Morgan v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (055106/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1202 (11 November 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1202 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Morgan v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (055106/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1202 (11 November 2025) Morgan v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (055106/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1202 (11 November 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1202.html sino date 11 November 2025 FLYNOTES: PROFESSION – Advocate – Trust account advocate – Constitutional challenge – Provisions restricting advocates from practising as legal practitioners in incorporated juristic entities – Differentiation between attorneys and advocates based on distinct nature of their practices and not on any prohibited ground – Failed to show that differentiation was unfair or impaired dignity – Prohibition serves a legitimate purpose by safeguarding independence and maintaining referral system – Application dismissed – Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 , ss 34(6) and 34 (7). HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA) CASE NO: 055106/2024 (1) REPORTABLE: YES (2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES (3) REVISED. DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 2025 SIGNATURE: In the matter between: LETHUKHUTHULA MARK MORGAN Applicant and MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT First Respondent LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA Second Respondent GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR Third Respondent PRETORIA SOCIETY OF ADVOCATES First Amicus Curiae FEARLESS AZANIAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION Second Amicus Curiae Summary: Trust account Advocate - application to have a provision of the Legal Practice Act declared unconstitutional, so as to enable trust account advocates, or even advocates generally, to practice as legal practitioners in incorporated law firms. Applicant misconstrued the nature of the practice of a trust account advocate - relief sought will also have the risk of prejudicing the independence of legal practitioners who practice as advocates. Regulation of branch of profession by prohibiting incorporation not arbitrary and not infringing on Constitutional rights. Application dismissed. ORDER 1.         The application is dismissed. 2.         Each party, including the amici, are ordered to pay their own costs. JUDGMENT The matter was heard in open court and authored by the judge whose name is reflected herein and was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' legal representatives by  ema;/ and by uploading ;1 to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines.  The date of handing-down is deemed to be 11 November 2025. DAVIS, J Introduction [1]        This matter came before court as a special motion, to be decided on by a full court. The reason for this is that the relief sought by the applicant may have implications for a certain category of legal practitioners nationally, in particular "trust account advocates". [2]        The basic premise of the applicant's application, is that the provisions of the Legal Practice Act [1] (the LPA) impermissibly precludes advocates from practising as legal practitioners in incorporated companies. [3]        The applicant's attack on the legislation in question is that it infringes his constitutional rights to pursue his profession, his rights to equality and his right to dignity. The relief sought by the applicant [4]        The principal relief sought by the applicant in his amended Notice of Motion, was for a declaration: "that Sections 34(6) and 34(7) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (the "LPA'') are declared unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that they do not permit Legal Practitioners contemplated in sections 34(2)(a)(i) (referral advocates) and 34(2)(a)(ii) (trust account advocates) of the LPA to establish a commercial juristic entity in order to conduct a legal practice ". [5]        In addition, the applicant sought an order that, during the time period that it may take the legislature to "correct" the LPA, section 34(7)(a) of the LPA be read that all legal practitioners, and not only attorneys, may practice as a "commercial juristic entity". The only limitation the applicant proposed on such incorporated firms was that, in the case of advocates, their shareholding or membership should be limited to not more than one advocate. This limitation was introduced by a late amendment to the applicant's Notice of Motion. Participation in the application [6]        The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development featured as the first respondent in the matter. The Legal Practice Council (LPC) has been cited as the second respondent and the General Council of the Bar (the GCB) as the third Respondent. Other interested parties have been admitted as amici curiae. They are the Pretoria Society of Advocates (the PSA) and the Fearless Azanian Lawyers Association (FALA). [7]        All the amici have made useful contributions to the debate and their submissions shall be referred to as far as necessary, hereunder. The provisions sought to be impugned [8]        It is not necessary to venture into a discussion of the history and development of the legal profession in South Africa. This has sufficiently been done elsewhere [2] . [9]        It will suffice, for purposes of this judgment, to record that, prior to the advent of the LPA, legal practitioners were limited to two categories (excluding notaries, conveyancers and patent agents). These were attorneys, admitted to practice in terms of the Attorneys Act [3] and advocates, admitted to practice in terms of the Admission of Advocates Act [4] . [10]      The distinction between the two branches of the profession has been retained in the LPA and in the Code of Conduct for all Legal Practitioners, Candidate Legal Practitioners and Juristic Entities (the Code) [5] . Advocates provided for in the LPA are referred to as "referral advocates", due to the fact that they only take instructions on brief from an attorney. In that sense, a client or work is "referred" to an advocate. [11]      The LPA has however introduced a new further category of legal practitioners, namely trust account advocates, that is advocates who, in terms of section 34(2)(a)(ii) of the LPA is entitled to operate a trust account and to take instruction directly from members of the public without a referral (a brief) from an attorney. The applicant is such a trust account advocate. [12]      In respect of the forms in which advocates may conduct their practice, sections 34(6) and (7) of the LPA provide as follows: "34 Forms of legal practice ... (6)       Advocates may only practise- (a)       for their own account and as such may not make over to, share or divide any portion of their professional fee whether by way of partnership, commission, allowance or otherwise,· (b)       as part of a law clinic established in terms of subsection (6); (c)        as part of Legal Aid South Africa; or (d)       as an advocate in the full-time employment of the State as a state advocate or the South African Human Rights Commission. (7)       A commercial juristic entity may be established to conduct a legal practice provided that, in terms of its founding documents- (a)       its shareholding, partnership or membership as the case may be, is comprised exclusively of attorneys (b)       provision is made for legal services to be rendered only by or under the supervision of admitted and enrolled attorneys; and (c)        all the present and past shareholders, partners or members, as the case may be, are liable jointly and severally together w;th the commercial juristic entity for- (i) the debts and liabilities of the commercial juristic entity were contracted during their period of office; and (ii) in respect of any theft committed during their period of office". [13]      The section which the applicant particularly seeks to impugn is section 34 (7)(a) and he contends that the provision enabling a form of practice as "a commercial juristic entity", should be extended to include all legal practitioners. This would mean that all advocates, including both referral and trust account advocates, be allowed to practice in incorporated law firms, in the same manner in which attorneys are currently allowed to do. The basis of the applicant's attack on the impugned provisions [14]      The applicant premised his application on the following statement: "The business of a trust account advocate, for instance, will have similar, if not the same, characteristics as that of an attorney. The trust account advocate will likely have to account for the following expenses: 63.1    the purchase or rental of offices,· 63.2    motor vehicles for messengers,· 63.3    Wages and salaries of support staff; 63.4    office equipment such as furniture, computers, printers, laptops, stationery, telephones, postage and courier services and emails; 63.6    Insurance for all the movable and Immovable assets; and 63.6    professional Indemnity insurance". [15]      The applicant claims that he seeks to assert his rights of freedom of trade, occupation and profession in terms of section 22 of the Constitution and that the limitation contained in section 34(7)(a) of the LPA impermissibly infringes those rights. [16]      In addition, the applicant alleges that his rights to equality and dignity are equally infringed upon. I shall deal with each of these alleged infringements hereunder, but first it must be determined what rights the applicant enjoys. The nature of the practice of a trust account advocate [17]      In respect of trust account advocates, the LPA expressly provides as follows: "34(2)(a) An advocate may render legal services in expectation of a fee, commission, gain or reward as contemplated in this Act or any other applicable law ... (ii)  upon receipt of a request directly from a member of the public or from a justice centre for that service, subject to paragraph (b) (b) An advocate contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii) may only render those legal services rendered by advocates before the commencement of this Act ..." (My emphasis). [18]      The maintenance of the distinction between the branches of the profession and the distinctive roles of trust account advocates and attorneys, as provided for in the LPA, have already received judicial attention. In this Division, Millar J has found as follows in Segole v RAF [6] : " The role of an attorney is clearly defined in the Rules and these set out and maintain the traditional separation of roles that existed before the LPA came into operation. If one had regard to the definitions contained in rule 1, it is readily apparent that the traditional separation of roles is maintained and is in harmony with section 34(2)(b). There is simply no room to argue that a trust account advocate is entitled to assume the role of both as attorney and an advocate. Both the LPA and the Rules unequivocally prohibit such a course of conduct ” [7] . [19]      Barely a month after the above pronunciation of the law, Weideman AJ considered the position afresh in Sithole v RAF [8] . This was due to the fact that the advocate who had appeared in that matter had, in the words contained in the judgment of Weideman AJ, attempted to " make out an argument that it was the intention of the Legal Practice Act that all practitioners should be equal and that, as such, she was entitled to do the work of an attorney ". [20]      This argument was (correctly) rejected, with reference to Rule 18(1) , which retained the distinction between the two branches of the profession, as follows: " A combined summons and every other pleading ... shall be signed by both an advocate and an attorney, or in the case of an attorney ... who has the right of appearance in the High Court, by only such attorney or, if a party sues or defences personally, by that party ". [21]      The Supreme Court of Appeal has also, as long ago as in Alves (supra at par [10]) found that the LPC " ... did not purport to merge ..." the advocates and attorneys profession. [22]      There is also another fundamental difference between an advocate with a trust account and an attorney who operates a trust account by nature of his profession. A trust advocate only receives monies from his clients into his trust account as a pre-payment for the services to be rendered by him or her as an advocate. This is done in terms of section 46.51 of the Code. Such an advocate therefore holds the monies in trust until he or she is entitled to debit fees against it. The trust account advocate does not hold the funds on behalf of the client for payment to any other third party, such as the seller of an immovable property or any other such cause. Trust account advocates therefore hold the monies in their trust accounts as principals, not as agents acting on mandates from their clients like attorneys do. This distinction between the two roles of a practitioner vis-a-vis a trust account has been clarified by the SCA in Van Wyk Van Heerden Attorneys v Gore and Another NNO [9] . [23]      The contention of the applicant that the nature of the practice of a trust account advocate is similar to that of an attorney, is incorrect and fundamentally flawed. Is the regulation of the profession of an advocate by prohibiting incorporation arbitrary? [24]      Section 22 of the Constitution provides as follows: " Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law ". [25]      The applicant conceded that " ... certain professions, including that of an advocate, which is one of the cornerstones of the administration of justice, must be regulated ” [10] [26]      The applicant's contentions are, however that " ... such regulation may not be arbitrary ". [27]      In this regard, the amici have emphasized that one of the fundamental traits of the advocates' profession is the independence of the individual advocate. This aspect has also received judicial attention over the years. I shall only refer to the most salient of the judgments hereunder. [28]      The common adage is that "absolute independence is the essential hallmark and characteristic of an advocate" and constitutes the essence of advocacy. This was articulated in S v Ntuli [11] ( Ntuli ), which cited with approval the rules applicable at the time, as follows: "It is important to stress that counsel is under a duty fearlessly to represent his or her client by advancing all arguments that can properly be marshalled in the client's favour. The ethical standard for members of the Bar is defined in clause 3.1 of the Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics in the following terms: 'Duty to client According to the best traditions of the Bar, an advocate should, while acting with all due courtesy to the tribunal before which he is appearing, fearlessly uphold the interests of his client without regard to any unpleasant consequences either to himself or to any person. Counsel has the same privilege as his client of asserting and defending the client's rights and of protecting his liberty or life by the free and unfettered statement of every fact, and the use of every argument and observation, that can legitimately, according to the principles and practice of law, conduce to this end; and any attempt to restrict this privilege should be jealously watched'. This is the essence of advocacy. The characteristic of fearless independence, however, serves a purpose beyond effective representation of clients. The Supreme Court of British Columbia has recognised that the independence of the Bar may well be a constitutionally protected right inasmuch as an independent Bar is essential to the maintenance of an Independent Judiciary. Just as the independence of the courts is beyond question ... so the independence of the Bar must be beyond question. The lawyers of the independent Bar have been the constant source of the Judges who comprise the independent Judiciary in English common law history. The "habit" of independence is nurtured by the Bar. An independent Judiciary without an independent Bar would be akin to having a frame without a picture". [29]      In De Freitas & Another y Society of Advocates of Natal & Another [12] , the public interest aspect of the independence of advocates was described  by Cameron JA as follows: " It is in the public interest that there should be a vigorous and independent Bar serving the public, which, subject to judicial supervision, is self-regulated, whose members are in principle available to all, and who in general do not perform administrative and preparatory work in litigation but concentrate their skills on the craft of forensic practice ". [30]      On the basis of these judgments, Streicher JA held as follows in Rosemann v General Council of the Bar [13] at para [49]: " There can, in my view, be no doubt that one of the objects of the referral practice is to ensure that administrative and preparatory work in litigation is handled by attorneys who are trained and organised to do so, thereby enabling advocates to concentrate their skills on the craft of forensic practice. It follows that a proper use of the referral practice serves the public interest. It follows, furthermore, on the other hand, that to allow advocates to accept instructions by attorneys to conduct litigation on behalf of a client from beginning to end, i.e. to do all the administrative and preparatory work in respect of litigation, would not serve the public interest and would constitute an abuse of the referral practice ". [31]      And further: 'Our law recognises a divided profession coupled with the referral system (see Commissioner, Competition Commission v General Council of the Bar of South Africa and Others 2002 (6) SA 606 (SCA) at 620C DJ. In terms of the referral system an advocate may, save in certain exceptional circumstances, not presently relevant accept instructions only from an attorney. In the Commissioner, Competition Commission case loc cit Hefer AP said in regard to a refusal by the Competitions Commission to exempt the referral rule of the members of the General Council of the Bar of South Africa from the provisions of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 : 'This is the law of the land and the Commission was not entitled to "bend" it ". [32]      The gist of the rules referred to in Ntuli (supra) is echoed in the Code. The Code provides for the rules applicable to referral and trust advocates in Parts IV and V respectively. The following provisions are, however, applicable to all advocates: " The interpretation of Part IV of this Code shall be effected purposively and aimed to give the fullest effect to the fundamental principles that shape, guide and express the essence of the profession of advocacy, which principles are that counsel are independent practitioners of advocacy and agents of the rule of law, who resist undue influence from anyone, whose specialized services are available to all persons, in particular indigent people, regardless of any disregard in which person requiring he services of counsel may be held by anyone,· counsel understand that the profession of advocacy is vocational and serves the public interest " [14] . [33]      The differing nature of the legal work undertaken by advocates and attorneys are illustrated in rule 23.2 of the Code.  It provides as follows: " There is no closed list of subject matter about which a brief may be accepted by counsel provided the brief not require counsel to undertake work which is properly that of an attorney. In particular, counsel may accept a brief to give legal advice orally or in a written opinion,· to prepare any documents required for use in any court or arbitration or other adjudicative proceedings; to argue an application; to argue an appeal,· to move an unopposed matter; to appear in a trial or in an arbitration or in any other decision-making forum; to negotiate on behalf of a client; to settle a matter, whether on trial or otherwise; to argue a matter on taxation before a taxing master; to make representations to the National Prosecution Authority about whether or not to charge a person with a criminal offence; to undertake a criminal prosecution on behalf of the State of on behalf of, or as, a private prosecutor; to preside as an arbitrator, or as the chair of a disciplinary enquiry, or as presiding officer in any other adversarial proceedings, or to conduct any inquisitorial proceedings; to act as an expert or as a referee; to act as a mediator, facilitator or adjudicator,· to conduct an investigation and furnished a report with recommendations as to facts found and to make recommendations as to future action,· to act as a curator ad litem; to make representations to a statutory or voluntary body or any state official,· and to act as a commissioner in any enquiry ". [34]      The Code further provides that the nature of the work performed by a referral advocate, is the same as the work performed by a trust account advocate [15] , the only difference being the rules imposed on the latter in respect of the management of a trust account [16] . [35]      These cases and the Code underline two things: firstly the absolute independence of advocates and secondly, the differences in the practices of advocates and attorneys as already indicated earlier. [36]      The fact that a trust account advocate may engage clients directly "from the street" (to use a common colloquialism), does not in any way detract from the above principles to act independently and only to be bound by the instructions of his client. All of the above principles therefore apply equally to trust account advocates. [37]      The reality of the two distinct branches of the profession, namely attorneys and advocates, is that they engage in different fields of legal expertise. Practitioners choose to become either attorneys or advocates, not because they are forced to select one profession or the other, but because of the different challenges and benefits which the two branches of the profession offer. The one branch, that of the attorneys profession, is mainly office-based, people orientated, usually in partnership with other persons of like inclinations and ambitions, where administrative and contract drafting skills are often important and where advice given is often outside the sphere of litigation. The other branch of the profession, that of an advocates practice, is court based, requiring forensic skills, at arm's length from the public, individualistic, concentrating on referred problems and usually little concerned with administration or other aspects of law such as estate planning and conveyancing. [38]      The regulation of the two distinct types of legal practitioners can hardly be said to be arbitrary and section 34 confirms that this distinction remains under the LPC. [39]      It should follow that the regulation of the forms of practice also cannot be said to be arbitrary. Once an advocate is permitted to practice, not for his own account, as provided for in section 34(6)(a) of the LPA, but for the account of a corporate entity as the applicant contends, not only are the lines of distinction between the branches of the profession becoming blurred, but the advocate's independence may become compromised. He or she would then no longer be only beholden his or her clients, but also under an obligation to realise profits for a corporate entity, to comply with company law obligations and the like. Clients are taken on, not by the advocate, but by a company. He or she would then no longer an independent counsel for the client, but an employee of a corporate entity. Where the legislature has, by statute, prohibited this from happening, it does not appear to be a simply arbitrary regulation of the profession, but one founded in reason. [40]      The limitation of the risk to the independence of an advocate's practice, serves a legitimate government purpose, namely a contribution to the maintenance of the rule of law (as referred to earlier) and meets the minimum threshold of a rationality review. The applicant can therefore not succeed on the basis of a purported arbitrary regulation. The attack based on section 22 of the Constitution must therefore fail. The right to equality [41]      Section 9 of the Constitution provides that "Equality (1)       Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law (2)       Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. (3)       The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. (4)       No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. (5)       Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair". [42]      There can be no doubt that the LPA differentiates between attorneys (who may practice under a corporate entity) and advocates (who may not). The question to be answered is whether this differentiation amounts to impermissible discrimination. [43]      The differentiation is based on the different natures of the legal practices conducted by the two branches of the profession and not on any of the grounds prescribed in Section 9(3), quoted above. The question is then whether the differentiation based on "unspecified" grounds, is unfair. [44]      The locus classicus in this regard is Harksen v Lane N.O and others [17] at paras. 47 and 4&:[47] Section &(2) contemplates two categories of discrimination. The first is differentiation on one (or more) of the 14 grounds specified in the subsection (a 'specified ground"). The second is differentiation on a ground not specified in subsection (2) but analogous to such ground (for convenience hereinafter called an 'unspecified" ground) which we formulated as follows in Prinsloo: "The second form is constituted by unfair discrimination on grounds which are not specified in the subsection. In regard to this second form there is no presumption in favour of unfairness". Given the history of this country we are of the view that "discrimination" has acquired a particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of people based on attributes and characteristics attaching to them   (U)nfair discrimination, when used in this second form in section 8(2), in the context of section 8 as a whole, principally means treating persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity. Where discrimination results in treating persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, it will clearly be a breach of section 8(2). Other forms of differentiation, which in some other way affect persons adversely in a comparably serious manner, may well constitute a breach of section 8(2) as well. There will be discrimination on an unspecified ground if it is based on attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner". [45]      The applicant does not present any factual basis for arguing that the differentiation is unfair, and he has failed to demonstrate, let alone discharge the onus on him, that such differentiation is unfair. [46]      The applicant's further argument that the restructuring of an advocate's practice to become more "commercially viable" or "sustainable" through incorporation, is a fallacy: an advocate's practice has no goodwill, cannot be sold, transferred or ceded to any other advocate or person, it arises with the start of the practice, exists as a result of the personal reputation of the advocate, and dies with the passing of the advocate. [47]      Although it was downplayed during oral argument, the papers indicated that the tax benefit which the applicant has identified for himself as a result of incorporation, might have been an additional motivation for the application. [48]      The tax benefit is structured as follows: once a fee is earned by the corporate entity, it is firstly used to defray the expenses resultant from all the activities mentioned by the applicant and as referred to in par [15] above, such as leases of buildings and vehicles and the employment of "support staff'. From what is remaining, the advocate is then paid a salary (on which he pays PAYE tax). [49]      Thereafter, the corporate entity may elect to distribute dividends. All this has the result of the corporate entity paying tax on profits, if any (at a lower rate than individual taxpayers) and the advocate then personally paying less tax than he would have as a sole practitioner. [50]     The applicant has, however, disavowed any reliance on any tax benefit, perceived or otherwise, as being a basis for his constitutional attack on the LPA and accordingly we need not decide the issue. Dignity [51]      Once it has been determined that the regulation of the profession, as provided for in section 22 of the Constitution, is both rational (and not arbitrary) and fair and in the public interest, than there can be no impairment of a practitioner's dignity if he or she decides, of own volition, to choose one or the other of the branches of equally dignified professions. Conclusions [52]      We find that there are no merits in any of the three Constitutional attacks on the impugned section of the LPA. [53]      On the issue of costs, we find that the Biowatch -principle is applicable and that it would be fair if each party, including the amici, pay their own costs. Order [54]      In the premises, an order is made in the following terms: 1.         The application is dismissed. 2.         Each party, including the amici, are ordered to pay their own costs. N DAVIS Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria I agree. H KOOVERJIE Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria I agree. L G P LEDWABA Acting Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria Date of Hearing: 26 August 2025 Reasons delivered: 11 November 2025 APPEARANCES: For the Applicant:                         Adv H Epstein SC together with Adv N Cassim SC, Adv T Mabuda & Adv J Janse van der Rensburg Attorney for the Applicant:            Vesi De Beer Attorneys, Pretoria For the 1 st Respondent: Attorney for the 1 st Respondent: The State Attorneys, Pretoria For the 2 nd Respondent:               Adv  P Ellis SC together with Adv A Lamey Attorney for the 2 nd Respondent:  Rooth & Wessels Inc., Pretoria For the 3 rd Respondent:               Adv M Chaskalson SC together with Adv K Shole Attorney for the 3 rd Respondent:  Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc., Johannesburg For the 1 st amicus:                        Adv M C Maritz SC together with Adv N C Maritz & Adv N Khumalo Attorney for the 1 st Amicus:          Bernhard van der Hoven Attorneys, Pretoria For the 2 nd Amicus:                       Adv A Tiry together with Adv M Njana Attorney for the 2 nd Amicus:          BJ Seete Attorneys, Nebo [1] 28 of 2014. [2] South African Legal Practice Council v Alves and Others 2021(4) SA 158 (SCA) (Alves) and Ex parte Goosen and Others 2019 (3) SA 489 (GJ). [3] 53 of 1979. [4] 74 of 1964. [5] Government Gazette No 42337 of 29 March 2019. [6] (16923/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 725 {21 July 2025) [7] The reference by Millar J is to the Uniform Rules of Court. [8] (052535/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 787 (8 August 2025). [9] 2023 (1) SA 80 (SCA) at par (23). [10] Par 59 of the Founding Affidavit. [11] 2003 (4) SA 258 (WLD) at paragraph [3]. [12] 2001(3) SA 750 (SCA) at 763G. [13] [2003] ZASCA 96. [14] Rules 22.3, 22.3.1and 22.3.2. read with Rule 38.2 of the Code. [15] Rules 39.1and 40 of the Code [16] Rule 38.2 [17] [1997] ZACC 12 ; 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para (54) (not [50] as the applicant's heads). sino noindex make_database footer start