Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 1369South Africa
Mogale City Local Municipality and Another v Diale and Others (Review) (2022/057557) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 (15 December 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
15 December 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mogale City Local Municipality and Another v Diale and Others (Review) (2022/057557) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 (15 December 2025)
Mogale City Local Municipality and Another v Diale and Others (Review) (2022/057557) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1369 (15 December 2025)
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sino date 15 December 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
number:
2022-057557
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE:
15 December 2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
MOGALE
CITY LOCAL MUNICIPLITY
First
applicant
MAKHOSAZANA
MSEZANA N.O.
Second
applicant
And
DOROTHY
DIALE
First
respondent
SOLVEM
(PTY) LTD
Second
respondent
INZALO
ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS
(PTY) LTD
Third
respondent
NATIONAL
TREASURY
Fourth
respondent
GAUTENG
DEPARTMENT
OF
TREASURY
Fifth
respondent
AUDITOR
GENERAL
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Sixth
respondent
JUDGMENT
This
judgment has been delivered by uploading it to the Court online
digital data base of the Gauteng Division, Pretoria and by
email to
the attorneys of record of the parties. The date of the delivery of
the judgment is deemed to be 15 December 2025.
Chabedi
AJ
Introduction
[1]
In this application Mogale City Local Municipality (the
“Municipality”)
seeks to review and set aside its own
decision on 29 April 2022 to award a tender to, and appoint, the
second respondent, Solvem
(Pty) Ltd (“Solvem”) as a
service provider for a period of three years, as well as its
subsequent decision on 8 July
2022 to ratify the April 2022 decision.
[2]
The decision to appoint Solvem was taken by the first respondent, Ms
Dorothy Diale
(“Diale”) following a deviation from
procurement procedures, which deviation forms the subject matter of
debate in
this application.
[3]
Solvem did not oppose the application but filed a conditional counter
application,
in which it seeks just and equitable remedy in the event
the review is granted. Diale also did not oppose the application but
filed
an explanatory affidavit explaining her role in the deviation
and subsequent appointment of Solvem.
[4]
The third respondent, Inzalo Enterprise Management Systems (Pty) Ltd
(“Inzalo”),
a bidder in the tender and the person that
first complained about Solvem’s appointment, filed a notice of
opposition but
did not file an answering affidavit. The National
Treasury, Gauteng Provincial Department of Treasury and the
Auditor-General of
South Africa were cited as the fourth, fifth and
sixth respondents, respectively, for their interest in the matter.
They too did
not oppose the application.
[5]
At the time the matter came before me, Solvem’s appointment had
already been
terminated for reasons not relevant to the issues that
stand to be resolved in this application. According to the
Municipality,
another service provider has already been appointed to
undertake the contended services. For these reasons, in its heads of
argument
Solvem argued that the application has become moot.
Background
[6]
On 1 April 2021, the Municipality advertised a tender RFP CORP (ICT)
05/2021
for the supply, delivery, support and maintenance of an
integrated financial management system which is compliant with the
so-called
Municipal Standard Chart of Accounts (“MSCOA”),
for a period of three (3) years.
[7]
After the original closing date for the tender lapsed on 7 May 2021,
the
tender was extended to 3 November 2021. Of the thirteen bid
responses received, only two (2) bids were found to be responsive by
the Bid Adjudication Committee, one of which was Solvem and the other
an entity named Munsoft (Pty) Ltd (“Munsoft”).
After the
two were evaluated for compliance with applicable Technical
Evaluation Criteria, Munsoft emerged as the preferred bidder
but was
subsequently disqualified due to apparent conflict of interest.
[8]
The tender was thereafter cancelled. On 25 March 2022 the
Municipality
sought permission from the National Treasury to
re-advertise the tender. National Treasury declined the request on 8
April 2022.
[9]
This being the case, on 29 April 2022, in a letter to that effect
Diale
appointed Solvem to provide the MSCOA services for a period of
three years based on Solvem’s proposal for an amount of R37
500
000 (excluding VAT) for the first year, R14 826 000 for year
two, and R15 927 500.30 for year three. Solvem accepted the
offer on
the same day and signed a service level agreement, which was never
counter signed by the Municipality.
[10]
Solvem’s appointment, as well as its preceding events, were
discovered in an
investigation by the Municipality, following a
complaint received from attorneys representing Inzalo, the third
respondent on 19
May 2022, in which it was alleged that Solvem was
appointed outside normal tender procedures. At that time Diale had
been placed
on special leave of absence by the Municipality, the
previous day.
[11]
It was discovered that Solvem’s appointment was preceded by a
deviation from
regular tender procedures, approved by Diale.
According to the Municipality the deviation report could not be
found, despite an
Anton Pillar procedure and an extensive search on
Diale’s Municipality issued electronic devices. Although in her
explanatory
affidavit Diale admits that there was a deviation
process, she too could not produce the deviation report and alleged
instead that
she left the report in her office when she was placed on
special leave.
[12]
Despite the missing deviation report, Solvem’s appointment was
“
ratified
” on 8 July 2022 by the then Municipal
Manager, Ms Msezana, the second applicant, on grounds that it would
have been highly
destructive to the functioning of the Municipality
to operate without the systems as the Municipality would otherwise be
unable
to fulfil its constitutional obligations. The ratification was
subsequently approved by Council on 29 July 2022.
[13]
The ratification was
purportedly done in terms of Regulation 36(1)(b) of the Municipal
Supply Chain Management (“SCM”)
Regulations, in terms of
which the Accounting
Officer
may
ratify
minor
breaches
of
procurement
processes, of a purely technical nature, by an official or committee
acting in terms of delegated powers or duties.
[14]
The Municipality argued in this regard that although organs of state
are permitted
under Regulation 36 of the Municipal’s Supply
Chain Management Regulations to dispense with official procurement
processes,
including public tender procedures to procure goods and
services, this may however only be done in cases of “emergency”,
where the goods and services are only available from a “single
provider”, or in “exceptional circumstances”.
The
Municipality also submitted that the reasons for a deviation must
also be recorded and reported to the next meeting of Council
and a
note to that effect must be included in the annual financial
statements.
[15]
According to the Municipality, the above strict requirements were not
complied with
in the case of Solvem and the associated notices,
presumably of a deviation, were not published on the Municipality’s
website.
Worse, the deviation report in terms of which Solvem was
appointed could not be found.
[16]
The Municipality argues therefore that the apparent failure to follow
procurement
processes and the lack of a deviation report renders
Solvem’s appointment irregular. Both these instances of
non-compliance
are substantial and do not constitute a minor breach
of a purely technical nature in terms of which a ratification under
Regulation
36(1)(b) may be obtained. As such, the ratification was
also unlawful.
[17]
Meanwhile Solvem continued to render the MSCOA services to the
Municipality, for
which it was paid millions of rands. This as both
the Municipality and Solvem argue, was so the Municipality could
maintain a financial
management system which enabled it to remain
constitutionally complaint. This is because MSCOA is a heavily
regulated system that
enables the administration and reporting of the
Municipality’s financial affairs, including to the
Auditor-General, the Provincial
Treasury and the National Treasury.
According to the Municipality, this system allows the Municipality to
run its day-to-day financial
systems, such as billing and the
collection of rates, without which, the operations of the
Municipality would collapse with substantial
prejudice to the
provision of basic services to its residents.
[18]
On 14 June 2022 the Johannesburg High Court, per Molahlehi J,
pursuant an application
by Inzalo, issued an order interdicting the
Municipality from using and employing Solvem’s services.
Although the Municipality
did not immediately stop using Solvem’s
services in the aftermath of the interdict, a new service provider
was eventually
appointed and Solvem’s services were then
terminated.
[19]
In a contempt application that followed, to enforce Molahlehi J’s
order, the
Municipality explained that the continued use of Solvem’s
services was not in wilful contempt of the court, but simply a
necessity as the MSCOA is the financial backbone of the Municipality
and it would simply not have been possible to function without
it.
[20]
In its counter application Solvem sought an order, that it is
entitled to payment
of the goods supplied by it, and the services
rendered, to the Municipality. Alternatively, if the parties cannot
agree on the
value of the payments, that the dispute be referred for
determination in an arbitration before a retired Judge. As stated
earlier,
Solvem also argued subsequently that the application has
become moot on account of the termination of Solvem’s
appointment
and therefore that the court may proceed to set aside the
agreement and grant the orders sought by it in the counter
application
as just and equitable remedy.
[21]
In her explanatory affidavit, Diale admits that she approved the
appointment of Solvem
as a service provider at the time acting as
Municipal Manager and that she did so in terms of a deviation report
for tender RFP
CORP(ICT) 05/2021 on 29 April 2022. She explained that
the deviation process was initiated by one Mr Ramatlhape Ratha, the
then
Executive Manager Corporate Support Services of the
Municipality. She then left a copy of the report in the Municipal
Manager’s
office, awaiting the acting Chief Financial Officer
to attend to further processes before filing and reporting thereof.
[22]
Diale explains that she then left the employ of the Municipality on
18 May 2022 when
she was unceremoniously placed on special leave of
absence, which she laments as unjustifiable and unlawful. She stated
further
that despite a search and seizure process by the Sheriff
following the Anton Pillar order, the deviation report and on her
related
documents were not found in her possession.
Discussion
and analysis
[23]
The first question to be answered in this application is whether the
application
is moot, second, whether the decisions of the
Municipality to appoint Solvem and thereafter ratify such appointment
were irregular,
unlawful and constitutionally invalid, and thus fall
to be reviewed and set aside, and if so, third, and lastly, the
determination
of the appropriate just and equitable remedy.
Is
the review moot?
[24]
It must be pointed out at the outset that the issue of mootness was
only raised on
behalf of Solvem in argument and not in its answering
affidavit/supporting affidavit to the counter application. Therefore,
it
was not dealt with by the Municipality in its supplementary and
replying affidavit. Considering the termination of Solvem’s
appointment and thus the need
in
those circumstances
to
determine whether
correcting
or reversing the impugned decisions
following
a review is possible, I am of the view that the issue of mootness was
well raised and must be addressed in the context
of this application.
[25]
I
n
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others
[1]
the
constitutional Court held that a case is
moot
and
therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an existing or
live controversy which should exist if the Court is to avoid
giving
advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.
[26]
Therefore, to answer the question whether this case is moot, the
court must consider
whether there is a live dispute or controversy
between the parties, that will be resolved by the relief and that the
relief sought
is not merely for the asking.
[27]
The authority relied on by Solvem for its argument that the case is
moot in
Agribee
,
[2]
relates to the court’s discretion to hear a matter where it
finds that the case is moot. It deals particularly with the principle
that mootness is not an absolute bar to the justiciability of an
issue, and that a court may entertain a case, even if moot, where
the
interests of justice so require.
[28]
In this case, although the grounds on which the Municipality relies
for the self-review
are not in dispute, both the Municipality and
Solvem seek just and equitable remedy, albeit on different terms,
necessitated by
the fact that Solvem continued to render services to
the Municipality beyond the discovery of its irregular appointment,
for reasons
already discussed above. A just and equitable remedy
under 172(1)(
a
)
of the Constitution, may only follow a declaration that a particular
decision or process is irregular and constitutionally invalid,
and an
order that it be reviewed and set aside.
[29]
In my view therefore, the application is not moot, as the court
cannot determine
a just and equitable relief, without first ordering
a review.
Accordingly,
Agribee
does not apply to the
facts of this case. The review must be adjudicated.
The
review
[30]
This is a review of the Municipality’s own decisions to appoint
Solvem as a
service provider, and the subsequent ratification of such
appointment. The Municipality brings the review on the principle of
legality
[3]
on the grounds that
although such decisions were purportedly taken in terms of a
deviation procedure under regulation 36 of the
Municipal SCM
Regulations, no record or evidence of such deviation or compliance
with the regulations could be found.
[31]
Regulation 36 of the Municipal SCM Regulations dealing with deviation
from, and ratification
of minor breaches of, procurement processes,
provides amongst other things that:
“
(1)
A supply chain management policy may allow the accounting officer—
(a) to
dispense with the official procurement processes established by the
policy and to procure any required goods
or services through any
convenient process, which may include direct negotiations, but only—
(i)
in an emergency;
(ii)
if such goods or services are produced or available from a single
provider only;
(iii) for
the acquisition of special works of art or historical objects where
specifications are difficult to compile;
(iv)
acquisition of animals for zoos; or
(v) in any
other exceptional case where it is impractical or impossible to
follow the official procurement processes;
and
(b) to
ratify any minor breaches of the procurement processes by an official
or committee acting in terms of delegated powers
or duties which are
purely of a technical nature.”
“
(2)
The
accounting officer must record the reasons for any deviations in
terms of sub regulation (1)(a) and (b) and report them to the
next
meeting of the council, or board of directors in the case of a
municipal entity, and include as a note to the annual financial
statements.”
[32]
Diale who admits having taken the decision to approve the deviation
and appoint Solvem,
on recommendation at the time of executive
Manager Corporate Support Services, offers no other information
surrounding the deviation,
how it was recommended and the reasons why
she deemed it appropriate to approve the recommendation and sign the
letter of appointment.
[33]
Beyond this, there is no explanation as to what the circumstances or
reasons for
the deviation were. Diale has confirmed however that the
report could not be found despite the Anton Pillar process and the
search
on her electronic devices. Therefore, as the Municipality
submitted, there is no evidence that the appointment of Solvem
followed
a proper deviation procedure and thus proof of compliance
with SCM Regulation 36.
[34]
I therefore agree with the Municipality’s submissions that the
failure to follow
procurement processes and the lack of a deviation
report to prove compliance with Regulation 36(1)(a) render the
decision to appoint
Solvem as a service provider irregular and
unlawful. I also find that non-compliance with the SCM Regulation is
materially substantial
and therefore could not reasonably be regarded
as constituting a minor breach warranting ratification under
Regulation 36(1)(b).
The decision to grant the ratification is
therefore also unlawful for these reasons.
[35]
Our courts have for some time recognised the principle that as
bearers of public
duty, and in performing their functions in the
public interest, public functionaries must, where faced with an
irregularity in
the public administration, seek to redress it.
[4]
[36]
In
Fedsure
[5]
the
Constitutional Court held, in relation to the exercise of public
power, that
the
legislature and executive in every sphere are constrained by the
principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function
beyond that conferred upon them by law.
In
Affordable
Medicines Trust and
Others
[6]
the
court stated that “[
t]o
give effect to the supremacy of the Constitution, courts 'must
declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the
Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.”
[37]
In
Gijima
,
[7]
with
reference to
Fedsure
and
Affordable
Medicines Trust
[8]
the
court stated that the exercise of public power which is at variance
with the
principle
of
legality is inconsistent with the Constitution itself and is invalid
if a decision or conduct did not conform to legal prescripts
it may
be reviewed and possibly set aside under legality review.
[38]
Accordingly, I find that the decisions of the Municipality on 29
April 2022 to appoint
Solvem as a service provider for the provision
of the MSCOA financial management systems, and on 3 July 2022 to
ratify such decision,
are unlawful and constitutionally invalid, and
therefore fall to be reviewed and set aside.
Remedy
[39]
In
Kirland
,
[9]
the court stated that “[o]nce a declaration of invalidity is
made, the court may proceed to the second stage.
At
this stage the court considers the effects of the declaration of
invalidity on parties or persons to whom the order
applies.
The
interests
of
those
parties
are
carefully
examined for the purposes of making an order that is just and
equitable in the circumstance of each case.
It
is only at the second stage that a court enjoys a discretionary
choice. However, that choice does not include the reversal of
what
was done during the first stage at which there is no discretion but
an obligation to make a declaration of invalidity.
The
two stages ought not to be conflated.”
[40]
As stated above Solvem, in answer to the review application, filed a
counter application
conditional on the granting of the review, in
which it seeks relief that it is just and equitable that it is
entitled to payment
of the services it rendered to the Municipality.
[41]
The Municipality
accepted that despite the irregularities, Solvem rendered some
services to the Municipality and that such services
came at a cost to
Solvem. It is worth pointing out that Solvem continued to render the
services because it was considered by the
Municipality at the time
that it had no choice but to continue with the services, as the
severing of ties with Solvem before the
appointment of a properly
procured service provider, would prove disastrous for the
Municipality as it depends on the MSCOA to
run its financial systems
and on which its administration depends.
[42]
In essence, Solvem continued to render the MSCOA services beyond the
discovery of
the irregularities, which was relatively soon after its
appointment, at the Municipalities behest. Indeed, the Municipality
in
its initial notice of motion, sought relief that it is just and
equitable that any declaration of invalidity must be suspended for
a
period of six months, to allow the procurement and appointment of
another service provider. This relief has since been abandoned
following the appointment of such service provider.
[43]
In these circumstances, the only issue in dispute is the
quantification of what would constitute
reasonable payment for the
services rendered. Both parties proposed mechanisms of determining
what services must be payable and
how much is payable in respect
thereof, which mechanisms include the employment of mediators,
auditors and experts in the relevant
fields who will embark on the
valuation of the services to enable the parties to reach settlement.
[44]
In
Steenkamp
[10]
the
court stated the following as to the remedy in a review:
“
[29]
It goes without saying that every improper performance of an
administrative function would implicate the Constitution
and entitle
the aggrieved party to appropriate relief. In each case the
remedy must fit the injury. The remedy must be fair
to those affected
by it and yet vindicate effectively the right violated. It must be
just and equitable in the light of the facts,
the implicated
constitutional principles, if any, and the controlling law.”
[45]
In
Steenkamp
the Court went on to give context to the need for a remedy after a
review by highlighting that it is appropriate to note
that ordinarily
a breach of administrative justice attracts public law remedies and
not private law remedies. The purpose of a
public law remedy is to
pre-empt or correct or reverse an improper administrative function.
In some instances, the remedy takes
the form of an order to make or
not to make a particular decision or an order declaring rights or an
injunction to furnish reasons
for an adverse decision. Ultimately the
purpose of a public remedy is to afford the prejudiced party
administrative justice, to
advance efficient and effective public
administration compelled by constitutional precepts and at a broader
level, to entrench
the rule of law.
[11]
[46]
In
Allpay
(2)
[12]
the Constitutional
Court
emphasised
that correction and reversal of invalid administrative action is
grounded in section 172(1)(b)
of
the Constitution. It then dealt with
the
issue of
remedial
correction as a logical consequence flowing from invalid and
rescinded contracts,
and
enrichment law generally, such as is the case in this application.
[47]
The Court stated in this regard that
while
due regard must be had to the constitutional principles governing
public procurement and more specifically the need to achieve
public
good,
the
primacy of public interest in such procurement matters must also be
taken into account when the rights, responsibilities and
obligations
of
all
affected
persons are assessed. The court then opined that this means that the
enquiry cannot be one-dimensional. It must have a
broader range. The
corrective principle may be capable of implementation at
certain
levels, but not others.
[13]
[48]
The above principles in Allpay, in my view, are relevant to the
Municipality’s
argument that whatever payment Solvem may be
entitled to, on established authorities, must be stripped of all
profit because its
appointment was irregular and unlawful
ab
initio
. I disagree. The approach in Allpay is such that the
determination cannot be a simplistic and one dimensional one. It must
consider
a broad range of issues arising from the facts and at
different levels.
[49]
In the circumstances where there has been no complicity alleged or
proven against
Solvem and the fact that Solvem remained on site
rendering the services at the request of the Municipality, I find it
unreasonable
the argument by the Municipality that Solvem’s
payment must be stripped of all profit.
[50]
I however agree with the Municipality’s submissions, that as to
what payment
Solvem should be entitled to does not arise from the
impugned appointment and the purported SLA, as these were unlawful
and fall
to be set aside. The question is what Solvem might
justifiably be entitled to as part of the corrective measures
following the
review, in the interest of justice and equity, for the
services it has rendered prior termination thereof.
[51]
I have also taken note of Solvem’s submissions as regard the
nature of the
services it rendered and that the determination of its
pricing is an intricate process. I note therefore that while Solvem
cannot
unduly profit from the impugned appointment, at the same time,
Solvem
must
not be prejudiced, and must thus be fairly and reasonably
compensated. This court does not have the expertise nor the evidence
at this stage to determine what may constitute reasonable and fair
compensation for the services rendered.
I
find therefore that it is just and equitable to direct the parties to
embark on a process aimed at determining what is fair and
reasonable
payment.
Costs
[52]
For the reasons discussed above, I find that it was necessary for the
Municipality
to bring this application. From the outset the
Municipality’s position was that despite the impugned nature of
Solvem’s
appointment, it would still require its services until
another service provider who could offer similar complaint system
could
be appointed. As stated above, part of the initial just and
equitable order included a relief to enable this arrangement.
[53]
It follows therefore, that such services would be compensated. There
is no indication
that they would not. Although Solvem may have
considered the counter application to be necessary to set out the
type of remedy
it would desire in those circumstances, there is no
reason why the Municipality should be burdened with the costs of such
counter
application. Solvem must bear its own costs in this regard.
[54]
Solvem on the other hand did not oppose the application and merely
made submissions
on the just and equitable remedy which I find to
have been of assistance to the court. Equally, I see no reason why
Solvem should
be responsible for the costs of the review application.
The Municipality must bear its own costs.
Conclusion
[55]
In the premises, I make the
following order:
1.
The decision of the first
applicant on 29 April 2022 to approve the deviation from procurement
procedures for the appointment of
the second respondent as a service
provider for the MSCOA-compliant financial system is declared
unlawful and constitutionally
invalid and reviewed and set aside.
2.
The appointment by the first
applicant on 29 April 2022 of the second respondent as a service
provider for MSCOA-compliant financial
system, is declared unlawful
and constitutionally invalid, and reviewed and set aside.
3.
The decision of the first
applicant on 8 July 2022 to ratify the decisions of 29 April 2022 in
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, is declared
unlawful and constitutionally
invalid and reviewed and set aside.
4.
The decision by the first
applicant’s Council on 29 July 2022 to approve the ratification
of the decisions of 29 April 2022,
is declared unlawful and
constitutionally invalid, and reviewed and set aside.
5.
In terms of
172(1)(b)
of
the Constitution, it is just and equitable, that:
5.1.
It is declared that
the second respondent is entitled to fair and reasonable payment for
the services rendered to the Municipality
for the provision of the
MSCOA financial management system.
5.2.
Such fair and
reasonable payment is to be determined as follows:
5.2.1.
The first applicant
and the second respondent shall within 60 days from the date of this
order engage in meaningful good faith negotiations,
including by way
of mediation, to determine and agree the amount due and payable to
the second respondent.
5.2.2.
In the event that the
negotiations and/or mediation process fail, the first applicant and
the second respondent shall agree to appoint,
and appoint an
independent expert in Integrated Financial Management and Internal
Control Systems for Local Governments or similar
processes (“
the
expert
”
)
within 30 (thirty) days of the failure of the mediation process,
failing which the court may be approached on the same papers,
supplemented where necessary, to appoint the expert.
5.2.3.
The expert shall
value all the works performed and the services rendered by the second
respondent, including use whatever reasonable
means to make his
determination and consider whatever information he deems reasonable
or relevant, and serve on the parties and
file in court a report on
such value within a reasonable period.
5.2.4.
The parties shall
agree on the value of the works performed and the services rendered
within 30 (thirty) days of receipt of the
report from the expert,
failing which the court may be approached on the same papers
supplemented, where necessary, to determine
the value of the works
performed and the services rendered.
5.3.
Upon determination of
the value of the works by the court, or as agreed by the parties:
5.3.1.
The payments made by
the first applicant to the second respondent before the date of this
order shall be set-off against the value
of the works so determined.
5.3.2.
The first applicant
shall pay the deficit, if any, after the set-off referred to above to
the second respondent within 60 days of
the determination.
5.3.3.
The second respondent
shall pay excess, if any, after the set-off referred to above, to the
first applicant within 60 days of the
determination.
5.4.
The costs of the
experts shall be paid jointly by the first applicant and the second
respondent.
6.
Each party must pay
their own cost.
MPD
Chabedi
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant:
R Tshetlo
Seleka
Attorneys Inc, Johannesburg
For
first respondent:
TK Mokhethi
Modiboa
Attorneys Inc, Klerksdorp
For
second respondent: HP Wessels
Van
Der Merwe & Associates, Pretoroa
Date
of hearing:
4 June 2025
Date
of Judgment:
15 December 2025
[1]
2000
(2) SA 1
(CC) para [21] with reference to
JT
Publishing (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of Safety and Security
and Others
[1996] ZACC 23
;
1997
(3) SA 514
(CC) at para
[15]
.
[2]
Agribee
Beef Fund Ltd and Another v Eastern Cape Rural Development Agency
and Another
2023
(6) SA 639
(CC), paras [26]-[29]
[3]
State
Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd
2018
(2) SA 23
(CC), para [36].
[4]
Khumalo
and
another v Member of the Executive Council for Education:
KwaZulu-Natal
2014
(3) BCLR 333
(CC) at para [29].
[5]
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council and Others
[1998] ZACC 17
;
1999
(1) SA 374
(CC), at paras [56]-[59].
[6]
Affordable
Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others
2006
(
3
)
SA
247
(
CC
),
paras [48]-[50].
[7]
State
Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd
2018
(2) SA 23
(CC), at para [40].
[8]
See also
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
2000(2)SA 674
(CC)
in
para [17].
[9]
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd
2014
(3) SA 481
(CC), para [61].
[10]
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape
2007
(3) SA 121 (CC).
[11]
Id
,.
[12]
Allpay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency and
others
2014
(4) SA 179
(CC) at para [29].
[13]
Allpay
at paras [32]-[34].
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