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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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[2023] ZAGPPHC 1217
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## PCS Global (Pty) Ltd v Moisel and Another (2022/11004)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1217 (22 September 2023)
PCS Global (Pty) Ltd v Moisel and Another (2022/11004)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1217 (22 September 2023)
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sino date 22 September 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 2022/11004
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED:
DATE:
22 September 2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
PCS
GLOBAL (PTY) LTD
Plaintiff/Respondent
and
EKKEHARD
WALTER MOISEL
1
st
Defendant/1
st
Excipient
BIRGET
CRONAU
2
nd
Defendant/2
nd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
(The
matter was heard in open court, but the judgment was delivered
electronically by uploading onto Caselines to the electronic
file of
this matter. It was electronically submitted to the parties/their
representatives on Caselines)
[1]
The defendants, as excipients, delivered an exception towards the
particulars of claim
of the plaintiff (the respondent in the
exception). There will be referred to the parties as in the main
action.
[2]
The exception delivered by the first defendant contains seven (7)
grounds of exception
and that of the second defendant three grounds
of exception. The second defendant's grounds of exception are
verbatim the same
as the first, second and fifth grounds of exception
raised by the first defendant.
[3]
The grounds of exception can be divided into two categories: to wit
(1) grounds one
to four are in respect of claims 1, 2, 3 & 6;
based on averments that these four claims were extinguished by
prescription in
that a period of more than three years lapsed from
the date that the claims arose; and (2) the grounds five to seven are
directed
towards the particulars of claim as a whole, the defendants
contending that the particulars of claim are vague and embarrassing.
The respondents claim that the incompleteness of the particulars of
claim seriously prejudices the defendants arising from a lack
of
particularity.
[4]
The defendants correctly stated that the
onus
is on the
defendants to show both vagueness and embarrassment, the
embarrassment resulting on prejudice.
DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN SPECIAL PLEA AND EXCEPTION:
[5]
Uniform Rule 22 deals with a plea while Rule 23 deals with
exceptions. Rule 18 deals with pleadings in general and in particular
what a plaintiff needs to include in any particulars of claim. The
gist is that every pleading shall contain a clear and concise
statement of the material facts upon which the pleader relies for
his/her claim, defence or answer to any pleading, with such
sufficient particularity to enable the opposite party to reply
thereto.
[6]
The gist is that the pleader should plea
facta probanda
(the
facts that had to be proved) and not also the
factia probantia
(the facts that would prove such facts). See
Erasmus, Superior
Court Practice 2nd ed vol 2 D1-232B.
("Erasmus").
On the importance of the distinction see
Erasmus D1-232B
footnote 3;
Nasionale Aartappelraad Kooperasie Bpk v Price
Waterhouse Coopers Ing
2001 (2) SA 790
(T) par 797 G-H and Deltamine
(Pty) Ltd v Tiger Brands Ltd
(2002) 2 All SA 26
SCA par (25).
[7]
In
Jowell v Bramwell-Jones
1998 (1) SA 836
W at 899G
it was
held that an exception averring that a pleading is vague and
embarrassing is not directed at a particular paragraph within
a cause
of action; it goes to the whole cause of action which must be
demonstrated to be vague and embarrassing.
[8]
An exception can also be taken to particular sections of a pleading
provided that
they are self-contained and amount in themselves to a
separate claim or defence.
Erasmus supra D1-297.
[9]
When an exception is successfully raised as in Rule 23, the court
would normally grant
the opposite party time to correct the
complaint(s) raised in the exception, but the opposing party does not
have the "luxury"
to reply to the exception raised, while
when a special plea is delivered, the recipient has the right to
reply thereto in a replication
or similar pleading. It is further not
necessary to obtain the consent of the court to reply to a special
plea provided not being
formally barred.
[10]
It is trite law that prescription is a defence raised by a defendant
against a claim instituted
against him by a plaintiff and this is
normally done in a special plea. The court cannot on its own take
notice of prescription
(section 17
of the
Prescription Act, 68 of
1969
-
"a party who invokes prescription shall do so in a
relevant document filed of record in the proceedings"
, a
special plea.
[11]
There are several cases where the issue was discussed whether such
complaint be raised in a special
plea or by way of exception. In
Sanan v Eskom
2010 (6) SA 638
(GSJ)
the court was confronted
with an exception to particulars of claim with regard to prescription
and not in a special plea. It held
in (par (20] that prescription
should be raised in a special plea and not in an exception, but
concluded that
"it seems to be incongruous that a party is
obliged to raise e defence in a particular way in order to
accommodate or assist
his opponent in raising a counter argument to
such defence"
. The court of same division in
Living Hands
(Pty) Ltd v Ditz
2013 (2) SA 368
(GSJ) T at 391C- 393E
held that
prescription may not be raised by way of exception as opposed to a
special plea.
[12]
In
Habib v Ethekwini Municipality
2020 (1) SA 280
(KZN)
it was
held that if prescription was raised by means of exception, the
exception did not constitute an irregular step. The court
held in par
[16] and [19]
"that if so confronted, it should examine
whether the particulars of claim are indeed excipiable, in other
words, whether the
particulars of claim contained insufficient
averments to sustain a cause of action".
The court continued
and held in par [16]
"that an exception based on prescription
will usually fail because the contention that the particulars of
claim lack the averments
necessary to sustain an action is incorrect.
This is because the plaintiff is not required to aver that his action
has not become
prescribed".
This conclusion
was
confirmed in
Jugwanth infra.
[13]
In
Jugwanth v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd
[2021] 4 All SA
346
(SCA)
the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside a High Court
order of allowing an exception be raised where the complaint was
prescription.
The SCA in particular held that the defendant's
reliance in the
Habib case
as justification for reliance on an
exception where prescription was raised was incorrect with the
conclusion of the court in
Habib
.
[14]
The SCA in
Jugwanth
made an in depth inquiry into this
question and came to the conclusion that prescription was a defence
to be raised in a special
plea. The SCA held that it was not
necessary for a plaintiff to anticipate the invocation of
prescription and plead a basis on
which the claim had not prescribed
in its particulars of claim
(Jugwanth par [10].
[15]
The SCA in
Jugwanth
further held that the submission by the
excipient that the delivery of an exception raising prescription
would require a plaintiff
to amend its particulars of claim to plead
a basis on which the claim had not prescribed, had to be rejected;
could simply not
be the case because it would lead to that an
exception to otherwise sufficient particulars of claim required a
plaintiff to amend
on pain of the exception being upheld and the
claim being dismissed if a plaintiff need not have anticipated
prescription being
raised in order for the particulars of claim to
disclose a cause of action.
Jugwanth par [17]
and
Erasmus
D1-284-285.
[16]
It is further trite that a party alleging prescription must allege
and prove the date on which
the other party acquired knowledge of the
identity of the debtors and the facts and date on which the creditor
(plaintiff here}
required the necessary knowledge from which the debt
arose.
[17]
A debt is not deemed due until the creditor (plaintiff here) has
knowledge of the identity of
the debtor and the facts giving rise to
the debt. A creditor who could exercise reasonable care in this
regard is deemed to have
the necessary knowledge.
Abrahamse v East
London Municipality: East London Municipality v Abrahamse
1997 (4) SA
613
SCA.
There is no such averment by the defendants before the
court to infer reasonable knowledge on the side of the plaintiff.
[18]
The debtor (defendants here) may in the alternative allege and prove
the date on which the plaintiff,
with the exercising of reasonable
care, should be deemed to have acquired the relevant knowledge
resulting in prescription successfully
raised.
Gericke v Sack
1978
(1) SA 821
A
and
Drennan Maud and Partners v Town Board of the
Township of Pennington
[1998] ZASCA 29
;
1998 (3) SA 200
SCA
. There are no
averments of kind from the defendants in this regard.
[19]
I am of the view that the exception with regard to
prescription cannot succeed and it is dismissed. The
costs aspect
will be dealt with below.
EXCEPTION:
VAGUE AND EMBARRASSING:
[20]
When the exception raised by the defendants with regard to the fifth
to seventh grounds are scrutinised,
it is clear that the defendants
attack specific paragraphs in the particulars of claim to be vague
and embarrassing, and not the
whole cause of action as set out in
Jowell supra
. This cannot be done.
[21]
Having read the particulars of claim and the objections raised by the
defendants, I am of the
view that the defendants failed to raise any
ground in this regard. The defendants further failed to allege and
prove any prejudice
on their behalf. The particulars of claim in my
view are clear and carry the necessary averments to sustain a cause
of action to
enable the defendants to plead thereto.
[22]
When reading the particulars of claim it is clear what the plaintiff
avers the defendants did
wrong: the first defendant as managing
director of the plaintiff, allegedly abused his position of trust and
made certain payments
towards the second defendant's banking account.
The particulars of claim are direct to the point what allegedly
transpired. The
annexures are clear when and the amounts transferred
to the account of the second defendant. Both were allegedly in a
position
of trust and all that they need is to plea to the
particulars of claim. I am satisfied that the averments made complies
with the
conciseness required in
Rule 18
, with the necessary
averments to sustain a cause of action. There is nothing vague or
embarrassing in the particulars of claim
in my view warranting any
success with the exceptions.
[23]
The initial exceptions were without any prayers and the afterthought
to file what purports to
be an attempt to cure this defect is without
substance. These second documents do not purport to be amendments to
the initial exceptions
filed.
CONCLUSION:
[24]
I am of the view that the exceptions do not pass the test in
Rule 23
and there is no reasonable prospect to success in this regard.
ORDER:
[24]
The exceptions are dismissed with costs. I am not convinced that it
amounts to an abuse of process and there is no reason for
a punitive
cost order. The cost order is on a party and party scale.
J
HOLLAND-MUTER
JUDGE
OF THE PRETORIA HIGH COURT
Matter
heard on 27 July 2023.
Judgement
delivered on 20 September 2023
TO:
VRA
INC
First
Defendant/Excipient's Attorney
Ref:
Warran Allen
Email:
warrana@vra.legal
warren@vra.legal
Counsel:
S M
Alberts
BIRGIT
CRONAU ATTORNEYS
Second
DEFENDANT/Excipient's Attorney
Ref:
Warran Allen
Email:
warrana@vra.legal
AND
TO:
GENIV
WULZ ATTORNEYS
Plaintiff/Respondent's
Attorney
Ref:GW/PCSG/01/2021
Email:michelle@wulzattorneys.co.za
taygen@wulzattorneys.co.za
Counsel:
D Prinsloo
danielprinsloo@icloud.com
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