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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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[2025] ZAGPPHC 412
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## Body Corporate of Federal Industrsl Park v Pec Metering (Pty) Ltd (31013/2018)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 412 (22 April 2025)
Body Corporate of Federal Industrsl Park v Pec Metering (Pty) Ltd (31013/2018)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 412 (22 April 2025)
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sino date 22 April 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 31013/2018
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
Date:
22 April 2025 E van der Schyff
In
the matter between:
THE
BODY CORPORATE OF FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL PARK
Plaintiff
and
PEC
METERING (PTY)
LTD
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Van der Schyff J
Introduction
[1]
During the period 2009
to 2014, the Defendant, PEC Metering (Pty) Ltd (“PEC”)
was employed by the Plaintiff, the Body
Corporate of Federal
Industrial Park (“the body corporate”). PEC was employed
to collect money due in respect of the
consumption of electricity,
water, and other services from the various consumers occupying the
body corporate’s premises
on behalf of the body corporate.
PEC was to pay over the required amounts to the City of Johannesburg
(“CoJ”)
on behalf of the body corporate.
[2]
During PEC’s
employment, a dispute arose between the body corporate, represented
by PEC, and the CoJ regarding amounts due
to the CoJ. An agreement
was reached between the body corporate and PEC that, pending the
resolution of the dispute between the
body corporate and CoJ, an
amount of R2 325 338.07 would be invested by PEC in an
interest-bearing trust account at JJR Incorporated
Attorneys.
[3]
The sum of R2 325
338.07 was deposited with JJR Incorporated Attorneys during February
2014. The dispute between the body corporate
and CoJ was resolved. On
19 February 2018, JJR Incorporated Attorneys released the amount of
R2 325 338.07 and interest accrued
to PEC. PEC retained the amount,
together with interest, despite the body corporate demanding payment
thereof.
[4]
The body corporate
claims that the parties agreed in February 2014 that the amount of R2
325 338.07 would be paid in trust with
JJR Incorporated Attorneys
pending the resolution of the dispute between itself and the CoJ,
whereafter the money would be paid
to it together with the accrued
interest. PEC retains the money in breach of this agreement without a
legal basis to do so.
[5]
PEC pleaded that it was
contractually obliged to collect money due in respect of the
consumption of electricity, water, and other
services from the
various consumers occupying the body corporate’s premises on
behalf of the body corporate and pay it over
to the CoJ. It was,
however, entitled to keep for itself the difference between the value
of the money collected from consumers
and the amount that had to be
paid over to the CoJ. In accordance with this agreement, PEC avers
that the parties agreed in February
2014 that, should the dispute be
resolved between the body corporate and CoJ to the effect that no
amount was due by the body corporate
to CoJ for the period for which
PEC was contracted, the full amount invested together with accrued
interest would be refunded to
PEC.
[6]
The evidence of three
witnesses was presented to the court. By agreement between the
parties, the evidence in chief of these three
witnesses was, for the
most part, contained in sworn witness statements filed prior to the
hearing.
Evidence presented by
the plaintiff
[7]
The body corporate
presented the evidence of two witnesses, Messrs. D. Paine and B.
Jacobs, respectively.
[8]
In his evidence in
chief, Mr. Paine, a representative of Collins Property Projects, the
initial property developer and manager,
explained that PEC was
appointed as the body corporate’s utility manager on 1 December
2009. PEC’s services were terminated
on 10 June 2014, with
effect from 1 July 2014. The reason for the termination was an
ongoing dispute between the body corporate
and PEC regarding funds
collected from the owners and members of the body corporate, and
funds actually paid over to CoJ. When
the agreement was terminated,
PEC had already collected an amount in excess of R6 million but
failed to pay over ‘some of
the funds’ to the CoJ.
[9]
Mr. Paine testified
that he negotiated an agreement with Mr. Van den Berg of PEC that the
funds not paid over to CoJ would be paid
into the trust account of
PEC’s attorneys' account to the benefit of the body corporate
with the interest accruing to the
benefit of the body corporate,
until the finalisation of the dispute with the CoJ. This agreement
was confirmed in writing in an
email sent on 24 February 2014. Mr.
Paine explained that the parties agreed that once the dispute with
CoJ was resolved, the funds
would either be paid over to CoJ or
refunded to the body corporate. Should any fee be due to PEC this
would also be paid to them
by the body corporate from these funds.
[10]
I pause to reflect on
the content of the email dated 24 February 2014 and the ensuing
emails. The email dated 24 February 2014 reflects
that Mr. Paine
confirmed that the funds may be held by PEC’s attorney in
trust:
‘
as
long as they are held on behalf of the body corporate and not PEC.
Interest to accrue for body corporate benefit and released
to either
PEC or the body corporate, or pro rata, once both the body corporate
and PEC agree on the allocation of the funds in
writing.’
[11]
The list of emails
indicates that Mr. van den Berg of PEC replied to this email that the
transfer of the funds would take place
early in March 2014. He
confirmed again on 12 March 2014 that the payment to the attorney’s
trust account has been scheduled
for 21 March 2014. On 30 April 2014,
and only in answer to a further enquiry directed by Mr. Paine, Mr.
Van den Berg said payment
of the funds was postponed and would be
effected to the attorney’s trust account on 2 May 2014. On 5
May 2014, Mr. Van den
Berg emailed proof of payment of the funds to
the attorney’s trust account to Mr. Paine.
[12]
In a further email
dated 10 June 2014, directed to PEC, Mr. Paine informed PEC that a
decision had been taken to release PEC from
managing the utilities
for the body corporate. PEC was, among others, requested to arrange
the transfer of the funds held in PEC’s
attorneys’ trust
account to the body corporate’s account. The funds were not
transferred.
[13]
On 18 May 2015, Mr. Van
den Berg sent an email to Mr. Paine wherein he confirmed, among
others, that the funds were kept in trust
in favour of the body
corporate. Mr. Paine stated that it was never agreed that all the
funds would be taken by PEC as its fee
or for any other reason. An
impasse was reached between Mr. Paine and Mr. Van den Berg regarding
PEC’s alleged entitlement
to fees, and at this point, Mr. Paine
was unable to finally resolve the dispute between the body corporate
and the CoJ.
[14]
Mr. Jacobs, the
chairperson of the body corporate, was the plaintiff’s second
and final witness. He confirmed that the funds
in question were to be
held in trust in favour of the body corporate pending the resolution
of the dispute with the CoJ. Once the
dispute with CoJ was resolved,
the funds would be used to pay CoJ. A second reason for the
oral agreement was that PEC insisted
that its own account be paid.
Mr. Jacobs’ evidence was that the body corporate is not in
possession of an explanation of
PEC’s fee demand for work
allegedly performed by it and thus is not in a position to respond
thereto.
[15]
Mr. Jacobs was involved
in settling the dispute with the CoJ. In terms of the settlement
reached with CoJ, the body corporate received
a credit and was
ultimately indebted to the CoJ in the amount of R3 026 364.46.
[16]
The body corporate
informed PEC’s attorneys of record in a letter dated 4 December
2017 that it reached a final settlement
with CoJ and is now obliged
to pay CoJ. The settlement agreement with CoJ was, however, only
concluded in February 2018. Despite
requesting that the funds held in
trust be paid out to the body corporate to pay CoJ, no funds were
received. On the contrary,
PEC’s attorneys of record advised
the body corporate’s attorney that the funds would be released
to PEC if the body
corporate did not institute action against PEC
within 30 days. Since the parties were involved in substantial
without prejudice
discussions without the involvement of their
respective attorneys, the body corporate could not issue summons
within the stipulated
thirty days.
[17]
The body corporate was
not provided with sufficient information to calculate the accuracy of
what PEC claims it is entitled to for
its services, but disputes that
it could amount to R2 325 338.07. PEC collected R6 054 244.70 from
the body corporate’s tenant
and paid over R3 728 906.63 to the
CoJ. It retained 38% of the total amount claimed as remuneration for
its services.
[18]
The body corporate’s
witnesses were extensively cross-examined. The evidence rendered
during cross-examination did not differ
in material respect from the
evidence in chief set out in the affidavits. I find both Mr. Paine
and Mr. Jacobs reliable witnesses.
They did not exaggerate to bolster
the body corporate’s case but set out the facts they were privy
to in a clear manner.
They did not contradict themselves. Mr. Paine’s
evidence regarding the oral agreement concluded that led to the funds
being
paid into JJR Incorporated Attorney’s trust account is
substantiated by the trail of emails preceding and following the
payment
of the funds into trust.
Evidence presented by
the defendant
[19]
Mr. G van den Berg
testified on behalf of PEC. Mr. Van den Berg denies that he agreed
orally that the amount in trust would be paid
out to the body
corporate after successfully resolving the dispute with CoJ. He
claims that the funds were destined to be PEC’s
money in order
to compensate PEC for the services rendered on a project.
[20]
Mr. Van den Berg
incorporated the explanation he provided in the affidavit filed in
resisting summary judgment, in his evidence
in chief. In this
affidavit he disputes that an agreement was reached that the money
held in trust, together with accrued interest,
would be released to
the body corporate if the dispute with the CoJ was resolved.
[21]
He explained that the
remuneration PEC would be entitled to for managing the body
corporate’s utilities would come from what
is generally
referred to as ‘over recovery’. This amount is derived by
calculating the difference between, on the one
hand, the tariff for
electricity paid by consumers compared to the bulk service charges
which the local authority is entitled to
charge for such units
consumed.
[22]
Mr. Van den Berg said
what was envisaged by the agreement of February 2014 is that money
would be held in the trust account of PEC’s
attorneys pending
the determination of the dispute with CoJ. In the event that the
dispute was resolved against the body corporate,
the money would be
made available to pay the body corporate’s debt to the CoJ. If,
however the dispute was resolved in the
body corporate’s
favour, PEC is entitled to the money. Mr. Van den Berg avers the
dispute with CoJ was settled in favour
of the body corporate.
[23]
During
cross-examination Mr. Van den Berg claimed that CoJ’s claim
against the body corporate has prescribed, resulting in
PEC becoming
entitled to the money collected by it. The record reflects the
following in this regard:
‘
Mr.
Carstens: … Is it your version that you sat with this 2.3
million rand in your account, the claim of the council prescribed,
and therefore you were entitled to keep the 2.3?
Mr. Van den Berg:
After that period, yes.
Mr. Carstens: So that is
the … that is how you earned your fee?
Mr. Van den Berg:
That is what happened by default, because of the prescribed charges.’
[24]
When the body
corporate’s council put it to Mr. Van den Berg that his
evidence under cross-examination as to why PEC is entitled
to the
amount claimed differs fundamentally from his evidence in chief and
from the pleaded case. Mr. Van der Berg indicated that
he does not
think that there is a difference. It was put to him that he testified
that the basis of the remuneration, according
to his evidence in
chief, was the difference between two sets of tariffs. When asked to
explain how the fact that CoJ’s bylaws
determine that the claim
has expired entitles PEC to remuneration when the remuneration is
based on the different sets of tariffs,
he answered, ‘That is
just how we see it’.
[25]
Mr. van den Berg’s
evidence in chief, together with the evidence elicited under
cross-examination, indicates that PEC was
of the view that it was
entitled to the amount paid into their attorneys' trust account on
the following premises: In terms of
PEC’s service agreement
with the body corporate PEC collected the fees for electricity and
utilities from the respective
occupants and members of the body
corporate. The accounts were sent to the members of the body
corporate in accordance with the
fees normally charged to utility
users of the CoJ. Because electricity and utilities were delivered in
bulk to the body corporate,
CoJ charged a reduced bulk fee for
utilities and services to the body corporate. PEC was only obliged to
pay over this lesser bulk
fee to CoJ. Its remuneration or profit was
the difference between what it collected from the users and what it
paid over to CoJ.
The funds in question were paid into PEC’s
attorney’s trust account for purposes of indemnifying the body
corporate
for any backdate or debit from CoJ in respect of the period
for which PEC was contracted. However, the electricity bylaws of the
CoJ determine that the municipality is not entitled to correct or
debit electricity accounts after 38 months from the date on which
the
relevant issue with the account has been reported. Because CoJ’s
claim prescribed according to PEC, PEC was entitled
to the full
amount held in trust.
[26]
The evidence presented
by Mr. van den Berg that PEC was entitled to the impugned funds
because CoJ’s claim against the body
corporate prescribed is
fundamentally different from the pleaded case and his evidence in
chief.
Discussion
[27]
This action is not
rooted in the service agreement concluded between the parties in
2009. The services rendered by PEC to the body
corporate merely
constitute the backdrop to the dispute.
[28]
The relevant facts on
which the action is based are that the parties agreed in February
2014 that a certain amount would be paid
into the trust account of
JJR Incorporated Attorneys after a dispute arose between the body
corporate and CoJ regarding amounts
due to CoJ. Based on PEC’s
own evidence, this amount was paid to indemnify the body corporate
against any backdated claim
or debit that CoJ would invoice for the
period that PEC was contractually obliged to render the utility
collection service to the
body corporate. These funds were, however,
released to PEC, and PEC is said to retain the funds without any
legal basis to do so.
[29]
PEC’s counsel
submitted that the court has to determine whether the parties entered
into a valid oral agreement as claimed
in the particulars of claim. I
find that the evidence proves on a balance of probabilities that such
an agreement was concluded.
Mr. Paine’s evidence is supported
by emails exchanged between the parties before and after the funds
under consideration
were paid into JJR Incorporated Attorney’s
trust account.
[30]
PEC initially averred
that the legal basis for retaining the funds was that its
remuneration for services was based on the difference
between funds
collected from members of the body corporate and the body corporate’s
liability towards CoJ. PEC later claimed
it was entitled to keep the
funds because the CoJ’s claim to the funds had prescribed.
[31]
However, the body
corporate’s evidence is that the dispute with CoJ was resolved,
but that the body corporate remained liable
for the amount of R3 728
906.63, which it paid over to CoJ.
[32]
The arrangement reached
between Mr. Paine and Mr. Van der Berg is clear. An amount of R2 325
338.07 would be paid into an interest-bearing
trust account of an
attorney to the benefit of the body corporate. All interest would
accrue to the body corporate.
[33]
By specifically
consenting to the money being paid into trust to its benefit, the
body corporate did not renounce any claim to the
funds. The fact that
JJR Incorporated Attorneys is also representing PEC is of no
significance. What is significant is that the
parties agreed that the
money should be paid into trust for the body corporate’s
benefit. The only way in which PEC could
have secured a claim to the
funds in the absence of the matter being settled
inter
partes
would have
been to institute a claim against the body corporate successfully.
[34]
On PEC’s own
evidence, the money was held in trust to indemnify the body corporate
against backdated claims or debits from
the CoJ. In the event that
the dispute was resolved against the body corporate, the money would
be made available to pay the body
corporate’s debt to the CoJ.
The matter with CoJ was resolved, and the body corporate’s
account was significantly reduced.
A substantial amount, however,
remained payable and was indeed paid to CoJ.
[35]
In any event, PEC
failed to provide any evidence that the amount was calculated on the
basis of ‘over recovery’ as explained
in PEC’s
affidavit resisting summary judgment. There is a fundamental
difference between remuneration calculated on the difference
between
the tariff paid for electricity by consumers, compared to the bulk
service charges which the local authority is entitled
to charge for
such units consumed, and keeping payments made by consumers towards
claims that subsequently ‘expire’
or become prescribed.
Because the latter aspect of the expiry or prescription of the claim
was not pleaded, the body corporate
could not answer thereto, or
present any evidence in this regard.
[36]
The claim thus stands
to succeed. As for costs, the principle applies that costs follow
success. No case was made out for costs
to be granted on a punitive
scale. Having regard to the complexity of the matter, it is just that
costs be awarded on Scale B.
ORDER
In
the result, the following order is granted:
1.
The Defendant is to pay the amount of R2
325 338.07 together with interest on the aforesaid amount at a rate
of 10.25% per annum
from 2 May 2014 to date of payment to the
Plaintiff.
2.
The Defendant is to pay the costs of the
action, which costs are to be calculated on Scale B.
E
van der Schyff
Judge
of the High Court
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
For
the Plaintiff:
Adv. W.C. Carstens
Instructed
by:
Otto Krause Incorporated
For
the Defendant:
Adv. W.M. Dreyer
Instructed
by:
Jarvis Jacobs Raubenheimer Incorporated
Date
of the hearing:
10, 11 & 26 March 2025
Date
of judgment:
22 April 2025
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