Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1003South Africa
E.C.J.S v Q.H.W.S (21421/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1003 (22 September 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
22 September 2025
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## E.C.J.S v Q.H.W.S (21421/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1003 (22 September 2025)
E.C.J.S v Q.H.W.S (21421/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1003 (22 September 2025)
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sino date 22 September 2025
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
Number: 21421/2020
(1) REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/NO
DATE:
22-09-2025
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
E[...]
C[...] J[...] S[...]
Applicant
and
H[...]
W[...] S[...]
Respondent
JUDGMENT
NKOSI
AJ
1.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application in terms of Rule 43 (1) (b) of the Uniform
Rules of Court which
provides that:
"1 This rule
shall apply whenever a spouse seeks relief from Court in respect of
one or more of the following matters: -
(a)
.......
(b)
A contribution towards the costs of a matrimonial action, pending or
about to be instituted;
(c)
...........
(d)
[2]
The parties are married to each other and there is a pending divorce
action instituted
by the Applicant. The action has been pending
finalisation since the year 2020 when combined summons was issued.
[3]
The Applicant prays for an order directing the Respondent to
contribute towards her
costs of the divorce action. She has argued
that the costs amount to R 2 000 000.00 (Two million
rand). The application
is opposed by the Respondent.
BRIEF
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
[4]
The Applicant is a Human Resource Management Consultant in the motor
industry. She
renders services on a contractual basis through M[...],
a Close Corporation of which she is the sole member. She resides in
Somerset,
Western Cape in her bonded property.
[5]
The Respondent is a specialist consultant in dams and hydro-power, is
an engineer
and a business man who serves as a director and
shareholder in various local and international companies. He is also
a Trustee
and beneficiary of a Trust. He is currently residing in the
United Kingdom.
[6]
The parties got married to each other on 17 January 2010 out of
community of property
with the accrual system applicable to their
marriage. I must add that the interpretation of the antenuptial
agreement is in dispute.
[7]
Sometime in February 2020, the Respondent left the common home and in
May 2020, the
Applicant issued the divorce summons.
[8]
The Respondent resides in the United Kingdon in a property worth
about R20 000
000.00. It would seen he owns 50% of its value and
the other half is owned by his current romantic partner. The
Applicant lives
in the Western Cape in her bonded property worth R3
000 000.00.
[9]
The Respondent owns several properties locally and abroad, the total
value of which
amounts to millions of rands. One of his local
properties worth more than R2 900 000.00 has been left
vacant for years.
[10]
Ever since his desertion, the Applicant has been solely responsible
for her monthly expenses
including her medical needs because the
Respondent removed her as a beneficiary on his medical aid. Further,
she owes her current
and past Legal Practitioners legal costs
relating to the divorce action effectively without a cost
contribution from the Respondent.
The Respondent has argued that she
is able to finance her divorce action adequately from her own
financial resources.
[11]
According to the Applicant, the parties lived a lavish lifestyle
characterised by frequent overseas
trips and a taste for opulence.
Most of her personal expenses were catered and paid for by the
Respondent. She was then accustomed
to the opulent lifestyle.
FACTORS
TO BE CONSIDERED
[12]
The list of factors to be considered in Rule 43(1)(b) application is
not constrained but unlimited
depending on peculiar circumstances of
each case.
[13]
The cause for the delay in finalising the matrimonial action, the
complexity of the issues to
be determined by Court and the
anticipated legal costs required to finalise the matter are some of
the factors to be taken into
account.
[14]
An accusation was levelled against the Respondent to the effect that
he is deliberately stalling
the finalisation of the divorce action.
It is conceivable that a party's conduct which is geared towards
frustrating the finalisation
of a matrimonial matter with the
intention to cause the opponent to succumb, may be a factor to be
considered by the Court. A party
who flexes financial muscle as a
show of strength with no regard to the expeditious finalisation of a
matrimonial matter will lead
the Court to come to the aid of the
vulnerable party to promote and protect that party's constitutional
right.
[15]
It was argued by Applicant's counsel and correctly so that factors a
Court normally considers
when adjudicating upon a claim of this
nature include:
15.1
the financial resources of both parties;
15.2
the level of complexity in the divorce case, and
15.3
the anticipated expenses for proper legal representation.
[16]
An investigation into these factors is intended to enable the spouse
to litigate on equal footing
with the other party. This will correct
a marked imbalance of financial resources necessary for a spouse to
litigate. In so doing
a spouse's right to equality and equal
protection of the law which are at the heart of a Rule 43 application
will be achieved and
the Applicant's right to dignity restored.
[17]
In BJM v WRM
[1]
Bezuidenhout AJ
stated:
"In Cary
[2]
Doney AJ referred to constitutional imperatives ... observed at the
outset that he was required to exercise his discretion under
Rule 43
in the light of the fundamental right to equality and equal
protection before the law. He held that...-
"...Applicant is
entitled to a contribution towards her costs which will ensure the
quality of arms in the divorce action against
her husband. The
Applicant will not be able to present her case fairly unless she is
empowered to investigate the Respondent's
financial affairs through
the financial accountant appointed by her..."."
[18]
The decision in Carey's case supports the principle established in
Van Rippen v Van Rippen
[3]
namely that the financially disadvantaged spouse should be enabled to
adequately present her case uninhibited by lack of funds
in
particular where the other spouse has the financial means.
FINANCIAL
RESOURCES OF THE PARTIES
[19]
The Respondent completed a Financial Disclosure Form ("FDF")
on 24 July 2020 and took
an oath to confirm that its contents were
true, complete, and correct
[4]
.
He disclosed that his net assets amounted to R 34 323 517.00. This
amount comprises of: -
19.1
Fixed property - R 13 083 500.00;
19.2
Personal assets - R 19 113 037.00;
19.3
Business interests - R 3 420 000.00;
19.4
Pension interest- R 4 141 940.00; and
His total liabilities
amount to R 5 434 960.00.
[20]
However, it is evidently clear from the Applicant's submissions that
the sum of the disclosed
assets is not conclusive and therefore
unreliable.
[21]
He is a director of various companies, namely A[...] Construction Eng
(Pty) Ltd, A[...] Investment
cc, and A[...] Dam (Pty) Ltd. There is a
marked difference between what he declared in his FDF of 2020
compared to his FDF of 2025.
He failed to mention the value of his
shareholding in A[...] Construction Eng (Pty) Ltd and A[...] Dam
(Pty) Ltd. He has also failed
to declare the value of his property in
France in his FDF of 2025.
[22]
A further complicating factor is the lack of full disclosure about
the unbundling of A[...] Construction
Eng (Pty) Ltd, which gave birth
to many private companies. He retained interest in all these private
companies, yet the monetary
value of his shareholding is not
disclosed. This leads me to believe that there are huge sums of money
not being disclosed, compared
to the assets mentioned in the 2020
FDF. His expenditures are also not fully disclosed in his FDF of
2020. I cannot therefore conclude
that there is a clear picture of
his assets and liabilities either in respect of the 2020 or 2025 FDF.
[23]
In Du Preez v Du Preez
[5]
Murphy
J said:
"...A
misstatement of one aspect of relevant information invariably will
colour other aspects with the possible result that
fairness will not
be done. Consequently, I would assume, there is a duty on applicants
in Rule 43 applications seeking equitable
redress to act with the
utmost good faith and to disclose fully all material information
regarding their financial affairs. Any
false disclosure or material
non-disclosure would mean that he or she is not before the Court with
"clean hands" and
on that ground alone the Court will be
justified in refusing relief."
[24]
The Applicant's net assets, are declared in her FDF and amount to
R 4 464 665.00.
The major assets are her fixed
property, worth R4 400 000.00. She has personal assets and business
interests amounting to R3 041
670.00 and R51 614.00,
respectively. Her liabilities, mainly the bond, amount to R3 028
619.00.
[25]
She is the sole member of M[...] CC, which is the main source of her
monthly income. M[...] also
pays a substantial amount for her monthly
expenses. In her FDF of 2020, her monthly income was R65 000.00, and
the annual revenue
was R2 700 000.00. The 2025 FDF
discloses a monthly income of R48 056.37 and R950 000.00 in
respect of revenue.
[26]
She explained the decline in her monthly income and revenue by
stating that it is inherent in
the nature of her business which is
mainly consultancy services offered to the motor industry. Her
services are engaged as and
when they are required.
[27]
She was criticised for inaccurate disclosure of her income and
expenses and correctly so. This
became apparent when counsel for the
Respondent demonstrated that it was not possible for the Applicant to
have been granted a
loan by the bank to purchase a house for R3 000
000.00 whilst earning a monthly salary of R 19 747.41 and having
monthly expenditure
of R64 345.00. Her explanation amounted to a
concession that indeed her monthly income was understated. She
submitted that the
said monthly expenditures were paid by M[...] on
her behalf. The Court invited her to produce a copy of her
application for the
said loan. The application was not disclosed.
However, it was only available on the third day of the Court hearing.
I accept her
explanation why the application was not available in the
first place. She produced proof of her efforts to retrieve a copy of
the
application months before the hearing of this application.
[28]
The loan application revealed that her monthly income was R73 000.00
as on 11 January 2021, when she
applied for a loan of R3 000 000.00.
This suggest that her annual income was R876 000.00, compared to R1
780 619.00 disclosed in
her 2020 FDF and R576 676.20 estimated annual
income as indicated in the 2025 FDF.
[29]
In CA v HA
[6]
the Court went
further and said:
"In a Rule 43
proceedings, it is prudent that the Court should be satisfied that an
applicant acts in good faith. Thus, an
applicant simply cannot afford
to omit facts in the founding affidavit that are vital to the
application. Surely, if the applicant
was willing not to reveal
certain facts in her founding affidavit, she must certainly be
willing not to be frank about weighty
facts that would reveal the
true state of her finances".
[30]
What the Court said in CA v HA is distinguishable from the
circumstances of the present case.
In this matter, there is no
indication that the Applicant is unwilling to disclose details of her
financial affairs. She has been
correctly criticised for inaccuracies
in her disclosure but not failure to disclose at all. The differences
do not amount to large
sums which would have influenced the amount of
cost contribution she is asking for and compelled me to conclude that
she has the
means to fund her legal costs.
[31]
In my considered view, the inaccuracies do not lead me to believe
that she is acting in bad faith.
Material facts relating to her
source of income, assets, and expenses were disclosed, but the source
for the payment of her expenses
were inaccurately stated.
Furthermore, the amount of her annual income was incorrect. As I have
already stated, the difference
between what is disclosed and
uncovered does not significantly put her in a better financial
position. Instead, her true financial
affairs justify this
application.
LEVEL
OF COMPLEXITY
[32]
The Respondent is linked to at least ten companies and a Trust.
A[...] (Pty) Ltd is not mentioned
in the divorce pleadings. The value
of his shareholding is not stated in monetary form but only in
percentages. His real income
remains a mystery, and the Applicant is
justified to call for an investigation. These companies are spread
across many oversees
countries. A forensic investigation into the
true state of the financial affairs of the Respondent is necessary
and it can only
be conducted by a qualified professional team.
[33]
Having regard to the Applicant's constitutional rights to equality
before the law, equal protection
of the law, and the right to dignity
which in the circumstances of this case may not be achieved in the
absence of equal arms,
I am of the view that an investigation into
the financial affairs of the Respondent should be undertaken to
unravel the intricate
business structure created by the Respondent.
ANTICIPATED
COSTS
[34]
The Applicant seeks a contribution towards the costs of her legal
team and the costs for investigating
the financial affairs of the
Respondent.
[35]
She received a quotation from ACT Solutions Pretoria Inc for the
envisaged investigation. The
total estimate costs amount to R1 007
500.00. There is nothing of note to suggest that the quotation is
exaggerated. The Applicant
will suffer prejudice if the envisaged
investigation is not undertaken. A possible settlement of the divorce
action is unlikely
at this stage and if achieved, it would not be
grounded on fairness for as long as the true state of the financial
affairs of the
Respondent are not known.
[36]
In respect of attorney's costs, I am referred to a document entitled:
"Estimate of fees
and disbursements due to Messis Loots Basson attorneys, attorneys for
the plaintiff, draw as between attorney
and client
[7]
."
I
have not been referred to a proforma invoice for fees and
disbursements for the divorce action which should have been presented
to the Applicant by her Legal Practitioner before the prosecution of
the divorce action. A fee agreement between the Applicant
and her
Legal Practitioner has not been referred to in her heads of argument
and no copy thereof before Court.
[37]
The attorney's estimates consist of several items which amount to
R1 421 327.30. The
fees amount to R210 343.00 and
disbursements R1 210 984.30 largely because of the investigation
costs I already referred to
and Counsel's costs. In the absence of a
fee agreement between the Applicant and the attorney, I am compelled
to scrutinize the
attorney's estimates.
[38]
I noticed that the attorney charges R2 900.00 per hour and counsel
charges R3 500.00 per
hour. It seems to me that the attorney is
senior and should have a right of appearance in the High Court. If
not, then he qualifies
to receive such a right of appearance. That
being said I am aware of a litigant's right to legal representation
by a legal representative
of her choice, but I have not heard from
the Applicant why her attorney could not appear in Court instead of
Counsel. The Respondent
has not made submissions about the
Applicant's lack of efforts to mitigate the legal costs.
[39]
Counsel for the Respondent challenged the reasonableness of the costs
of the investigation whose
submission caught the attention of the
Court. I am equally concerned by the fact that the Applicant has not
demonstrated any cost
saving measures on her part.
[40]
The Applicant has not utilised the remedies provided for in Uniform
Rule 35(3) and Rule 21. If
applied effectively the Applicant would
most probably obtain the records relating to the financial affairs of
the Respondent and
consequently the costs envisaged for the
investigation would be considerably reduced. These rules set time
frames within which
to comply and failure to comply has serious
consequences which may lead to the strike out of the party's defence
with costs.
[41]
It was further submitted by counsel for the Respondent that an order
for costs of this application
on an attorney and client scale will
amount to a duplication if the Applicant is awarded the entire amount
sought. I support her
submission. It is clear from the proforma
invoice of the Legal Practitioner that a significant number of
sections on caselines
relate to both the divorce action and the Rule
43 application. A duplication of the legal costs should therefore be
avoided.
CONCLUSION
[42]
The FDF of the Respondent confirmed that he is a man of financial
means and can meet not only
his legal costs but those of the
Applicant as well. The Applicant's counsel correctly submitted that
the Applicant seeks contribution
towards legal fees of R 2 000 000,00
and not merely the payment of the full R 2 000 000,00. My view is
that the Applicant is able
to cover a negligible amount towards her
legal costs compared to the financial strength of the Respondent.
[43]
Considering the amount which may be allowed when a bill of costs of
this application is taxed
or settled, the fact that the Respondent is
able to contribute some amount towards her cost, the existence of
alternative means
to save a portion of the costs of investigation and
a possibility of the divorce action being settled and unopposed, I am
of the
view that a reasonable cost contribution should be
R2 000 000.00 less 25%. Any perceived shortfall or
overcharge in the
award will be mitigated by an order that, payment
be made in four equal instalments.
[44]
This matter was heard on 15 September 2025 and the parties had agreed
in their joint minute that
the hearing would last only 1 hour.
However, the matter was heard and rolled over to the next day. On 16
September 2025 the matter
was further rolled over to 17 September
2025 partly heard and eventually finalised on that day. The agreed
duration for the hearing
was exceeded by approximately 5 hours. I
will therefore not benefit either party by ordering costs of the
application which exceed
1 hour in order to demonstrate the Courts
displeasure.
[45]
The Applicant has provided the Court with a draft order which does
not stipulate any amount but
suggests that an amount awarded may be
paid in instalments. Regarding costs, Counsel for the Applicant
argues that the Respondent
should be ordered to pay the costs of this
application on an attorney and client scale. The Court is not
persuaded that in the
circumstances of this case a punitive cost
order is warranted.
ORDER
[46]
For the reasons aforementioned, I make the following order:
1.
The Respondent is to make a contribution towards the Applicant's
legal costs
in the amount of R1 500 000.00 paid in four equal
instalments of R375 000.00 with the first instalment payable on or
before the
11
th
of October 2025 and subsequent payments to
be made on or before the 7
th
of each subsequent month.
2.
The contribution set out in paragraph 1 above is to be paid into the
Trust Account
of the Applicant's attorney of record, Loots Basson
Attorneys Inc.
3.
The Respondent shall pay the costs of the application including
Counsel's costs
on a party and party scale C which costs shall
include the cost of the hearing on the 15 September 2025 only.
NKOSI
AJ
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
PRETORIA
Date
of Hearing 15, 16, 17 September 2025
Date
of Judgement: 22 September 2025
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
Adv
Riani Ferrerra
Instructed
by
Loots
Basson Attorneys Inc
Email
ilarie@lootsbasonattorneys.co.za
For
the Respondent:
Adv C
Van Schalkwyk
Instructed
by
BronwynMay
Attorneys Inc
Email
bmay@bronwynmay.co.za
admin@bronwynmay.co.za
[1]
BJM v WRM 2023 JDR1316 (GJ) at para 44)
[2]
Cary v Cary 1999 (3) SA615(C)
[3]
Van Rippen v Van Rippen 1949(4) SA 634 (C)
[4]
Caseline 03-211
[5]
Du Preez v Du Preez 2009(6) SA 28 (GNP) at para 16
[6]
CA v HA (5578/2022)
[2024] ZAWCHC 25
(6 February 2024) at para 27.
[7]
Caseline 01-41q
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