Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 760South Africa
Palm Chrome (Pty) Ltd v 2 Glowing Sunset Trading 56 CC and Others (2023-080001) [2023] ZAGPPHC 760 (28 August 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
28 August 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Palm Chrome (Pty) Ltd v 2 Glowing Sunset Trading 56 CC and Others (2023-080001) [2023] ZAGPPHC 760 (28 August 2023)
Palm Chrome (Pty) Ltd v 2 Glowing Sunset Trading 56 CC and Others (2023-080001) [2023] ZAGPPHC 760 (28 August 2023)
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sino date 28 August 2023
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2023-080001
(1)
REPORTABLE: Yes
☐
/ No
☒
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes
☐
/
No
☒
(3)
REVISED: Yes
☐
/ No
☒
Date: 28
August 2023
WJ du Plessis
In
the matter between:
PALM
CHROME (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
and
2
GLOWING SUNSET TRADING 56 CC
FIRST
RESPONDENT
MAGEDELIE
MALATJI CHENGETA
SECOND
RESPONDENT
ALL
UNLAWFUL ENTRANTS AND/OR POSSESSORS AND/OR OCCUPIERS OF THE MINING
PROPERTY CONSISTING OF PORTIONS 2,3,4 AND 5 AND A PERTION
OF
PORTION 6 OF THE FARM PALMIETFONTEINT 208 REGISTRATION DIVISION
JP, NORTHWEST PROVICE
THIRD
RESPONDENT
GODFATHER
SECURITY AND CLEANING PTY LTD
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
BENNITO
MOTITSWE
FIFTHE
RESPONDENT
THE
MINISTER OF POLIC
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
THE
STATION COMMANDER FOR SAPS, SUN CITY
SEVENT
RESPONDENT
MINISTER:
DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY
EIGHT
RESPONDENT
DEPARTMENT
OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
NINTH
RESPONDENT
BAPOLOMITI
COMMUNAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION
TENTH
RESPONDENT
MINISTER:
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
ELEVENTH
RESPONDENT
BATHLALERWA
TRADITION COUNCIL
TWELTH
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS AJ
[1]
This is an urgent application that,
firstly, a declarator be issued in terms of which it is declared that
the Applicant is not a
party to, and bound by, an agreement between
the Twelfth Respondent and the First Respondent, secondly that the
First Respondent
does not have a right to mine, followed by orders
evicting First to Fourth Respondents from the mining area, and
interdicting them,
in short, from returning and interfering with
mining activities.
[2]
The Applicant is the holder of a mining
permit and a prospecting right in respect of the mining area in
question. None of the respondents
hold a mining right, mining permit
or prospecting right in respect of the mining area. However, the
First and Second respondents
aver that the First Respondent has a
right to mine and prospect for chrome in the mining area because of
the purported agreement
signed by the Second and the Fifth
Respondent, purportedly on behalf of the Twelth Respondent trading as
the Applicant (Palm Chrome
Pty Ltd), on 12 August 2022.
[3]
The First Respondent, represented by the
Second Respondent, states that it has acquired this right to mine for
chrome in the area
by
agreement
with the
Applicant (as explained in the previous paragraph), who is the lawful
holder of a mining permit and prospecting right in
respect of the
mining area. The Applicant disagrees and, in this application, seeks
a declaratory order that it is not a party
to this contract and is
not bound by the terms of the agreement.
[4]
Should the court find in favour of the
Applicant that it was not a party to this agreement and is therefore
not bound by it, the
respondents have no right to mine all prospect
in the mining area. However, if the court were not to grant a
declaratory order,
then the Applicant states the agreement upon which
the First Respondent wants to rely cannot give it the right to mine
or prospect
for chrome in the mining area. This is because the
agreement does not provide the First Respondent the right to mine but
merely
is a framework agreement for future endeavours.
[5]
The Applicant states that the relief it
seeks aims to protect its lawful right to mine and prospect on the
mining property. They
say the right is not in dispute. They have a
mining permit that will be up for renewal on 27 September 2023. Thus,
to protect this
right to mine and continue mining operations, the
application is urgent. They argue they cannot obtain substantial
redress in the
motion court in the ordinary course as the application
would not be adjudicated before 27 September 2023.
[6]
They set out the facts from which this
particular matter arises but also speak to the urgency as follows:
Firstly, members of the
Fourth Respondent armed with machine guns
maintain a presence in the mining area to protect the First, Second
and Third Respondents
whom it says are engaged in illegal mining.
These armed personnel of the Fourth Respondent preclude the Applicant
from entering
the mining area. Furthermore, while the First, Second
and Third Respondents continued to mine chrome on the mining
property, or
at least while there is a reasonable apprehension that
they would do so, the Applicant loses approximately R1,000,000 daily.
[7]
The
First and Second respondents disagree that this matter is urgent.
They say so for the following reasons: that the deponent of
the
affidavit for the Applicant has known of the existence of the
disputed agreement since November 2022. Since then, the Applicant
has
been aware of the ongoing clashes at the site between the parties and
security. The conflict over who is entitled to mine has
been
long-standing. The Applicant has disputed the First Respondent's
mandate to mine since late 2022. They state "how exactly
a
declaratory order as regards to the disputed agreement has suddenly
required the intervention of the urgent court to the degree
claimed
(at all) is a mystery".
[1]
[8]
Furthermore, the First Respondent launched
a successful spoliation application on 22 March 2023. The order was
handed down on 6
April 2023. They state that since the legal question
centred on a factual dispute about the agreement's validity, one
would have
expected the Applicant to issue summons to seek a
declarative that the contract is void or to launch an application for
interim
relief. The Applicant did not do any of these things and did
nothing for approximately seven months when it enrolled the previous
application in this matter as a matter of urgency. They state that
there is no explanation on the Applicant's papers now before
the
court as to why it did nothing over the long periods.
[9]
The First and Second respondents claim that
this application is a gross abuse of the court process for the
following reasons: a
judgement is yet awaited in the previous
application, there are various disputes of fact, and it is
accompanied by an extreme degree
of urgency. They seek dismissal,
alternatively, a striking-off and a punitive order of costs.
# Ad urgency
Ad urgency
[10]
Rule 6(12)(b) requires that
"(b) In every
affidavit or petition filed in support of any application under
paragraph (a) of this subrule, the applicant
must set forth
explicitly the circumstances which is averred render the matter
urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims
that applicant could
not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course (my
emphasis)."
[11]
Mogalakwena
Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo
[2]
stated
t seems to me that when
urgency is in issue the primary investigation should be to determine
whether the Applicant will be afforded
substantial redress at a
hearing in due course. If the Applicant cannot establish prejudice in
this sense, the application cannot
be urgent. Once such prejudice is
established, other factors come into consideration. These factors
include (but are not limited
to): whether the respondents can
adequately present their cases in the time available between notice
of the application to them
and the actual hearing, other prejudice to
the respondents and the administration of justice, the strength of
the case made by
the Applicant and any delay by the Applicant in
asserting its rights. This last factor is often called, usually by
counsel acting
for respondents, self-created urgency.
[12]
The Applicants are quite correct when they
state it is for the Applicant to prove urgency and not for the
respondent to prove or
disprove that the Applicant has not proven
urgency. The Applicant must demonstrate urgency by setting out the
facts that render
the matter explicitly in an affidavit. According to
the First and Second Respondent, the Applicant already had all the
facts needed
to launch an application asking for a declaratory order
that it seeks in this case in November 2022, which would by now have
been
heard in a motion court. If not November, at least during March
2023, when the First Respondent launched an urgent application
(spolitation).
[13]
The Applicant launched an application for
interdictory relief in the ordinary course of motion proceedings on
19 May 2023. It accelerated
the determination of the dispute by
placing it on the urgent roll of 4 July 2023 when the Applicant
learned that the First and
Second Respondents were conducting illegal
mining activities on the land.
[14]
The
4 July 2023 application sought an interdict against the First and
Second Respondents from mining in the mining area. In this
application, they seek a declaratory order that the First and Second
Respondent have no right to mine or to conduct mining exploration
activities on the mining property and an order to evict those
Respondents from the mining area. In its Founding Affidavit,
[3]
the Applicant states why it launched this application:
"The Applicant
launched an urgent applieaction which was set down on 4 July 2023, in
which judgment has as of yet not been
handed down. This application
was set to follow the aforesaid urgent application in the event of
the application not being successful.
The Applicant can however not
dealy the launching of this application any further."
[15]
It is not because this application is
urgent. The Applicant could not wait any longer on a judgment from
the previous urgent application.
However, launching another urgent
application (with similar relief relying on similar facts) is not the
answer. The matter is not
urgent.
[16]
In
Price
Waterhouse Coopers Incorporated and Others v National Potato
Co-operative Ltd
[4]
it was stated (references omitted)
It has long been
recognised in South Africa that a court is entitled to protect itself
and others against the abuse of its process
but no all-embracing
definition of 'abuse of process' has been formulated. Frivolous or
vexatious litigation has been held to be
an abuse of process and it
has been said that 'an attempt made to use for ulterior purposes
machinery devised for the better administration
of justice' would
constitute an abuse of the process. [….] Nevertheless it is
important to bear in mind that courts of law
are open to all and it
is only in exceptional cases that a court will close its doors to
anyone who wishes to prosecute an action.
The importance of the right
of access to courts enshrined by section 34 of the Constitution has
already been referred to. However,
where a litigant abuses the
process this right will be restricted to protect and secure the right
of access for those with
bona fide
disputes.
[17]
I agree with the Respondents that the
Applicant should have waited for the outcome of the 4 July 2023
proceedings before using the
urgent court in its battle against the
First and Second Respondent, especially since this application deals
with the same issues
as the 4 July 2023 application. Dressing up
remarkably similar problems relying on the same facts in different
clothes, notably
the question whether the Applicant is bound by what
it calls the purported contract and placing it on the urgent roll, is
improper
and an abuse of the process.
# Order
Order
[18]
I, therefore, make the following order:
1.
The application is struck from the roll
with costs on an attorney and client scale.
WJ DU PLESSIS
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Delivered: This
judgement is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
It will be sent to the
parties/their legal representatives by email.
Counsel
for the applicant:
Mr N
Martiz SC
Mr R
van Schalkwyk
Instructed
by:
JW
Botes Inc
Counsel
for the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents:
Mr BM
Slon
Instructed
by:
Nicqui
Galaktiou Inc
Counsel
for the 5
th
and 12
th
respondents:
Mr N
Matidza
Instructed
by:
Kgosi
Sekele Inc
Date
of the hearing:
23
August 2023
Date
of judgment:
28
August 2023
[1]
HOA par 27.
[2]
[2014]
ZAGPPHC 400; [2014] 4 All SA 67 (GP).
[3]
Par 89 -90.
[4]
2004
(6) SA 66
(SCA).
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