although he
could not say for certain why the plaintiff fell, he testified that
the train was moving
and that the train doors were still open when
the plaintiff fell. This is how he fell of the train.
[47]
It must be remembered that the defendant's plea was, as contained in
particular 6 of its plea,
that the incident set out by the plaintiff
in his particulars of claim and also confirmed or corroborated by the
evidence of his
witness, did not take place.
[48]
Mr van Ryneveld argued in his heads of argument that it was not put
to the plaintiff that the
accident did not take place. This is
correct. That the plaintiff fell because he was pulled by
another passenger, that
was not put to the plaintiff's delay in
exiting the train within two minutes amounted to contributory
negligence. That the train
did not move when the doors were opened at
Schutte station, that the train doors were closed before the train
started to depart
Schutte station.
[49]
The ambulance records were wrong. There was an issue about these
ambulance records. Mr Lukhele
was unhappy about the hospital records.
He required someone who had completed the records, to come and
testify and the plaintiff
was unable to produce any witness to
confirm that indeed he was picked up from the railway station by an
ambulance.
[50]
Now this evidence was not required because the plaintiff himself
testified that he was taken
from the railway station by an ambulance.
It was not his duty to make sure that someone who picked him up from
the railway station
completed his record.
[51]
While Mr Lukhele wanted, but did not want the hospital records to be
handed in because the person
who completed them was not available, on
the contrary he wanted this Court to accept the evidence of the
statement by Thobejane
I find this very contrary to his intention.
[52]
In conclusion I found that the plaintiff and his witness have set out
the incident as it took
place on the date in question; that their
evidence cannot be contradicted, and I find that the defendant's
witnesses were unable
to shed any light on the incident as was
testified by the plaintiff and his witness. Their evidence, while it
is very valuable,
it did not help the Court to determine as to
whether this incident took place or did not take place.
[53]
Based on the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness, the injury he
sustained, the fact that
he was fetched by an ambulance from the
station as he testified, the absence of any evidence to contradict
him, the Court finds
that the incident did occur at Schutte railway
station on the day mentioned in the particulars of claim, and that
the said incident
was caused by the negligence of the defendant's
employees.
[54]
Finally, not finally actually, there was an issue regarding the
trains, whether he fell from
one train or the other, the fact is he
fell from a train and the number of the trains were not mentioned and
the time also was
not mentioned in the particulars of claim. Whether
or not he fell from train 022 or 021, the fact is he fell from the
train. He
was seen by a witness falling from the train.
[55]
I think the case that Mr Lukele referred to in this matter is the
case of
Mashongwa v PRASA
[2015] ZACC 36
says much about the
facts of this case. It is the only authority on the incidents that
relate to the negligence of the defendant's
own trains. It is the
only authority that tells the defendant as to what he should do when
he transports commuters on the railway
line. It tells our courts what
conduct of the defendant constitutes negligence, and in view of the
fact that this is the only authority
which deals with the subject
matter, it serves no useful purpose to refer to any other authority.
[56]
The case dealt with whether a transport utility like PRASA, ought to
be held vicariously liable
for damages that flow from a breach of
public law of duty to provide safety and security measures for all
its rail commuters. In
paragraph 20 it states:
"Public carriers
like PRASA have always been regarded as owing a legal duty to their
passengers to protect them from suffering
physical harm while making
use of their transport services. That is true of taxi operators, bus
services and the railways, as attested
to by numerous cases in our
courts. That duty arises, in the case of PRASA, from the
existence of the relationship between
carrier and passenger, usually,
but not always, based on a contract. It also stems from its public
law obligations. This merely
strengthens the contention that a breach
of those duties is wrongful in the delictual sense and could attract
liability for damages."
Paragraph
21 it says:
"The criticism
levelled at PRASA is that it omitted to do two things. First, to
ensure that there were security guards on the
train. Second, it
permitted the train to travel between Walker Street and Rissik Street
stations with the coach doors open.
Whether a reasonable train
operator would have foreseen the risk of harm to passengers arising
from this, and taken steps to guard
against that risk, are questions
that fall to be answered in the enquiry into negligence. But in
addressing wrongfulness the question
is whether omissions of that
type, in breach of PRASA's public law obligations, are to be treated
as wrongful for the purposes
not only of public law remedies, but
also for the purpose of attracting delictual liability sounding in
damages. For the reasons
that follow, even if one treats both of
those as an omission, it makes no difference to the analysis of
wrongfulness."
[57]
If you recall that in his particulars of claim the plaintiff set out
the respect in which in
his view, the defendant was negligent and it
also set out the duties that the defendant had to comply with when he
was transferring
commuters.
I
am satisfied that the plaintiff has made out a good case and that
accordingly the judgment on the merits should be granted in
favour of
the plaintiff, with costs.
The
Court makes the following order, judgment on the merits is granted in
favour of the plaintiff, with costs.
MABUSE,
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE:
2025.02.25
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