Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 182South Africa
Khumalo Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Step Up Engineering (Pty) Ltd (075138-2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 182 (27 February 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
27 February 2025
Headnotes
as follows: “[12] Notwithstanding its awareness of the fact that its discretion must be exercised judicially, the court a quo did not keep in view the specific principle that, generally speaking, an unpaid creditor has a right, as ex debiti justitiae to a winding up order against the respondent company that has not discharged the debt. Different considerations may apply where business rescue proceedings are being considered in terms of Part A of CH 6 of the New Companies Act 71 of 2008. The court aquo also did not head the principle that, in practice, the discretion of a court to refuse to grant a winding up
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Khumalo Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Step Up Engineering (Pty) Ltd (075138-2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 182 (27 February 2025)
Khumalo Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Step Up Engineering (Pty) Ltd (075138-2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 182 (27 February 2025)
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sino date 27 February 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO:
075138-2023
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE
27/02/2025
LENYAI
J
In
the matter of:
KHUMALO
ENGINEERING (PTY) LTD
Applicant
(REG.
NO.: 2016/214997/07)
And
STEP UP ENGINEERING
(PTY) LTD
Respondent
(REG. NO.:
2010/010996/07)
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by
uploading to
Caselines. The date and time of hand-down
is
deemed to be 14:00
on 27 February 2025.
JUDGMENT
LENYAI
J
[1]
This is an application for the final, alternatively provisional
liquidation of the respondent.
[2]
The applicant avers that the application is launched in terms of the
provisions of section 345(1)
of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973, read
with Item 9 of Schedule 5 to the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
.
[3]
The applicant submits that on or about 18 July 2017 it entered into a
joint venture agreement
with the respondent for the purpose of
execution of Project No: RTD01-2016/17, 20Km Road and Stormwater and
2,5Km Stormwater Channels
– Soshanguve (the project).
Subsequent to the joint venture agreement and the awarding of the
tender, a dispute arose between
the parties regarding the management
and control of the administration and execution of the joint venture
project and on the 25
th
January 2021 the parties entered
into a settlement agreement.
[4]
The applicant avers that the material terms of the settlement
agreement relevant for the purposes
of this application are as
follows:
4.1
With effect from the date of the signature of the agreement, the
applicant would give up its interest
in and to the project to the
respondent so that the respondent becomes the sole interest holder in
the project and would be entitled
to execute the project for its sole
benefit subject to the terms and conditions of the settlement
agreement;
4.2
In consideration of the interest referred to above, the respondent
would pay the applicant an amount
of R5 800 000.00 payable as
follows:
4.2.1 an
amount of R1 200 000.00 would be paid on or before 28 February 2021;
4.2.2 the
balance of R4 600 000.00 would be payable in six equal monthly
installments commencing from 31 March 2021
and the last payment being
on the 31 August 2021, or alternatively a lump sum would be payable
on or before 31 July 2021 provided
that the respondent would keep the
applicant informed of the status of the project on a monthly basis
for as long as the balance
remains unpaid;
4.2.3 the
payments would be effected into applicant’s bank account
indicated in the settlement agreement and the
proof of payment would
be emailed to the applicant’s legal representative;
4.2.4 the
parties agreed that the joint venture agreement would be considered
to be cancelled on the date of the signing
of the settlement
agreement, subject to the provisions recorded therein;
4.2.5 the
agreement would constitute the entire agreement between the parties
with regard to the matter dealt with therein
and no representations,
terms, conditions or warranties not contained therein would be
binding on the parties and no agreement
varying, adding to, deleting
from or cancelling the agreement would be effective unless reduced to
writing and signed by or on
behalf of the parties.
[5]
The applicant submits that the respondent made a series of sporadic
payments to the applicant
between the period of 30
th
March
2021 till 24
th
December 2022 totaling an amount of R3 750
000.00. The respondent is still owing the applicant an amount of R2
050 000.00.
[6]
The applicant avers that the respondent breached the terms of the
settlement agreement in having
failed to make the payments as agreed
to in the settlement agreement. In terms of the agreement, the
respondent was obliged to
make full payment of the outstanding
balance by the 31
st
August 2021.
[7]
The applicant avers that it is a creditor of the respondent in an
amount of not less than R100.00.
The applicant further submits that
it has served a
section 345
notice on the respondent’s
registered address through the sheriff and despite such notice, the
respondent has failed to make
payment within 21 days thereafter.
[8]
The applicant avers that the settlement agreement as well as the
breach are not denied by the
respondents. The respondent is alleging
that there is a dispute relating to the joint venture agreement,
which dispute has been
addressed in the settlement agreement. The
applicant further contends that the respondent’s answering
affidavit is a series
of admissions and bare denials of the factual
evidence presented in the founding affidavit.
[9]
The
respondent contends that the applicant’s claim is founded on an
alleged breach of the settlement agreement. The respondent
avers that
since the issuing of the proceedings by the applicant, it had paid a
further amount of R350 000.00 which reduced the
amount outstanding to
R1 700 000.00.
[10]
The
respondent further avers that the settlement agreement makes
provision amongst other things that:
9.1
the settlement agreement be made an order of court;
9.2
in the event of breach, the applicant approaches City of Tshwane and
make a claim against any funds
due and payable to the respondent in
terms of this tender project.
[11]
The respondent contends that the applicant did not make the
settlement an order of court and neither did
it approach the City of
Tshwane first as stipulated in the settlement agreement. Despite
these omissions the applicant delivered
a
section 345
notice and
instituted liquidation proceedings on allegations of breach of
contract.
The
respondent further contends that the applicant is using the
liquidation proceedings as a means to enforce payment.
[12]
The respondent further contends that there are
disputes of fact which cannot be disposed of in motion
proceedings. The respondent submits that the applicant rendered
performance impossible by causing construction mafia to disturb
the
execution of the project’s work and this constitutes a breach
of contract on the part of the applicant.
[13]
The respondent submits that it is not insolvent and is capable of
paying its creditors.
[14]
Section 345(1)(i) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (as amended)
provides that:
“
A
company… shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if –
(a)
a
creditor, by cession or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted in
a sum of not less than one hundred rand then due –
(i)
has
served on the company, by leaving the same at its registered office,
a demand requiring the company to pay the sum so due;
…
and
the company or body corporate has for three weeks thereafter
neglected to pay the sum, or to secure or compound for it to the
reasonable satisfaction of the creditor;”
[15]
It is common cause between the parties that upon the respondent’s
breach of the settlement agreement,
the applicant caused a section
345 notice to be served on the respondent’s registered address
by the sheriff. This notice
remained unsatisfied by the respondent
more than three weeks after it was served, and this triggered the
deeming provision that
the respondent is unable to pay its debts.
See:
ABSA Bank
Limited v Tamsui Empire Park 1 CC (11151/2013
[2013] ZAWCHC 187
at
para 13.
[16]
The deeming provision can only be circumvented in the event that the
alleged indebtedness of a company is
disputed
bona
fide
on reasonable
grounds. See:
Badenhorst
v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd
1956 (2) SA 346
(T) at
346 – 348.
[17]
In the matter of
Afgri
Operations Ltd v Hamba Fleet (Pty) Ltd
2022 (1) SA 91
(SCA)
,
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the position in relation to a
court’s discretion in liquidation proceedings and held
as
follows:
“
[12]
Notwithstanding its awareness of the fact that its discretion must be
exercised judicially, the court a quo did
not keep in view the
specific principle that, generally speaking, an unpaid creditor has a
right, as ex debiti justitiae to a winding
up order against the
respondent company that has not discharged the debt. Different
considerations may apply where business rescue
proceedings are being
considered in terms of Part A of CH 6 of the New
Companies Act 71 of
2008
. The court aquo also did not head the principle that, in
practice, the discretion of a court to refuse to grant a winding up
order
where an unpaid creditor applies therefore is a “very
narrow one” that is rarely exercised and then in special or
unusual
circumstances only.
…
[17]
The question of onus is indeed critically relevant in a case such as
this. It bears repeating that once the
respondent’s
indebtedness to the applicant for a winding up order has, prima
facie, been established, the onus
is
on it, the respondent, to show that this indebtedness is indeed
dis
puted
on bona fife and reasonable grounds.”
[18]
In the matter before me, the respondent in its answering affidavit
submits that it is not insolvent and is
capable of paying its
creditors. The respondent has not furnished the court with its
audited financial statements to corroborate
its claim that it is
solvent. I am reluctant to accept the say so of the respondent as to
its financial position without the audited
financial statements being
shared with the court.
I
am not satisfied that the respondent has shown the court that its
dispute of the indebtedness, is disputed on bona fide reasonable
grounds.
[19]
The
respondent further contends that there are disputes of fact which
cannot be disposed of in motion proceedings. The respondent
submits that the applicant rendered performance impossible by causing
construction mafia to disturb the execution of the project’s
work and this constitutes a breach of contract on the part of the
applicant. Again, here the respondent makes these submissions
without
placing anything more before the court to corroborate its claims.
This in my view is an unsubstantiated claim, devoid of
any
explanation or detail to assist the court in the adjudication of this
matter. Furthermore the disputes that were there between
the parties
were addressed in the settlement agreement.
[20]
The respondent raises a defense that the settlement agreement relied
upon by the applicant was not made an
order of court as stipulated by
the terms of the agreement. In my view nothing turns on this point.
Clause 6 of the settlement
agreement makes provision that either
party is entitled to approach any competent court to make the
agreement an order of court
without notice to the other party. The
fact that this agreement was not made an order of court does not
invalidate the agreement.
[21]
The respondent also submits that in terms of the settlement agreement
the applicant was supposed to approach
the City of Tshwane for the
amount owed. Clause 4 of the settlement agreement provides as
follows:
“
The
parties agree that should “SETHEO” fail to honour its
payment obligations herein, “KHUMALO” shall in
addition
to all other remedies available to it in law including, without
limitation, to approach any court of competent jurisdiction
for any
appropriate relief, be entitled forthwith and without any further
notice to “SETHEO” to demand payment thereof
from the
City of Tshwane against the proceeds of “the project”…”
[22]
After careful reading of the clause, I am of the view that the
operative word here are the words “in
addition”. The
agreement does not say “prior” to approaching the court,
it says in addition to all other remedies
available to it in law, the
applicant is entitled to approach the City of Tshwane. I am of the
view that the respondent misunderstood
the settlement agreement.
[23]
The agreement is valid and binding on the parties and the applicant
is correctly within his rights to rely
on it to establish its claim.
On closer scrutiny of the papers before me and the submissions made
in court, the settlement agreement
is not disputed, and the debt is
also not being disputed by the respondent. In fact, the respondent
goes as far as to admit that
despite having made a further payment
after the liquidation process has been initiated by the applicant, it
still owes the applicant
an amount of R1 700 000.00.
[24] I
am satisfied that the applicant has complied with the provisions of
section 345
and the respondent is by operation of law, deemed to be
unable to pay its debt.
[25]
Under the circumstances I make the following order:
1.
The respondent is hereby placed under
provisional liquidation;
2.
The respondent and any other party who wishes to avoid such an order
being made final are called
upon to advance reasons, if any, why the
court should not grant a final order of liquidation of the respondent
on the 26 August
2025 or as soon thereafter as the matter may be
heard;
3.
The order must be served on the respondent’s registered address
as well as on its employees
and Trade Unions, if any;
4.
The order must be served on the Master of the High Court and the
South African Revenue Services;
5.
This order must be advertised once in the Government Gazette and once
in the Citizen and
local newspaper
6.
Costs of the application to be costs in the liquidation.
LENYAI J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances
Counsel
for Applicant
:
Adv M
Jacobs
Instructed
by
:
Prinsloo
Attorneys Inc
Counsel for the Respondents
:
Adv T Munotsiwa
Instructed by
:
Gwanangura Inc Attorneys
Date
of hearing
:
28
August 2024
Date
of Judgement
:
27
February 2025
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