Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 531South Africa
Sibiya v S (A121/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 531 (23 May 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Sibiya v S (A121/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 531 (23 May 2025)
Sibiya v S (A121/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 531 (23 May 2025)
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sino date 23 May 2025
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
Number: A121/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
DATE:
23 May 2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
MANDLA
DUNKU
SIBIYA
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to
the
parties/their legal representatives by e-mail and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on Caselines. The date
for
hand-down is deemed to be ___ May 2025.
JUDGMENT
MOKADIKOA
– CHAUKE, AJ
Introduction
[1]
The appellant was charged in the Regional
Court sitting in Tsakane with one count of rape of a
seventeen-year-old girl. The appellant
was further charged with a
second count of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The
appellant was informed that the
provisions of
section 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
were applicable on count 1, in
that the rape was committed after he assaulted the complainant with a
pot.
[2]
The appellant was legally represented
during the trial.
[3]
The appellant was, on 14 November 2023,
convicted of rape in contravention of
section 3
of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) 32 of 2007 (Count
1) and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm (Count 2).
[4]
On 26 March 2024, he was sentenced to life
imprisonment in respect of count 1, and 12 months imprisonment in
respect of count 2.
Counts 1 and 2 were ordered to run concurrently
in terms of
section 280(2)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
[5]
The appellant has an automatic right of
appeal because of the sentence of life imprisonment that was imposed.
[6]
The appellant has approached this Court on
appeal against both conviction and sentence.
Testimony by the
complainant
[7]
The complainant, R[...] P[...] S[...],
testified that on 16 March 2019, she was home alone after her mother
and her friend had left.
The appellant opened the door and asked her
why the door was not locked as someone can come in and rape her. He
ordered her to
lock the door. Whilst she was trying to close the
door, the appellant pushed the door and the complainant fell on the
bed. The
complainant was frightened and she screamed. The appellant
told her that she was making noise, and he took a pot that was on the
floor and hit her with it on her face. The appellant removed her
swimming costume, which she was wearing, with force, and removed
his
pants. The complainant tried to resist, but the appellant was
stronger than her and he came between the complainant’s
thighs, forcefully kissed her and then inserted his penis inside her
vagina, thus raping her.
[8]
After the appellant raped her, the complainant and the
appellant got dressed and the appellant left the house. The
complainant also
left the house and ran to her friend’s house,
where she reported what had happened to her friend’s mother.
The friend’s
mother phoned the complainant’s mother and
when she arrived, the complainant also reported to her that the
appellant had
raped her. The police were called and when they
arrived, she was taken to a medical practitioner who examined her.
The complainant
sustained an injury on her lip as a result of the
assault with the pot.
Testimony by Ms L[...]
(witness)
[9]
S[...] J[...] L[...] (“Ms L[...]”)
testified that she knows the complainant. The complainant and her
daughter are friends.
During the evening of 16 March 2019, she heard
someone crying outside. She went out of the house and found the
complainant. She
asked the complainant what was wrong, and the
complainant told her that Dunku (referring to the appellant), had
raped her. The
complainant was pointing at a man that was running
away. Ms L[...] called her brother and asked him to run after the man
and bring
him back, but her brother was not able to catch up with the
man who was pointed out by the complainant. She blew a whistle to
call
members of the community. She called the complainant’s
mother, and the police were also called.
The State presented
the following evidence in support of its case:
[10]
The State handed in a J88 report by a
medical officer in terms of
section 220
of the
Criminal Procedure
Act, as
well as, a Forensic DNA report, as exhibits B and C
respectively. The legal representative of the appellant confirmed the
correctness
of both these reports; they were not in dispute. The two
reports captured the following:
10.1
The J88 report, which is a gynaecological examination report,
reflected the following conclusion: “physical
injuries are
consistent with the history of physical assault”.
10.2
The Forensic DNA Report, which is the results of the semen specimen
that was found on the complainant: The
complainant’s panty was
taken for DNA testing, where a semen specimen was found and tested in
comparison with the appellant’s
semen. The DNA result of the
semen specimen that was on the complainant’s panty was found to
match the DNA of the appellant’s
semen. There was a complete
match on the two samples.
Thereafter, the State
closed its case. The defence commenced with its case and the
appellant testified in his defence. The Pre-sentencing
Report and
Victim Impact Report were, also handed in by consent.
Testimony in defence
by appellant
[11]
The appellant, Mandla Dunku Sibiya,
testified that on 16 December 2015, he met the complainant and he
proposed love to her. On 16
March 2019, the complainant invited him
to visit her later, which he did. The appellant testified that he
arrived at the complainant’s
home and they started talking. The
complainant told him that her mother was not around and that he
should relax. He massaged
her and they both enjoyed themselves.
The appellant asked the complainant if she had condoms, and she said
she did not. The appellant
became angry and hit the complainant with
a pan on her cheek, but the complainant calmed him down. He left the
complainant’s
house and she walked with him for a short while
and then turned back. The appellant could not give reasons why he
attacked the
complainant with the pan. The appellant further denied
that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant.
After consideration of
the evidence of all the witnesses, the Court a quo decided against
the appellant and sentenced him to life
imprisonment.
Ad Conviction
[12]
On appeal, the appellant raised the following grounds:
a.
The complainant was not a reliable witness;
b.
The State failed to prove their case against the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt;
c.
The version of the appellant is reasonably possibly true.
In
oral argument, the appellant’s counsel submitted that whatever
could be said in favour of the appellant was contained in
the heads
of argument. As far as the conviction of rape was concerned, he could
not fathom the appellant’s version that he
did not have sexual
intercourse with the complainant whilst the Forensic DNA Report was
admitted as correct.
[13]
The Forensic DNA Report puts to bed the
appellant’s appeal. The report is proof beyond reasonable doubt
that the appellant
raped the complainant. Besides the bare denial,
the appellant could not provide any explanation as to how his semen
ended up on
the complainant’s panties, if, as he alleges, he
did not have sexual intercourse with her. There is, therefore, no
need for
this Court to go into the evidence. Besides, the Court a quo
made credibility findings in relation to all the State’s
witnesses.
It found the witnesses to be credible, reliable, and
truthful, and cannot be faulted in that regard. The Court
a
quo was correct in its guilty finding
on the charge of rape.
Ad Sentence
[14]
In trying to convince the court to temper
with the sentence imposed by the Court a quo, counsel for the
appellant orally argued
that the fact that the complainant suffered
only the injury to her lip, which was caused by the pan that the
appellant used to
hit her, should count in the appellant’s
favour as no excessive force was used during the commission of the
offence. The
appellant’s counsel, however, ended up conceding
that the trauma that the complainant suffered as a result of the rape
should
count as injury suffered by the complainant. Counsel could not
take the argument any further and requested the court to consider
the
argument raised in the appellant’s heads of argument.
[15]
Relying
on the judgment in
S
v Vilakazi,
[1]
where it was found that:
‘’
It
is clear from the terms in which the test was framed in
Malgas
and endorsed in
Dodo
that it is incumbent upon a court in every case, before it imposes a
prescribed sentence, to assess, upon a consideration of all
circumstances of the particular case, whether the prescribed sentence
is indeed proportionate to the particular offence’’
it was argued on behalf
of the appellant, in the heads of argument, that the sentence of life
imprisonment is shocking and inappropriate.
The argument was further
that the sentence, in the circumstances of this case, is out of
proportion with the facts of the case
and that the Court a quo
clearly over emphasized the interests of the complainant and that of
the community.
[16]
The
Court was, furthermore, referred to the judgment in
S
v GN
[2]
whereat
Du Plessis J, held as follows
‘’
In
S v Malgas
(par
25) Marais JA pointed out that
s 51
of the Act ‘has limited but
not eliminated the courts’ discretion in imposing sentence’.
It follows that, where
the Act prescribes a minimum sentence, the
courts must still seek to differentiate between sentences in
accordance with the dictates
of justice.’’
[17]
The State, in turn, argued that the
sentence is appropriate and should not be reconsidered.
[18]
Sentencing
is a matter pre-eminently for the discretion of the Court a quo. The
court hearing the appeal should be careful not to
erode that
discretion and would be justified to interfere only if the trial
court’s discretion was not judicially and properly
exercised,
which would be the case if the sentence imposed is vitiated by
irregularity or misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate.
[3]
[19]
A
sentence of life imprisonment is prescribed for rape where the victim
is assaulted with the intention to do grievous bodily harm,
and it
can only be deviated from if the court finds substantial and
compelling circumstances warranting the imposition of a lesser
sentence.
[4]
[20]
The Court a quo, correctly, found no
substantial and compelling circumstances that would have compelled it
to deviate from the prescribed
minimum sentence. It found so, having
taken the appellant’s personal circumstances into account as
against the gravity of
the offence and the interests of society. The
appellant’s personal circumstances were overwhelmed by the
other factors.
[21]
It is trite, violence against women and
children is prevalent in this country. The offence of rape is, also,
grievous in nature
and is aggravated by the fact that the
complainant, in this instance, was raped inside the sanctity of her
own home where she was
supposed to feel most safe and protected. She
was traumatised. In the Victim Impact Report, the complainant states:
“after
I have been raped, I changed a lot because I felt like I
lost purpose of living, what’s worse I have lost my dignity
after
the rape.’’ This profoundly indicates the trauma
that the complainant continues to suffer.
[22]
In
S
v Kearns
,
[5]
it was held:
“
A
rapist not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal
integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological harm in
the
process. Rape is not merely a physical assault; it is often
destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer
destroys the physical of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul
of the helpless female. The physical scar may heal, but the
mental
scar will always remain. When a woman is ravished, what is not merely
physical injury, but the deep sense of some deathless
shame. It is a
violation with violence of the private person of a woman. This
constitutes an outrage by all means. By the very
nature of the
offence, it is an obnoxious act of the highest order.’’
[23]
The
appellant is, in addition, not a first time offender. He was
convicted of malicious injury to property in 2013, which involved
an
element of violence. This is indicative of his character. In
S
v Malgas,
[6]
it
was held that
“
the
specified sentences were not to be departed from lightly and for
flimsy reasons which could not withstand scrutiny. Speculative
hypotheses favourable to the offender, maudlin sympathy, aversion to
imprisoning first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy
of
the policy implicit in the amending legislation, and like
considerations were equally obviously not intended to qualify as
substantial and compelling circumstances.”
[24]
In our view, the arguments raised by
counsel for the appellant on sentence are unmeritorious, and we find
no material misdirection
on the finding of the Court a quo on
the sentence imposed. It is in line with a proper exercise of
judicial discretion
on any sentencing court in the position of the
Court a quo.
[25]
The sentence imposed by the Court a quo is
appropriate under the circumstances.
[26]
Consequently, I propose the following
order:
1.
The appeal is dismissed.
2.
The conviction and sentence on count 1 is
confirmed.
3.
The conviction and sentence on count 2 is confirmed.
4.
The appellant’s name is to be put in a
registrar of sexual offenders.
M MOKADIKOA-CHAUKE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
I agree and it is so
ordered
E M KUBUSHI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Date
of hearing: 05 March 2025
Date
of Judgment: ___ May 2025
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant:
Adv L Augustyn
Instructed by:
Legal Aid
For the Respondent:
Adv Masekoameng
Instructed
by
Director of Public
Prosecutions
[1]
2009
(1) SACR 552
(SCA)
at
par 15.
[2]
2010
(1) SACR 93
(T) at para 12.
See
also
S
v Mahomotsa
2002 (2) SACR 435
(SCA) and
S
v Nkomo
2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA).
[3]
S v
Rabie
1975 (4) SA 855 (A).
[4]
Section
51
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
.
[5]
2009
(2) SACR 684
(GSJ) at para 15.
[6]
2001
(1) SACR 469
(SCA) at para 9
d
- e
.
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