Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 727South Africa
Mhlongo v Netball South Africa (071849/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 727 (8 July 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
8 July 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mhlongo v Netball South Africa (071849/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 727 (8 July 2025)
Mhlongo v Netball South Africa (071849/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 727 (8 July 2025)
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sino date 8 July 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 071849/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
(3)
REVISED:
NO
(4)
Date: 08 July 2025
Signature:
In
the matter between:
JOSEPH
TAYLOR MHLONGO
Applicant
And
NETBALL
SOUTH AFRICA
Respondent
JUDGMENT
NYATHI
J
A.
Introduction
[1]
The applicant is before court seeking a declaratory order against the
applicant’s
Disciplinary Committee (‘DC’)’s
findings and sanction imposed on him.
[2]
Applicant seeks more specifically that:
2.1
the findings and sanction be
declared a nullity.
2.2
the DC was improperly constituted,
thus the respondent acted
ultra
vires
the provisions of
its Constitution.
2.3
the findings of the DC and the
sanction imposed by the respondent against him be set aside. The
respondent be directed to forthwith
withdraw the findings and
sanctions against the applicant and reinstate the applicant’s
membership without qualification
or limitation.
B.
Background
[3]
The applicant had been a member of the respondent
for 15 years, having served in leadership positions in the
KwaZulu-Natal and eThekwini
Federations, when he was hauled before a
Disciplinary Committee of the respondent.
C.
Respondent’s points
in
limine
[4]
The respondent seeks to have the application
dismissed on the basis of points
in
limine
that it has raised firstly, and
also on the merits. The court first heard the parties’
submissions on the points
in limine
.
In the process the argument overlapped with the merits as well.
Judgment was thereafter reserved. Counsel for the parties have
filed
thorough heads of argument in respect of both components of the
application, for which I am grateful.
[5]
Ms. Kriek appearing for the respondent, raised the following points
of law:
5.1
Lack of jurisdiction
–
the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter due to the existence of an
arbitration clause in terms of the Constitution of the
NSA. This
clause was mandatory, and the applicant has failed to submit the
dispute to alternative dispute resolution such as mediation
or
expedited arbitration as is provided for. The court’s
jurisdiction is accordingly ousted.
5.2
Section 21(1)(b)
of the
Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013
–
in
his founding affidavit, the applicant has failed to make out a case
triggering the Court’s power to grant the declaratory
relief
sought by virtue of the provisions of
section 21(1)(b)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
5.3
a third point questioning the
authority of the deponent to depose to the affidavits was abandoned,
therefore nothing more need be
said about it.
[6]
On the jurisdiction aspect, Schedule Four to the March 2023
Constitution provides
that:
“
Any disputes
arising out of, or in connection with, the enforceability of this
constitution, or the application and interpretation
of the provisions
hereof, or any dispute between any members or the South African
Confederation of Sport and Olympic Committee
(SASCOC) or between a
member and the National Executive Committee or members of NSA shall
be referred in terms of the SASCOC Dispute
Procedure Resolution to
the Disputes Resolution Council for resolution through mediation or
expedited arbitration in terms of the
Rules and Procedures for the
Resolution of Disputes in Sport, prevailing at the time such dispute
is so referred. In the event
of arbitration in terms of the above,
such resolution shall be final and binding on the parties to the
dispute.”
[7]
Paragraph 31 of the March 2023 Constitution defines disputes as
follows:
"For the purpose
of this paragraph disputes includes without prejudice to the
generality of that term:
31.1 Any action by any
member with regards to the interpretation and application of this
Constitution.
31.2. Dispute in
connection with:
31.2.1 the interest of
a member.
31.2.2 the employment
of a member.
31.2.3 the powers,
duties and office of a member.
31.2.4 the affairs of
Netball SA.
31.2.5 the
interpretation, application and/or effect of any of the terms,
conditions or restriction imposed or any procedure to
be followed
under this Constitution
…
31.8 Where a dispute
arises between members or between a member and NSA, such dispute
shall be referred to final and binding arbitration
only after the
parties have attempted to resolve the dispute by negotiation or
mediation. ... "
[8]
It was then submitted on behalf of the respondent that Mr. Mhlongo's
grievances
(and the dispute) being the subject matter of this
application, falls squarely within the provisions of Schedule Four to
the March
2023 Constitution as well as paragraph 31 thereof, in that
same pertains to Mhlongo's membership with NSA, the interpretation,
application and/or effect of the terms, conditions or restriction
imposed or any procedure to be followed under the Constitution.
[9]
In terms of the provisions of section four and paragraph 31 quoted
above, the
referral to mediation and arbitration is mandatory through
the meaning of the word “
shall”
. Mhlongo
has thus not fulfilled a jurisdictional requirement before initiating
the application.
[10]
Ms Kriek then concluded that when a party
institutes
court proceedings despite the arbitration agreement
or clause, the defendant may,
inter alia
, ask for the stay of
proceedings, pending final determination of the dispute by the
arbitrator.
[11]
Foreseeing resistance
from the applicant, which did actually eventuate, the submission was
made on behalf of the respondent that
the party resisting the stay of
court proceedings bears the onus (which is not easily discharged) of
convincing the court that,
owing to exceptional circumstances, the
stay should be refused. In other words, courts will enforce an
agreement to arbitrate or
an arbitration clause unless there are
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
[1]
[12]
In support of the
respondent’s contentions, reference was made to the matter of
Timbela
Trading CC v Anglo American Platinum Ltd and Another
[2]
where a special plea had
been raised by the respondent in an application which was referred to
trial that the disputes between the
parties were subject to an
arbitration agreement. Bester AJ granted an order staying the action
pending the final determination
of the disputes by an arbitrator in
terms of the arbitration agreement.
D.
Applicant’s contentions against the points
in
limine
[13]
Ms Stroebel on behalf of the applicant opposes the respondent’s
submissions as being ill-founded
and misplaced. She commenced with a
concession that the applicant’s case for a declaratory order
was erroneously stated as
being founded on
Section 21(1)(b)
of the
Superior Courts Act instead
of
Section 21(1)(c).
she applied for an
amendment, which was granted.
[14]
Ms
Stroebel then dealt with the jurisdictional point of law submitting
that an arbitration clause does not oust the jurisdiction
of this
court. She stated that a party seeking a stay of proceedings pending
arbitration
[3]
must launch a
substantive application.
E.
Discussion on the legal provisions
[15]
The
Constitutional Court in
Crompton
Street Motors CC v Bright Idea Projects 66 (Pty) Ltd
[4]
confirmed
SCA’s finding in
PCL
Consulting (Pty) Ltd v Tresso Trading 119 (Pty) Ltd
[5]
that
“
If
any party to an arbitration agreement commences any legal proceedings
in any court (including any inferior court) against any
other party
to the agreement in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to
arbitration, any party to such legal proceedings
may
at
any time after entering appearance but before delivering any
pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings,
apply
to that court for a stay of such proceedings.”
[6]
[my
emphasis].
[16]
Ms Kriek persisted in reply that points of law in motion proceedings
are akin to a special plea in
action proceedings. There is nothing
contentious about that, except that a special plea is raised before
the defendant takes any
further steps and the pleader then pleads
over on the merits. This is because a special plea is a
procedural device that allows
a party to raise a preliminary issue
that, if decided in their favour, could dispose of the entire matter
without the need to proceed
to a full trial. Essentially, it's a
way to address a defence before the court delves into the merits of
the case. It
makes sense therefore that in motion proceedings
these objections should be raised in the respondent's answering
affidavit and
not for the first time in the heads of argument or from
the bar.
[17]
In general terms, a point
in limine
should not be raised for
the first time in heads of argument in motion proceedings, lest the
party so raising it be accused of
“trial by ambush”. This
is considered unfair and prejudicial to the opposition in that they
may not have adequate opportunity
to prepare a proper response.
[18]
It is trite that in motion proceedings affidavits serve as both
pleadings and evidence. A newly raised
point in limine might not be
supported by the evidence presented in the affidavit. The proper
procedure is to raise points in limine
in the answering affidavit, or
through a formal substantive application thus allowing the other
party to respond with their own
evidence and legal arguments.
[19]
The exceptions to the general rule stated above are:
a.
if the point in limine is a purely legal one based on undisputed
facts not requiring new evidence. And
b.
if the late raising of the point
in limine
does not prejudice
the opposing party.
[20]
In the current application, the respondent does raise a point
in
limine
pertaining to the court’s lack of jurisdiction in
its answering affidavit. It however makes no reference to
arbitration.
The issue of arbitration is more pertinently ventilated
in its heads of argument.
[21]
From the submissions made before the court, this is no doubt, an
instance that is catered for in the
exceptions to the general norm,
paving the way for the court to consider the point of law raised.
[22]
That there is a dispute between the parties is common cause.
[23]
A point of law in motion proceedings is akin to a special plea in
motion proceedings. The instant point
raised has the effect of a
dilatory plea. If it is granted, the current proceedings will be
paused pending the resolution of the
dispute by an arbitrator as
provided for in the arbitration agreement.
[24]
The respondent’s counterapplication for a stay of the
applicant’s application pending the
arbitration succeeds.
F.
Conclusion
[25]
In the result, I order as follows:
a) The
application is stayed pending the final determination of the disputes
on the pleadings between the parties
by an arbitrator in terms of
Paragraph 31 of the March 2023 Constitution, which govern the
relationship between the parties.
b) The
applicant shall pay the costs of the points in limine on the party
and party scale, including the costs
of counsel at scale B.
J.S.
NYATHI
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Date
of hearing: 14/05/2025.
Date
of Judgment: 08 July 2025
On
behalf of the Applicant: Ms J Stroebel
Applicant’s
attorneys: Hurter Spies Incorporated
On
behalf of the Respondents: Ms R Kriek
Respondent’s
attorneys: Donaldson Attorneys
Delivery
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email and uploaded on the
CaseLines
electronic platform. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 08 July
2025.
[1]
Para
30, respondent’s heads of argument.
[2]
Case no (23506/2021) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1896 (9 September 2024)
[Unreported].
[3]
In
terms of
Section 6
of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965
.
[4]
[2021]
ZACC 24.
[5]
[2007] SCA 9(RSA).
[6]
PCL
Consulting footnote 3.
sino noindex
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