Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 234South Africa
Body Corporate of Nonsa Court v Mothoagae and Another (058372/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 234 (3 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
3 March 2025
Headnotes
in Deeds Office, the first respondent purchased the property on 7 November 2013 at a purchase consideration of R 800 000, 00. In the result, the first respondent has been the owner of the property for just over eleven years.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Body Corporate of Nonsa Court v Mothoagae and Another (058372/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 234 (3 March 2025)
Body Corporate of Nonsa Court v Mothoagae and Another (058372/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 234 (3 March 2025)
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sino date 3 March 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
Number:
058372/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE:
SIGNATURE:
JANSE VAN
NIEUWENHUIZEN J
In
the matter between:
THE
BODY CORPORATE OF NONSA COURT
Applicant
and
GAOLATLHE
MOTHOAGAE
First Respondent
CITY
OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN CITY
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
JANSE
VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN J:
Introduction
[1]
This is an application in terms of Rule 46(1) and 46A of the Uniform
Rules of Court for an order
declaring the first respondent’s
immovable property specially executable and authorising the Registrar
to issue a warrant
of execution in respect of the property.
[2]
The application is opposed by the first respondent, who appeared in
person at the hearing of the
matter.
Background
facts
[3]
The first respondent is the registered owner of a unit in Nonsa
Court, Johannesburg South, Gauteng.
According to the records held in
Deeds Office, the first respondent purchased the property on 7
November 2013 at a purchase consideration
of R 800 000, 00. In
the result, the first respondent has been the owner of the property
for just over eleven years.
[4]
In view of the first respondent’s ownership of the unit, she is
a member of the applicant
and is liable to make payment of levies.
The first respondent’s levy payments fell into arrears during
2019 and on 14 March
2023 the applicant obtained judgment against the
first respondent in the amount of R 111 797, 59.
[5]
The first respondent did not pay the judgment amount, and the
applicant caused a warrant of execution
against movables to be issued
by the registrar. On 26 September 2023 the Sheriff executed the
warrant and issued a
nulla bona
return.
[6]
The
nulla bona
return resulted in the present application
being launched.
Opposition
[7]
The first respondent explained in her answering affidavit that it had
always been her dream to
own her own property. At the time of the
purchase of the property, the first respondent was employed at the
University of the Witwatersrand
(“Wits”). The purchase
consideration for the property was financed through a mortgage bond
from Nedbank and, in order
to realise her dream, the first respondent
made extra bond payments monthly.
[8]
In March 2018 Wits retrenched the first respondent and she utilised
the settlement amount to pay
off the Nedbank bond and to continue
paying the monthly levies.
[9]
In December 2018, the first respondent applied for and was accepted
for a PhD Fellowship Programme
at the Wits School of Public Health. A
few months into the program and during July 2019, the first
respondent fell ill and required
surgical intervention. Shortly
thereafter, the first respondent was diagnosed with Stage IV
Endometriosis, a severe condition that
required major surgery. The
surgery was booked for November 2019.
[10]
The first respondent stated that she was, sadly, unfairly dismissed
from the PhD Fellowship Program in September
2019. Although the CCMA
has ruled that the first respondent’s dismissal was, both
procedurally and substantively unfair she
could not be reinstated due
to the nature of the contract she had signed which is somehow unique
to the Wits School for Public
Health.
[11]
The first respondent engaged with the University in an endeavour to
find an amicable solution. Her engagements
have not borne any fruit
to date, and she has escalated the matter to the Council for Higher
Education as well as the Department
of Higher Education and Training.
[12] In
the meantime the first respondent has been seeking alternative
employment without success. The first respondent
attached proof of
her job seeking efforts.
[13]
The first respondent stated that she takes full responsibility for
the payment of the levies, but that her
current financial situation
makes it extremely difficult to honour her financial commitments.
The first respondent has made
some payments towards the arrear
levies, but the amounts she paid did not even equal the monthly levy
amount. The first respondent
is convinced that her financial position
will change at some point in the future and requested that she be
given time to honour
her financial obligations towards the applicant.
[14]
Finally, the first respondent summarised her opposition to the
application as follows:
14.1
the property is the only property she owns, and it is her primary
residence;
14.2 she
lives with her niece who is a first-year student in need of
accommodation;
14.3
she is presently in a period of financial difficulty due to her
unfair dismissal which dismissal is receiving
the attention of the
CHE and DHET senior officials;
14.4
she has on various occasions engaged the applicant and its attorneys
to explain her situation and her intention
to settle the debt; and
14.5
she has been paying small amounts towards the debt.
Legislative
framework
[15]
Rule 46(1) of the Uniform Rules of court provides that a warrant for
execution against immovable property
may, subject to rule 46A, only
be issued if a debtor’s movable property is insufficient to
satisfy the debt and the immovable
property has been declared
specially executable by the court or the registrar in terms of Rule
31(5).
[16]
Rule 46A, in turn, provides for execution against residential
immovable property. In terms of rule 46A(2)(a)(ii),
a court must
consider alternative means available to a judgment debtor to satisfy
the debt, other than execution against a debtor’s
residence. In
casu
the first respondent on her own version does not have
alternative means to satisfy the debt.
[17]
Furthermore and in terms of rule 46A(2)(b) a court shall not
authorise execution against a residential immovable
property that is
a primary residence, unless the court, having considered all the
relevant factors, considers that the execution
is warranted.
[18]
The applicant is a juristic body created in terms of the provisions
of the Sectional Titles Management Act,
8 of 2011. The function of
the applicant is to,
inter alia,
collect levies payable by the
owners of the units in the scheme. The levies payable by all the
owners is for their joint benefit
in that, the buildings, garden and
other infrastructure in the scheme is properly maintained. Proper
maintenance in turn, ensures
that the value of the properties is
enhanced.
[19]
Without proper maintenance the scheme will most likely fall in
disrepair and will significantly decrease
the value of all the
properties in the scheme. The payment of levies by all the owners of
the scheme is to their mutual benefit.
[20] It
is against the aforesaid background, that the court must consider
whether the authorisation of execution
against the property of the
first respondent is warranted.
[21]
Firstly, I wish to state that the first respondent’s financial
woes are not due to any fault on her
part. The first respondent has
on all accounts worked hard to achieve her dream of owning a property
and, until her dismissal,
has promptly honoured all her financial
obligations. In the circumstances, the position the first respondent
finds herself in is
most unfortunate.
[22]
The high levels of unemployment is a sad reality in our country.
There are daily applications in court to
execute against residential
property that is a primary residence. More often than not a debtor’s
sudden loss of employment
is the cause for the debt.
[23]
The law must, however, be applied equally to the rights of all the
parties before court. Should the court
refuse to authorise the
execution of the first respondent’s property, the rights of the
other owners in the scheme who is
in a position and does pay levies,
will unfairly be infringed.
[24] On
the conspectus of the evidence before court, I cannot find that
authorisation to execute against the first
respondent’s
property is unwarranted.
[25]
Lastly, the first respondent relied on her constitutional right to
adequate housing as envisaged in section
26(1) of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. The first respondent
submitted that her aforesaid right
will be infringed should the court
authorise execution against her property.
[26] In
this regard, Mr Louw, counsel for the applicant, referred to the
matter of
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and
Others
2006 (2) SA 264
(SCA), in which the court held that the
right “
obliges private parties not to infringe unjustifiably
with any person’s existing access to adequate housing’’.
[27]
The first respondent’s property is unencumbered and a sale in
execution will in all likelihood, having
regard to the amount of the
debt, result in a surplus to the benefit of the first respondent. The
fact that the law authorises
the sale of the first respondent’s
property in execution negates the notion that the applicant is
“
unjustifiably”
infringing the first respondent’s
right to adequate housing by applying for such an order.
[28] In
authorising the execution of the first respondent’s property,
the court must in terms of rule 46A
(9), consider whether a reserve
price should be set.
[29]
The market value of the property was estimated at R 1 225 000,
00 by a sworn valuator, Mr Furness.
Mr Furness estimated the forced
sale value of the property to be R 900 000, 00. The Municipal
valuation of the property is
R 979 000, 00. On 4 October 2023,
the first respondent owed the second respondent R 41 595, 00 in
respect of rates and
taxes, electricity, water consumption and
related charges. The outstanding levies in May 2024 amounted to R
255 776, 78. Once
the amount owed in respect of municipal taxes
and the levies owed to the applicant is deducted from the forced sale
value of the
property, I deem a reserve price of R 600 000, 00
to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
[30]
The first respondent indicated during the hearing of the matter that
her financial circumstances may change
in the foreseeable future. In
the circumstances, the applicant has agreed to a suspension of the
execution order for a period of
two months.
Costs
[31]
The applicant as the successful party is entitled to a cost order in
its favour.
ORDER
The following order is
granted:
1.
The following immovable property:
SECTION
NO. 20 AS SHOWN AND MORE FULLY DESCRIBED ON SECTIONAL PLAN NO.
SS170/2002, IN THE SCHEME KNOWN AS NONSA COURT IN RESPECT
OF THE LAND
AND BUILDING OR BUILDINGS SITUATED AT JOHANNESBURG NORTH, CITY OF
JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN MUNICICPALITY OF WHICH
SECTION THE FLOOR
AREA, ACCORDING TO THE SAID SECTIONAL PLAN, IS 114 (ONE HUNDRED AND
FOURTEEN) SQUARE METRES IN EXTENT; AND
AN
UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE COMMON PROPERTY IN THE SCHEME APPORTIONED TO
THE SAID SECTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARTICIPATION QUOTA
AS
ENDORSED ON THE SAID SECTION PLAN
HELD
BY DEED OF TRANSFER NO. ST 15175/2014
is
declared specially executable.
2.
The registrar is authorised to issue a warrant of
execution against the immovable property.
3.
The immovable property to be sold in a sale in
execution with a reserve price of R 600 000, 00.
4.
The execution of this order is suspended for a
period of two months from date of this order.
5.
The first respondent is ordered to pay the costs
of the application.
N. JANSE VAN
NIEUWENHUIZEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE
HEARD:
24 February 2025
DATE
DELIVERED:
3
March 2025
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant:
Advocate
Louw
Instructed
by:
Beyers
Incorporated Attorneys
The
First Respondent:
In
person.
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