Compensation Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Compensation Fund and Others (2024/110241) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1370 (5 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1370 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Compensation Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Compensation Fund and Others (2024/110241) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1370 (5 December 2025) Compensation Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Compensation Fund and Others (2024/110241) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1370 (5 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1370.html sino date 5 December 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA CASE NO: 2024-110241 (1)  REPORTABLE: YES / NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO (3)  REVIEWED: YES/NO In the matter between: COMPENSATION SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD Applicant and COMPENSATION FUND First Respondent COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER Second Respondent DIRECTOR- GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR Third Respondent MINISTER OF LABOUR Fourth Respondent MINISTER OF FINANCE Fifth Respondent HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA Sixth Respondent MINISTER OF HEALTH Seventh Respondent JUDGMENT RAUBENHEIMER AJ Introduction [1] The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act [1] (COIDA) fulfils a crucial role in the workplace in South Africa. [2] According to the Preamble of COIDA, the purpose of the act is “ to provide for compensation for disablement caused by occupational injuries or diseases sustained or contracted by employees in the course of their employment, or for death resulting from such injuries or diseases; and to provide for matters connected therewith.” [2] [3] The Minister of Labour is mandated in terms of section 97 of COIDA to determine the fees payable to medical practitioners for services rendered in terms of COIDA, subject to section 76, as well as the general procedures, persons, places, and manner of payment in respect of the mentioned services. [3] [4]  The Minister determines these fees and general conditions annually. [5]  The General Conditions incorporated in the medical tariffs for the years 2022-2025 are the subject of a review application. [6]  The Minister has not yet filed the record of the decision, and the current application is to compel the Minister to file the record. The parties [7]  The applicant conducts a business of factoring the accounts of medical practitioners. Its business model is that it buys the right, title, and interest in medical account claims against the Compensation Fund, therefore becoming the legal holder of the accounts of the medical service providers. It is consequently entitled to enforce the claims against the Compensation Fund. [8]  The applicant effectively functions as an intermediary between the Compensation Fund and the medical service providers. It has more than 1350 medical service providers, and representatives of 4000 service providers as clients. [9]  The client base of the applicant covers a comprehensive array of medical disciplines, from General Practitioners to various specialist practitioners to hospitals and other medical facilities. It collects approximately 45% of accounts rendered to the Compensation Commissioner. [10]  The first respondent is the Compensation Fund established in terms of the COIDA. [11]  The second respondent is the Compensation Commissioner, as the official functionary responsible for overseeing the administration of the Compensation Fund. [12]  The third respondent is the Director-General of the Department of Labour, appointed by the Minister of Labour. [13]  The fourth respondent is the Minister of Labour as the head of the Department of Labour and the executive authority of the Compensation Fund and as such authorised to make regulations pertaining to the fees payable and general conditions applicable to the payment of fees to medical practitioners for services rendered in terms of COIDA. [14]  The fifth respondent is the Minister of Finance as the head of the National Treasury. [15]  The sixth respondent is the Health Professions Council of South Africa, the statutory regulating body for the health care profession. [16]  The seventh respondent is the Minister of Health as the head of the Department of Health. The review application [17] The applicant launched a review application in terms of section 6(2) read with section 8(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act [4] , to review the medical tariffs and general conditions published by the Minister for the 2022 to 2025 financial years on 27 September 2024. [18]  In terms of rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court, the fourth respondent had to provide the record of the proceedings to be reviewed, as well as the reasons for the decision by the fourth respondent, within 15 days after receipt of the review application. [19]  The review application was opposed by the first, second, third, and fourth respondents. [20]  When the record and the reasons for the decision were not provided within 15 days, the applicant launched an application in terms of Rule 30A to compel the fourth respondent to serve and file the record as well as the reasons on 24 February 2025. [21]  This application was opposed by the first, second, and third respondents on 14 March 2025. Only the first respondent delivered an answering affidavit. The submissions by the applicant [22]  The purpose of the application is to compel the fourth respondent to produce the record of the proceedings on which the decision was made, as well as the reasons for the decision. [23]  The substantive merit of the review is not to be considered in the relief sought in the current application. [24]  The fourth respondent, who is saddled with the obligation to produce the record, did not oppose the application and has not filed any opposing papers, neither has the fourth respondent filed a confirmatory affidavit to the answering affidavit of the first respondent. [25]  The opposition of the first respondent is irregular. It was not the decision maker and consequently has no obligation to produce the record. [26]  The first respondent does not deny that the record has not been produced and effectively attempts to justify the non-compliance with the rules by the fourth respondent, without the latter opposing the relief sought. [27]  Such a course of action effectively obstructs the review process and delays the applicant’s right to resolution. [28]  The basis for the opposition by the first respondent is that the applicant is not entitled to the record because it is not a consulted stakeholder. This proposition is founded on the basis that the applicant is not one of the entities required to be consulted in the decision-making process. Secondly, the applicant does not have a mandate from the consulted entities to institute the review application [29]  The applicant contends that the right to the record of the proceedings has its origin in the institution of the review application. It is a procedural right and is not dependent on the identity or status of the applicant. [30]  The locus standi of the applicant and the merits of the review are not in issue at this stage of the proceedings. The argument that the review is not properly before the court due to the applicant’s lack of locus standi is misplaced and premature. [31]  Such matters, as well as the reviewability or correctness of the tariff decisions by the fourth respondent, are reserved for the main application. [32]  The applicant contends that it has a direct and substantial interest in the decisions of the fourth respondent on the basis of its position as an agent for the medical service providers affected by the decision. [33]  Rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court is peremptory in nature and imposes an obligation on the decision-maker to produce the full record of the proceedings under review to the Registrar when a review application is launched. The submissions by the respondents [34]  The applicant is not a stakeholder in the process of determining the tariffs and conditions and was consequently not a party that was consulted in the decision-making process. None of the parties involved in the decision takes issue with the decision. [35]  The applicant is not mandated to bring the review application to any of the parties involved in the decision. As the applicant was not involved in the decision-making process, it has no right to be granted access to the record of the proceedings [36] In terms of section 75 of COIDA, all questions regarding the need for, and the nature and sufficiency of, any medical aid supplied or to be supplied in terms of this Chapter shall be decided by the third respondent. [37]  The third respondent is furthermore mandated in terms of section 76(2) to determine the tariff of fees in consultation with the Medical Association of South Africa, the Chiropractic Association of South Africa, and the Dental Association of South Africa. [38]  The fourth respondent, as the political head, is not in possession of the records and is consequently not in a position to produce the records or reasons. [39]  The applicant acts in its own right and as an agent for the numerous medical service providers affected by the decision, as a result of which it has to establish a legal standing to bring a review application. The mere existence of a financial interest is not sufficient to establish legal standing. The applicant is required to show that it would be in the interests of justice to review the decision. [40]  The relationship between the applicant and its clients is based on an agreement to collect debts on their behalf and not to institute review proceedings on their behalf, and as such, the applicant is not mandated to review the decision of the fourth respondent. Discussion [41] At its core, locus standi is a threshold issue. It’s not just a procedural checkbox; it's a fundamental question of whether a party has a legitimate interest in the case, giving it the right to seek a remedy from a court. If an applicant lacks standing, the court is essentially powerless to hear the merits of their case. [5] [42]  This is why raising it early makes perfect sense from an efficiency standpoint. The burden of producing a Rule 53 record is substantial for a government department or a large entity and could involve compiling thousands of pages of documents, minutes, and internal communications. Such a process requires a significant investment of time, resources and public money. Obliging a respondent to go through that effort for an applicant who will ultimately be found not to have standing constitutes a futile and wasteful exercise. [43] This logic has been consistently endorsed by the courts. If the applicant lacks standing, they are simply not entitled to the record, and compelling its production would be wrong [6] [44]  The basis of this principle is about protecting the judicial process from being bogged down by frivolous or legally unsustainable claims. [45]  In terms of section 38 of the Constitution any person has a right to approach a competent court. The old common law test was rigid and demanding, requiring a "direct and personal interest." [46] The Constitutional Court, in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others , held that constitutional provisions should not be subjected to strained or narrow readings simply to secure a desired outcome; instead, rights must be interpreted generously so that their full protections are realised, with the limitations analysis conducted where appropriate. [7] This ensures that the state is held accountable. [47]  This liberalisation is crucial because the right to just administrative action, as guaranteed by section 33 of the Constitution and given effect through PAJA, is constitutionally entrenched. Accordingly, where legal standing is at issue, the section 38 test should be applied generously. [48]  The Constitutional Court has repeatedly described Rule 53 as more than just a procedural rule. It's a vital tool for ensuring government transparency and accountability: [49] In Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission , the court stressed that the purpose of the record is to ensure reviews are not "launched in the dark." [8] The record containing all the documents, evidence and reasons for the decision is the only way an applicant can properly understand and challenge the administrative action. [50] Undeniably, a Rule 53 record is an invaluable tool in the review process. It may help shed light on what happened and why; give a lie to unfounded ex post facto (after the fact) justification of the decision under review; in the substantiation of as yet not fully substantiated grounds of review; in giving support to the decision-maker’s stance; and in the performance of the reviewing court’s function . [9] [51]  The courts affirmed this but demonstrated that each outcome depends on the merits of the case. [52]  In Metropolitan Health Corporate (Pty) Ltd and Others v South African Police Service Medical Scheme (POLMED) and Another it was held that: “ [25]    I am of the view that the request of the respondents that the court at this stage, in an interlocutory application, adjudicate upon defences raised in respect of the merits of the main application, is inappropriate and a court should not be inclined to accede to such a request. This court at this stage do not know what the nature and the content of the documents are forming part of the Rule 53 record. The respondents may be correct with their submissions, but it may also be that they are not correct. It may be that the applicants find something within the rule 53 record which they can use in its review application to counter these submissions of the respondents. This will only become evident after disclosure of the rule 53 record and after the applicants have amplified their founding papers and amended its notice of motion if deemed necessary. POLMED’s submission that the present is more than an interlocutory application is exactly what should be prevented at this stage of the review proceedings. As I have indicated above, the applicants’ founding affidavit and notice of motion in the main application are not even finalised yet.” [10] [53] In the Democratic Alliance case the question of whether a respondent in a judicial review can attempt to shut down the entire proceeding by challenging an applicant's right to be in court, even when the applicant is requesting that the official record was answered in the affirmative. Not only is this a permissible move, but it’s also a sound defensive play in South African administrative law. Raising the defence of a lack of locus standi in response to an interlocutory application to compel the Rule 53 record is a proper, admissible, and frequent tactic. As a result, the lack of locus standi falls to dismiss the application. [11] [54] At stake in such an application are two fundamental constitutional principles, namely the applicant's right to state transparency and access to justice versus the court's need for judicial efficiency and finality. The right of review gives effect to the values of accountability and openness in the decision-making process [12] [55]  In practice, courts resolve this tension through the careful exercise of judicial discretion. In the Democratic Alliance matter the court provided a clear roadmap where the NDPP consistently challenged the DA’s standing at the interlocutory stage when the DA sought to access the record. Although the court held that the DA did have the required public interest standing and was therefore entitled to the record, the case firmly established the procedural legitimacy of raising the locus standi defence to oppose an application to compel, and this validated the respondent’s right to ask the court to decide the threshold issue first. [56] Uniform Rule 53, which governs the procedure for judicial reviews, is no longer a simple procedural rule. The Constitutional Court has elevated it to the status of a fundamental constitutional tool. [13] Its entire purpose is to give effect to the right to just administrative action as guaranteed in section 33 of the Constitution by ensuring transparency and accountability. [57] It affords the applicant to see the full picture and, if necessary, amend the grounds of review based on what the record reveals. [14] Without it, the entire review process would be fundamentally unfair. [58] Judicial efficiency entails that courts should not expend judicial resources on cases brought by individuals or entities who have no legally recognized interest in the outcome. [15] It is the core function of locus standi to act as a gatekeeper. [16] [59]  It is trite that a point of law that can dispose of an entire case should be dealt with at the earliest opportunity. [60]  As locus standi is a threshold issue to be dealt with first the Constitutional Court in Giant Concerts CC v Rattray and Others did not deal with the merits of the case because the party lacked locus standi. [61] In the Tulip Diamonds matter the court similarly held that standing is a threshold issue that must be determined at the outset before the merits of a case are entertained. It is a gateway through which a litigant must pass before a court will entertain the merits of a case." [17] [62] The court emphasised that locus standi is not merely a technical point. The absence of locus standi means the court has no authority to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. If standing is not established, "that is the end of the matter." [18] [63]  The question now arises whether the applicant does indeed have locus standi. [64]  For the applicant to obtain locus standi, it must have a direct and substantial interest in the matter to be adjudicated. The effect of this requirement is that the interest must be direct and not indirect or remote. It must be substantial and not trivial, and it must be actual, not hypothetical. Lastly, the interest must be personal to the applicant. [65] In Jacobs en 'n Ander v Waks en Andere, [19] White residents of Carletonville challenged the town council's decision to maintain segregated recreational facilities, arguing it was unlawful. The Appellate Division granted them standing, reasoning that while the decision primarily affected Black residents, the applicants, as members of the municipal community, had a direct and substantial interest in the lawfulness of their own council's actions. This decision indicated a slightly more flexible approach, recognizing that a "personal" interest could be shared with a distinct group, but it stopped short of allowing a general public interest action. [66] In Gross and Others v Pentz [20] the trustees of a trust sought to sue on behalf of the trust. The SCA reaffirmed the "direct and substantial interest" test as the governing standard at common law. The court confirmed that the interest must be "a legal interest in the subject-matter of the action which could be prejudicially affected by the judgment of the Court." [67]  The constitutional shift has forced courts to reinterpret what a "direct and substantial interest" actually means. The focus has moved away from a narrow assessment of the applicant's personal financial or proprietary injury and toward the broader need to vindicate the rule of law and ensure public power is exercised lawfully. [68] In Walele v City of Cape Town, [21] a property owner challenged his neighbour's building plans based on non-compliance with statutory regulations. Within the framework of PAJA, which gives effect to the constitutional right to just administrative action, his standing to ensure the municipality acted lawfully has been readily accepted. Courts now generously interpret the idea that people are "adversely affected" by illegal administrative action to include those materially impacted, not just those whose specific legal rights are infringed. [69] Previously, the common law strictly forbade the actio popularis , an action instituted by an individual based solely on the public interest, simply to ensure the law is upheld. However, the constitutional value of public accountability has chipped away at this prohibition. While a litigant in a non-constitutional matter can't directly use Section 38's "public interest" clause, the courts have found creative ways to grant standing to entities acting in that very capacity. For instance, political parties or public interest organisations are often granted standing to challenge state decisions that violate statutes, such as the unlawful disposal of public property. [22] The court finds a "sufficient interest" not in the party's personal gain, but in its role as a representative of the public and its interest in ensuring lawful governance and upholding the principle of legality. [70]  In determining the nature of the interest, the court has to ascertain whether the interest is legal, financial, or sentimental. The interest must be one recognised by the law. [71]  In Giant Concerts , the court recognised that the legal interest of a commercial entity includes an interest in a lawful and procedurally fair administrative process that has an effect on the competitive environment. The interest is thus not limited to the outcome of the decision but in the legitimacy of the process itself. [72]  The interest must be direct, not indirect or consequential. The applicant must show that it stands to directly gain or lose something as a result of the decision sought to be reviewed. [73]  The actuality of the interest is determined by establishing whether it is current and existing. [74]  Finally, the question has to be answered as to how the decision affects the rights and obligations of the applicant. [75]  The court engages in a pragmatic, results-based inquiry. It weighs these factors to determine if the litigant has enough "skin in the game" to justify the court's intervention. This approach is now infused with the constitutional value of ensuring that public power is exercised lawfully. Application [76]  It is undisputed that the applicant facilitates and collects about 45% of all medical records submitted to the second respondent by, in excess of, 1350 medical service providers comprising approximately 4000 individual service providers. The applicant also services medical facilities and hospitals. [77]  The applicant conducts a factoring business in terms of which it purchases the right, title, and interest in medical account claims against the Compensation Fund. It thus becomes the legal holder of the accounts of the medical service providers and is entitled by law to enforce claims against the third respondent. Conclusion [80]  The applicant has shown that it has a direct and substantial interest in the review application. [81]  The applicant is thus entitled to the record of the proceedings. Order [82]  Consequently, the following order is made: 1.     The fourth respondent shall serve and file the complete record of the proceedings under review in the review application instituted under case number 11024/2024. 2.     The fourth respondent shall serve and file such reasons as required by law or may wish to provide within 10 days of the date of this judgment. 3.     The first and fourth respondents shall pay, jointly and severally, the costs of this application on scale B. E RAUBENHEIMER ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA Electronically submitted Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed to be 05 December 2025 For the Plaintiffs:                                                             Adv van As Instructed by Adams & Adams For the First Respondents:                                               Adv Mulaudzi Instructed by State Attorney Date of the hearing:                                                          15 October 2025 Date of Judgment:                                                            November 2025 [1] Act 130 of 1993. [2] As above. [3] As above. [4] Act 3 of 2000 [5] Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another, Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Defence and Others (CCT29/01, CCT14/01) [2001] ZACC 12 ; 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC); 2001 (11) BCLR 1137 (CC); 2001 (2) SACR 632 (CC) (5 October 2001) [6] Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (19577/09) [2011] ZAGPPHC 57 (22 February 2011) at para 15 and 16. [7] Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (CCT5/95) [1995] ZACC 13 ; 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC); 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (6 December 1995) at para 213. [8] Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission (CCT289/16) [2018] ZACC 8 ; 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC); 2018 (7) BCLR 763 (CC) (24 April 2018) at para 13. [9] Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality [2014] ZACC 24 ; 2014 (6) SA 592 (CC); 2014 (11) BCLR 1310 (CC) at para 37. [10] Metropolitan Health Corporate (Pty) Ltd and Others v South African Police Service Medical Scheme (POLMED) and Another (60445/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 302 (9 May 2023) at para 25. [11] Democratic Alliance (n 5 above at 37). [12] Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another v Richards Bay Coal Terminal (Pty) Ltd (CCT 104/23) [2025] ZACC 3 ; 2025 (6) BCLR 639 (CC); 2025 (5) SA 617 (CC) (31 March 2025) at para 73. [13] Competition Commission of South Africa v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited; Competition Commission of South Africa v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited; Competition Commission of South Africa v Waco Africa (Pty) Limited and Others (CCT158/18; CCT179/18; CT218/18) [2020] ZACC 2 ; 2020 (4) BCLR 429 (CC) (20 February 2020) at para 25. See Further Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission (n 7 above at 13-15). [14] Competition Commission of South Africa v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (n 13 above at para 25). [15] Die Hoerskool Menlo Park School Governing Body v City Manager: City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others (26999/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1028 (19 October 2024) at para 6. [16] Happy Valley Holiday Hotel and Pleasure Resort 1972 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nakoseni Property Developers (Pty) Ltd and Others (9066/2020) [2024] ZAGPJHC 98 (2 February 2024) at para 37. [17] Tulip Diamonds FZE v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others ZASCA 1; 2013 (1) SACR 443 (SCA) at para 1. [18] Sandton Civic Precinct (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg and Others ZASCA 104 [2008] ZASCA 104 ; ; 2009 (1) SA 317 (SCA) at paras 19-21. [19] Jacobs en 'n Ander v Waks en Andere (113/1990) [1991] ZASCA 152 ; 1992 (1) SA 521 (AD); (20 November 1991) [20] Gross and Others v Pentz (414/95) [1996] ZASCA 78 ; 1996 (4) SA 617 (SCA); [1996] 4 All SA 63 (A); (22 August 1996) [21] Walele v City of Cape Town and Others (CCT 64/07) [2008] ZACC 11 ; 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC); 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) (13 June 2008) [22] Limpopo Legal Solutions v Vhembe District Municipality and Others (CCT119/16) [2017] ZACC 30 ; 2018 (4) BCLR 430 (CC) (17 August 2017) at paras 13-15. sino noindex make_database footer start