Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1193South Africa
S v Hongwana (Sentence) (CC 63/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1193 (7 November 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
7 November 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## S v Hongwana (Sentence) (CC 63/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1193 (7 November 2025)
S v Hongwana (Sentence) (CC 63/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1193 (7 November 2025)
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sino date 7 November 2025
SAFLII Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: CC 63/2024
(1)Reportable: No.
(2) Of interest to other
judges: No
(3) Revised.
Date 07 November 2025
Signature
In
the matter between:
THE
STATE
and
ZAKHELE
BENNET HONGWANA
ACCUSED
JUDGMENT
ON SENTENCE
Munzhelele J
[1]
The accused was convicted of the offence of murder of T[...] D[...]
N[...], read with the provisions
of
section 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
, as amended. On Count 2, he was convicted
of malicious damage to property, being a competent verdict on a
charge of housebreaking
with intent to commit a crime. On Count 3,
the accused was convicted of pointing anything likely to lead a
person to believe that
it is a firearm, in contravention of
section
120(6)(b)
of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
.
[2]
The accused elected not to testify in mitigation of sentence, and the
State likewise did not call
any witnesses in aggravation thereof. The
evidence presented for purposes of sentencing emanated from a
pre-sentence report compiled
by Mr. Thokhozani Mbatha, a probation
officer employed by the Department of Social Development, under the
supervision of Mrs. Bosch.
The
report was handed in by consent between the parties and marked as
Exhibit “D”, and its contents were admitted into
evidence. It contained information relating to the accused’s
personal circumstances, family history and functioning, interpersonal
relationships, relationship with the deceased, educational
background, employment record, physical and psychological condition,
and substance abuse (specifically alcohol).
The
probation officer recommended that the accused be sentenced in terms
of
section 51(1)(a)
of Act 105 of 1997. Which recommendation was
rejected by the defense because the court had already made a
determination that the
sentence would fall under section 51(1)
because the accused and the deceased were in a domestic abuse
relationship, not based on
premeditated murder.
In
addition, Mrs. B.P. Tunzi, a social worker employed by the Department
of Social Development, prepared a psycho-social report
concerning
C[...] L[...] A[...], N[...] N[...] S[...], and N[...] S[...], being
the deceased’s cousin and two minor children.
This report,
compiled under the supervision of Mrs. Bosch, was admitted into
evidence as Exhibit “E”.
The
defense counsel handed in two letters from the accused, which were
addressed to the accused’s children and the family,
apologizing
for his conduct. These letters are exhibit ‘F1’ to ‘F2’.
Furthermore,
handwritten victim impact statements by Ms. L[...] M[...], Mr. N[...]
N[...], and Ms. M[...] N[...]
were
tendered and admitted into evidence as Exhibits “G1” to
“G3”.
[3]
The personal circumstances of the accused
are as follows: He is 54 years of age, a first offender,
and has no
previous convictions. He was customarily married to the deceased,
with whom he had two children, aged six and four years.
He has two
additional children, aged 34 and 16, from previous relationships. All
his children were financially dependent on him.
The
accused matriculated from Jafta Mahlangu High School and, in the year
2000, obtained a Diploma in Traffic Management from Boekenhoutkloof
Traffic College. He was employed as a traffic officer for 24 years
until the date he voluntarily handed himself over to the police.
According
to the report, the accused had a stable upbringing. His late father
operated a dry-cleaning business that supported the
family until his
passing. The accused and the deceased had been married for six years
before her death. Their two minor children
currently reside with
their cousin and the deceased’s relative in Mamelodi.
The
accused expressed remorse for his actions. He indicated that his
relationship with the deceased had become strained due to marital
disputes and his suspicions of infidelity, though he admitted having
no concrete proof thereof. He also acknowledged that he was
abusing
alcohol over the weekend when he was stressed with his marital
issues. But on the date of the offence, he was sober. The
accused
stated that he has been emotionally affected by the offence,
particularly when thinking of the impact this offence has
caused on
his children.
[4]
The social worker, Mrs. Tunzi, investigated the social circumstances
of the deceased’s family,
who are direct victims of the murder.
The deceased’s two minor children and their cousin were present
at the scene when the
deceased was shot and killed. Their clothes
were soaked in their mother’s blood as they desperately tried
to stop her bleeding
and their attempt to wake her up.
The
report records that the children were found traumatized, anxious, and
frightened upon the arrival of their cousin, who had to
calm them
down. The children exhibit anger towards the accused for killing
their mother. They experience insomnia, nightmares,
and flashbacks of
the incident. Both suffer from poor concentration and fatigue due to
lack of sleep.
The
minor child, S[...], has expressed a desire to become a doctor one
day “to save lives,” while their cousin has developed
panic attacks and is undergoing treatment. The children reportedly
become frightened by loud noises and refuse to sleep at night
due to
nightmares in which they dream that the accused is coming to harm
them.
The
cousin, who is the primary caregiver and breadwinner for the
deceased’s children, faces challenges registering the children
with her medical aid because she has not yet obtained legal
guardianship, and the social worker has undertaken to assist in this
regard.
It
is evident that the murder of the deceased has had a profound and
enduring psychological and emotional impact on the children
and the
extended family.
In
her victim impact statement, L[...] C[...] L[...]
expressed
deep emotional pain and loss over the deceased’s death. N[...]
N[...]
described
experiencing persistent anxiety, fear, and social withdrawal, leading
to loss of employment and increased alcohol consumption
to cope with
the trauma. M[...] N[...]
stated
that she has lost hope in life, as the deceased was her source of
encouragement and spiritual strength.
[5]
Counsel for the accused submitted that the Court should take into
consideration that there had
been no prior incidents of abuse before
the commission of the offence. However, this submission is not
entirely correct. The evidence
before the Court, particularly the
reports of the probation officers, revealed that the marriage between
the accused and the deceased
was characterized by constant quarrels
and physical altercations. As a result, the deceased, on several
occasions, left the matrimonial
home with the children.
The
accused himself confirmed that there were ongoing disagreements
regarding their 16-year-old child. The deceased desired that
the
child should reside with her mother, whereas the accused objected.
This disagreement became a persistent source of conflict
in their
marriage, which ultimately culminated in the accused killing his
wife.
Counsel
for the accused further submitted that the personal circumstances of
the accused should be considered cumulatively to arrive
at an
appropriate sentence, guided by the principles enunciated in S v
Malgas
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA); S v Zinn
1969 (2) SA 537
(A); S v
Sikoti
2008 (1) SACR 177
(E); S v M
[2007] ZACC 18
;
2007 (2) SACR 539
(CC); S v
Skenjana
1985 (3) SA 51
(A); S v Dodo
[2001] ZACC 16
;
2001 (3) SA 382
(CC); S v
Abrahams
2002 (1) SACR 116
(SCA); S v Vilakazi
2009 (1) SACR 552
(SCA); S v Rabie
1975 (4) SA 855
(A); and S v Matyityi
2011 (1) SACR
40
(SCA).
Counsel contended that
the accused has shown remorse, as he repeatedly requested forgiveness
from the deceased’s family and
wrote letters to both the family
and his children expressing his regret. It was submitted that the
accused acted out of emotion
and without premeditation.
Counsel
urged the Court to consider all the circumstances collectively and
cumulatively in determining whether substantial and compelling
circumstances exist to justify a deviation from the prescribed
minimum sentence. It was further submitted that the imposition of
a
life sentence would be disproportionate to the circumstances of this
case and would induce a sense of shock.
Counsel
conceded that the death of the deceased has left deep emotional scars
on the victims, which only the passage of time may
heal.
[6]
The State, on the other hand, argued that there are no substantial
and compelling circumstances present
in this matter. The accused,
being a law enforcement officer, a husband, and a father, was
expected to uphold the law and protect
his family. Instead, the
family has suffered irreparable harm and disintegration as a result
of his conduct.
The State further
submitted that the accused has not demonstrated genuine remorse. He
has shown regret for his actions. The assertion
that he sent his
sister to apologize to the deceased’s family is not supported
by evidence. The sister's decision to approach
the family was made of
her own accord and not at the instruction of the accused.
Accordingly, the State
contended that in the absence of substantial and compelling
circumstances, the only appropriate sentence
is that of life
imprisonment. It was further submitted that the sentences imposed on
the remaining counts should run concurrently
with the sentence of
life imprisonment.
Evaluation and
Analysis
Legal framework
[7]
In
S v Swart
2004 (2) SACR 370
(SCA), the court said:
‘
In
our law, retribution and deterrence are proper purposes of
punishment, and they must be accorded due weight in any sentence that
is imposed. Each of the elements of punishment is not required to be
accorded equal weight, but instead, proper weight must be
accorded to
each according to the circumstances. Serious crimes will usually
require that retribution and deterrence come to the
fore and that
rehabilitation of the offender will consequently play a smaller role.
Moreover, as pointed out in S v Malgas
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA), where
the court finds that it is not bound to impose a prescribed sentence,
the sentence to be imposed in lieu of the prescribed
sentence should
be assessed paying due regard to the benchmark which the legislator
provided.’ This has also been echoed
by the defense Counsel in
his arguments.
In
S v Kruger
2012 (1) SACR 369
(SCA), Shongwe JA (Harms AP and Plaskett
AJA concurring) confirmed that punishing a convicted person should
not be likened to revenge.
It must have all the elements of, and
purposes of, punishment, prevention, retribution, individual and
general deterrence, and
rehabilitation.
In
the case of S v Van Wyk
1997 (1) SACR 345
(T) 366g-h and S v Voges
1975 (3) SA 88
(AD) 890E, and S v ABT
1975 (2) SA 214
(AD) 219H, it
has been said that:
“
Being
a first offender does not mean that such effect should override all
the other principles to be considered during the sentencing
process.
First offenders are therefore not entitled to non-custodial sentences
merely because they are first offenders. So,
the value of being
a first offender should be considered by the trial Court against the
other factors under consideration during
the sentencing process.”
In
S v Vilakazi 2009(1) SACR 552 (SCA) at para 58, Nugent JA said that:
in cases of serious crimes as these, the personal circumstances
of
the offenders by themselves will necessarily recede into the
background, once it becomes clear that the crime is deserving of
a
substantial period of imprisonment.
In
S v Qamata
1997 (1) SACR 479
(E) 483a, it was said that:
“
An
appropriate sentence actually means a sentence in accordance with the
blameworthiness of every individual offender.”
Legal
principles
[8]
The
accused has been convicted of murder read with the provisions of
section 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105
of 1997, as
amended, because the accused and the deceased were involved in
domestic violence. The prescribed minimum sentence for
such an
offence is life imprisonment, unless the court finds the existence of
substantial and compelling circumstances justifying
a deviation
therefrom. The court must determine the presence of such
circumstances after considering the totality of the evidence
placed
before it, both during the trial on the merits and during the
sentencing proceedings.
In
S v Malgas
2001 (1) SACR 469
(SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal made
it clear that “it is no longer business as usual”, the
legislature intended
that the prescribed sentences be imposed unless
there are truly convincing reasons for departure. Courts are
cautioned not to deviate
for flimsy or speculative reasons, as this
would defeat the deterrent and retributive objectives of the minimum
sentence regime.
And certainly, put the administration of justice
into disrepute.
In
S v Swart
2004 (2) SACR 370
(SCA), the court reaffirmed that
retribution and deterrence must take precedence in cases of serious
crimes, while rehabilitation,
though relevant, must yield to the
gravity of the offence. Similarly, S v Vilakazi
2009 (1) SACR 552
(SCA) held that in cases of serious violent crime, the personal
circumstances of the offender recede into the background, and
society’s interest in safety, deterrence, and retribution takes
precedence. The State and the defense agree that the offence
is of a
serious nature, and that deterrence should take precedence. They
further concur that a custodial sentence is appropriate,
considering
the application of the law to the facts, as well as the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances set out below.
Application
of the law to the Facts
[9]
The
facts of this case disclose an extremely brutal and callous murder
committed within a domestic setting — a context that
aggravates
rather than mitigates. The accused shot and killed his wife, T[...]
D[...] N[...], in the presence of their two minor
children, aged six
and four. The children, innocent bystanders of a horrifying act of
violence, were found soaked in their mother’s
blood as they
desperately tried to stop her bleeding. The gravity of this act and
its enduring psychological impact cannot be overstated.
The
accused’s conduct reveals a profound disregard for the sanctity
of human life and for his responsibilities as a husband
and father.
The manner of the killing demonstrates a level of brutality and
emotional detachment inconsistent with momentary loss
of control.
Instead, it reflects deliberate and violent intent to end the life of
the deceased.
Aggravating
Circumstances
[10]
Several
aggravating features of this case stand out:
- Commission
of the offence in the presence of minor children:This
factor alone weighs heavily against the accused. The children
witnessed their mother’s murder at the hands of their
father —
an event that has left them deeply traumatized, as recorded in the
psycho-social report and victim impact statements.
The children now
live with persistent nightmares, anxiety, and fear that their father
will return to harm them. The trauma inflicted
upon them is
long-term and irreversible.
Commission
of the offence in the presence of minor children:
This
factor alone weighs heavily against the accused. The children
witnessed their mother’s murder at the hands of their
father —
an event that has left them deeply traumatized, as recorded in the
psycho-social report and victim impact statements.
The children now
live with persistent nightmares, anxiety, and fear that their father
will return to harm them. The trauma inflicted
upon them is
long-term and irreversible.
- Violation
of trust and domestic relationship:The
deceased was killed by the very person who was meant to love and
protect her. Domestic murders are an affront not only to
the
victim’s rights but also to the foundational values of family
and society. The Constitutional Court and the legislature
have
repeatedly condemned domestic and gender-based violence as a scourge
that has reached pandemic proportions in South Africa.
The courts
are enjoined to impose sentences that send a clear message of zero
tolerance for such conduct.
Violation
of trust and domestic relationship:
The
deceased was killed by the very person who was meant to love and
protect her. Domestic murders are an affront not only to
the
victim’s rights but also to the foundational values of family
and society. The Constitutional Court and the legislature
have
repeatedly condemned domestic and gender-based violence as a scourge
that has reached pandemic proportions in South Africa.
The courts
are enjoined to impose sentences that send a clear message of zero
tolerance for such conduct.
- Use
of a weapon and deliberate action:The
murder was spontaneous. The accused armed himself with his service
pistol and confronted the deceased, thereby showing intentional
conduct to end the life of the deceased. The use of a weapon and the
deliberate infliction of fatal injuries justify the classification
of this offence as one warranting the harshest possible sentence.
Use
of a weapon and deliberate action:
The
murder was spontaneous. The accused armed himself with his service
pistol and confronted the deceased, thereby showing intentional
conduct to end the life of the deceased. The use of a weapon and the
deliberate infliction of fatal injuries justify the classification
of this offence as one warranting the harshest possible sentence.
- Absence
of genuine remorse:Although
the accused claimed to feel regret, the pre-sentence report and
victim impact statements reveal that his remorse is self-centered
rather than genuine. He portrays himself as emotionally wounded
rather than taking full accountability for his actions. True
remorse
involves acknowledgment of wrongdoing, empathy for the victim, and
an acceptance of the need for punishment — elements
absent in
this case. The accused is only showing regret for what he has done.
Genuine contrition is absent from the facts.
Absence
of genuine remorse:
Although
the accused claimed to feel regret, the pre-sentence report and
victim impact statements reveal that his remorse is self-centered
rather than genuine. He portrays himself as emotionally wounded
rather than taking full accountability for his actions. True
remorse
involves acknowledgment of wrongdoing, empathy for the victim, and
an acceptance of the need for punishment — elements
absent in
this case. The accused is only showing regret for what he has done.
Genuine contrition is absent from the facts.
- Severe
and continuing impact on the victims:The
psycho-social report and victim impact statements vividly illustrate
the devastating emotional and psychological harm caused
to the
children and their extended family. The trauma, fear, and social
stigma that now define their lives are direct consequences
of the
accused’s actions.
Severe
and continuing impact on the victims:
The
psycho-social report and victim impact statements vividly illustrate
the devastating emotional and psychological harm caused
to the
children and their extended family. The trauma, fear, and social
stigma that now define their lives are direct consequences
of the
accused’s actions.
Mitigating
Factors Considered
[11]
The
court has duly considered the mitigating factors advanced on behalf
of the accused:
- He
is a first offender.
He
is a first offender.
- He
is 54 years of age.
He
is 54 years of age.
- He
has served society as a traffic officer for 24 years.
He
has served society as a traffic officer for 24 years.
- He
claims to have acted under emotional distress and suspicion of
infidelity backed by no facts.
He
claims to have acted under emotional distress and suspicion of
infidelity backed by no facts.
- He
has four children, two of whom are minors.
He
has four children, two of whom are minors.
- He
has been awaiting trial for a year.
He
has been awaiting trial for a year.
However,
none of these factors — whether individually or cumulatively —
is of such weight as to constitute substantial
and compelling
circumstances.
As
it is held in S v Vilakazi (supra), in serious crimes such as murder,
the personal circumstances of the offender necessarily
recede into
the background. The brutality and gravity of the offence and the
severe
trauma suffered by the two minor children and the family
far
outweigh these considerations [personal circumstances of the
accused].
The
accused’s age and employment history demonstrate maturity and
stability, not vulnerability or impulsiveness. His role
as a law
enforcement officer, in fact, aggravates rather than mitigates his
culpability — he was expected to uphold the law,
not violate
it.
Alcohol
consumption and marital discord cannot operate as mitigating factors.
As observed in numerous authorities, including S v
Qamata
1997 (1)
SACR 479
(E), emotional tension or intoxication does not reduce moral
blameworthiness where the offender acts with intent and persistence.
The
Interests of Society
[12]
Society
demands protection from those who commit acts of domestic violence,
especially where such acts destroy families and traumatize
children.
The prevalence of femicide and intimate-partner murders in South
Africa necessitates the imposition of stern sentences
to send a
strong message that such conduct will not be tolerated.
As
emphasized in S v Swart (supra), deterrence and retribution must
assume prominence in sentencing for grave offences of violence.
The
court cannot ignore the broader societal need to protect women and
children and to reaffirm the sanctity of human life.
Proportionality
and the Purposes of Punishment
[13]
Punishment
must always be proportionate to the offence and the offender’s
degree of moral culpability. In this instance, the
offence is among
the most serious imaginable — the taking of a human life within
a domestic setting, in the presence of children,
with long-term
psychological consequences.
Rehabilitation,
while important, carries little practical weight here. The accused’s
conduct reflects a fundamental moral
breakdown and a disregard for
both legal and moral boundaries. A lesser sentence would undermine
the seriousness of the crime and
diminish public confidence in the
justice system.
As
held in S v Malgas (Supra), courts should not lightly depart from the
prescribed sentences. In the absence of truly compelling
factors that
would render life imprisonment disproportionate, the legislature’s
benchmark must be respected.
Conclusion
[14]
Having
carefully considered all the evidence, the pre-sentence report and
victim impact reports, the submissions by counsel, and
the applicable
legal principles, the court finds that no substantial and compelling
circumstances exist to justify a deviation
from the prescribed
minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
The
offence was committed with brutality and disregard for human dignity,
in the presence of the deceased’s minor children,
causing them
lifelong trauma. The murder of a spouse within the family home
represents a profound betrayal of trust and a direct
attack on the
sanctity of family life.
Accordingly,
the only appropriate and just sentence that reflects the gravity of
the crime, the interests of society, and the principles
of
proportionality and deterrence is that of life imprisonment.
Sentence
1.
On
Count 1 (Murder): The accused is sentenced to life imprisonment in
terms of
section 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
,
as amended.
2.
On
Count 2 (Malicious damage to property): The accused is sentenced to 5
years’ imprisonment.
3.
On
Count 3 (Pointing of a firearm): The accused is sentenced to 2 years’
imprisonment.
4.
The
sentences on Counts 2 and 3 shall run concurrently with that on Count
1.
Ancillary orders
- In
terms ofSection 103(1) of theFirearms Control Act 60 of 2000, the
court makes no order. This means the accused is deemed unfit to
possess a firearm.
In
terms of
Section 103
(1) of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
, the
court makes no order. This means the accused is deemed unfit to
possess a firearm.
- In terms ofSection 103(4) of theFirearms Control Act 60 of 2000, the court makes an order
for search and seizure of the accused’s premises for firearms,
ammunition licenses, and or competency
certificates.
In terms of
Section 103
(4) of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
, the court makes an order
for search and seizure of the accused’s premises for firearms,
ammunition licenses, and or competency
certificates.
- In
terms ofsection 299A(1) of Act 51 of 1977, the court informs the
complainants that they have a right to make representations to the
Commissioner
of the Correctional Services when placement of the
prisoner on parole is considered, to attend any relevant meetings of
the parole
board, when the accused’s parole is to be decided.
This is subject to the directive issued by the Commissioner of
Correctional
Services under Section 4 of the Correctional Services
Act
In
terms of
section 299A
(1) of Act 51 of 1977, the court informs the
complainants that they have a right to make representations to the
Commissioner
of the Correctional Services when placement of the
prisoner on parole is considered, to attend any relevant meetings of
the parole
board, when the accused’s parole is to be decided.
This is subject to the directive issued by the Commissioner of
Correctional
Services under Section 4 of the Correctional Services
Act
- The
accused has the right to appeal the conviction and sentence that was
imposed on him today. You can request legal aid attorneys
or an
attorney where you pay out of your own pocket to assist you in
bringing a substantive application for leave to appeal the
conviction and sentences within 14 days of this sentence. If your
application is later than 14 days, then you should apply for
the
condonation to be allowed an extension of time to file the
application for leave to appeal out of time.
The
accused has the right to appeal the conviction and sentence that was
imposed on him today. You can request legal aid attorneys
or an
attorney where you pay out of your own pocket to assist you in
bringing a substantive application for leave to appeal the
conviction and sentences within 14 days of this sentence. If your
application is later than 14 days, then you should apply for
the
condonation to be allowed an extension of time to file the
application for leave to appeal out of time.
M. MUNZHELELE
Judge
of the High Court of South Africa
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Heard:
04
& 07 November 2025
Delivered:
07
November 2025
Counsel
for the State:
Adv.
Tshabalala
Counsel
for Accused:
Mr.
Rudman
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