Payne v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Local Division and Others (2024/080260) [2025] ZAGPPHC 767 (4 August 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 767 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Payne v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Local Division and Others (2024/080260) [2025] ZAGPPHC 767 (4 August 2025) Payne v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Local Division and Others (2024/080260) [2025] ZAGPPHC 767 (4 August 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_767.html sino date 4 August 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA) Case No: 2024/080260 (1)        REPORTABLE: NO (2)        OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3)        REVISED: YES DATE: 2/8/2025 SIGNATURE In the application between:- RICHARD JOHN PAYNE Applicant and THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION First Respondent THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Second Respondent THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT Third Respondent THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT Fourth Respondent THE MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION Fifth Respondent Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email.  The date for the handing down of the judgment shall be deemed to be the date upon which it is circulated. JUDGMENT LG KILMARTIN, AJ: A. INTRODUCTION : [1] The applicant, Richard John Payne (hereinafter referred to as “the applicant” or “Mr Payne”), seeks an order reviewing and setting aside and declaring as unconstitutional and invalid, a request for his extradition from the United Kingdom made by the first respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Local Division (referred to below as “the first respondent” or “the DPP”) on 26 September 2022 (“the extradition request”).  Mr Payne’s application is referred to below as "the review application”. [2] Mr Payne seeks the relief on the basis that the DPP had no power to make an extradition request to a foreign state. He relies, in this regard, on the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) judgment in Schultz v Minister of Justice [1] (“ Schultz SCA ”) which was handed down on 23 May 2024. [3] The DPP and the second respondent, the National Director of Public Prosecutions (“the NDPP”), collectively referred to below as “the NPA respondents”, brought an application for leave to appeal Schultz SCA on 17 September 2024 which is still pending before the Constitutional Court (“ Schultz CC ”). The Court was advised that Schultz CC was filed three and a half months out of time and, hence, an application for condonation was also brought by the NPA respondents in the Constitutional Court.  As will be explained below, the late filing of the application for leave to appeal has the consequence that the decision of Schultz SCA stands. [4] In response to Mr Payne’s application, the NPA respondents applied to stay the review application pending the outcome of Schultz CC . [5] On 14 February 2025, the NPA respondents filed a notice of withdrawal in Schultz CC . [6] On 27 February 2024, the NPA respondents wrote to the Registrar of the Constitutional Court advising that the notice of withdrawal had been served in error given that they had erroneously overlooked the need to seek an order from the Constitutional Court tempering the retrospective effect of the SCA’s order in Schultz SCA .  In that correspondence, the NPA respondents also stated that the NDPP would file an explanatory affidavit confirming that the appeal would be pursued on a limited basis, i.e. only on the basis of whether the SCA’s order in Schultz SCA was prospective and would not apply retrospectively. [7] The review application and the stay application were argued on 18 March 2025 and I reserved judgment. B. THE RULE 61.11 APPLICATION : [8] On 2 May 2025 the applicant brought an interlocutory application in terms of Rule 61.11 of the Legal Practice Council Code of Conduct for all Legal Practitioners, Candidate Legal Practitioners and Juristic Entities (“the LPC Code”) in order to place a judgment and the order of the United Kingdom’s King’s Bench Division in the appeal of Richard John Payne v the Government of the Republic of South Africa [2] regarding a decision of the District Judge Robinson (“the District Judge”) in an application under section 114 of the Extradition Act, 2003 (“the UK Extradition Act”) which was handed down by Lord Justice Dingemans and Mr Justice Choudhury on 30 April 2025 (“ Payne UK ”). [9] Rule 61.11 of the LPC Code provides as follows: “ 61.11  After a hearing when judgment is awaited, a legal practitioner shall not place before, or try to send to, a judicial officer any further material of whatever nature, except by agreement among representatives of all parties; provided that, if consent is unreasonably withheld, the placing of such further material may, in an appropriate case, be the subject matter of an application to re-open the hearing to receive it or, if the further material consists only of references to authorities which might offer assistance to deciding a question, a legal practitioner may address a request in writing to the judge’s registrar or equivalent court official to approach the judicial officer with an invitation to receive the references .” [10] Although the NPA respondents initially refused to consent to the Payne UK decision being provided to this Court, they subsequently filed a notice to abide the Court’s decision in the Rule 61.11 application and, on 14 May 2025, also filed a “ supplementary affidavit ” attaching a copy of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom. [11] A widely shared note was posted on CaseLines on 14 May 2025 enquiring whether any further affidavit(s) would be filed in response to the “ supplementary affidavit ”, which was not responded to.  Due to the lapse of time, the Court accepts that the parties do not intend to file any further affidavits in the Rule 61.11 application. [12] Having considered the papers in the Rule 61.11 application, I am of the view that, although the judgment and application for leave to appeal in Payne UK , do not directly impact on the issues to be decided by me, they are relevant in that they have given this Court further relevant background facts which form part of the context against which this matter must be adjudicated.  I therefore had regard to the aforesaid. [13] Insofar as the costs of the Rule 61.11 application are concerned, I am of the view that as Mr Payne and the NPA respondents placed additional relevant matter before the Court after the hearing of the matter which was of assistance to the Court, no order as to costs should be granted. [14] Turning now to stay and review applications, the Court was advised by counsel for the NPA respondents that they stand or fall by the stay application.  Put differently, if the stay application is refused, there is no answer by the NPA respondents to the review application as the SCA’s decision in Schultz SCA stands and is the law which must be applied. [15] Before dealing with the merits of the stay and review applications, I deem it necessary to deal with further relevant background facts which provide additional context. C. RELEVANT BACKGROUND FACTS : [16] On 22 September 2022, the DPP made a request for Mr Payne to be extradited from the United Kingdom to South Africa in order to face charges relating to alleged racketeering, fraud, corruption and money laundering in South Africa. [17] It is common cause that the extradition request was not made by the Minister of Justice but by the DPP.  The DPP indicated that he was responsible for matters incidental to instituting and conducting prosecutions in terms of section 179(2) of the Constitution. [18] It also appears that the Minister of Justice did not consider the extradition request and his consent was not obtained when the request was made. [19] Mr Payne objected to the extradition request in the United Kingdom on the basis that the DPP did not have the power to make it and, in response, the DPP submitted a memorandum in which it contended that the Minister of Justice plays no part in outgoing extradition requests. [20] According to Mr Payne, the submissions made by the DPP in its memorandum were the same arguments which were made in Schultz SCA and these arguments were rejected by the SCA. [21] Mr Payne’s extradition hearing took place in the United Kingdom from 21 to 23 February 2024. [22] On 14 March 2024, the District Judge ruled that Mr Payne should be extradited to South Africa. [23] On 7 May 2024, the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom (“the Secretary of State”) ordered that Mr Payne was to be extradited. [24] The decisions of the District Judge and the Secretary of State precede the date when Shultz SCA was handed down. [25] The appeal against the District Judge’s ruling as well as the decision of the Secretary of State were heard in the High Court in London on 25 March 2025 and I refer to what is stated above in this regard as well as the pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. D. SCHULTZ SCA : [26] As far as Schultz SCA is concerned, it specifically dealt with whether the DPP had the power to submit an outgoing extradition request to a foreign country (which, in that case, was the United States of America) and the High Court held that the DPP had such power. [3] The SCA disagreed and set aside the High Court’s judgment and order. [27] In Schultz SCA, the SCA had regard to: (i) the Constitution; (ii) the Extradition Act, 67 of 1962 (“the Extradition Act”); and (iii) International law in reaching its decision. [28] In this regard, the SCA found that: [28.1] The Constitution vests the power in the Minister of Justice because extradition engages the foreign affairs power in the Constitution.  In this regard, the following was stated in Schultz SCA : [4] “ [32]     A request for extradition by one State to another necessarily operates at the international level. This must apply in respect of both incoming and outgoing requests. Implicitly, and consistent with international customary law and the Constitution, both forms of request engage the executive sphere of power. To hold, as the respondents argue, that it is the NPA and not the executive that has decision-making power in respect of outgoing extradition requests would be contrary to established international law principles: it would accord to a non-executive domestic organ of state, an executive function at a State-to-State level. An intention so to depart from established international law principles would require clear expression in the Extradition Act. It cannot be implied simply from the absence of express provisions according to the Minister’s decision-making powers in outgoing extradition requests. ” [28.2] The Extradition Act vests the power in the Minister of Justice by implication of the provisions governing incoming extradition requests.  In this regard the following was stated in Schultz SCA : [5] “ [34]     Quagliani thus confirms that under the Extradition Act it is the executive that is empowered not only to respond to an incoming request for extradition but also to make an outgoing request. Importantly, the judgment recognises that the absence, in the Extradition Act, of an express power on the part of the executive to make an outgoing extradition request does not signify an absence of that power. The executive power to make an outgoing request is to be implied from the principle of reciprocity, which lies at the very heart of extradition .” [28.3] International law makes it clear that the executive arm of the government is empowered to engage with foreign states in the international law community and the Minister of Justice is the functionary who signs extradition treaties on behalf of South Africa and he is the functionary responsible for performing all acts necessary to give effect to the treaty. [6] [29] As was correctly pointed out by counsel for Mr Payne, the SCA in Schultz SCA applied the judgment of the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Quagliani [7] (“ Quagliani ”) where the Constitutional Court held that the power to make an outgoing extradition request vests in the executive.  In this regard, the Constitutional Court stated, inter alia , the following: [8] “ [44]     The Act, read with other legislation such as the Criminal Procedure Act, thus gives the executive branch all the required statutory powers to be able to respond to a request for extradition from a foreign state and for the executive branch to be able to request the extradition of individuals who are in foreign states. It should be added that although the power to request extradition to the Republic from a foreign country is not expressly provided for in the Act, it is necessarily implicit in sections 19 and 20. Both deal with requests for surrender, and indeed, section 19 expressly envisages extradition being requested in terms of an extradition treaty. ” [30] Insofar as the doctrine of precedent is concerned, in Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs [9] the Constitutional Court stated the following: “ It was of course open to the Supreme Court of Appeal to reject its own previous decisions, provided it concluded they were clearly wrong .  But the majority made no effort to explain why Abdi, Arse, Bula and Ersumo were wrong or how. The Supreme Court of Appeal has itself emphasised that respect for precedent , which requires courts to follow the decisions of coordinate and higher courts, lies at the heart of judicial practice.  This is because it is intrinsically functional to the rule of law , which in turn is foundational to the Constitution.  Why intrinsic?  Because without precedent, certainty, predictability and coherence would dissipate.  The courts would operate without map or navigation, vulnerable to whim and fancy.  Law would not rule . ” (Emphasis added) [31] Based on the doctrine of precedent, this Court is bound by the decisions of Quagliani and Schultz SCA. [32] In Schultz SCA , the Court ordered, inter alia the following: “ 2.    The order of the High Court is set aside and replaced with the following: ‘ It is declared that only the [Minister of Justice and Correctional Services] in his capacity as a member of the National Executive of the Republic of South Africa, has the power to make an extradition request for the extradition of the applicant from the United States of America.’ ” [33] The order in Schultz SCA is clear and does not state that it should only apply prospectively. E. THE STAY APPLICATION [34] It is trite that an applicant seeking the stay of proceedings must satisfy the Court that there are “ exceptional circumstances ” that warrant the Court depriving a party of their right to have a legal dispute resolved by a Court. [10] Mr Payne argues that the NPA respondents have not satisfied this test. [35] The NPA respondents’ case for a stay is based on lis alibi pendens . [36] In Caesarstone Sdot-Yam Ltd v World of Marble and Granite 2000 CC and Others [11] (“ Caesarstone ”), the SCA, inter alia , held that a plea of lis alibi pendens is based on the proposition that the dispute ( lis ) between the parties is being litigated in the Court in which the plea is raised and that the policy underpinning it is that there should be a limit to the extent to which the same issue is litigated between the same parties and that it is desirable that there be finality in litigation.  The SCA further confirmed that the courts are also concerned to avoid a situation where different courts pronounce on the same issue with the risk that they may reach differing conclusions. [12] [37] In Caesarstone , the SCA confirmed that: [37.1] The requirement of there being “ the same cause of action ” could be relaxed if the circumstances justified doing so and that this requirement would be relaxed in such an instance to require that the central issue be the same in both proceedings. [13] [37.2] The requirement that the relief claimed had to be the same could be relaxed where the circumstances supported doing so. [14] [38] Insofar as the Court exercises its discretion to grant a stay, the following was stated in Caesarstone [15] “ [36]     In exercising its discretion considerations of fairness and convenience are fundamentally important. I agree with Coetzee DJP in Kerbel v Kerbel that once the requisites for a plea of lis pendens are established the court should be inclined to uphold it, because it is undesirable for there to be litigation in two courts over the same issue. That was the approach of De Villiers CJ in Wolff NO v Solomon, when he said: ‘ I am not prepared to say that the plea of lis pendens in a foreign state would be a good defence in every case in which the plea of res judicata in such foreign state would have been a good answer. But I do hold that the fact that a suit has been commenced by a plaintiff, and is still pending in the Court of a foreign state having jurisdiction over the defendant, affords, prima facie, a good ground for a plea in abatement to an action instituted in this Court by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, for the same thing, and arising out of the same cause, in the absence of proof that justice would not be done without the double remedy.’” [39] In Nestlé (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Mars Inc . (“ Nestlé ”) [16] the SCA described the features of the plea lis alibi pendens as follows: “ The defence of lis alibi pendens shares features in common with the defence of res judicata because they have a common underlying principle which is that there should be finality in litigation. Once a suit has been commenced before a tribunal that is competent to adjudicate upon it the suit must generally be brought to its conclusion before that tribunal and should not be replicated (lis alibi pendens). By the same token the suit will not be permitted to be revived once it has been brought to its proper conclusion (res judicata). The same suit, between the same parties, should be brought only once and finally. ” [40] In Nestlé [17] the SCA also stated the following regarding the application of lis alibi pendens : “ [17]     There is room for the application of that principle only where the same dispute, between the same parties, is sought to be placed before the same tribunal (or two tribunals with equal competence to end the dispute authoritatively) . In the absence of any of those elements there is no potential for a duplication of actions. In my view, none of those elements is present in this case. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they can exist where the matters in issue have been placed before two quite different tribunals (as in this case), the one operating consensually and the other by force of statute, each having its own peculiar functions, powers and authority. For in such a case each tribunal will, by definition, be inquiring into a ruling upon different matters, and neither will be capable of ruling authoritatively on the issue that falls within the competence of the  other.” (My emphasis) [41] Mr Payne argues that: [41.1] Lis alibi pendens cannot apply because the parties in Schultz SCA and Schultz CC are not the same as the parties in Mr Payne’s review application and, although the courts have extended the requirement there must be the same parties to “privies”, it has not done so where there is no connection between the parties at all. Mr Payne also criticises the NPA respondents for failing to cite the Minister of Justice or Department of International Relations and Cooperation (“DIRCO”) Minister in the Schultz application. [41.2] The NPA respondents’ reliance on lis pendens is abusive and they have not been candid with the Court.  He further alleges that it is inappropriate for an organ of state to vacillate in the manner that the NPA has. [42] According to the NPA respondents: [42.1] This is a matter where lis alibi pendens should apply.  In this regard, the NPA respondents contend that Schultz SCA is dispositive of Payne because the two cases turn on an identical cause of action, i.e. that both extradition requests were issued by the wrong member of the executive. [42.2] There is a risk that two courts will reach different conclusions and, specifically, a risk that this Court will grant the main application on the strength of Schultz SCA , only for the Constitutional Court to subsequently overturn Schultz SCA .  According to the NPA respondents not only would this Court’s judgment be inconsistent with the final decision of the Constitutional Court but it would have afforded a wanted fugitive an opportunity to escape facing justice in South Africa. [42.3] Hearing the main application would also duplicate the burden on the courts which should be avoided as both this Court and the Constitutional Court would be devoting resources to answering the same questions. [42.4] There is a connection between the parties because both Payne and Schultz include as parties (at least at the outset), the DPP, the NDPP, the Minister of Justice and the DIRCO Minister, albeit that the DIRCO Minister and the Justice Minister are not participating in the Schultz application because the DIRCO Minister elected to abide and the Minister of Justice did not appeal the decision.  The NPA respondents argue that the mere fact that Mr Payne is not cited as a party in Schultz cannot defeat a plea of lis alibi pendens . [42.5] The cases which discuss lis alibi pendens approach the matter from a private law perspective, namely that they assume the litigation brought by one party cannot be dispositive of the rights of another, unrelated party.  In this regard, the NPA respondents contend that the Schultz and Payne matters involve questions of public law.  In this regard, the Court was referred to Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others [18] to support the argument that when one person litigates a constitutional question to finality, the outcome is final not just for him/her but for everyone else.  It was submitted that the Court should bear this in mind when assessing the considerations of fairness and convenience. [42.6] The NPA respondents have never vacillated and have, throughout, accepted that if Schultz SCA stands in its current form it would be dispositive of the merits of this matter. [43] The highwater mark of the NPA respondents’ case is that Schultz SCA is dispositive of Payne, but the Constitutional Court “ may yet establish a new test or understanding of the relevant facts and law ”. [44] In my view, having regard to the authorities referred to above, the stay application cannot succeed.  In this regard: [44.1] The NPA respondents have not demonstrated “ exceptional circumstances ” that warrant a stay. [44.2] I agree with Mr Payne’s argument that a stay application is not ordinarily brought because a litigant desires the law to be changed. [44.3] The Court was referred by Mr Payne’s counsel to Mazibuko NO v Sisulu and Others NNO [19] (“ Mazibuko ”) where The Speaker of the National Assembly (“the Speaker”) sought to avoid the determination of a legal dispute on the basis that the law applicable was going to change.  The Constitutional Court rejected the argument of the Speaker and held that it had an obligation to determine the dispute on the basis of the law that existed and applied at the time. [44.4] The Court was also referred by Mr Payne’s counsel to Amabhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and Another v Minister of Justice and Others [20] where this Court also rejected the argument that a matter should not be determined because the Minister of Justice believed legal change was imminent.  This Court (following Mazibuko ) confirmed that it must pronounce on such issues and not prevaricate. [44.5] This Court is a High Court and is bound by the law as it stands and as pronounced in Quagliani and Schultz SCA (particularly bearing in mind that the application for leave to appeal was filed late and the Schultz SCA decision stands). [44.6] Insofar as fairness is concerned, it is not fair to stay matters in a lower Court where binding precedents already exist in case a higher Court may change the law (which has already been pronounced upon) at a later stage. [44.7] The Court must take into account that this is not a case where courts of equal standing are being requested to decide the same issue and there is no risk that there will be conflicting decisions in this regard.  The highest Courts in the country have already handed down judgments which are in line with one another and which are binding on this Court. [44.8] This is not a case where duplication of judicial resources is taking place and the stay requested by the NPA Respondents cannot be granted merely on the basis that the Constitutional Court “ may yet establish a new test or understanding of the relevant facts and law .” [44.9] The NPA respondents have conceded that unless the Constitutional Court finds that Schultz SCA has no retrospective effect, it is dispositive of the main application. [45] Having considered all arguments, I am of the view that the application for a stay falls to be dismissed and do not see why costs should not follow the result. [46] Insofar as the Court was requested by Mr Payne to grant punitive costs on the basis that: (i) he alleges the NPA has not been candid with this Court; and (ii) the NPA respondents’ version before the Constitutional Court differs from the version before this Court – in this Court the NPA respondents sought to reserve their right to argue that Schultz was factually distinguishable, while in the Constitutional Court they accepted Mr Payne’s relief in the review application falls to be granted in light of Schultz SC .  In this regard, the Court was referred to MEC for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v Kirland Investments t/a Eye and Lazer Institute [21] [47] I am of the view that there is nothing untoward about the approach adopted by the NPA respondents or any indication that the stay application constitutes an abuse of process. Hence, I am only inclined to grant costs on party-and-party Scale C, such costs to include the costs of two counsel, one of whom is a senior, where so employed. F. THE REVIEW APPLICATION : [48] Section 172 of the Constitution provides as follows: “ 172 Powers of courts in constitutional matters (1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court- (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including- (i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.” [49] There is an obligation on the courts to make declarations of constitutional invalidity which applies to law or conduct held to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [22] the following was stated in this regard: “ [103]   Declaring law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid is plainly an obligatory power vested in this Court as borne out by the word “must”. Unlike the discretionary power to make a declaratory order in terms of section 38 of the Constitution, this Court has no choice but to make a declaratory order where section 172(1)(a) applies. Section 172(1)(a) impels this Court, to pronounce on the inconsistency and invalidity of, in this case, the President’s conduct and that of the National Assembly. This we do routinely whenever any law or conduct is held to be inconsistent with the Constitution. It is not reserved for special cases of constitutional invalidity. Consistent with this constitutional injunction, an order will thus be made that the President’s failure to comply with the remedial action taken against him by the Public Protector is inconsistent with his obligations to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic; to comply with the remedial action taken by the Public Protector; and the duty to assist and protect the office of the Public Protector to ensure its independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness.” [50] It is clear from the above that the Court, in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, must make a declaratory order where the section applies. [51] For the reasons already explained, Schultz SC is clearly determinative of the matter and therefore Mr Payne is entitled to the relief sought by him in prayers 2 to 5 of the notice of motion. G. ORDER : In the light of what is stated above, I make an order in the following terms: 1. The first and second respondents’ application to stay the proceedings is dismissed; 2. The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the applicant in the stay application, including the costs of two counsel, on Scale C; 3. The extradition request of the first respondent dated 26 September 2022 to the Government of the United Kingdom for the applicant’s extradition to South Africa (“the extradition request”) is hereby reviewed and set aside; 4. The extradition request is hereby declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and invalid; 5. It is declared that the first and second respondents have no authority to submit an extradition request on behalf of the Republic of South Africa to the United Kingdom; 6. The first and second respondents are directed, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, to pay the costs of the review application, such costs to include the costs of two counsel, on Scale C. LG KILMARTIN ACTING Judge of the High Court Pretoria Date of hearing: 17 March 2025 Interlocutory application in terms of Rule 61.11: Brought on 2 May 2023 Final affidavit filed on 14 May 2025 Date of judgment: 4 August 2025 For the Applicant: A Katz SC K Perumalsamy Instructed by: Ian Levitt Attorneys For the First and Second Respondents: K Hopkins SC D Simonsz Instructed by: Office of the State Attorney, Pretoria [1] (76/2023) [2024] ZASCA 77 (23 May 2024). [2] [2025] EWHC 1043 (Admin). [3] Schultz v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (2022/002804) [2022] ZAGPPHC 1141 (21 November 2022). [4] Schultz SCA , para 32 at p 17. [5] Schultz SCA , para [34] at p18. [6] Schultz SCA , paras [25] to [32], pp 14 – 17. [7] 2009 (2) SA 466 (CC). [8] Quagliani , para [44] at 485 B/C. [9] 2019 (2) SA 329 (CC), para [21] at 343 E. [10] Western Assurance v Caldwell’s Trustees 1918 AD 262 at 273. [11] 2013 (6) SA 499 (SCA). [12] Caesarstone , para [2] at 502 F/G. [13] Caesarstone , paras [21] to [22] and [24] at 508 B and 509 F/G. [14] Caesarstone , paras [21] and [22] at 508 B -  509 C. [15] Caesarstone , para [36] at 513 I. [16] 2001 (4) SA 542 (SCA), para [16] at 548 I – 549 B. [17] 2001 (4) SA 542 (SCA), para [17] at 549 B – 549 D. [18] 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), para [229] at 1103 C/D - I. [19] 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC), para 70 at 270 E – G. [20] 2020 (1) SA 90 (GP), paras 11 to 13 at p 7. [21] 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC), para [82] at 505. [22] 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC), para 103 at 619 F/G TO 620 A/B sino noindex make_database footer start