Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 582South Africa
Dragon Chrome BF (Pty) Ltd and Others v Kietzmann (2025-074447) [2025] ZAGPPHC 582 (9 June 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
9 June 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Dragon Chrome BF (Pty) Ltd and Others v Kietzmann (2025-074447) [2025] ZAGPPHC 582 (9 June 2025)
Dragon Chrome BF (Pty) Ltd and Others v Kietzmann (2025-074447) [2025] ZAGPPHC 582 (9 June 2025)
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sino date 9 June 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
Number: 2025-074447
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE
2025-06-09
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
DRAGON
CHROME BF (PTY) LTD
[REG.
NR.:
2024/774409/07]
1
st
Applicant
JOOST
SMUTS
[ID
7[...]]
2
nd
Applicant
GINTER
SMUTS
[ID
9[...]]
3
rd
Applicant
FERGUS
DERWIN
[ID
6[...]]
4
th
Applicant
and
PAUL
KIETZMANN
Respondent
This
judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to
the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for
handing down is deemed to be 9 June 2025.
JUDGMENT
POTTERILL
J
Background
[1]
Dragon Chrome BF (Pty) Ltd’s [Dragon Chrome] sole business is
the beneficiation of chrome
tailings through washing and processing
to extract chrome concentrate for sale to third parties. It is
common cause that
Dragon Chrome’s business is solely conducted
from Portion 1[…] of the Farm B[…] 4[…] J2 North
West Province
[the site]. It is further common cause that the
site is registered in the name of Chrome Capital. Furthermore
it is
not disputed that for Dragon Chrome to perform its duties it
had employees, utilised the services of a sub-contractor and a
security
firm. Dragon Chrome is a vehicle for a partnership in
the form of a joint venture between three shareholders, F12 and
Liminico.
The respondent in this matter, of which Mr Kietzmann
[Kietzmann] is the sole director of Chrome Capital (Pty) Ltd [Chrome
Capital]
is the third shareholder holding 40% shareholding in Dragon
Chrome.
[2]
The relationship between the parties is regulated by a contract and
inter alia
provides that possession and control of the site
was given to Dragon Chrome to run the plant on site. It is
common cause that
it conducted operations on site six days a week for
24 hours per day.
[3]
On 25 April 2025 Chrome Capital brought an urgent application before
the Johannesburg High Court
interdicting Dragon Chrome and the other
respondents in the application from:
3.1
Interfering with or denying access to Chrome Capital, its directors,
employees and/or contractors;
3.2
Selling, disposing of or alienating and/or encumbering any of the
chrome ore, tailings, plant equipment,
infrastructure and/or movable
assets;
3.3
Conducting any business operations on the site;
3.4
Excluding an/or removing Sentinal Security (Pty) Ltd from the site.
In
addition an order was sought against the four applicants
in casu
in the following terms:
(1)
Immediately restoring Chrome Capital’s
physical possession of
the site;
(2)
Providing full and complete accounting
to Chrome Capital;
(3)
Declaring that any chrome sales, asset
removals and/or operational
decisions without the consent of Chrome Capital or without a
unanimous written resolution, are lawful
and of no force or effect;
(4)
To restore Chrome Capital’s possession
of certain assets.
[4]
By agreement the urgent application was referred to arbitration
before retired Judge Harms scheduled
to be heard on 20 June 2025.
[5]
On 22 May 2025 Kietzmann arrived on site with interim protection
orders. These orders were
issued against Joost Smuts, Ginter
Smuts and Fergus Derwin of Dragon Chrome in terms of the Harassment
Act 17 of 2011 [the Act].
This resulted in Mr Derwin to be
removed from the site, as well as the Fidelity Services, and all the
employees of Dragon Chrome.
Moreover, Dragon Chrome’s
sub-contractor was removed from the site. On behalf of the
applicants it was surmised that
due to this action Dragon Chrome’s
possession of the site was completely terminated.
[6]
On behalf of the applicant it was argued that despite the restricted
content of the Harassment
Orders issued by the Magistrate Dragon
Chrome’s possession of the site was completely terminated.
These orders were
given without notice to the three individuals and
no reasons in the application to the Magistrate set out why the
giving of notice
would impede the application. The applicants
are vindicating their right to be heard by seeking the suspension of
the orders.
An application to anticipate was placed on the
roll, but was postponed because the Magistrate would not attend to
Court due to
a personal crisis. On that date the matter will
again be postponed, if opposed, not affording them substantial
redress.
The matter is thus urgent as Dragon Chrome cannot
conduct business. If the matter is heard in the ordinary Court
then it
would lead to the demise of Dragon Chrome.
[7]
It was further argued by the applicant that the dispute in the
arbitration revolves around all
these issues and the obtaining of the
interim interdict was an abuse of process. The interim
interdict did not cater for
the employees, the security firm or the
sub-contractor and thus they were unlawfully spoliated of their
undisturbed possession.
[8]
On behalf of the respondent, Mr Paul Kietzmann, an answering
affidavit of over 150 pages was filed
regurgitating the same facts
over and over. This is frowned upon by this Court. Most
of it relates to the merits to
be decided by the arbitrator.
[9]
In a nutshell the respondent’s argument is that a mandament of
spolie is not inherently
urgent, especially where the two
requirements of the mandament of spolie has not been proven.
The dispossession was in terms
of lawful orders and therefore the
application must fail. Furthermore, the applicants were not in
undisturbed possession
because they were the initial spoliators.
The applicant as spoliators cannot be heard to shout “spoliation”.
Furthermore, the applicants have not quantified any averred losses by
not being able to proceed with their business. In any
event,
the applicant have invoked the remedies availed to them by service a
notice in terms of section 3(5) of the Act when they
anticipated the
return date for the interim order on 24 hours’ notice.
This set-down for 4 June 2025.
Decision
on urgency
[10]
I am satisfied that the matter is urgent. Despite the urgent
application by agreement being referred
to arbitration the respondent
sought to restrain and effectively dispossess the applicants before
this arbitration was heard.
This is frowned upon by this
Court. Although this Court is not to determine the unlawfulness
of the interim order it is clear
that at least two of the averments
made to the Magistrate were untruths. I also accept that the
applicants will not obtain
substantial redress in due course because
I can accept the submissions from senior counsel that the
anticipation order will only
be dealt with at the earliest in August
2025. This can be accepted as it was conveyed to him from the
Magistrates Court where
the matter was postponed to be on the
postponed date postponed further.
[11]
The fact that the applicants were in
de facto
possession
before the spoliation is clear. The possession need not be
exclusive possession as the applicants had control of
the site.
[12]
Pertaining to the second requirement, the deprivation of possession,
the orders obtained did not deprive
the employees, the sub-contractor
or the security firm from entering the premises. The respondent
has thus unlawfully despoiled
the applicants of control over the
site. As to the defence of counter-spoliation, this defence is
rejected because the “counter-spoliation”
of the
respondent was not effected instanter and did not form part of the
res
gestae
of that occasion.
[1]
[13]
I am satisfied that the applicants have proved the facts necessary to
justify a final order. I am thus
satisfied to suspend the
interim order pending the final determination thereof. In view
thereof all the applicants are successful
and the site’s
possession must be restored to the applicants. The suspension
follows as a natural result of the success
of the mandament of
spolie.
[14]
As for costs I am satisfied that there is no reason to not follow the
ordinary rule the costs should follow
the result. I am also
satisfied that the conduct of the respondent, while agreeing to
arbitration, to institute proceedings
in the Magistrates Court
without notice to the applicants was
mala fide
. The
conduct in filing an excessive opposing affidavit further renders a
punitive costs order reasonable.
[15]
The following order is made:
15.1
Kietzmann (the respondent) is ordered to restore the Dragon Chrome’s
possession of the site and premises
known as Portion 1[…] of
the Farm B[…] 4[…] JQ, North West Province, that
includes allowing Dragon Chrome
to deploy its security company
Fidelity Security;
15.2
The implementation and execution of the interim protection orders
dated 16 May 2025 (under case numbers HA-770/2025,
HA-767/2025 and
HA-769/2025) is suspended pending the outcome of the hearing, as
provided for in section 9(2) of the Protection
from Harassment Act,
17 of 2011;
15.3
Kietzmann (the respondent) is ordered to pay the applicants’
costs, including the costs of two counsel,
on an attorney and client
scale.
S.
POTTERILL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE NO:
2025-074447
HEARD ON:
4 June 2025
FOR THE APPLICANTS:
ADV. A.P.J. ELS SC
ADV. D.D. SWART
INSTRUCTED BY:
Heymans & Co
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
ADV. R. BLUMENTHAL
INSTRUCTED BY:
Witz Incorporated
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
9 June 2025
[1]
Mthimkulu
and Another v Mahomed and Others
2011
(6) SA 147
(GSJ) at 150D
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