Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 370South Africa
Sookoo and Another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another (49048/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 370 (15 April 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
15 April 2025
Headnotes
the preservation order is only in respect of the tax liabilities identified in the application in terms of section 163(1) and not in respect of other unrelated tax liabilities.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Sookoo and Another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another (49048/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 370 (15 April 2025)
Sookoo and Another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another (49048/2021) [2025] ZAGPPHC 370 (15 April 2025)
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sino date 15 April 2025
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number:
49048/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE: 15 APRIL 2025
SIGNATURE: JANSE VAN
NIEUWENHUIZEN J
In
the matter between:
VISHEN
AQEEL SOOKOO
First
Applicant
SPIRIT
OF AFRICAN MARKET (PTY)
LTD
Second Applicant
and
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE
SERVICE
First
Respondent
JACQUES
VAN WYK
N.O.
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
JANSE
VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN J:
Preservation order
granted under section 163 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011
(“the Act”) – whether scope
of the preservation
order can extend beyond the original purpose for which it was
granted. Held that the preservation order is
only in respect of the
tax liabilities identified in the application in terms of section
163(1) and not in respect of other unrelated
tax liabilities.
Introduction
[1]
On 25 October 2021, Mabuse J issued a provisional preservation order
in accordance with the provisions
of section 163 of the Tax
Administration Act, 28 of 2011 (“the Act”) in respect of
the assets of the applicants. The
provisional order was confirmed on
16 January 2023.
[2]
The applicants contend that there is no longer a basis for the
preservation order to remain in
force and prays for a declaratory
order to this effect.
[3]
The second respondent, cited in his official capacity as the court
appointed curator to preserve
the assets of the applicants, does not
oppose the relief claimed herein.
Background
[4]
Pieter Willem Posthumus (“Posthumus”), employed by the
first respondent, the Commissioner
for the South African Revenue
Service, as an Executive responsible for Tactical Analysis and
Investigations: Criminal and Illicit
Economic Activities deposed to
the affidavit in support of the preservation application. For ease of
reference the first respondent
will be referred to as SARS.
[5]
The basis for obtaining the preservation order was explained in the
affidavit as follows:
“
7.
The preservation order is sought based on the on-going investigations
by the CIEA Division, which
focus on identifying and addressing
non-compliance with the tax Acts administered by the Commissioner.
The focus of the aforementioned
includes, inter alia, the tax
compliance of companies and persons who were contracted by the South
African Government departments
to supply Personal Protective
Equipment (“PPE”) in the fight against the Covid-19
pandemic.
45.
The Commissioner seeks to preserve the respondent’s assets in
order to secure collection of any
Value-Added Tax (‘VAT”
or “output tax”), Income Tax and/or any other taxes that
may be payable by the respondents
from the amounts, inter alia,
received by Khagiso Afrika in its First National bank account number
6[...] which was paid by the
South African Police Service (“SAPS”)
for the procurement of PPE through tender. Such amounts were
immediately transferred
by Khagiso Afrika to the respondents as it
will be detailed further below.
49.
The current investigations into the tax affairs of the respondents
are premised on the funds received
by Khagiso Afrika through a tender
for the procurement of PPEs which was awarded by the SAPS, ….
51.
As a result of the aforementioned tender, Khagiso Afrika received
payment from SAPS totalling an amount
of R 134 410 900, 00
but failed to charge and declare VAT and the gross income to SARS.
Instead, on receipt of these
amounts, Khagiso Afrika immediately
transferred sizeable amounts successively to other respondents who in
turn, failed to declare
and pay any attendant taxes from such
amounts.
52.
I am satisfied on reasonable grounds that there is a substantial
amount of tax that may be due and payable
by the respondents, in
excess of
R 85 989 667,
12
(“the probable tax liability
”).
Further that a preservation order is required in order to prevent the
realisable assets of the respondents or any other
person against whom
the probable tax liability may be collected,
from being disposed or removed, thereby frustrating the collection of
such tax.”
(own emphasis”)
[6]
An amount of R 11 130 000, 00 was paid by Khagiso into the
bank account of the second
applicant on 15 and 16 April 2020 and SARS
calculated the second applicant’s
probable tax liability
as follows:
Gross income received
(VAT inclusive)
R 11 130 000, 00
Gross Amount (Less VAT)
R 9 678 260,
87
Estimated VAT
prejudice
R 1 403 778, 13
Estimated Income Tax
prejudice
R 2 709 913, 04
Total
prejudice
R 4 113 691, 17
[7]
The citation of the first applicant as a respondent in the
application, is explained as follows:
”
XIII.
SPIRIT OF AFRICA
168.
Spirit of Africa’s sole director is Mr Sookoo and he was
appointed on 24 June 2020, the same day the
erstwhile director, Mr
Thabasum Mohammed (“Mr Mohammed”) resigned.
169.
As directors, both Mr Sookoo and Mr Mohammed had full access and
direct control of the Sprit of Africa’s
FNB account number
6[...].”
[8]
In conclusion, SARS summarised the basis for the application as
follows:
“
183.
Therefore, I submit that after Khagiso Afrika had transferred the
funds to other respondents the remaining balances in
its FNB account
are insufficient to meet its probable tax liability. Consequently, a
preservation order is required to prevent
any further dissipation of
funds by following up
and preserving
funds
received from Khagiso Afrika by other respondents.
184.
I am advised that the preservation of the funds paid out by Khagiso
Afrika, which are now in the possession
of other respondents,
constitute a ground for granting a preservation order.
185.
Furthermore, the respondents who received funds from Khagiso are
liable to be assessed for the non-declaration
of income and other tax
payable therefrom. ….
187.
It is not entirely known at this stage what the other respondents did
with the money received from Khagiso
Afrika and what further assets
they own. Therefore, upon granting of the preservation order and the
appointment of a curator bonis,
the curator bonis will be able to
investigate each respondent with a view of determining what further
assets the respondents own
and trace any funds that may have been
dissipated.”
(own emphasis)
Declaratory relief
Applicants’
case
[9]
The declaratory relief is based on two assessments performed by SARS.
The first assessment dated
30 June 2023, pertains to the income tax
liability of the second applicant for the period 2019 –
2021.The assessment determined
that the income tax payable for the
2020 tax period is R 2 605 226, 00 and for the 2021 tax
period R 3 635 717,
00. Penalties and interest were added
resulting in a total liability of R 6 282 438, 58.
[10]
The second assessment dated 18 July 2023, pertains to a VAT audit
performed on the second applicant’s
VAT submissions for the
period 04/2020 to 10/2021. In terms of the assessment, the VAT
payable for the period is R 624 957,
29. Once penalties and
interest were added, the total VAT liability amounts to R 1 539 906,
18.
[11]
The applicants contend that the assessment went beyond the scope for
which the preservation order was obtained.
According to the
applicants, the audit established that the second applicant did not
owe SARS any debt resulting from the April
2020 PPE transaction with
Khagiso. In the result, the basis on which the preservation order was
obtained has fallen away and the
applicants are entitled to the
declaratory relief.
[12]
Insofar as the indebtedness for the remaining period is concerned,
the second applicant disputes the totality
of the assessments made
and a dispute resolution process is underway.
Opposition by SARS
[13]
SARS does not deny that the second applicant does not owe any taxes
in respect of the Khagiso PPE transaction
but submitted that the
preservation order is still required to collect the substantial
amount of tax liability owed by the second
applicant based on the
assessments made by it. SARS, furthermore, stated that it has
commenced with audit investigations into the
tax affairs of the first
applicant, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he
too will owe income tax when SARS’s
audit has been completed.
Legal
framework and discussion
[14]
The question whether the scope of a preservation order is confined to
the purpose for which it was sought
forms the crux of the dispute
between the parties.
[15]
The parties agreed that the question could only be answered by
interpreting section 163 of the Act that provides
for a preservation
of assets order.
[16]
Prior to considering the section, it is apposite to have regard to
the principles applicable to the interpretation
of statutes as
outlined in
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni
Municipality
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) at par [18]:
“
Interpretation
is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument,
or
contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document
as a
whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence.
Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must
be given to
the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and
syntax; the context in which the provision appears;
the apparent
purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those
responsible for its production. Where more than one
meaning is
possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these
factors.
15
The process is objective not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be
preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike
results
or undermines the apparent purpose of the document.”
[17]
Section 163(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“
(1)
A senior SARS official may, in order to prevent any realisable assets
from being disposed of or removed
which may frustrate the collection
of the full amount of tax that is due or payable or the official on
reasonable grounds is satisfied
may be due or payable, authorise an
ex parte application to the High Court for an order for the
preservation of any assets of a
taxpayer or other person prohibiting
any person, subject to the conditions and exceptions as may be
specified in the preservation
order, from dealing in any manner with
the assets to which the order relates.”
[18]
The section envisages two grounds on which an application for a
preservation order may be sought:
18.1
firstly, when the full amount of tax is due and payable, which
entails that the amount is known when the
application is brought; and
18.2
secondly, when an official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that
the full amount of a tax liability may
become due and payable.
[19]
From the facts it is clear that SARS relied on the second ground when
it applied for the preservation order.
The PPE award made by SAPS to
Khagiso constituted the reasonable ground on which the application
was launched. This much
was confirmed by Posthumus in the
answering affidavit filed on behalf of SARS, to wit:
“
7.
The preservation application was made pursuant to preliminary
investigations conducted by the Commissioner
into the tax compliance
of the respondents in the preservation order. These respondents were
involved in questionable awards made
by the South African Police
Service (“SAPS”) to Khagiso as a part of the procurement
of Personal Protective Clothing
(‘PPE’s”), during
the National Disaster caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.”
[20]
Subsequent to the investigation by SARS, it became clear that the
second applicant did not have a tax liability
in respect of the
Khagiso transaction. The ground for obtaining the preservation order,
therefore, seized to exist.
[21] In
the aforesaid circumstances, section 163(10)(b) provides that a
preservation order will no longer be in
force and effect if the
assets subject to the preservation order are no longer required for
the purpose of the satisfaction of
“
the tax debt”.
[22]
Having regard to the section as a whole, it appears that “
the
tax debt”
referred to in section 163(10)(b) is the tax
amount that was due and payable or on reasonable grounds may become
due and payable
as envisaged in subsection (1). Subsection (3) lends
support to the aforesaid interpretation; in that it states that “
a
preservation order may be made if required to secure the collection
of
the tax referred to in subsection (1).
”
(own emphasis”).
[23] Mr
Sigogo SC, counsel for SARS, did not agree. Mr Sigogo relied on the
definition of a “
tax debt”
in the Act, to wit “
an
amount referred to in section 169(1).”
Section 169(1) in
turn provides that “
an amount of tax due and payable in
terms of a tax Act is a tax debt due to SARS for the benefit of the
National Revenue Fund.”
[24] Mr
Sigogo submitted that the tax due and payable by the second applicant
is a “
tax debt”
that falls within the ambit of
section 163(10)(b). According to Mr Sigogo, the fact that the tax
debt was not the subject matter
of the preservation order is of no
consequence. As long as a taxpayer is indebted to SARS, a “
tax
debt”
exists and the preservation order remains intact.
[25] In
order to determine the context in which a “
tax debt”
is defined in the Act, it is apposite to have regard to the
structure of the act. Section 169 that defines a “
tax debt”
is contained in Chapter 11 which regulates the recovery of tax in
general.
[26]
Section 163 is contained in Chapter 10 which regulates the payment of
tax and only applies in defined circumstances.
In order to invoke the
provisions of the section, SARS needs to meet the requirements
contained in section 163. The purpose of
section 163 is manifestly
confined to these requirements.
[27] In
the aforesaid context, a “
tax debt”
for purposes
of section 163, must be interpreted within the confines of the
section.
[28] In
casu
the preservation order was obtained at the behest of the
Tactical Analysis and Investigations: Criminal and Illicit Economic
Activities
section of SARS. The “
criminal and illicit
economic activity”
that formed the subject matter of the
investigation was, on the version of Posthumus: “
the
questionable awards made by the South African Police Service (“SAPS”)
to Khagiso as a part of the procurement of
Personal Protective
Clothing (‘PPE’s”), during the National Disaster
caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.”
[29]
The application was not based on the payment of tax liabilities that
falls outside the scope for which the preservation
order was
obtained. Chapter 11 is appliable to the recovery of tax and should
be utilised to recover any tax liability that
does not fall
within the scope of the investigation for which the preservation
order was obtained.
[30]
Should SARS be of the view that the present tax debt of the second
applicant or the probable tax debt of
the first respondent meets the
requirements of a preservation order, SARS is at liberty to apply for
such an order. It is, however,
inconceivable that a preservation
order that was obtained for a specific purpose will be in force
ad
infinitum
and may be utilised by SARS for any future tax debt
that may become due and payable.
[31] In
the result, I am satisfied that the applicants are entitled to a
declarator on terms prayed for in the
notice of motion and to a cost
order as prayed for.
ORDER
The following order is
granted:
1.
It is declared that the preservation order
issued on 16 January 2023
is no longer in force in relation to the assets of the applicants.
2.
The first respondent is ordered to pay the
costs of the application
including the costs of counsel on scale C.
N. JANSE VAN
NIEUWENHUIZEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE
HEARD:
25 February 2025
DATE
DELIVERED:
15
April 2025
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the Applicants:
Mastenbroek
Instructed
by:
Ulrich
Roux Attorneys
For
the First Respondent:
Sigogo
SC (with him Kapila)
Instructed
by:
Majang
Inc
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