Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 869South Africa
E.V v G.V (2024-143960) [2025] ZAGPPHC 869 (17 August 2025)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## E.V v G.V (2024-143960) [2025] ZAGPPHC 869 (17 August 2025)
E.V v G.V (2024-143960) [2025] ZAGPPHC 869 (17 August 2025)
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sino date 17 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case number: 2024-143960
1.
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
2. OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/ NO
3.
REVISED: YES/
NO
DATE: 17 August 2025
In the matter between:
E [….] V
[….]
APPLICANT
and
G
[….]
V
[….]
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MARX
DU PLESSIS, AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application in terms of Rule 43 of the Uniform Rules of
Court in which the applicant
seeks interim relief pending the
finalisation of the divorce action between the parties.
[2]
The applicant claims,
inter alia
, a contribution towards her
maintenance in the sum of R20,000.00 and a contribution towards her
legal fees in the sum of R200,000.00.
[3]
Both the applicant and the respondent sought leave to deliver
supplementary affidavits in terms
of Rule 43(5). The reasons advanced
for these supplementary affidavits, as well as the court’s
approach thereto, will be
dealt with later in this judgment.
[4]
It is, however, necessary at the outset to emphasise the nature and
purpose of Rule 43 proceedings.
Rule 43 was designed to provide
parties with a swift, inexpensive and effective remedy for interim
relief in matrimonial matters.
The Rule requires parties to deliver
sworn statements in the nature of a declaration and plea, setting out
concisely the relief
claimed and the grounds therefor. The object
being to ensure that such matters are resolved expeditiously and
inexpensively.
Background
[5]
The parties were married to one another out of community of property,
subject to the accrual system,
on 11 January 1997. One child was born
of the marriage, a son, EV. Although EV has attained the age of
majority, he is not yet
self-supporting. The respondent presently
bears sole responsibility for EV’s maintenance.
[6]
The parties have not cohabited since August 2023, when the applicant
vacated the erstwhile matrimonial
home. EV remained in the care of
the respondent.
[7]
Apart from making payment of the applicant’s monthly medical
aid premiums, the respondent
has made no cash contribution towards
the maintenance of the applicant since she vacated their erstwhile
matrimonial home.
[8]
Shortly after the applicant vacated the erstwhile matrimonial home,
the parties engaged in mediation
which culminated in the conclusion
of a settlement agreement during October 2023.
[9]
In terms of the settlement agreement, the respondent undertook and
performed the following obligations:
[9.1]
He purchased an immovable property to the value of R1,350,000.00
which was subsequently registered in the
name of the applicant. This
immovable property serves as the applicant’s residence.
[9.2]
He paid the conveyancing cost, water and electricity connection fees,
and related expenses in the sum of
R81,500.00.
[9.3]
He paid an amount of R50,000.00 as contribution towards the
applicant’s relocation cost.
[9.4]
He transferred the sum of R3,080,000.00 into an investment account
nominated by the applicant and made payment
of the associated
administration fees and taxes. (These funds are not to be accessed or
utilised by the applicant pending the finalisation
of the divorce
action.)
[10]
The applicant, while disclosing the conclusion of the settlement
agreement, contends that she was manipulated
into signing it. She
nevertheless confirms that the respondent purchased the immovable
property and caused it to be registered
in her name, and that he
continues to pay her monthly medical aid contributions.
[11]
Furthermore, the applicant confirms that the transfer of the
investment funds was effected, and that the
parties are agreed she
may not access these funds pending the finalisation of the divorce.
[12]
The applicant has, however, failed to disclose in her founding
affidavit the balance of the sums paid by
the respondent, and she has
not disclosed that she is possessed of an investment to the value of
R4,000,000.00, derived from an
inheritance, or what returns this
investment yields.
[13] It
is common cause that this latter investment is excluded from the
applicant’s estate for the purposes
of calculating the accrual.
[14]
The applicant’s R4,000,000.00 investment, derived from an
inheritance, was disclosed not by the applicant
herself, but by the
respondent in his sworn statement. The applicant then elected to
address the content of the respondent’s
sworn statement in what
she styled as a replying affidavit, to which the respondent in turn
delivered a supplementary affidavit.
Legal principles
[15]
Each Rule 43
application falls to be determined on its own facts.
Despite this,
certain
foundational principles governing such applications have become
well-established in our courts. These principles are,
inter
alia
:
[15.1]
The purpose of Rule 43 applications is to provide swift,
effective
and inexpensive relief in matrimonial matters, pending the
finalisation of the main action.
[1]
[15.2]
Rule 43 contemplates brevity. Affidavits should approximate
the form
of a declaration or plea and should contain only such information as
is strictly necessary for the court to make an equitable
interim
determination. Prolixity and unnecessary detail are to be
avoided.
[2]
[15.3]
Prolixity in a Rule 43 proceeding constitutes an abuse of
process
because it defeats the very purpose and object of the Rule.
[3]
[15.4]
There is tendency in Rule 43 applications for parties, whether
acting
expediently or strategically, to misrepresent the true nature of
their financial affairs.
T
his
often takes the form of an exaggeration of expenses or an
understatement of income, only to be corrected later when confronted
with contrary evidence. Such conduct undermines the integrity of Rule
43 proceedings. Consequently, applicants who seek equitable
relief
under Rule 43 are under a duty to act with the utmost good faith
(
uberrima
fides
).
They must make a full and frank disclosure of all material facts
relating to their financial affairs. A failure to do so, whether
by
misstatement or omission, means that the applicant approaches the
court with unclean hands, and on that basis alone a court
is
justified in refusing relief.
[4]
[15.5]
A fundamental principle underpinning any award of maintenance
is the
consideration not only of the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to pay, but equally the demonstrated
need of
the party claiming maintenance.
[5]
[15.6]
Maintenance claims must be reasonable and moderate. Extravagant,
inflated, or unjustified claims may undermine the entire
application.
[6]
[15.7]
There should be a level playing field in relation to party
representation.
[7]
The
scale upon which the parties litigate, and the manner in which the
trial proceeds, must take proper account of the respective
means of
the parties.
[8]
[15.8]
Rule 43 applications deviate from ordinary motion proceedings
in that
they do not permit the filing of a third set of affidavits. This
underscores the duty on an applicant to place all pertinent
information before the court in the founding affidavit.
[9]
[15.9]
As stated, an applicant in Rule 43 proceedings bears an
obligation to
act with the utmost good faith and to make full and frank disclosure
of his or her financial position. The penalty
for such non-disclosure
may be as severe as the outright refusal of the application.
[10]
[16]
It is against the backdrop of the foregoing principles, the
voluminous papers placed before this Court, and
the arguments
advanced on behalf of the parties that this matter falls to be
determined.
Prolixity
[17] In
terms of Rule 43, an applicant is required to deliver a sworn
statement in the nature of a declaration,
setting out the relief
claimed and the grounds therefor, while the respondent’s sworn
statement is to take the form of a
plea. Such statements are intended
to be concise. The parties are accordingly obliged to place before
the court only such evidence
and information as is necessary and
relevant for the determination of the application, and to refrain
from prolix, verbose, or
irrelevant matter.
[18]
Both parties’ sworn statements, which include the supplementary
affidavits filed, fall foul of the
principles outlined above.
[19]
The applicant’s sworn statement extends over nineteen pages, of
which approximately eleven are devoted
to irrelevant allegations
concerning her employment history, alcoholism, and the respondent’s
alleged role therein. In all
of these pages of unnecessary matter, no
information whatsoever is furnished regarding the applicant’s
investment and the
return it yields. This omission is striking as it
cannot be denied that such information is essential, as it bears
directly on
the applicant’s need for maintenance and her
ability to maintain herself.
[20] In
response, the respondent delivered a sworn statement spanning fifty
pages, much of which is characterised
by verbosity and unnecessary
elaboration, extending well beyond what is required for the purpose
of a Rule 43 application.
[21]
The respondent’s sworn statement, which disclosed the
applicant’s investment and the balance
of the payments made to
her, prompted the applicant to file a replying affidavit. This
replying affidavit spans a further nineteen
pages. In turn, the
respondent delivered yet another sworn statement, styled a
supplementary affidavit.
[22]
The circumstances of this application, as reflected in the numerous
and lengthy affidavits before me, are
not exceptional so as to
justify the unacceptable length and content of the papers. A failure
to frame Rule 43 statements in accordance
with the spirit, purpose,
and requirements of the Rule constitutes an abuse of process.
[23]
Had the applicant made a full and frank disclosure of her financial
position, as required, there would have
been no need for either party
to deliver further affidavits. I am not persuaded that there exists
any justification for the inordinate
prolixity evident in the papers
before me.
Failure to make a full
disclosure
[24] As
appears from the preceding paragraphs, a further matter of concern is
the applicant’s misstatement
of the true nature of her
financial affairs. Not only did the applicant fail to disclose a
significant investment, and the returns
yielded by such investment,
but she also omitted to disclose the further substantial
contributions made to her by the respondent
in terms of the disputed
settlement agreement.
[25] It
is a common feature of Rule 43 applications that parties inflate
their expenses or understate their income,
only later, when
confronted with contrary evidence, seeking to amend and supplement
their papers through the filing of further
affidavits. Such a
practice is neither acceptable nor permissible.
[26]
The fact that the applicant conceded, only in a replying affidavit,
which is ordinarily not permitted, and
only after the disclosure was
made by the respondent, that she holds an investment of R4,000,000.00
and has received further sums
and contributions from the respondent,
demonstrates that the applicant failed to make a full and frank
disclosure of her finances
in her founding affidavit. The applicant
accordingly approaches this Court with unclean hands.
[27]
Such conduct undermines the integrity of Rule 43 proceedings and of
court orders granted pursuant thereto.
It follows that where an
applicant fails to act with the requisite candour, the relief sought
may properly be refused outright.
[28]
Rule 43 empowers the court to “
dismiss the application or
make such order as it thinks fit to ensure a just and expeditious
decision
.” The discretion is essentially an equitable one
and must be exercised judicially, with due regard to all relevant
considerations.
Conclusion
[29] On
the limited information disclosed by the applicant, it is impossible
for this Court to determine whether
the applicant has a need for
maintenance and, if so, in what amount, and consequently whether the
respondent is in a position to
meet such a need.
[30] A
claim for a contribution towards legal costs flows from the duty of
support owed between spouses and must
take proper account of the
respective means of the parties. Given this Court’s inability
to determine the applicant’s
means, her claim for a
contribution towards legal costs cannot be determined.
[31]
Having considered the evidence and the authorities cited above, I am
unable to find that the applicant has
established the requisite need
for maintenance or for a contribution towards her legal costs.
Order
In the result, I make the
following order:
1.
The application is struck off the roll.
2.
No order as to costs is made.
Z MARX DU PLESSIS
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date of
hearing:
12 August 2025
Date of
order:
17 August 2025
APPEARANCES
On behalf of the
applicant:
Adv M Coetzee
On behalf of the
respondent: Adv S Barreiro
[1]
Taute
v Taute 1974(2) 675 (EC)
[2]
Colman
v Colman 1967(1) SA 291 (c) at 292A
[3]
Smit
v Smit 1978(2) SA720 (W)
[4]
Du
Preez v Du Preez (16043/2008) [2008] ZAGPHC 334
[5]
Buttner
v Buttner 2006 (3) SA 23 (SCA)
[6]
Carstens
v Carstens 1985 2 SA 351 (SE)
[7]
Nicholson
v Nicholson
1998 (1) SA 48
(W) at 50C-G
[8]
Glazer
v Glazer 1959(3)(SA) 928 (W)
[9]
E
v E and related matters 2019 3 All SA 519
[10]
Du
Preez v Du Preez
2009 (6) SA 28
(T)
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