Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1101South Africa
S v Mugadui (Sentence) (CC25/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1101 (25 September 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
25 September 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## S v Mugadui (Sentence) (CC25/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1101 (25 September 2025)
S v Mugadui (Sentence) (CC25/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1101 (25 September 2025)
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sino date 25 September 2025
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: CC25/2023
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES /
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
DATE:
25/09/2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
STATE
V
RUDA
JOAO
MUGADUI
ACCUSED
SENTENCE
MOSOPA J
[1]
On the 20 June 2025, the accused was
convicted of murder in terms of section 51(1) and Part 1 of Schedule
2 of Act 105 of 1997,
after pleading guilty to the charge levelled
against her.
[2]
The accused is these proceedings is still
represented by Mr Botha from the Legal Aid, South Africa. The state
is represented by
Mr Lalane from the Director of Public Prosecutions,
Pretoria.
[3]
The trial occasioned a number of
postponements at the instance of both the state and the defence.
Initially the state sought a report
to confirm if the accused herself
was a victim of human trafficking, taking into consideration the
manner that she was brought
into the country. Such report was never
presented to this court and the trial of the accused commenced.
Before the conviction of
the accused, the defence expert witness
relocated and went back stay in Canada. That also delayed the
finalisation of the matter.
[4]
The accused did not testify in mitigation
of sentence. The defence led the evidence of an expert witness
Professor Gerard Labuschagne,
a Clinical Psychologist. The witness
testified through a link from Canada, after both the state and the
defence agreed that his
evidence can be obtained in that manner.
[5]
Professor Labuschagne confirmed to have
compiled a report in 2024, but it was dated 15 October 2025, which
was a typing error, and
was supposed to read 15 October 2024. The
report was admitted into evidence and marked as Exhibit ‘C’.
In the report
it was stated that the accused was born on 13 November
2004 in Chibavar District, Mozambique. She lived there until she came
to
live in South Africa in June 2021. Her parents are still alive
residing in Mozambique. Her father was in the military and is now
a
pensioner and her mother is a housewife.
[6]
They made ends meet through subsistence
farming. She is the second eldest of six children born to her
parents. Her older brother
passed away, even though no year
specified. Her four younger siblings all reside in Mozambique. Her
home language is Ndau which
is similar to Shona language. She grew in
a household without electricity or running water. Her family house
was a mud structure
with grass or thatch roofing. Her family home
consisted of three huts, one for her parents, the other one for her
and the other
for her siblings.
[7]
She completed primary school and went
immediately to high school. She failed grade 10 twice, and it was
during her third attempt
that she came to South Africa for marriage
purposes. Her high school was an hour walk away from their residence.
She reported no
disciplinary problems at school and indicated that
the reason she failed grade 10 twice was because she struggled with
Mathematics
and English. She does not have any health problems and
does not consume alcohol. She does not have previous convictions.
[8]
She entered illegally in the country by
crossing the boarder into the country. She was transported by a taxi
to Tembisa and that
is when she met the deceased for the first time.
The deceased told her that he has 5 wives and 19 children and
grandchildren, and
he was also a traditional healer. She describes
her marriage relationship as one characterized by conflict, which
included verbal
fights, threats of harm towards her including threats
to be killed and assaults. The deceased would regularly consume
alcohol,
and the fights will occur within the drinking context.
[9]
Under the nature of interpersonal violence,
with the following risk factors, intimidation, threats, physical
harm, sexual harm,
severe intimate partner violence, chronic intimate
partner violence, and intimate partner violence related- supervision
violence,
the presence of risk factor was found under chronic
intimate partner violence by the accused. It is further indicated
under this
risk factor that, “while there is a history of
intimate partner violence in the relationship, it appears that the
deceased
was the instigator of this, and the accused the victim
thereof.
[10]
It was also found that the accused has none
of the risk factors associated with a concern future intimate partner
violence and that
the likelihood for reoffending is low considering
the significant absence of risk factors.
[11]
In cross-examination, Professor Labuschagne
conceded that the “Buttered Woman Syndrome is not applicable
in
casu
. He further conceded that what the
accused did was avoidable as that was not the only option, of killing
the deceased. She could
have for example run away. She was young at
that stage, and some other psychological aspects could have played a
role. He maintained
that the accused is a suitable candidate for
rehabilitation. The accused closed her case after the testimony of
Professor Labuschagne
in mitigation of sentence.
[12]
The state in aggravation of sentence led
the evidence of M[...] S[...] S[...] who is the child of the
deceased. She did not physically
meet with the accused but used to
see her photographs and was seeing the accused for the first time at
court. She stays in Tembisa,
South Africa. She read into record the
Victim Impact Statement that she prepared, wherein she said the
following, that she misses
the memories she had with the deceased.
When she was told that her father was murdered, she felt that it was
a lie. She was shattered
inside, and she could not bear it. The
deceased did not get time to meet his grandchildren, and they also
did not get a chance
of meeting him. She misses her father’s
morning telephonic calls, when he will enquire if everything was fine
with her.
[13]
On court’s questions she contradicted
the Clinical psychological report about the number of wives his
father married. According
to her, her father was married to four
wives, and the accused was the fourth wife, as opposed to five wives.
They never as a family
received any letter from the accused
apologising in relation to her conduct which resulted in the killing
of her father. After
the evidence, the state closed its case.
[14]
It is trite that in sentencing an offender
the point of departure is to consider the offender, the offence and
the interests of
society. (
S v Zinn
1969(2) SA 537 (A))
[15]
I determined the age of the accused at the
time of the commission of the offence as 18 years and 2 months. This
means that when
she arrived in the country she was 17 years in June
2021. I still find it peculiar when accused failed to inform us of
her correct
age which necessitated the age to be determined by court.
She gave Professor Labuschagne her correct age in 2024 when the
report
was compiled and also the fact that she had to repeat grade
10, on two occasions. But when she appeared before Dr Lukhozi in
2025,
she only informed her of the date and month she was born. This
conduct, Professor Labuschagne, deem it as an act of dishonesty.
[16]
The accused was very young and of a school
going age when she was forced into a marriage by her family and the
family of the deceased.
She was brought into the country illegally.
The accused after meeting with the deceased, realised for the first
time that her husband
is not of her age but a person who qualifies to
be her grandfather. She was isolated from her family, and her freedom
of movement
was restricted by the accused. She suffered a series of
assault at the hands of the deceased, and her neighbours saw injuries
on
her occasioned by such assaults.
[17]
The deceased was excessively using alcohol,
and such assaults will occur in the context of alcohol consumption.
Her right to communicate
with he outside world, more especially with
her family was curtailed by the deceased in that he did not allow her
to possess a
cell phone. She initially lied as to what happened after
murdering the deceased to the deceased’s son, but did not
persist
with such lie in this court as she fully took responsibility
of her actions. The deceased did not want the accused to have
friends,
and she could not visit her family members. She only
realised that she was pregnant with the child of the deceased after
her arrest.
She has since given birth to that child, who is now with
her family in Mozambique. The accused was denied a right to raise her
own child due to her incarceration.
[18]
The murder was a result of the accused
answering the phone belonging to the deceased, a conduct which the
deceased did not appreciate.
The accused assaulted her several times
with an iron bar. The chief post-mortem findings on the body were,
three lacerations frontal
area, one is 8cm and penetrates the frontal
lobes of the brain with the two other blows 3cm wide. The pathologist
was of the view
that, axe was possibly used as an attack weapon. The
skull is fractured, frontal bone left and right and linear fracture
of the
right perennial bone. The brain is lacerated with diffuse
subarachnoid bleeding present. The cause of death was found to be
head
injury by sharp trauma-unnatural.
[19]
The injures sustained by the deceased as
can be gleaned from scene photo album, which was admitted into
evidence and post-mortem
findings, is an indication that the deceased
died a brutal and painful death. The section 112 statement does not
indicate the time
of his death, whether the deceased was under the
influence of alcohol or not. What we know is that he has just used
the bathroom
before he was murdered.
[20]
According to the photographer who took
scene photographs, he received a request to attend a scene of murder
at 2am and arrived there
at 02:35am. Taking into account these
timelines, it is possible that this murder occurred in the early
hours of the morning under
the thickness of darkness, when majority
of people were sleeping. According to the accused he fell on the bed,
and she covered
her with blankets. However, scene photo album tells a
different story, and shows a person sleeping inside the blankets.
There is
not much emphasis which can be placed on this aspect by this
court as the state accepted the circumstances of the murder as
outlined
by the accused in the section 112 statement.
[21]
The death of the deceased had a negative
impact on the life of his family. He was married to various wives,
but the court did not
have the benefit of hearing how it impacted on
the lives of the wives and other children of the deceased. What also
shocked this
court is the fact that the daughter of the deceased did
not visit her father after getting married to the accused and was
seeing
the accused for the first time here at court. This is
surprising taking into account that her mother was in a polygamous
marriage
with the deceased and she is not the first wife.
[22]
This murder is the kind that can be
classified under Gender Based Violence crimes. The Government
annually highlights the dangers
of Gender Based Violence crimes, but
majority of the people choose not adhere to this calling. According
to Professor Labuschagne
this is one of the murders that could have
been avoided by the accused, by for example running away from the
deceased. Based on
the findings by Professor Labuschagne, the
contention by Mr Botha that the accused as a young person, not
speaking any of the languages
in South Africa and her movement
restricted, is with no merit. There were many times when the accused
could be with the neighbours,
and this will be in the absence of the
accused as she was not allowed to leave the house. This could have
been a perfect time for
her to flee the abuse she was suffering at
the hands of the accused. Her uncle according to Professor
Labuschagne report, was domiciled
in the country.
[23]
Gender Based Violence crimes is a serious
thorn in the flesh of the government. Legislature has now amended Act
105 of 1997, to
prescribe imprisonment for life if murder is in the
context of domestic relationship. Actions of the deceased when
assaulting the
accused cannot be condoned as that, also amounted to
Gender Based Violence crimes. It is not clear as to why the accused
neighbours
did not report such abuse to the police, as the law makes
it mandatory to report such if someone had witnessed such abuse
taking
place. Marriages within the customary context involves the
families. The abuse suffered by the accused persisted for a very
lengthy
period of time, but there was no intervention from both the
family of the deceased and that of the accused.
[24]
When sentencing an offender, the court need
also to cater for the interests of society. The society expects
serious crimes to be
punished severely, and this in my view is a
reasonable expectation taking into account a high rate of commission
of violent crimes
in this country. In
S
v Mhlakaza
[1997] 2 ALL SA 185
(A)
;
“
The
object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion but to serve
the public interest. A sentencing policy that caters predominantly
or
exclusively for public opinion is inherently flawed. It remains the
court's duty to impose fearlessly an appropriate and fair
sentence,
even if the sentence does not satisfy the public. In this context the
approach expressed in
S v Makwanyane &
Another
[1995] ZACC 3
;
1995 (2) SACR 1
(CC) par 87-89
(per Chaskalson P) applies mutatis mutandis: public opinion may have
some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself,
it is no substitute
for the duty vested in the court; the court cannot allow itself to be
diverted from its duty to act as an independent
arbiter by making
choices on the basis that they will find favour with the public.”
Further that;
“
Given
the current levels of violence and serious crimes in this country, it
seems proper that, in sentencing especially such crimes,
the emphasis
should be on retribution and deterrence.”
[25]
In
S v Karg
1961 (1) SA 231
(A)
it was said that,
if sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration
of justice may fall into disrepute and injured
persons may inclined
to take the law into their own hands.
[26]
The court in
S
v SMM
2013 (2) SACR 292
(SCA) at
para 13
, when dealing with sentence
stated,
“
I hasten to add
that it is trite that each case must be decided on its own merits. It
is also self-evident that sentence must always
be individualised, for
punishment must always fit the crime, the criminal and the
circumstances of the case. It is equally
important to remind
ourselves that sentencing should always be considered and passed
dispassionately, objectively and upon a careful
consideration of all
relevant factors. Public sentiment cannot be ignored, but it can
never be permitted to displace the careful
judgment and fine
balancing that are involved in arriving at an appropriate sentence.
Courts must therefore always strive
to arrive at a sentence
which is just and fair to both the victim and the perpetrator, has
regard to the nature of the crime and
takes account of the interests
of society. Sentencing involves a very high degree of responsibility
which should be carried out
with equanimity. As Corbett JA put it
in
S v Rabie
:
'A judicial
officer should not approach punishment in a spirit of anger because,
being human, that will make it difficult for
him to achieve that
delicate balance between the crime, the criminal and the interests of
society which his task and the objects
of punishment demand of him.
Nor should he strive after severity; nor, on the other hand,
surrender to misplaced pity. While not
flinching from firmness, where
firmness is called for, he should approach his task with a humane and
compassionate understanding
of human frailties and the pressures
of society which contribute to criminality.'
[27]
At verdict stage, I made a pronouncement
that the murder in this matter falls squarely within the purview of
section 51(1) in that
the deceased was in a domestic relationship
with the accused when he was murdered. Murder
in
casu
, was committed in January 2022.
The Act was amended on the 05 August 2022 to include persons killed
in a domestic relationship.
The amendment does not pronounce itself
to be retrospective, meaning that the amendment is with effect from
05 August 2022.
[28]
In
Veldman
v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division
2007 (3) SA 210
(CC) para 26
, Mokgoro J
stated;
“
[26]
Generally, legislation is not to be interpreted to extinguish
existing rights and obligations. This is so unless
the statute
provides otherwise or its language clearly shows such a meaning. That
legislation will affect only future matters and
not take away
existing rights is basic to notions of fairness and justice which are
integral to the rule of law, a foundational
principle of our
Constitution. Also central to the rule of law is the principle of
legality which requires that law must be certain,
clear and stable.
Legislative enactments are intended to “give fair warning of
their effect and permit individuals to rely
on their meaning until
explicitly changed.”
[29]
Section 35(3)(n) of Constitution makes the
following provision;
“
35(3)
Every accused person has a right to a fair trial which includes the
right-
(n) to the benefit of the
least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed
punishment for the offence has been changed
between the time that the
offence was committed and the time of sentencing”
[30]
At the time of commission of this murder,
there was no prescribed sentence for killing a person who you are
with, in a domestic
relationship. But the offender could still be
sentenced to life imprisonment if the murder is premeditated or
planned, committed
by a group of people in furtherance of common
purpose. The constitutional implication to the finding I made, is
basically that
the accused cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment
as at the time of murder there was no prescribed sentence for such.
[31]
In argument, I was called upon by Mr Botha
to consider the circumstances under which the accused was brought
into the country, arranged
marriage, age of the accused, abuse at the
hands of the deceased, as admitted by the state in the accused’s
guilty plea.
The state is of the view that the accused ought to be
sentenced to the ultimate penalty, life imprisonment.
[32]
It is trite that age of the accused at
sentencing stage plays a critical role, as a teenager is
prima
facie
to be regarded as immature and
that the youthfulness of an offender will invariably be a mitigating
factor, unless it appears that
the viciousness of his or her deeds
rule out immaturity. (See
S v Matyityi
2011(1) SACR 40 (SCA)).
[33]
It cannot be ignored that the accused was
robbed the enjoyment of her youth by her family and that of the
deceased. After being
married to the deceased, she stopped with her
schooling and became a housewife. Things that are normally done by
people of her
age, she could no longer do them. Deceased forced her
to have a child which she did not want. The distance between her new
home
and family speaks volumes and she could neither communicate with
them. The deceased subjected her to, what one can refer to as “life
of a slave”. However, her actions in killing the deceased are
not justified.
[34]
Accused made it a point when killing the
deceased that he does not wake up alive, looking at the injuries
sustained by the deceased.
Despite there being a struggle between the
accused and the deceased before his death, the accused did not
sustain any injuries.
The timing of the death, the fact that it
happened at night, leaves much to be desired. Accused was at one
stage wrestling on the
floor with he deceased until she managed to
reach out to the weapon she used to kill the deceased with, and in my
view, such was
a perfect time for her to run away. But accused
instead repeatedly assaulted the deceased with the iron bar on his
head.
[35]
What also puzzled me, given the
circumstances of this murder, is to why did the accused not plead a
defence of self-defence. This
can be construed to be that accused
knew that there was no justification for her actions. However, all
these circumstances in my
considered view, excludes the imposition of
life imprisonment.
[36]
This does not mean that the accused can
escape imprisonment. I am also considering the fact that accused has
been in custody since
her arrest in January 2022, which is now 3
years and 8 months awaiting finalisation of her trial matter. I
cannot apportion delay
in finalisation of the trial matter to any
party, but delay was occasioned by systemic issues.
[37]
The accused must take this opportunity and
empower herself and finish her matric and most probably proceed to
tertiary level. Accused
must also find in herself to apologise to the
family of the deceased, for murdering the deceased. It is unfortunate
that she was
also a victim, but she could not lay criminal charges
against the deceased for her to get justice. Her status in the
country could
have been one of the elements that prohibited her from
doing that or her age. But all this is speculation as accused refused
to
testify.
[38]
Having regard to all these factors, I will
proceed to sentence the accused as follows;
1.
Murder: accused is sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment.
M.J. MOSOPA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT, PRETORIA
APPEARANCES:
For
the State :
Advocate S. Lalane
Instructed
by : Director of
Public Prosecutions
For
the accused : Mr M. Botha
Instructed
by : Legal Aid South
Africa
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