Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 268South Africa
Resilient Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Legal Practitioners Fidelity Fund and Another (64872/2020; 54987/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 268 (20 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
20 March 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Resilient Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Legal Practitioners Fidelity Fund and Another (64872/2020; 54987/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 268 (20 March 2025)
Resilient Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Legal Practitioners Fidelity Fund and Another (64872/2020; 54987/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 268 (20 March 2025)
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sino date 20 March 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
Number:
64872/2020
54987/20201
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/NO
2025/03/20
In
the matters between:
RESILIENT
PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
FIRST APPLICANT
(Registration
Number: 2002/016890/07)
SNOWY
OWL PROPERTIES 300 (PTY) LTD
SECOND
APPLICANT
(Registration
Number: 2003/017970/07)
BRITS
X 98 HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION
THIRD
RESPONDENT
NPC
(Registration
number: 2008/009639/08)
AND
THE
LEGAL PRACTITIONERS FIDELITY FUND
FIRST
RESPONDENT
MADIBENG
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
BAQWA,
J
Introduction
[1] The
applicants herein seek a consolidation of two actions pending before
this court being case numbers 64872/2020
and 54987/2020.
[2]
Case 64872/2020 has been brought against the Legal Practitioners
Fidelity Fund (FF) for the recovery of R28 196
848.86
(Twenty-Eight Million One Hundred and Ninety-Six Thousand Eight
Hundred and Forty-Eight Rand and Eighty-Six Cents) which
was
entrusted by the applicants to the applicant’s former attorney,
Mr Gerard Jacques du Plessis (Du Plessis) for payment
to the Madibeng
Local Municipality (Madibeng) in respect of municipal charges and
which was stolen by Du Plessis.
[3]
Case number 54987/2020 was instituted by the applicants during 2020
against Madibeng also for the recovery
of stolen funds.
[4] The
consolidation application is opposed by Madibeng but it is supported
by the FF which has filed an affidavit
in support of consolidation.
The
Law
[5]
The purpose of consolidation actions in terms of rule 11 is to have
issues which are substantially similar
tried at a single hearing in
order to avoid the disadvantages attendant upon a multiplicity of
trials. In many cases joinder is
a form of consolidation and
consolidation a form of joinder.
Nel
v Silicon Smelter (Edms) Bpk.
[1]
[6]
The convenience of consolidation includes matters such as commonality
of parties and issues, limitation of
costs and the more efficient use
of court time and resources. It also serves to avoid the risk of
contradictory outcomes on a single
issue if the dispute were to be
determined in separate actions,
Kriel
No v Rockland Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd; Born Free Investments 247
(Pty) Ltd v Kriel
NO.
[2]
Applicant’s case
[7] The
claim against FF, case number 64872/2020 is based on section 26 of
the old Act and on Section 55 (1) of
the Legal Practice Act (the
Act) Act and the effect of these provisions is that the FF is liable
to reimburse persons who
suffer monetary loss as a result of theft of
money or property given in trust to an attorney or advocate or any
person employed
in that practice or supervised by that attorney or
advocate. Liability will however ensue if the plaintiff has exhausted
the possibility
of recovering the pecuniary loss from a party other
than the FF.
[8] The
issues for determination are whether the deposits into Du Plessis’s
account constitute an entrustment
in terms of section 26 and 55 of
the respective referenced legislation, the quantum of the claim and
the alleged failure on the
part of the plaintiffs to recover the
damages suffered from the other person liable for such recovery.
[9]
The
fund pleads in paragraph 22 of the plea “The monies stolen by
Du Plessis, were so stolen in collusion with an employee
of Madibeng
Municipality, Trevor Nkateko Mokhawana who was acting in the course
and scope of his employment with that municipality.”
The action under case
No 54987/2020
[10] The above
claim is instituted against Madibeng based on the allegation that
Mukhawana, in the course of his employment
with Madibeng with his
conferred authority was sufficiently linked to the fraudulent conduct
and his everyday scope of employment
to result in vicarious liability
of the Madibeng Municipality for the damages suffered as a result of
the fraudulent scheme.
The link between the
pending actions
[11] Section 79 of the
Act directs a plaintiff against the FF to first seek recovery of the
amount claimed from any other person
liable for such recovery.
Section 49 of the old Act contains a similar provision regarding the
exhaustion of all remedies at the
plaintiff’s disposal as a
precondition to recovery of damages from the FF.
[12] The applicants
therefor, by statutory prescript, have an obligation to first attempt
recovery of damages from third parties
that may also be liable with
the logical implication that the vicarious liability of Madibeng will
have to be canvassed in both
actions against FF and the action
against Madibeng.
[13] Consequently, should
the action not be consolidated, all of the evidence relevant to the
vicarious liability of Mukhwana would
have to be led separately in
both actions, and witnesses testify and be cross-examined twice on
the same issues with the resultant
inconvenience, wastage of
resources, unnecessary repetition of evidence, the possibility of
contradictory outcomes and duplication
of costs.
Proposed consolidated
particulars of claim
[14] A proposed
consolidated particulars of claim have been annexured by the
applicants in a format which first seeks judgment against
Madibeng in
the amount of R28 196 848.86. In the event of a court
finding Madibeng not liable, judgment is sought against
the FF being
the party liable for damages in terms of the Act, suffered as a
result of entrusted monies.
[15] As provided in the
Act the proposed particular of claim seek to ensure that the case
against the FF would proceed only after
the court has ruled out any
claim against Madibeng.
[16] It is the
respondent’s contention that if consolidation were to be
granted, the result would be a merger of two separate
trials into one
which would prolong a fairly confined claim against Madibeng and that
this would be the antithesis of what is contemplated
in Rule II of
the Uniform Rules of court and that such an outcome would constitute
the opposite of convenience.
[17]
A significant caveat has been issued by the Supreme Court of Appeal
regarding consolidation of cases in
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality vs Blair Atholl Homeowners
Association
[3]
to this effect. Careful thought should be given to a separation of
issues and that a full ventilation of all the issues is more
often
than not the better course which might ultimately prove expeditious.
This calls for a closer look at the point of origin
of the current
application.
[18] The applicants
lodged a claim with the FF on in February 2008 on the basis of its
erstwhile attorneys, Du Plessis, having stolen
money which had been
entrusted to him for payment of monthly rates and taxes to Madibeng.
[19]
The FF rejected
the applicant’s claim on 22 January 2020 “on the grounds
tha there was no entrustment as contemplated
for in section 26 of the
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979.”
[20] Further
correspondence was addressed to the applicant on 27 October 2020
which inter alia advise the applicants as follows:
20.1 Clients who had
entrusted funds stolen in accordance with section 26 of the Attorneys
Act enjoy protection by operations of
the statute.
20.2 Not all moneys are
covered by the fund’s mandate as set out in the Attorneys Act
and/or the
Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014
with prescribes the Legal
Practitioners Fidelity Funds powers and duties.
[21] The applicants
instituted a claim against the FF under case number 64872/2020 and
challenged the FF’s repudiation of
the claim in December 2020.
[22] The basis of their
claim was that in term of section 26 of the Attorney Act
alternatively section 55 of the Act the FF is liable
to reimburse
persons who have suffered monetary loss given in a trust to a trust
account practice in the course of the practice
of the attorney under
the circumstances defined in section 26 of the Attorney Act or
section 55 (1) of the Act respectively.
[23] In its plea the FF
stated that Du Plessis was merely a condui for payment of the first
and second applicants’ debt to
Madibeng and that as such, such
monies had not been entrusted as contemplated in section 26 of the
Attorneys Act.
The delay in applying
for consolidation
[24] An important factor
to be considered is the time it took for the applicants to reconsider
their approach to the litigation
against the FF and Madibeng. As
stated above the initial action was in 2008.
[25] It took them three
years after instituting two separate action to bring this
application. This was after all pre-trial processes
had been
followed.
[26]
It is however not just the delay in changing tact but more
importantly failure by the applicants to explain the belated change
of heart. The absence of an explanation militates against the
granting of the explanation.
International
Tobacco Company
South
Africa v United Tobacco Companies (South) Ltd.
[4]
[27]
Harms
[5]
confirms that a factor
that may count against a plaintiff is the fact that he chose to
institute separate proceedings. A change
of heart should be
explained.
Acknowledgement by the
applicant
[28]
Significantly the
applicants seem to acknowledge the absence of relevance of the
entrustment issues to Madibeng. In recognition
of this difficulty
they submit that “if the claims are consolidated, it will be in
all parties’ interests for a separation
of issues to be ordered
so that the court will be requested to rule on the liability of
Madibeng.”
[29] This in my view is
an important concession that there are material differences in the
two action proceedings. Further, the
suggestion of the possibility of
a separation after a consolidation contradicts the very basis of Rule
II of the Uniform Rules
of Court in that trial is extended and the
cost of the litigation is increased. This can hardly be said to
constitute convenience
for the parties have already taken steps to
ensure that the matters are trial ready.
Conclusion
[30]
In my view it cannot be argued in this application that there is
sufficient overlap between the entrustment issue and whether
or not
an employee had acted within the course and scope of his employments
at
Madibeng
Municipality.
[6]
See
Chhita v Ranchod.
[31] The respondent has
argued, and I accept that the two action proceedings do not concern
the determination of substantially the
same questions of law or fact,
one is a vicarious liability issue whilst the other is an
interpretation of statutes issue. The
facts and evidential material
required do not justify a consolidation of the actions.HhH
[32] Another important
consideration is that the two actions are ripe for hearing and that
whilst the applicants might be constrained
to excuse other claims
before proceeding against the FF, Madibeng is not under that
statutory constraint: what is convenient for
the applicants is not
necessarily convenient for Madibeng. The balance probabilities test
would therefore weigh against the granting
of the consolidation
application.
[33] In the result I make
the following order:
Order
The
application for consolidation of the two actions is dismissed and the
applicants are ordered to pay the respondent’s costs
on a party
and party scale jointly and severally the one paying the other to be
absolved.
SELBY BAQWA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing: 10 February 2025
Date
of judgment: 20 March 2025
Appearance
On
behalf of the Applicants
Adv M
Chaskalson SC
matthewchasklson@vmxenge.co.za
Instructed
by
Lood
Pretorius Erasmus Inc
behalf
of the Respondents
Adv L
Kutumela
lebogang@kutumela.com
Instructed
by
Gildenhuys
Malatji Inc
[1]
1981
(4) SA 792
(A) at 802.
[2]
unreported,
WCC case no 5417/2014, 9609/2014 and 12862/2019 dated 24 November
2021 at paragraph [22].
[3]
[
2019]
1 ALL 291 (SCA) para 2.
[4]
1953
(1) SA 241
at 243.
[5]
Civil
Procedure in the Superior Courts.
[6]
(
A5002/2022)
[2022] ZAGP JHC 1259 (15 December) para 57-58.
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