Dr Maureen Allem Inc v Lawn and Another (2025-156780) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1146 (14 October 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1146 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Dr Maureen Allem Inc v Lawn and Another (2025-156780) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1146 (14 October 2025) Dr Maureen Allem Inc v Lawn and Another (2025-156780) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1146 (14 October 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1146.html sino date 14 October 2025 FLYNOTES: LABOUR – Restraint – Confidential information and trade connections – Ac knowledged access to confidential information – Registered a new company and advertised aesthetic services – Received payments from former patients – Engaged with suppliers previously linked to former employer – New company was a vehicle for unlawful competition – Conduct breached restraint agreement – Restraint clarified as a radius and not a driving distance – Proposal to limit enforcement to three branches was reasonable – Final interdict granted. SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA Case number: 2025-156780 Date of hearing:  18 September 2025 Date delivered: 14 October 2025 (1)                REPORTABLE: YES /NO (2)                OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YES /NO (3)                REVISED DATE 14/10/25 SIGNATURE In the application between: DR MAUREEN ALLEM INC                                                         Applicant and DR LESTONN WADE LAWN                                          First Respondent DR LESTON LAWN INC                                            Second Respondent JUDGMENT SWANEPOEL J : [1]      The applicant seeks an urgent order against the respondents, restraining them from breaching a restraint of trade agreement that the first respondent entered into as an erstwhile employee of the applicant, and from unlawfully competing with the applicant. The second respondent is a company registered by the first respondent on 25 July 2025. The first respondent is the sole director of the second respondent. [2]      The applicant provides specialized services in respect of skin, body and health renewal. It employs medical practitioners to render the services on its behalf. It is common cause that on 25 August 2017 the applicant and the first respondent (a medical practitioner) entered into a written employment contract of employment (although the first respondent had been employed by the applicant since 2013). [3]      The material terms of the agreement were the following: [3.1]       The first respondent acknowledged that in the course of his employment he would become aware of the applicant’s confidential information relating to its know-how and techniques, methods, client lists,  client and business connections, trade secrets and inventions; [3.2]       The first respondent undertook not to directly or indirectly persuade, induce or incite or persuade any client of the applicant to take aways its business from the applicant; [3.3]       The first respondent undertook not to be engaged or concerned with any competitive activity in any manner during his term of employment, and for 12 months thereafter; [3.4]       The restraint would operate within 15 kilometers of any location in the Republic of South Africa in which the applicant conducted business, and all other such locations world-wide; [3.5]       The first respondent acknowledged that the restraint provisions were reasonable as to subject matter, period and territorial limitation, and was reasonably required by the applicant to protect its proprietary interests; [3.6]       In the event that the first respondent should compete unlawfully with the applicant, then the restraint period would extend to 24 months. [3.7]       A ‘competitive activity’ was defined as any activity which utilizes the confidential information, trade secrets or inventions of the applicant or an activity that has, or may have, the effect of enticing or persuading or drawing clients or prospective clients away from the applicant. [3.8]       “Confidential information’ was extremely widely defined, and comprised of virtually every possible item of information that was held by the applicant in any form, as was the concept of ‘trade secrets’. [4]      It is also not in dispute that in consideration of the restraint of trade protection, the first respondent was paid R 17 400 per month in addition to his basic salary. [5]      During January 2025 it became apparent that the first respondent’s registration with the Health Professions Council of South Africa had lapsed. Consequently, he was no longer entitled to practice as a medical practitioner. The applicant also sought to institute disciplinary steps against the first respondent on other grounds. In response to the proposed disciplinary enquiry the first respondent resigned on 27 March 2025, with the parties agreeing that that date would also be his last date of employment. [6]      On 2 April 2025 the applicant and the first respondent entered into a confidentiality agreement in terms of which the first respondent undertook to retain personal information of patients, and not to use or disclose such information. The first respondent also undertook not to contact any patient whose details he would have had access to during his employment. [7]      During August 2025 the applicant discovered that the first respondent was engaged in business activities that contravene the terms of the employment agreement. The applicant became aware of the alleged breach of the agreement when it discovered payment to the first respondent by three of the applicant’s erstwhile patients. The three payments were discovered on the first respondent’s email address that he had used when he was still employed by the applicant. [8]      The first respondent also contacted and collaborated with a supplier of the applicant on 13 August 2025. In social media posts the first respondent advertised his services in respect of “rejuvenating treatments, age-defying enhancements, or skin-perfecting solutions”. These services are apparently provided in Pretoria North. The first respondent advertised his services under the name and style of “Loving you Aesthetics Studio”, including “Beauty, cosmetics & personal care”. The business is described as a “premier concierge aesthetic service offering bespoke, high-end treatments”. [9]      On 25 August 2025 the applicant’s attorney sent the first respondent a letter recording that the first respondent was acting in breach of the restraint and demanding that he should desist from further breaching the restraint agreement. In a laconic response the first respondent’s attorney simply denied the applicant’s averments. [10]    The first respondent does not dispute that he is offering services that are similar, and in some instances identical to the services rendered by the applicant. His justification is that the services that he provides are services that a medical practitioner would typically provide and that the restraint of trade provisions preclude him from earning a livelihood in his chosen profession. [11]    The first respondent also admits having received money from two of the applicant’s patients, which he says was intended to assist him financially.  He admits having provided one of the applicant’s patients with medical care. The nature of the care is not disclosed, but, says the first respondent, they are personal friends and he cannot be expected to deny his friend care. [12]    The respondents, firstly, allege that there are material disputes of fact that require that the matter be referred to oral evidence. There is no real dispute of fact. The salient facts, that the first respondent signed a restraint of trade agreement, that the first respondent has established the second respondent in anticipation of competing with the applicant, that the first respondent has advertised his services, and that the services compete with the applicant, are not seriously disputed. [13]    The respondents argued, further, that the matter was not urgent. They say so on the basis that the emails referred to above were sent to the first respondent’s email address in May 2025, and that the applicant either was aware of the emails in May, or should have been aware thereof. The respondents argued that the applicant had created its own urgency. This submission is similarly baseless. The applicant’s version, that it only became aware of the emails in August 2025, and that it immediately instructed its attorney to send a letter demanding that the respondents desist from the allegedly unlawful conduct, is not disputed. The applicant took action immediately upon becoming aware of the funds received by the first respondent. [14]    The first respondent disputes the contention that the applicant contributed to his understanding and knowledge of the health industry. He says that he used the exact same skills as an employee of the applicant, than he did in his previous employment. Although the first respondent had completed a number of courses relating to aesthetic medicine before he joined the applicant, his practice was, with limited exception, that of a general practitioner. The applicant is an established player in the field of aesthetic health, trading from approximately 20 locations across South Africa. The first respondent was, as an employee, exposed to advance training by specialists from abroad who provided training to the applicant’s employees.  In my view there is little doubt that the first respondent’s employment allowed him to develop into a specialist in aesthetic health. The first respondent formed patient-doctor relationships with the applicant’s patients, and has interacted with the applicant’s suppliers over a number of years. In my view the applicant has established an interest that is deserving of protection. [15]    The first respondent admits that a 12-month restraint period is reasonable. However, he says that the premises from which he provides the services is not within a 15 kilometer drive, but is 17 kilometers by road along the shortest route. There is no dispute that the premises are within a 15 kilometer radius from the applicant’s premises. The protected territory is defined in the agreement as “any location situated within 15 km of any location in the Republic of South Africa or any other country in which the Employer or Skin Renewal Conducted business during the 12 (twelve) month period immediately preceding the Termination Date”. [15]    In my view the agreement cannot be interpreted to mean that the distance is calculated by the shortest possible route. That would mean that the restraint would be dependent upon what routes are available. That could not, in my view, have been the intention of the parties. The agreement must be interpreted on its wording, and it must be given a businesslike interpretation. [1] In my view the wording “any location within 15 km” can only be interpreted as being any location within a radius of 15 km. [16]    The first respondent has attacked the agreement on the basis that it is unconstitutional to prevent him from practicing as a medical practitioner, especially in cases where patients prefer to consult with him. Our courts have recognized the validity of a restraint of trade in respect of medical professionals before; In Esme Dreyer Physiotherapy Inc v Shuayb Omar [2] the Court was concerned with a physiotherapist who was subject to a restraint of trade, which it enforced. In Diedre Steyn Physiotherapy Inc v Marlene Stander [3] the court similarly enforced a restraint of trade agreement that a physiotherapist had agreed to. [17]    It was held in Magna Alloys & Research v Ellis that in appropriate circumstances an ex-employee may be restrained from competing with the ex-employer. [4] The effect of the Magna judgment was explained as follows in J Louw & Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter [5] : “ Covenants in restraint of trade are valid. Like all other contractual stipulations, however, they are unenforceable when, to the extent that, their enforcement would be contrary to public policy. It is against public policy to enforce a covenant which is unreasonable, one which restricts the covenantor’s freedom to trade or to work. In so far as it has that effect, the convenant will therefore not be enforced. Whether it is indeed unreasonable must be determined with reference to the circumstances of the case.” [18]    The approach to restraints of trade agreements was explained thus in Basson v Chilwan [6] : [15] A court must make a value judgment with two principal policy considerations in mind in determining the reasonableness of a restraint.  The first is that the public interest requires that parties should comply with their contractual obligations, a notion expressed by the maxim pacta servanda sunt. The second is that all persons should in the interests of society be productive and be permitted to engage in trade and commerce or the professions. …Section 22 of the Constitution guarantees '[e]very citizen . . . the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely' reflecting the closeness of the relationship between the freedom to choose a vocation and the nature of a society based on human dignity as contemplated by the Constitution.  It is also an incident of the right to property to the extent that s 25 protects the acquisition,  use, enjoyment and exploitation of property,  and of the fundamental rights in respect of freedom of association (s 18), labour relations (s 23) and cultural, religious and linguistic communities (s 31). [19]    The factors to consider were spelled out as follows [7] : [19.1]     Is there an interest of one party deserving of protection? [19.2]     Is the interest being prejudiced by the other party? [19.3]     Does the interest weigh up qualitatively and Quantitively against the opposite party’s interest in not being left economically inactive? [19.4]     Is there a facet of public policy that requires that the restraint should either be rejected or maintained? [20]    These principles apply to all persons equally, and the fact that the first respondent is a medical practitioner is not a magic charm that excludes him from the application of the principles of restraints of trade. I say this, however, within the specific facts of this matter, and in other cases, the approach may be different. It is also not a defence to say that the patient has a right to decide who to consult. If a medical practitioner is subject to a restraint of trade, and he would, by consulting with the patient, breach the agreement, he is obliged to decline to treat the patient. [21]    The principles enunciated in Basson attempt to balance the rights of the applicant to protect its intellectual property, against the first respondent’s constitutional right to freedom of trade and to be economically active. Applying these principles to this case, it is quite apparent that the applicant has a protectible interest. The first respondent conceded in the employment agreement that he would be exposed to the applicant’s confidential information and trade secrets, and that is in fact what happened. On the first respondent’s own version he has engaged with the applicant’s patients and suppliers subsequent to his employment ending. He has advertised his services on social media and he has registered the second respondent as a vehicle through which to compete with the applicant. [22]    A significant factor to be considered is that the first respondent was specifically paid additional monies in consideration of the restraint of trade. It would be unjust to refuse to enforce the restraint in circumstances where the first respondent has received in excess of R 2 million as consideration for his agreement to be restrained from competing with the applicant in the event of his employment ending. [23]    The applicant has demonstrated a clear right to protection, and it has demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm should the first respondent be allowed to entice its patients and to interact with its suppliers. The balance of convenience inclines to the granting of an interdict. [24]    However, it is trite that a restraint agreement should be reasonable not only as to the period of its application, but also as regards the area to which it applies. In this case the restraint applies for 12 months, a period that the first respondent concedes is reasonable. However, the agreement provides for an extension of the period to 24 months in the event that the first respondent is in breach. I cannot find any justification for this penalty, save that it is intended to be punitive, and perhaps to prevent employees from committing a breach. Overall, the effect of the extension clause is to extend the restraint period for an unreasonable time. [25]    The notice of motion seeks an order in which the restraint area  covers a radius of 15 km within the applicant’s  20 locations across South Africa. As I have pointed out the founding affidavit confines the restraint area to an area within a radius of 15 km from the applicant’s Nieuw Muckleneuk, Irene and Lynnwood branches. If the restraint is applied to all 20 outlets, it would likely prevent the first respondent from plying his trade. Confining the restraint area to the aforementioned three branches seems to me to be reasonable. The first respondent would be entitled to then ply his trade in other areas in Gauteng. [26]    I propose to grant an order that limits the period and the area to which the restraint applies. As far as the second respondent is concerned, it was clearly registered to be a vehicle for the first respondent to ply his trade. Allowing it under these circumstances to continue to do so would result in the second respondent unlawfully competing with the applicant. For that reason an interdict in respect of the second respondent would be appropriate. There is no reason why costs should not follow the result. [27]    I make the following order: [27.1] T he forms and service provided for in the Rules of this Honourable Court be dispensed with allowing the matter to proceed as one of urgency in terms of the provision of Rule 6(12); [27.2] The relief as set out hereinbelow shall operate as a Final Interdictory Order; [27.3]   The First Respondent is interdicted, either alone, jointly, or together with any other person, from: [27.3.1]      acting in breach of the signed employment agreement governing the employment relationship between the Applicant and the First Respondent (“the Agreement”) and annexed to the Founding Affidavit as Annexure “VS4”. [27.3.2]      acting in breach of the Restraint of Trade, as contained in the Agreement, for a period of 12 (Twelve) months from the date of this judgment, and from unlawfully competing with the Applicant by way of: [27.3.2.1]   continuing the operation of business, company or concern under the name of “ Dr Lestonn Lawn Inc . ” (“the Second Respondent”) and “ Loving You Aesthetic Studio” (collectively hereinafter referred to as “the Enterprises”), or any other business, company or concern, or in the First Respondent’s individual capacity during the Restraint of Trade period at the premises situated at the registered address of the Enterprises at 3[...] A[...] CRESCENT, WATERKLOOF VALLEY, MONUMENT PARK, PRETORIA, 0181 as well as his principal place of business situated at 7[...] C[...] STREET, DOORNPOORT, PRETORIA NORTH or as a concierge; [27.3.2.2]   using the Applicant’s proprietary and confidential information in the business of the Enterprises in conflict with the provisions of the Restraint of Trade; [27.3.2.3]   using his knowledge of, and influence over, the Applicant’s customers/patient’s/client’s, employees and business associates for his own interests and that of the Enterprises to the prejudice of the Applicant; [27.3.2.4]   directly or indirectly encouraging, enticing, inciting, persuading or inducing any employee of the Applicant to terminate his or her employment with the Applicant, or cause or assist in causing any of the forgoing to take place; [27.3.2.5]   furnishing any information or advice to an employee then employed by the Applicant or to any prospective employer of such an employee or using any other means which are directly or indirectly designed or, in the ordinary course of events, calculated to result in any such employee terminating his/her employment by the Applicant and/or becoming employed by or directly or indirectly in any way interested in or associated with any other company, close corporation, firm, undertaking or concern; [27.3.2.6]   directly or indirectly encouraging, enticing, inciting, persuading or inducing any client or past client of the Applicant, to take its custom away from the Applicant, or cause or assist in causing any of the foregoing to take place; [27.3.2.7]   directly or indirectly discouraging or dissuading any client or past client of the Applicant from maintaining its custom with the Applicant, or causing or assisting in causing any of the foregoing to take place; [27.3.2.8]   being interested in or engaged or concerned with, directly or indirectly, any Competitive Activity (as defined in the Agreement), either alone or jointly or together with, or as agent for any other person, whether as principal, proprietor, shareholder, partner, representative, member, consultant, advisor, director, financier, administrator, employee, trustee or beneficiary of a trust or otherwise, in any business, company or concern which carries on business in competition with the Applicant. [27.4]          The aforesaid restraints shall be applicable and enforceable within a radius of 15 (fifteen) kilometres of the applicant’s Nieuw Muckleneuk, Lynnwood and Irene branches. [27.5]   The Second Respondent is interdicted from aiding and abetting the First Respondent in his breach of his contractual and common law obligations towards the Applicant and in engaging in unlawful competition with the Applicant. [27.6] The costs of this Application shall be borne by the Respondents jointly and severally, the one paying, the other to be absolved, on scale C including the costs of counsel. SWANEPOEL J JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA Counsel for the applicant: Adv. M Nowitz Instructed by: HBG Schindlers Attorneys Counsel for the respondents: Adv. L Curlewis Instructed by: Clarke & Van Eck Attorneys Hearing on: 18 September 2025 Judgment on: 21 October 2025 [1] Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) [2] Esme Dreyer Physiotherapy Inc v Shuayb Omar [2024] ZALCCT 64 (12 December 2024) [3] Diedre Steyn Physiotherapy Inc v Marlene Stander [2020] ZAECPEHC 14 (9 June 2020) [4] Magna Alloys & Research v Ellis [1984] ZASCA 116 ; 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) [5] J Louw & Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter and Others 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) at 243 B-C [6] Basson v Chilwan 1993 (3) SA 472 (A) [7] Chilwan (supra) at 743 G sino noindex make_database footer start