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Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1369South Africa

Mogale City Local Municipality and Another v Diale and Others (Review) (2022/057557) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 (15 December 2025)

High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
15 December 2025
OTHER J, Chabedi AJ, Solvem’s appointment had

Judgment

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Mogale City Local Municipality and Another v Diale and Others (Review) (2022/057557) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 (15 December 2025) Mogale City Local Municipality and Another v Diale and Others (Review) (2022/057557) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 (15 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1369.html sino date 15 December 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA Case number: 2022-057557 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: NO DATE: 15 December 2025 SIGNATURE In the matter between: MOGALE CITY LOCAL MUNICIPLITY First applicant MAKHOSAZANA MSEZANA N.O. Second applicant And DOROTHY DIALE First respondent SOLVEM (PTY) LTD Second respondent INZALO ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (PTY) LTD Third respondent NATIONAL TREASURY Fourth respondent GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY Fifth respondent AUDITOR GENERAL OF SOUTH AFRICA Sixth respondent JUDGMENT This judgment has been delivered by uploading it to the Court online digital data base of the Gauteng Division, Pretoria and by email to the attorneys of record of the parties. The date of the delivery of the judgment is deemed to be 15 December 2025. Chabedi AJ Introduction [1]        In this application Mogale City Local Municipality (the “Municipality”) seeks to review and set aside its own decision on 29 April 2022 to award a tender to, and appoint, the second respondent, Solvem (Pty) Ltd (“Solvem”) as a service provider for a period of three years, as well as its subsequent decision on 8 July 2022 to ratify the April 2022 decision. [2]        The decision to appoint Solvem was taken by the first respondent, Ms Dorothy Diale (“Diale”) following a deviation from procurement procedures, which deviation forms the subject matter of debate in this application. [3]        Solvem did not oppose the application but filed a conditional counter application, in which it seeks just and equitable remedy in the event the review is granted. Diale also did not oppose the application but filed an explanatory affidavit explaining her role in the deviation and subsequent appointment of Solvem. [4]        The third respondent, Inzalo Enterprise Management Systems (Pty) Ltd (“Inzalo”), a bidder in the tender and the person that first complained about Solvem’s appointment, filed a notice of opposition but did not file an answering affidavit. The National Treasury, Gauteng Provincial Department of Treasury and the Auditor-General of South Africa were cited as the fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, respectively, for their interest in the matter. They too did not oppose the application. [5]        At the time the matter came before me, Solvem’s appointment had already been terminated for reasons not relevant to the issues that stand to be resolved in this application. According to the Municipality, another service provider has already been appointed to undertake the contended services. For these reasons, in its heads of argument Solvem argued that the application has become moot. Background [6]          On 1 April 2021, the Municipality advertised a tender RFP CORP (ICT) 05/2021 for the supply, delivery, support and maintenance of an integrated financial management system which is compliant with the so-called Municipal Standard Chart of Accounts (“MSCOA”), for a period of three (3) years. [7]          After the original closing date for the tender lapsed on 7 May 2021, the tender was extended to 3 November 2021. Of the thirteen bid responses received, only two (2) bids were found to be responsive by the Bid Adjudication Committee, one of which was Solvem and the other an entity named Munsoft (Pty) Ltd (“Munsoft”). After the two were evaluated for compliance with applicable Technical Evaluation Criteria, Munsoft emerged as the preferred bidder but was subsequently disqualified due to apparent conflict of interest. [8]          The tender was thereafter cancelled. On 25 March 2022 the Municipality sought permission from the National Treasury to re-advertise the tender. National Treasury declined the request on 8 April 2022. [9]          This being the case, on 29 April 2022, in a letter to that effect Diale appointed Solvem to provide the MSCOA services for a period of three years based on Solvem’s proposal for an amount of R37 500 000 (excluding VAT) for the first year, R14 826 000 for year two, and R15 927 500.30 for year three. Solvem accepted the offer on the same day and signed a service level agreement, which was never counter signed by the Municipality. [10]        Solvem’s appointment, as well as its preceding events, were discovered in an investigation by the Municipality, following a complaint received from attorneys representing Inzalo, the third respondent on 19 May 2022, in which it was alleged that Solvem was appointed outside normal tender procedures. At that time Diale had been placed on special leave of absence by the Municipality, the previous day. [11]        It was discovered that Solvem’s appointment was preceded by a deviation from regular tender procedures, approved by Diale. According to the Municipality the deviation report could not be found, despite an Anton Pillar procedure and an extensive search on Diale’s Municipality issued electronic devices. Although in her explanatory affidavit Diale admits that there was a deviation process, she too could not produce the deviation report and alleged instead that she left the report in her office when she was placed on special leave. [12]        Despite the missing deviation report, Solvem’s appointment was “ ratified ” on 8 July 2022 by the then Municipal Manager, Ms Msezana, the second applicant, on grounds that it would have been highly destructive to the functioning of the Municipality to operate without the systems as the Municipality would otherwise be unable to fulfil its constitutional obligations. The ratification was subsequently approved by Council on 29 July 2022. [13] The ratification was purportedly done in terms of Regulation 36(1)(b) of the Municipal Supply Chain Management (“SCM”) Regulations, in terms of which the Accounting Officer may ratify minor breaches of procurement processes, of a purely technical nature, by an official or committee acting in terms of delegated powers or duties. [14]        The Municipality argued in this regard that although organs of state are permitted under Regulation 36 of the Municipal’s Supply Chain Management Regulations to dispense with official procurement processes, including public tender procedures to procure goods and services, this may however only be done in cases of “emergency”, where the goods and services are only available from a “single provider”, or in “exceptional circumstances”. The Municipality also submitted that the reasons for a deviation must also be recorded and reported to the next meeting of Council and a note to that effect must be included in the annual financial statements. [15]        According to the Municipality, the above strict requirements were not complied with in the case of Solvem and the associated notices, presumably of a deviation, were not published on the Municipality’s website. Worse, the deviation report in terms of which Solvem was appointed could not be found. [16]        The Municipality argues therefore that the apparent failure to follow procurement processes and the lack of a deviation report renders Solvem’s appointment irregular. Both these instances of non-compliance are substantial and do not constitute a minor breach of a purely technical nature in terms of which a ratification under Regulation 36(1)(b) may be obtained. As such, the ratification was also unlawful. [17]        Meanwhile Solvem continued to render the MSCOA services to the Municipality, for which it was paid millions of rands. This as both the Municipality and Solvem argue, was so the Municipality could maintain a financial management system which enabled it to remain constitutionally complaint. This is because MSCOA is a heavily regulated system that enables the administration and reporting of the Municipality’s financial affairs, including to the Auditor-General, the Provincial Treasury and the National Treasury. According to the Municipality, this system allows the Municipality to run its day-to-day financial systems, such as billing and the collection of rates, without which, the operations of the Municipality would collapse with substantial prejudice to the provision of basic services to its residents. [18]        On 14 June 2022 the Johannesburg High Court, per Molahlehi J, pursuant an application by Inzalo, issued an order interdicting the Municipality from using and employing Solvem’s services. Although the Municipality did not immediately stop using Solvem’s services in the aftermath of the interdict, a new service provider was eventually appointed and Solvem’s services were then terminated. [19]        In a contempt application that followed, to enforce Molahlehi J’s order, the Municipality explained that the continued use of Solvem’s services was not in wilful contempt of the court, but simply a necessity as the MSCOA is the financial backbone of the Municipality and it would simply not have been possible to function without it. [20]        In its counter application Solvem sought an order, that it is entitled to payment of the goods supplied by it, and the services rendered, to the Municipality. Alternatively, if the parties cannot agree on the value of the payments, that the dispute be referred for determination in an arbitration before a retired Judge. As stated earlier, Solvem also argued subsequently that the application has become moot on account of the termination of Solvem’s appointment and therefore that the court may proceed to set aside the agreement and grant the orders sought by it in the counter application as just and equitable remedy. [21]        In her explanatory affidavit, Diale admits that she approved the appointment of Solvem as a service provider at the time acting as Municipal Manager and that she did so in terms of a deviation report for tender RFP CORP(ICT) 05/2021 on 29 April 2022. She explained that the deviation process was initiated by one Mr Ramatlhape Ratha, the then Executive Manager Corporate Support Services of the Municipality. She then left a copy of the report in the Municipal Manager’s office, awaiting the acting Chief Financial Officer to attend to further processes before filing and reporting thereof. [22]        Diale explains that she then left the employ of the Municipality on 18 May 2022 when she was unceremoniously placed on special leave of absence, which she laments as unjustifiable and unlawful. She stated further that despite a search and seizure process by the Sheriff following the Anton Pillar order, the deviation report and on her related documents were not found in her possession. Discussion and analysis [23]        The first question to be answered in this application is whether the application is moot, second, whether the decisions of the Municipality to appoint Solvem and thereafter ratify such appointment were irregular, unlawful and constitutionally invalid, and thus fall to be reviewed and set aside, and if so, third, and lastly, the determination of the appropriate just and equitable remedy. Is the review moot? [24]        It must be pointed out at the outset that the issue of mootness was only raised on behalf of Solvem in argument and not in its answering affidavit/supporting affidavit to the counter application. Therefore, it was not dealt with by the Municipality in its supplementary and replying affidavit. Considering the termination of Solvem’s appointment and thus the need in those circumstances to determine whether correcting or reversing the impugned decisions following a review is possible, I am of the view that the issue of mootness was well raised and must be addressed in the context of this application. [25]        I n National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others [1] the constitutional Court held that a case is moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or live controversy which should exist if the Court is to avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. [26]        Therefore, to answer the question whether this case is moot, the court must consider whether there is a live dispute or controversy between the parties, that will be resolved by the relief and that the relief sought is not merely for the asking. [27]        The authority relied on by Solvem for its argument that the case is moot in Agribee , [2] relates to the court’s discretion to hear a matter where it finds that the case is moot. It deals particularly with the principle that mootness is not an absolute bar to the justiciability of an issue, and that a court may entertain a case, even if moot, where the interests of justice so require. [28]        In this case, although the grounds on which the Municipality relies for the self-review are not in dispute, both the Municipality and Solvem seek just and equitable remedy, albeit on different terms, necessitated by the fact that Solvem continued to render services to the Municipality beyond the discovery of its irregular appointment, for reasons already discussed above. A just and equitable remedy under 172(1)( a ) of the Constitution, may only follow a declaration that a particular decision or process is irregular and constitutionally invalid, and an order that it be reviewed and set aside. [29]        In my view therefore, the application is not moot, as the court cannot determine a just and equitable relief, without first ordering a review. Accordingly, Agribee does not apply to the facts of this case. The review must be adjudicated. The review [30]        This is a review of the Municipality’s own decisions to appoint Solvem as a service provider, and the subsequent ratification of such appointment. The Municipality brings the review on the principle of legality [3] on the grounds that although such decisions were purportedly taken in terms of a deviation procedure under regulation 36 of the Municipal SCM Regulations, no record or evidence of such deviation or compliance with the regulations could be found. [31]        Regulation 36 of the Municipal SCM Regulations dealing with deviation from, and ratification of minor breaches of, procurement processes, provides amongst other things that: “ (1)    A supply chain management policy may allow the accounting officer— (a)    to dispense with the official procurement processes established by the policy and to procure any required goods or services through any convenient process, which may include direct negotiations, but only— (i)      in an emergency; (ii)     if such goods or services are produced or available from a single provider only; (iii)    for the acquisition of special works of art or historical objects where specifications are difficult to  compile; (iv)    acquisition of animals for zoos; or (v)   in any other exceptional case where it is impractical or impossible to follow the official procurement processes; and (b)  to ratify any minor breaches of the procurement processes by an official or committee acting in terms of delegated powers or duties which are purely of a technical nature.” “ (2)    The accounting officer must record the reasons for any deviations in terms of sub regulation (1)(a) and (b) and report them to the next meeting of the council, or board of directors in the case of a municipal entity, and include as a note to the annual financial statements.” [32]        Diale who admits having taken the decision to approve the deviation and appoint Solvem, on recommendation at the time of executive Manager Corporate Support Services, offers no other information surrounding the deviation, how it was recommended and the reasons why she deemed it appropriate to approve the recommendation and sign the letter of appointment. [33]        Beyond this, there is no explanation as to what the circumstances or reasons for the deviation were. Diale has confirmed however that the report could not be found despite the Anton Pillar process and the search on her electronic devices. Therefore, as the Municipality submitted, there is no evidence that the appointment of Solvem followed a proper deviation procedure and thus proof of compliance with SCM Regulation 36. [34]        I therefore agree with the Municipality’s submissions that the failure to follow procurement processes and the lack of a deviation report to prove compliance with Regulation 36(1)(a) render the decision to appoint Solvem as a service provider irregular and unlawful. I also find that non-compliance with the SCM Regulation is materially substantial and therefore could not reasonably be regarded as constituting a minor breach warranting ratification under Regulation 36(1)(b). The decision to grant the ratification is therefore also unlawful for these reasons. [35]        Our courts have for some time recognised the principle that as bearers of public duty, and in performing their functions in the public interest, public functionaries must, where faced with an irregularity in the public administration, seek to redress it. [4] [36] In Fedsure [5] the Constitutional Court held, in relation to the exercise of public power, that the legislature and executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law. In Affordable Medicines Trust and Others [6] the court stated that “[ t]o give effect to the supremacy of the Constitution, courts 'must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.” [37]        In Gijima , [7] with reference to Fedsure and Affordable Medicines Trust [8] the court stated that the exercise of public power which is at variance with the principle of legality is inconsistent with the Constitution itself and is invalid if a decision or conduct did not conform to legal prescripts it may be reviewed and possibly set aside under legality review. [38]        Accordingly, I find that the decisions of the Municipality on 29 April 2022 to appoint Solvem as a service provider for the provision of the MSCOA financial management systems, and on 3 July 2022 to ratify such decision, are unlawful and constitutionally invalid, and therefore fall to be reviewed and set aside. Remedy [39]        In Kirland , [9] the court stated that “[o]nce a declaration of invalidity is made, the court may proceed to the second stage. At this stage the court considers the effects of the declaration of invalidity on parties or persons to whom the order applies. The interests of those parties are carefully examined for the purposes of making an order that is just and equitable in the circumstance of each case. It is only at the second stage that a court enjoys a discretionary choice. However, that choice does not include the reversal of what was done during the first stage at which there is no discretion but an obligation to make a declaration of invalidity. The two stages ought not to be conflated.” [40]        As stated above Solvem, in answer to the review application, filed a counter application conditional on the granting of the review, in which it seeks relief that it is just and equitable that it is entitled to payment of the services it rendered to the Municipality. [41] The Municipality accepted that despite the irregularities, Solvem rendered some services to the Municipality and that such services came at a cost to Solvem. It is worth pointing out that Solvem continued to render the services because it was considered by the Municipality at the time that it had no choice but to continue with the services, as the severing of ties with Solvem before the appointment of a properly procured service provider, would prove disastrous for the Municipality as it depends on the MSCOA to run its financial systems and on which its administration depends. [42]        In essence, Solvem continued to render the MSCOA services beyond the discovery of the irregularities, which was relatively soon after its appointment, at the Municipalities behest. Indeed, the Municipality in its initial notice of motion, sought relief that it is just and equitable that any declaration of invalidity must be suspended for a period of six months, to allow the procurement and appointment of another service provider. This relief has since been abandoned following the appointment of such service provider. [43]       In these circumstances, the only issue in dispute is the quantification of what would constitute reasonable payment for the services rendered. Both parties proposed mechanisms of determining what services must be payable and how much is payable in respect thereof, which mechanisms include the employment of mediators, auditors and experts in the relevant fields who will embark on the valuation of the services to enable the parties to reach settlement. [44] In Steenkamp [10] the court stated the following as to the remedy in a review: “ [29]  It goes without saying that every improper performance of an administrative function would implicate the Constitution and entitle the aggrieved party to appropriate relief.  In each case the remedy must fit the injury. The remedy must be fair to those affected by it and yet vindicate effectively the right violated. It must be just and equitable in the light of the facts, the implicated constitutional principles, if any, and the controlling law.” [45] In Steenkamp the Court went on to give context to the need for a remedy after a review by highlighting that it is appropriate to note that ordinarily a breach of administrative justice attracts public law remedies and not private law remedies. The purpose of a public law remedy is to pre-empt or correct or reverse an improper administrative function. In some instances, the remedy takes the form of an order to make or not to make a particular decision or an order declaring rights or an injunction to furnish reasons for an adverse decision. Ultimately the purpose of a public remedy is to afford the prejudiced party administrative justice, to advance efficient and effective public administration compelled by constitutional precepts and at a broader level, to entrench the rule of law. [11] [46]        In Allpay (2) [12] the Constitutional Court emphasised that correction and reversal of invalid administrative action is grounded in section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. It then dealt with the issue of remedial correction as a logical consequence flowing from invalid and rescinded contracts, and enrichment law generally, such as is the case in this application. [47]        The Court stated in this regard that while due regard must be had to the constitutional principles governing public procurement and more specifically the need to achieve public good, the primacy of public interest in such procurement matters must also be taken into account when the rights, responsibilities and obligations of all affected persons are assessed. The court then opined that this means that the enquiry cannot be one-dimensional. It must have a broader range. The corrective principle may be capable of implementation at certain levels, but not others. [13] [48]        The above principles in Allpay, in my view, are relevant to the Municipality’s argument that whatever payment Solvem may be entitled to, on established authorities, must be stripped of all profit because its appointment was irregular and unlawful ab initio . I disagree. The approach in Allpay is such that the determination cannot be a simplistic and one dimensional one. It must consider a broad range of issues arising from the facts and at different levels. [49]        In the circumstances where there has been no complicity alleged or proven against Solvem and the fact that Solvem remained on site rendering the services at the request of the Municipality, I find it unreasonable the argument by the Municipality that Solvem’s payment must be stripped of all profit. [50]        I however agree with the Municipality’s submissions, that as to what payment Solvem should be entitled to does not arise from the impugned appointment and the purported SLA, as these were unlawful and fall to be set aside. The question is what Solvem might justifiably be entitled to as part of the corrective measures following the review, in the interest of justice and equity, for the services it has rendered prior termination thereof. [51]        I have also taken note of Solvem’s submissions as regard the nature of the services it rendered and that the determination of its pricing is an intricate process. I note therefore that while Solvem cannot unduly profit from the impugned appointment, at the same time, Solvem must not be prejudiced, and must thus be fairly and reasonably compensated. This court does not have the expertise nor the evidence at this stage to determine what may constitute reasonable and fair compensation for the services rendered. I find therefore that it is just and equitable to direct the parties to embark on a process aimed at determining what is fair and reasonable payment. Costs [52]        For the reasons discussed above, I find that it was necessary for the Municipality to bring this application. From the outset the Municipality’s position was that despite the impugned nature of Solvem’s appointment, it would still require its services until another service provider who could offer similar complaint system could be appointed. As stated above, part of the initial just and equitable order included a relief to enable this arrangement. [53]        It follows therefore, that such services would be compensated. There is no indication that they would not. Although Solvem may have considered the counter application to be necessary to set out the type of remedy it would desire in those circumstances, there is no reason why the Municipality should be burdened with the costs of such counter application. Solvem must bear its own costs in this regard. [54]        Solvem on the other hand did not oppose the application and merely made submissions on the just and equitable remedy which I find to have been of assistance to the court. Equally, I see no reason why Solvem should be responsible for the costs of the review application. The Municipality must bear its own costs. Conclusion [55]        In the premises, I make the following order: 1. The decision of the first applicant on 29 April 2022 to approve the deviation from procurement procedures for the appointment of the second respondent as a service provider for the MSCOA-compliant financial system is declared unlawful and constitutionally invalid and reviewed and set aside. 2. The appointment by the first applicant on 29 April 2022 of the second respondent as a service provider for MSCOA-compliant financial system, is declared unlawful and constitutionally invalid, and reviewed and set aside. 3. The decision of the first applicant on 8 July 2022 to ratify the decisions of 29 April 2022 in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, is declared unlawful and constitutionally invalid and reviewed and set aside. 4. The decision by the first applicant’s Council on 29 July 2022 to approve the ratification of the decisions of 29 April 2022, is declared unlawful and constitutionally invalid, and reviewed and set aside. 5. In terms of 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, it is just and equitable, that: 5.1. It is declared that the second respondent is entitled to fair and reasonable payment for the services rendered to the Municipality for the provision of the MSCOA financial management system. 5.2. Such fair and reasonable payment is to be determined as follows: 5.2.1. The first applicant and the second respondent shall within 60 days from the date of this order engage in meaningful good faith negotiations, including by way of mediation, to determine and agree the amount due and payable to the second respondent. 5.2.2. In the event that the negotiations and/or mediation process fail, the first applicant and the second respondent shall agree to appoint, and appoint an independent expert in Integrated Financial Management and Internal Control Systems for Local Governments or similar processes (“ the expert ” ) within 30 (thirty) days of the failure of the mediation process, failing which the court may be approached on the same papers, supplemented where necessary, to appoint the expert. 5.2.3. The expert shall value all the works performed and the services rendered by the second respondent, including use whatever reasonable means to make his determination and consider whatever information he deems reasonable or relevant, and serve on the parties and file in court a report on such value within a reasonable period. 5.2.4. The parties shall agree on the value of the works performed and the services rendered within 30 (thirty) days of receipt of the report from the expert, failing which the court may be approached on the same papers supplemented, where necessary, to determine the value of the works performed and the services rendered. 5.3. Upon determination of the value of the works by the court, or as agreed by the parties: 5.3.1. The payments made by the first applicant to the second respondent before the date of this order shall be set-off against the value of the works so determined. 5.3.2. The first applicant shall pay the deficit, if any, after the set-off referred to above to the second respondent within 60 days of the determination. 5.3.3. The second respondent shall pay excess, if any, after the set-off referred to above, to the first applicant within 60 days of the determination. 5.4. The costs of the experts shall be paid jointly by the first applicant and the second respondent. 6. Each party must pay their own cost. MPD Chabedi Acting Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria APPEARANCES For the Applicant:               R Tshetlo Seleka Attorneys Inc, Johannesburg For first respondent:           TK Mokhethi Modiboa Attorneys Inc, Klerksdorp For second respondent:      HP Wessels Van Der Merwe & Associates, Pretoroa Date of hearing:                   4 June 2025 Date of Judgment:               15 December 2025 [1] 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para [21] with reference to JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others [1996] ZACC 23 ; 1997 (3) SA 514 (CC) at para [15] . [2] Agribee Beef Fund Ltd and Another v Eastern Cape Rural Development Agency and Another 2023 (6) SA 639 (CC), paras [26]-[29] [3] State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC), para [36]. [4] Khumalo and another v Member of the Executive Council for Education: KwaZulu-Natal 2014 (3) BCLR 333 (CC) at para [29]. [5] Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others [1998] ZACC 17 ; 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC), at paras [56]-[59]. [6] Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 ( 3 ) SA 247 ( CC ), paras [48]-[50]. [7] State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC), at para [40]. [8] See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000(2)SA 674 (CC) in para [17]. [9] MEC for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC), para [61]. [10] Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC). [11] Id ,. [12] Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and others 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) at para [29]. [13] Allpay at paras [32]-[34]. sino noindex make_database footer start

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