Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1355South Africa
Samons NO and Others v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Community Safety and Transport Management of the North-West Provincial Government and Another (Appeal) (039123/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1355 (15 December 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
15 December 2025
Headnotes
Summary: Business rescue – removal of practitioner in terms of section 139(2) of the Companies Act – Business Rescue Practitioner (BRP) removed by court a quo – although approach of court a quo incorrect, no material misdirection on the facts – found, on appeal that a number of instances of non-compliant conduct by the BRP proven – these included PFMA non-compliance, failure to publish a business rescue plan or to do it timeously, failure to produce annual financial statements, irregular payment of pre-commencement debt, failure to prioritise payment of employees’ salaries, mismanagement and a lack of compliance with reporting obligations. Removal of BRP justified in the circumstances. Appeal dismissed.
Judgment
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## Samons NO and Others v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Community Safety and Transport Management of the North-West Provincial Government and Another (Appeal) (039123/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1355 (15 December 2025)
Samons NO and Others v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Community Safety and Transport Management of the North-West Provincial Government and Another (Appeal) (039123/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1355 (15 December 2025)
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sino date 15 December 2025
FLYNOTES:
COMPANY – Business rescue practitioner –
Removal
from
office
–
Non compliance
with core duties as practitioner – Engagement in conduct
contrary to statutory requirements –
Prolonged failure to
produce a compliant plan – Reliance on unapproved public
financing – Absence of financial
reporting – Creation
and use of unauthorised bank accounts – Irregular
dispositions of rights – Erosion
of transparency –
Discretionary choice to remove practitioner justified –
Companies Act 71 of 2008
,
s 139(2).
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 039123/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
15 DECEMBER 2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
THOMAS
HENDRICK SAMONS N.O.
First
Appellant
THOMAS
HENDRICK SAMONS
Second
Appellant
NORTH-WEST
TRANSPORT INVESTMENT (SOC) LTD
Third
Appellant
NORTH-WEST
STAR (SOC) LTD
Fourth
Appellant
ATTERIDGEVILLE
BUS SERVICE (SOC) LTD
Fifth
Appellant
and
THE
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR
THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SAFETY
AND
TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT OF THE
NORTH-WEST
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
First
Respondent
THE
AFFECTED PERSONS IN THE THIRD,
FOURTH,
AND FIFTH APPELLANTS
Second
Respondent
THE
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR THE
DEPARTMENT
OF PROVINCILA TREASURY OF THE
NORTH-WEST
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
Intervening
Party
Summary:
Business rescue – removal of practitioner in terms of
section
139(2)
of the
Companies Act – Business
Rescue Practitioner
(BRP) removed by court a quo – although approach of court a quo
incorrect, no material misdirection on
the facts – found, on
appeal that a number of instances of non-compliant conduct by the BRP
proven – these included
PFMA non-compliance, failure to publish
a business rescue plan or to do it timeously, failure to
produce annual financial
statements, irregular payment of
pre-commencement debt, failure to prioritise payment of employees’
salaries, mismanagement
and a lack of compliance with reporting
obligations. Removal of BRP justified in the circumstances. Appeal
dismissed.
ORDER
The appeal is refused
with costs, including the costs of two counsel, where employed.
JUDGMENT
The
matter was heard in open court and the judgment was prepared and
authored by the judge whose name is reflected herein and was
handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic
file
of this matter on Caselines. The date of handing-down is deemed
to be
15
…
December
2025.
DAVIS,
J (HASSIM J and VAN NIEKERK AJ concurring)
Introduction
[1]
The
matter concerns an appeal against the removal from office of a
business rescue practitioner (“BRP”), Mr T H Samons,
in
terms of the provisions of
section 139
(2)
of the
Companies Act, by
the court
a
quo,
per
Kooverjie J on 21 November 2024. The matter came before us by
leave of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[2]
The appellants are the BRP and the three state owned
companies under
business rescue, being Northwest Transport Investment (SOC) Ltd
(NTI), Northwest Star (SOC) Ltd (NWS) and Atteridgeville
Bus Services
(SOC) Ltd (ABS).
[3]
The MEC for the Department of Community Safety and Transport
Management of the Northwest Provincial Government (COSATMA) is the
first respondent and the previous intervening party, the MEC
for the
Department of Provincial Treasury of the Northwest Government
(Treasury) is the second respondent.
[4]
The BRP was appointed as the business rescue practitioner
of the
three companies respectively on 21 July 2022 (NTI), 4 August 2022
(ABS) and 16 September 2022 (NWS). The business
recue
proceedings of the three companies were conducted as if they were a
single company and were collectively referred to as the
“NTI
companies”.
Proceedings
in the court a quo
[5]
In
the court a quo COSATMA sought the removal of the BRP on grounds of
incompetence, dereliction of statutory duties, and unlawful
conduct,
including failure to comply with the
Companies Act
[1
]
and the Public Finance Management Act
[2]
(the PFMA). The BRP had opposed the application and placed
blame on COSATMA and the Gauteng Department of Roads & Transport
(GDRT) for alleged non-cooperation and failure to fund the operations
of the NTI companies.
[6]
The grounds for
removal were listed by COSATMA in its founding affidavit. The first
cause of complaint was that the BRP had failed
to publish a business
rescue plan timeously and, extensions for its publication were
unlawful . In addition, under the control
of the BRP, there was a
“staggering” escalation of the NTI companies’
liabilities. The BRP also failed to prioritize
the payment of
salaries of employees. The BRP was further accused of having failed
to comply with the PFMA by opening bank accounts
without proper
authorization and by failing to obtain the necessary approval of the
Premier of the province for the financing of
the business rescue
plan. The BRP was also accused of favouring a creditor of the
companies, Transnat Coachlines (Pty) Ltd (Transnat)
at the expense of
affected persons. This included a failure to properly investigate
Transnat’s claims and the making of unlawful
payments to it
and/or its joint venture with another corporation, Ziggy Investments
CC. The BRP was also accused of having a conflict
of interest, of
attempting to dismiss the directors of the companies from their
respective boards, of being non-compliant with
tax and employment
legislation and by attempting to sell assets of the companies.
[7]
In respect of the
delay in publishing the business rescue plan, the court
a
quo
referred
to the facts that the first business rescue plan was only prepared
and “circulated” on 3 July 2023, the second
plan was
“circulated” on 18 September 2023 and the third plan was
only adopted in July 2024. The finding was that these
time periods
exceeded the 25-day time period since the date on which the BRP was
appointed as prescribed in
section 150(5)(b)
of the
Companies Act.
[8]
Regarding the
extensions of time, the court
a
quo
found
that although extensions were indeed sought between September 22 and
May 2023, but when COSATMA refused to accede to further
extensions
after November 2020, the BRP only sought extensions from the
creditors. As a result, the third plan, which was thereafter
approved, was adopted without COSATMA’s consent. The
court
a quo
held that extensions
of time for the publishing of business rescue plans sought by the BRP
from creditors after COSATMA had refused
further extensions, were
unlawful.
[9]
In respect of the
failure to have produced and submitted annual financial statements it
was found that it had been proven that the
annual financial
statements for the years 2019 to 2024 were neither prepared nor made
available to COSATMA and that the BRP only
informed the
Auditor-General 18 months after his appointment of his difficulty
with the compilation of the financial statements
[10]
Although the court
a
quo
acknowledged
the challenges faced by the BRP, principally being the absence of
source documents and that the relevant officials,
being the director
and head of the audit committee Mr. Sadiki and the CFO of the
companies Mr. Kenosha, failed to assist him and
were in fact
recalcitrant in doing so, it found in this regard as follows “
It
is my view that the BRP was required to manage the process with a
level of skill and independence and could not merely lay the
blame at
the door of the officials. He had an obligation to report the state
of the entities’ affairs to the MEC and proffered
no
explanation as to why he did not inform the applicant of the
challenge he faced”.
[11]
The court
a
quo
found
that the lack of reporting was exacerbated by the BRP painting a
different picture to the affected parties. It was only on
19 March
2023 when the BRP, in response to a first attempt at his removal,
responded as follows “
An
independent auditing firm has been employed at additional expense to
manage the financial reporting requirements of NTI and ultimately
to
perform the requisite audit in conjunction with the BRP team. This
audit is currently in progress for purposes of compiling
the
outstanding annual financial reports and the other current reports to
be submitted to the Auditor General
.”
It was found that this statement was not true. At that time the
external auditing firm had not been mandated to conduct
an audit and
statements to the effect that such an audit was in progress were
misleading and prejudicial to creditors and the affected
parties. It
was lastly found on this topic that it was concerning that the BRP
did not even have management reports in place for
the duration of the
business rescue proceedings
[12]
In respect of the
issue of employees’ salaries, the court
a
quo
found
that it was common cause that the employees had not been paid
regularly and on a monthly basis during the course of the business
rescue proceedings. The court
a
quo
acknowledged
that the BRP had pointed out that in order to keep the bus operations
afloat he had no option but to pay Transnat and
the various
suppliers. He persisted that he had balanced all the factors
envisaged in the
Companies Act and
on the occasions that he paid the
suppliers he had no funds left to pay the salaries. The finding of
the court of
a
quo
was
that the BRP’s reasoning evinced the fact that he failed to
appreciate that he had little or no discretion regarding the
payment
of salaries and that his understanding that it was permissible to
skip salary payments as they would eventuate to post
commencement
finance claims by virtue of
section 135(1)(a)
of the Act, was
dismissed as being fatally flawed.
[13]
In respect of the
non-compliance with the PFMA and Treasury Regulations the court
a
quo
found
that non-compliant conduct had been proven. The learned judge firstly
referred to the fact that in terms of section 55 of
the PFMA the BRP
was required to regularly submit financial reports to COSATMA,
Treasury and the provincial government. The repeated
requests for
information from these departments indicated that there was no such
financial reporting. The court
a
quo
further
found that the BRP's explanation for his failure to respond to
various correspondences from September 2023 to February 2024
as well
as his failure to respond to the portfolio committee's request for
information, illustrated his incompetence. She further
found that his
response via his attorneys to the effect that he had not prepared any
financial reporting documents, was “glaringly
untenable”.
[14]
In respect of
compliance with the PFMA further, the court
a
quo
referred
to a report from the Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC)
commissioned by the MEC of COSATMA. The GTAC report,
of which
the business rescue practitioner was acutely aware, recorded that
NTI’s contracts with the GDRT would expire at
the end of March
2020 and that the renegotiation of such contracts was inevitable.
GDRT had to ensure that NTI had a plausible
plan to restructure its
operations and that its own governance requirements would not be
violated when contracting with NTI.
It was imperative for the
GDRT not to expose itself to political embarrassment or allegations
of financial misconduct in these
circumstances. Accordingly,
the adoption of the business rescue plan was crucial for the GDRT in
its negotiations with the
BRP. The GTAC report recorded in this
regard that since the NTI companies were actively seeking financial
assistance from the provincial
government, regard had to be given to
section 38(1)J of the PFMA whereby an accounting officer had to
ensure that any entity to
which it transfers funds had systems and
internal controls in place to manage its funds.
[15]
It was found by the
court
a quo
that the BRP had,
without the consent or approval of COSATMA, ceded NWS's claims as
security to third parties. The BRP further encumbered
NTI's immovable
property to the value of R130 million in favour of Transnat. It
was also found that the BRP in this fashion
did not appreciate his
statutory obligations and contravened section 66(3)(d) of the PFMA.
This section prescribes that the
MEC for Finance of a province
is the responsible person regarding such contracts. The BRP had
omitted to put such a requirement
in place.
[16]
As a consequence of
the above, the BRP was removed from office on 21 November 2024. The
application for leave to appeal that order
was refused on 27 March
2025 whereafter the Supreme Court of Appeal was petitioned and leave
was granted to appeal that order to
this court.
The
appellants’ attack on the judgment in the court
a quo
[17]
The
appellants argued that the court
a
quo
had
erred by failing to consider all the grounds for removal raised in
the affidavits and only dealt with them selectively.
They
further argued that in respect of all the individual grounds listed
by COSATMA in the founding affidavit, the BRP had provided
cogent
explanations. Accordingly, the appellants contended that the
court
a
quo
had
adopted an incorrect approach by concluding that section 139 does not
require a court to determine all the complaints raised.
The
appellants argued that this constituted a misdirection because a
court is obliged to consider “all relevant facts”
before
deciding on a removal. The appellants in particular rely on the
judgment in
Knoop
v Gupta
[3]
for the principle that removal requires a factual foundation for the
statutory grounds alleged to have been contravened and that
all
evidence must be considered.
[18]
The appellants
further argued that the judgment contained material misdirections of
fact and law regarding the issues relied on
by the court
a
quo
for
removal, being the Transnat claim, the alleged failure to prioritize
salaries, the absence of annual financial statements and
delays in
publishing a business rescue plan.
[19]
Concerning the
Transnat claim, the court a quo found that COSATMA’s allegation
that the claim was an inflated one, was common
cause. The
appellants argued that this constituted a misdirection as that
allegation was disputed on the papers and that
the BRP had fully
explained his verification of the claim.
[20]
In respect of
salaries the appellants submitted that
section 135(1)(a)
of the
Companies Act does
not require immediate payment of salaries and that
prioritization of operational expenses was necessary to maintain
services. They
argued that the court
a
quo
misinterpreted
section 135
of the
Companies Act.
[21
]
Regarding the issue
of financial statements, the appellants argued that historical
failures to prepare them predated the BRP's appointment
and that the
court
a quo
failed to consider
the evidence of obstruction and misconduct by officials previously
responsible for financial management
[22]
In respect of delays
in publishing the business rescue plan, the appellants argued that
the delays were caused by a lack of funding,
strikes, missing
financial records and ongoing negotiations. They stated that a draft
plan had been circulated and that publication
was halted at COSATMA’s
instance.
[23]
On behalf of the BRP
it was argued that he had achieved substantial progress in
stabilizing the companies, improving financial performance
and
restoring operations and that these factors were not taken into
account by the court
a
quo
.
[24]
The
appellants submitted that the court
a
quo
failed
to comply with the principles extracted from
Vodacom
v Makete
[4]
,
specifically the obligation to give reasons. A failure to
consider material evidence constituted an unfair hearing and on
this
basis the appellants argued that the appeal should succeed.
[25]
Lastly it was argued
on behalf of the appellants that in the founding affidavit it was not
pertinently alleged that the BRP had
failed to comply with
Section 7
of the PFMA when he opened new bank accounts at First National Bank.
The BRP could therefore not have been expected to specifically
deal
with this alleged failure in his answering affidavit. In this
regard the appellant’s counsel also referred to
paragraph 6.5
of the progress report of the BRP, dated 19 December 2022, where the
opening of the three new bank accounts were
disclosed. It was
also disclosed in that progress report that an application had been
lodged by the BRP with the Minister
of Finance to consider an
exemption from the provisions of the PFMA.
[26]
Regarding the
counter-application, the appellants argued that the court
a
quo
erred
in dismissing it rather than referring the disputes of fact to oral
evidence or trial. Concerning the alleged funding
agreements
with COSATMA, the appellants submitted that the BRP's removal was
based on findings inconsistent with the evidence and
unsupported by
proper factual or legal reasoning. They argue that their appeal
should succeed and that the removal order
should be set aside and
that the counter-application should be referred to evidence or
determined afresh.
Evaluation:
the applicable principles
[27]
Firstly,
it is trite that an appeal lies against an order that is made by a
court and not its reasons for making the order
[5]
.
It follows that, on appeal, a respondent is entitled to support the
order on any relevant ground and is not confined to
supporting it
only for the reasons given by the court below
[6]
.
[28]
Therefore, even if the learned judge in the court a quo may have
erred in having
robustly decided that the factual disputes could be
decided on the papers and may have rejected the version of the BRP on
certain
disputed aspects as the appellants claim she did, it must
still be determined by this court whether COSATMA had been entitled
to
the orders sought in the court
a
quo
, on the facts established on the
papers.
[29]
Section 139(2)
provides that a BRP may be removed from office “
upon
request of an affected person … on any of the following
grounds:
(a)
incompetence or failure to perform
the duties of a business rescue practitioner.
(b)
failure to exercise a proper degree
of care …
(c)
engaging in illegal acts or conduct.
(d)
if the practitioner no longer
satisfies the requirements set out in
section 138(1).
(e)
conflict of interest or lack of
independence.
(f)
The practitioner is incapacitated …”.
[30]
With reliance on
Knoop v Gupta
(supra), the appellants argued that the court a quo erroneously
adopted an approach that, because certain facts “stand
uncontroverted”,
the BRP’s removal must follow.
They further argued that the approach to factual disputes adopted by
the court
a quo
was incorrect and amounted to an incorrect application of the
Plascon-Evans Rule
.
[31]
For the sale of clarity, it is necessary to have regard to what the
SCA had
determined in
Knoop v Gupta
on the position regarding the removal of a business rescue
practitioner. It has been stated to be the following (at paras
[17] and 18): “
The court has a
discretion to either grant or to refuse an order for the removal of a
BRP. The discretion is exercised if
one or more of the grounds
for removal set out in
section 139(2)
have been established on a
balance of probabilities. However, proof of a ground for
removal alone does no dictate that a
order for removal must follow.
The power of removal is not combined with a duly to exercise that
power…. [18] the
power now given to a court is not novel ….
That power extends to the removal of executors and liquidator of
companies
…. Two general principles will be that removal
is not something to be ordered lightly and the primary reason
justifying
removal will be actual or potential prejudice or harm to
the interests of the estate, trust or company and those in which
interests
the administration was established, such as heirs in as
estate or creditors inn circumstances of insolvency
”.
[32]
The steps envisaged are therefore (1) the determination of primary
facts on
a balance of probabilities which constitute contravention of
the requirements of
section 139
of the
Companies Act, (2
) to
determine whether those facts caused or might cause actual or
potential harm to affected parties and (3) whether such a finding
justifies the exercise of a court’s discretion in favour of
removal.
[33]
In
order to determine what facts have been sufficiently established in
motion proceedings, the rule is that final relief should
only be
granted “…
if
the facts state by the respondent together with the admitted facts in
the applicant’s affidavit justify such an order ….
Where it is clear that facts, though not formally admitted, cannot be
denied, they must be regarded as admitted
”
[7]
.
Context
[34]
Before considering, as a starting point, the facts “stated by
the respondent”
(in this case, the BRP), context of his
position and that of the NTI companies needs to be given. This
can be found in the
very detailed GTAC report (96 pages) of which the
following series of extracts are crucial as they informed the whole
of the business
rescue proceedings. Firstly, with reference to
NTI’s own annual report immediately preceding the GTAC report,
its business
was recorded as follows:
“
NTI
is a State-Owned Enterprise registered as a private company under the
Companies Act and
as a Provincial Government Business Enterprise
Entity in terms of Schedule 3(D) of the PFMA. The company owns
and manages
a substantial commercial property portfolio and also
operates the administrative head office for NWS, a wholly owned
subsidiary.
NTI, NWS and NWS’s Subsidiary, ABS, operate
transport services in certain areas of the Gauteng Province with
limited extensions
into other Provinces from four bus operating
centres. Service workshops have been established at all
operating centres to
maintain the bus fleet and to ensure a high
level of operating efficiency. NWS and ABS also provide private
hires and contract
services on request. Weekend services
between urban and rural areas are also provided”
[35]
The report further makes the point that NTI is a public entity and,
in a separate
section of the report, refers to the PFMA requirements
imposed on its board. The report also made reference to the
Protocol
on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, which provides
a framework for schedule 2, 3B and 3D public entities (the NTI
companies
are such entities).
[36]
After an extensive evaluation of the NTI companies’ operations,
financial
status, previous judicial management as well as liquidation
proceedings, GTAC concluded that “…
NTI
is in deep financial distress and may already be insolvent.
There is also little prospect of it being able to trade itself
into
sustainability
”. The
following opinion is then expressed as to possible future options for
the companies:
“
Organisations
in these circumstances have few options. If it is to become
commercially viable, NTI requires a combination
of:
-
An injection of capital from its
shareholder to allow it to meet its immediate liabilities and avoid
an application for liquidation;
-
A further injection of capital in
order to facilitate the recapitalisation of its fleet;
-
A renegotiation of the terms of the
contract with GDRT’
-
A rise in fares;
-
Organisational restructuring to
reduce operational costs (e.g. by exiting the worst performing routes
and/or right sizing its workforce)
”.
[37]
On the issue of restructuring, GTAC advised as follows:
“
Assuming
that NTI seeks to avoid liquidating itself and enters business
rescue, a number of initiatives have been proposed for how
it might
restructure its business so that it increases revenues, reduces costs
or does both.
It
needs to be stressed that it is exceptionally difficult to see how
any of these options could be implemented effectively without
some
form of recapitalization of the NTI, so the first initiative
described is recapitalization. This is not what is often
understood by the term restructuring, which is normally understood to
refer to changes to a company’s operational activities
…
The
most obvious way in which NTI might be recapitalized is if the
shareholder or some other entity in government provided it with
a
capital injection. This could be a once-off injection or equity
that was sufficient to allow NTI to meet its immediate
liabilities
(around R300 million) or a larger injection that would allow NTI to
buy a new bus fleet (estimated at R1.3 billion).
There
are some notable challenges, however. These include:
-
It is far from obvious that NWPG has
the funds to inject into NTI, and the same is likely true of both
GDRT and DoT.
-
If the funds were appropriated by an
entity other than NWPG, they would, presumably, expect an equity
state in NTI, which would
create additional governance and
institutional challenges.
-
Even if the funds are available,
there are some legal and political challenges to overcome because the
funds would have to be appropriated
through an adjustments budget,
during the debate about which, a political case for diverting scarce
public resources to NTI would
have to be made and defended. In
addition, in terms of
section 38(1)(j)
of the PFMA, the entity that
injected funding would have to satisfy itself that NTI was able to
manage those funds efficiently,
effectively and transparently,
failing which it would itself be at risk of engaging in financial
misconduct
”.
[38]
A
shareholder loan to the NTI companies, as “provincial
government business enterprises” would be subject to not only
the general PFMA requirements listed in the GTAC report, but to
sections 66(1)
(c) of the PFMA, which provides that “
An
Institution to which this Act applies, may not borrow money …
unless such borrowing … in the case of a provisional
government business enterprise under the ownership control of a
provincial executives, is within the limits as set in terms of
the
Borrowing Powers of Provincial Governments Act …
”
[8]
.
[39]
Even if it may be argued that the above will only apply when an
entity borrows
money from a party outside the provincial government
which owns it (although this is doubtful) then section 66(3)(d),
which is
of general application, will still apply. It provides
that any “transaction that binds or may bind that public entity
to any future financial commitment, may only be entered into by “…
the MEC for finance in the province,
acting with the concurrence of the Minister, subject to any
conditions that the Minister may
impose …
”.
The reference to the Minister, is to the National Minister of
Finance.
The
business rescue plan proposed by the BRP
[40]
Having set out the statutory requirements imposed on the borrowing of
money
by the NTI companies, it is apposite to refer to what the BRP
has done, with reference to his own words and conduct (lest there
be
any doubt about disputed evidence, as alleged before).
[41]
In respect of the “final revised business rescue plan”,
the BRP
stated the following: “
As
agreed, the duly revised and amended business rescue plan was
transmitted to the applicant’s legal representatives on 18
September 2023. This included the agreement to the effect that
finance in the amount of R615 million would be provided.
I can
and do confirm that, at the meeting of 15 September 2023, an
agreement was reached with the parties represented by their
respective attorneys … and this agreement is encapsulated and
recorded in the second plan
”.
[42]
The BRP continued later in his answering affidavit as follows: “
In
numerous telephone conversations between my attorney (Mr Bernhard
Richer) and Mr Hlahla (the applicant’s attorney) it was
agreed
that the funding is ready and available and that it would be
forthcoming in short order … it was anticipated (and
I was
reassured, repeatedly) that the funding would be available virtually
immediately and it was accordingly also anticipated
that the business
rescue plan would and could be adopted and implemented by end
of September 2023, at the latest in the first
week of October 2023
”.
[43]
The abovementioned “final” plan was never published nor
adopted.
Various “progress reports” followed from
23 September 2023 onwards.
[44]
In the meantime, the BRP gave an undertaking to the employees of the
NTI companies
on 10 November 2023 that an amount of approximately R77
million would be paid towards salaries upon receipt of the
“Recapitalisation
Amount or any advance thereof”.
[45]
On 28 November 2023, by way of a letter of the BRP’s attorney
to GDRT,
the BRP advised that “
the
Companies’ sole source of income is the subsidy revenue that it
derives from the (NWS) Negotiated contract. This
is an
uncontroversial fact and we are all in agreement that the Companies
at present do not have the financial wherewithal to fulfil
their
obligations in terms of the Negotiated Contracts, which would
inevitably lead to the cancellation of the Negotiated Contract
and
the subsequent liquidation of the companies …. Against
this backdrop … we have been instructed to address
this letter
to you, as the attorneys of Transnat and Triponza, in order to record
the salient terms of the solution agreed in principle
in order to
ensure the preservation of the Negotiated Contracts, which as stated,
is the lifeblood of the Companies
”.
[46]
The “Negotiated Contracts” referred to the “ABS
Negotiated
Contract” entered into between ABS and GDRT on 30
June 2023 and the “NWS Negotiated Contract” entered into
between
GDRT and NWS on 30 Jun 2023, were all entered into by the
BRP.
[47]
The result of the letter was an agreement between GDRT and ABS in
terms of
which the BRP ceded all of ABS’ “right, title
and interest in and to the ABS negotiated Contract to Transnat”.
The BRP explained the reason for this as follows in the letter: in
2018, ABS effectively abandoned and made over its operations
to
Transnat as it had no buses or funds. Since then, Transnat had
effectively run the business of ABS and rendered services
to GDRT.
[48]
In
the letter further, the BRP painted the above as a historical fact
and therefore alternatively argued that initial takeover effectively
constituted “
a
cession in securitatem debiti in favour of Transnat alternatively it
constitutes a delegation agreement between GDRT, Abs and
Transnat.
On any basis, irrespective of the nomenclature, a transfer has
occurred
”
.
Based on this argument, the BRP assuaged any concerns from Transat
about compliance with the PFMA on the basis that control
of the ABS
negotiated contract was not in ABS’ hands, but in the hands of
Transnat, and had no economic benefit for ABS.
Therefore, so
the BRP concluded “…
it
cannot be argued that the same transaction concluded between Transnat
and ABS in respect of ABS operations constitute a “Significant”
transaction as contemplated in Section 54(2)(d) of the PFMA …
[9]
”.
Accordingly, so the BRP’s conclusion went, no statutory
requirements had to be complied with.
[49]
The BRP further indicated that the above state of affairs was
reflected in
the initial business rescue plans. These plans had
to be revised and could not be implemented due to an absence of
recapitalisation.
In the meantime further, the lack of payment
of salaries caused widespread labour unrest, which lead to a
prolonged strike.
[50]
The strike was eventually terminated, inter alia as a result of
COSATMA paying
R96 million on 31 December 2023 and R18 million on 11
June 2024. The latter payment was to the payroll administrator
directly
and not to the BRP.
[51]
Finally, the eventual business rescue plan was published on 28 June
2024.
A second meeting of creditors was convened for 11 July
2024 and postponed to 18 July 2024. In his supplementary
affidavit,
the BRP stated that this plan was adopted at the postponed
meeting.
[52]
The relevant parts of the business rescue plan (annexure THS1 to the
BRP’s
answering affidavit) relating to the topic of PFMA
compliance, can be found in two alternate proposals. The first
is “Option
A” which deals with recapitalisation and the
second is “Option B” which envisages a “structured
winding
down”. It also provided for the fees for the BRP
in excess of R42 million.
[53]
In respect of the recapitalisation proposed in Option A, three
proposals were
presented. As an introduction thereto, the BRP
explained: “
Despite the
reasonable impression created that the [previous] BRP and its terms
were acceptable to the shareholder … the
shareholder’s
team failed to formally respond to various communications addressed
to them. The BRP’s legal team
continued to attempt to
engage with the Shareholder’s legal team, but to no avail.
However, the BRP maintained a reasonable
belief that the shareholder
was desirous of implementing the terms of the 18 September Revised BR
Plan …
”.
Reference was then made to public announcements of an amount of R389
million to be made available, allegedly over
and above the
recapitalisation amount. The report continued “
despite
what appeared to be successful negotiations, coupled with the public
undertakings [by the speaker] … the shareholder
failed to
provide the agreed funding
”.
[54]
After listing the positive result from a labour audit initiated by
the BRP,
resulting in a monthly saving in excess of R7 million, the
first proposal (Option A: Proposal 1) was based on the BRP’s
version
of the prior agreement for recapitalisation, alleged to have
been reached on 18 September 2023. It provides for a
recapitalisation
by COSATMA of some R600 million (as calculated in
par 11.3.5 of the report under “shareholder contributions).
[55]
The second proposal (Option A: Proposal 2) involved an
“inter-governmental
bailout”, which involved the
investment of a partial recapitalisation by GDRT in the amount of
R144 Million.
[56]
The third proposal (Option A: Proposal 3) involved a “hybrid”
scenario,
including the acquisition of a bus fleet and re-allocation
of bus routes. The BRP conceded that this proposal “…
would require significant regulatory
and statutory approvals
” and
as such, “…
no formal
engagement regarding this option has been made to existing bus
operators
”.
[57]
In a nutshell then, the “plan” of the BRP, which he had
eventually
formulated two years after his appointment, was to borrow
money from the Northwest Provincial Government, in excess of R615
million.
This would be over and above the R292 million
that “the Shareholder” had already paid during the period
since
the BRP’s appointment to date of publication of the plan.
[58]
It is not clear from the answering affidavit which option had been
voted for
by the creditors. The publication of the plan only
took place after the application had been launched and was disclosed
in
the answering affidavit. As such, no non-compliance with the
PFMA had or could have been alleged in the founding affidavit.
COSTMA has, however, consistently complained that no workable plan
had been presented and that the reporting obligations on the
BRP as
accounting authority for the companies had not been complied with.
It is clear that these two aspects go hand in hand.
The BRP’s
stance was that he had all along fully complied with his statutory
obligations, which would imply that the business
rescue plan was PFMA
compliant.
The
financial reporting obligations of the BRP
[59]
The
reporting obligations of the BRP in terms of the PFMA (in particular
section 55
[10]
thereof), which
were mentioned in the founding affidavit were that the BRP had “…
consistently
refused (and continued to do so until the delivery of the founding
affidavit) to report to the Provincial Legislature,
the HoD of
COSATMA or to me [the MEC] for the hundreds of millions of Rands that
were directly deposited or transferred from the
NTI companies’
other bank accounts into the BRP’s new FNB accounts
”
.
The
opening of new bank accounts by the BRP
[60]
The reference to “new FNB accounts” is a reference to par
176.1
of the founding affidavit. Therein, under the heading
“failure to comply with his obligations under the PFMA”,
COSATMA complained that the BRP had, despite the companies having
existing bank accounts at ABSA, opened three new bank accounts
with
FNB, exclusively accessible only to the BRP and his advisors.
[61]
The opening of these accounts was clearly done in direct
contravention of section
7(2) of the PFMA which provides that “…
a public entity … may open a
bank account only – (a) with a bank registered in South Africa
and approved in writing
by the National Treasury and (b) after any
prescribed tendering process had been complied with
”.
Section 7(5) further provides that such a bank “
or
any other institution that holds money for … a public entity
listed in Schedule 3 … must promptly disclose information
regarding the account when so requested … by the relevant
provincial treasury
”.
[62]
When confronted with this issue in argument, counsel for the
appellants referred
us to paragraph 6.5 of the BRP’s progress
report dated 19 December 2022. Therein the opening of the three
bank accounts
had been disclosed. It was also recorded that the
BRP had requested the Minister of Finance to consider an exemption
from
the provisions of the PFMA.
[63]
The abovementioned is not proof that the BRP had by his
conduct,
complied with the PFMA. Mere disclosure of the opening
of the accounts, does not constitute compliance with the PFMA.
The attempts at obtaining ex post facto exemptions from PFMA
requirements confirm that, to the knowledge of the BRP, the PFMA and
Treasury Regulations had not been complied with.
[64]
A
further flaw in the argument presented on behalf of the BRP, is that
an examination of the request for exemption itself (Annexure
FA60 to
the founding affidavit) reveals that it was a request in terms of
section 92
[11]
of the PFMA to
be exempted from the provision of sections 38(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) of
the PFMA
[12]
. There was
no reference in that request to section 7 of the PFMA.
[65]
Moreover, in the founding affidavit it had been expressly alleged
that, despite
the request for exemption, the BRP had in fact not
obtained any exemption. This allegation was not disputed in the
BRP’s
answering affidavit.
[66]
The result is that, on the BRP’s own version, he had been
operating bank
accounts in contravention of the PFMA, the provisions
of which had been designed to provide for oversight over the
management of
public finances. This denial of oversight was
exactly what COSATMA had been complaining about in its founding
affidavit and
in the prior requests for information and disclosure
mentioned therein. In fact, in the founding affidavit,
reference was
made to the staggering amounts, estimated at being in
excess of R800 million, which must have gone in and out of these
accounts.
[67]
It therefore comes as no surprise that the BRP had not sought or
obtained any
approval from Treasury for the loan which featured in
the final proposed business rescue plan. The BRP has engaged
with and
naively relied on promises made to him by the previous MEC
for COSATMA regarding recapitalisation but only sought to formally
engage
the Premier long after the publication of the final plan.
[68]
The BRP attempted to paint a picture that the final business rescue
plan was
merely a revision of previous proposed plans, which he had
“circulated” but not published as required by the
Companies Act, but
this cannot be correct. As set out above,
the final plan had three possibilities and the BRP did not even
attempt to explain
which of those had been adopted. It is clear
that the three options proposed are mutually destructive and that
they could
not all three be implemented. On his own version
then, the BRP failed to dispel the accusation that he could not, in
more
than two years, come up with a workable business rescue plan.
The
counter-application
[69]
The counter-application was launched by the BRP and the NTI companies
as applicants
thereto. The relief claimed was for an order that
“
the applicant shall pay the
third respondent, within seven days of granting of this order …
R615 000 000.00 (six
hundred and fifteen million Rand) to
be reflected in the books and records of the third respondent as a
sub-ordinated non-interest
bearing loan account (and) interest on the
aforesaid sum …
”.
[70]
In the context as already described above, the BRP therefore sought
to enforce,
by way of a court order, payment of an amount in respect
of a disputed agreement, without any prior compliance with the PFMA
and
without any written agreement even having come into existence.
[71]
The counter-application was therefore correctly refused insofar as
its demise
has not in any event followed the removal order.
The
section 18(4)
appeal
[72]
When
the removal order was initially appealed against, COSATMA sought and
obtained an order for the implementation of the removal
of the BRP.
The BRP appealed that order in terms of section 18(4) of the Superior
Courts Act
[13]
. In the
light of the conclusion which we have reached, namely that the appeal
should be refused, this issue has now become
moot. It might
only resurface should the BRP seek special leave to appeal from the
SCA.
Conclusion
[73]
We do not understand the judgment in
Knoop
v Gupta
to mean that a court is in
every instance obliged to consider each and every allegation
regarding contravention of
section 139
of the
Companies Act made
against a BRP. The judgment cautions a court to only consider
“all the circumstances” when it exercises its discretion
in respect of proven offending conduct.
[74]
Having regard to the above and the issues to be decided as referred
to in paragraph
[32] above, we conclude as follows:
-
The compilation of a workable and legally compliant business rescue
plan is one
of the most crucial components of a business rescue
practitioner’s obligations.
-
In the present instance, the BRP has, on his own version, failed to
compile such
a plan. The plan presented by him was premised on
an oral recapitalisation loan in respect of which no Treasury
approval
has been obtained. It also followed an extensive
period during which the BRP has failed to comply with his obligations
in
terms of
section 55
of the PFMA regarding reporting on financial
aspects to COSATMA, thereby negating oversight over a public entity
and all the time
while operating bank accounts which, also in
contravention of the PFMA, excluded the same oversight.
-
We therefore find that, on a balance of probabilities the grounds for
removal
contemplated in
sections 139(a)
(failure to perform the
duties of a business rescue practitioner) and 139(c) (engaging in
illegal acts or conduct) have been established
on the papers.
-
Due to the seriousness of the offending conduct so established, we do
not consider
it necessary delve into the myriad of other allegations
indicated earlier and which additionally occupied the court
a
quo
.
-
We conclude that the established offending conduct, has either caused
COSATMA
as affected party harm in that its statutory prescribed
oversight obligations have been compromised or that it has the
potential
to harm the interests of the affected party. The
second of the three requirements set out in
Knoop
v Gupta
to which we have referred
earlier, has therefore also been satisfied.
[75]
The criticism of the appellants of the judgment of Kooverjie J was
that she
had exercised her discretion on incorrect facts.
Having regard to the fundamental nature of the established offending
conduct
of the BRP and the materiality thereof to the business rescue
plan and the business rescue proceedings itself in the present
matter,
we fail to find any basis upon which a court’s
discretion could have been exercised in any other fashion than to
grant an
order for the removal of the BRP.
Costs
[76]
In the premises, where we have concluded that the appeal should fail,
we find
no cogent reason to depart from the customary rule that costs
follow the event. We also find no reason to intervene in the
costs order granted in the court
a
quo
.
Order
[77]
In the premises the order of court is as follows:
The appeal is refused
with costs, including the costs of two counsel, where employed.
N
DAVIS
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
I
agree
S K
HASSIM
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
I agree
P A VAN NIEKERK
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date
of Hearing: 3 and 4 November 2025
Reasons
Judgment delivered:
…
..
15 December 2025
APPEARANCES:
For
the Appellant:
Adv
A J Daniels SC together with
Adv C
de Villiers-Golding
Attorney
for the Appellant:
Richter
Attorneys, Johannesburg
c/o
Van der Merwe Attorneys, Pretoria
For
the 1
st
Respondent:
Adv
NGD Maritz SC together with
Adv
JL Myburgh and Adv AA Basson
Attorney
for the Respondent:
De
Swardt Myambo Hlahla Attorneys,
Pretoria
For
the Intervening Party:
Adv M
Gwala SC
Attorney
for the Intervening Party:
Oosthuizen
Caine Incorporated,
c/o
Ben Groot Attorneys Inc
t/a
GVS Law, Pretoria
[1]
71
of 2008.
[2]
1
of 1999.
[3]
2021
(3) SA 88
(SCA).
[4]
2025
JDR 3389 (CC).
[5]
South
African Revenue Bank v Khumalo and Others
2010
(5) SA 449
(SCA) at par [4].
[6]
Sentrale
Kunsmis Korporasie (Edms) v NKP Kunsmisverpreiders (Edms) Bkp
1970
(3) SA 367
(A) at 395G – 396A.
[7]
Stellenbosch
Farmer’s Winery Ltd v Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd
1957
(4) SA 234
(C) at 235 E – G.
[8]
48
of 1996.
[9]
This
section provides as follows:
(2) Before a public
entity concludes any of the following transactions, the accounting
authority for the public entity must promptly
and in writing inform
the relevant treasury of the transaction and submit relevant
particulars of the transaction to its executive
authority for
approval of the transaction: (d) acquisition or disposal of a
significant asset;
[10]
Section
55
provides as follow:
“
Annual report
and financial statements — (1) The accounting
authority for a public entity— (a) must keep
full and proper
records of the financial affairs of the public entity; (b) prepare
financial statements for each financial year
in accordance with
generally accepted accounting practice, unless the Accounting
Standards Board approves the application of
generally recognised
accounting practice for that public entity; (c) must submit those
financial statements within two months
after the end of the
financial year— (i) to the auditors of the public entity for
auditing; and (ii) if it is a business
enterprise or other public
entity under the ownership control of the national or a provincial
government, to the relevant treasury;
and [Sub-para. (ii)
substituted by
s. 32
(a) of Act No. 29 of 1999.] (d) must submit
within five months of the end of a financial year to the relevant
treasury, to the
executive authority responsible for that public
entity and, if the Auditor-General did not perform the audit of the
financial
statements, to the Auditor-General— (i) an annual
report on the activities of that public entity during that financial
year; (ii) the financial statements for that financial year after
the statements have been audited; and (iii) the report of the
auditors on those statements. [Para. (d) amended by s. 32 (b) of Act
No. 29 of 1999.] (2) The annual report and financial statements
referred to in subsection (1) (d) must— (a) fairly present the
state of affairs of the public entity, its business, its
financial
results, its performance against predetermined objectives and its
financial position as at the end of the financial
year concerned;
(b) include particulars of— (i) any material losses through
criminal conduct and any irregular expenditure
and fruitless and
wasteful expenditure that occurred during the financial year: (ii)
any criminal or disciplinary steps taken
as a consequence of such
losses or irregular expenditure or fruitless and wasteful
expenditure; (iii) any losses recovered or
written off; (iv) any
financial assistance received from the state and commitments made by
the state on its behalf; and (v) any
other matters that may be
prescribed; and (c) include the financial statements of any
subsidiaries. (3) An accounting authority
must submit the report and
statements referred to in subsection (1) (d), for tabling in
Parliament or the provincial legislature,
to the relevant executive
authority through the accounting officer of a department designated
by the executive authority. [Sub-s.
(3) substituted by s. 32 (c) of
Act No. 29 of 1999.] (4) The relevant treasury may direct that,
instead of a separate report,
the audited financial statements of a
Schedule 3 public entity which is not a government business
enterprise must be incorporated
in those of a department designated
by that treasury
”.
[11]
The
section provides as follows:
“
Exemptions
— The Minister, by notice in the national
Government Gazette, may exempt any institution to
which this Act
applies, or any category of those institutions, from any specific
provisions of this Act for a period determined
in the notice
”.
[12]
The section provides as follows:
General
responsibilities of accounting officers. —
(1) The accounting
officer for a department, trading entity or constitutional
institution—
(
a
) must
ensure that that department, trading entity or constitutional
institution has and maintains — (ii) a system
of internal
audit under the control and direction of an audit committee
complying with and operating in accordance with regulations
and
instructions prescribed in terms of sections 76 and 77; (iii) an
appropriate procurement and provisioning system which is
fair,
equitable,
transparent, competitive
and cost-effective.
[13]
10
of 2013.
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