Thobejane v Mercedes-Benz Finance and Insurance a Division of Mercedez-Benz Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Leave to Appeal) (16432/2019) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1384 (17 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1384 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Thobejane v Mercedes-Benz Finance and Insurance a Division of Mercedez-Benz Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Leave to Appeal) (16432/2019) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1384 (17 December 2025) Thobejane v Mercedes-Benz Finance and Insurance a Division of Mercedez-Benz Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Leave to Appeal) (16432/2019) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1384 (17 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1384.html sino date 17 December 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA CASE NO: 16432/2019 (1)      REPORTABLE: YES/NO (2)      OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO (3)      REVISED: YES/NO SIGNATURE: DATE: 17/12/2025 In matter between: LERUMA EMMANUEL THOBEJANE APPLICANT and MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCE AND INSURANCE RESPONDENT A DIVISION OF MERCEDEZ-BENZ FINANCIAL SERVICES SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD JUDGMENT (APPLICATION FO LEAVE TO APPEAL) STONE AJ [1]          The applicant applies for leave to appeal against the whole of my judgment and order granted on 28 July 2025. The applicant in this application is the respondent in the main application, and the respondent is the applicant in the main application. [2]           As in the original application, Mr Thobejane, an attorney by profession, appeared in person, as he had done in previous proceedings between the parties. Mr Minnaar appeared on behalf of the respondent. Before the inception of argument on the application for leave to appeal, I made an order varying my judgment  dated 28 July 2026, to correct patent errors and prevent ambiguity, by replacing the words “ respondent’s attorney ” with the words “ applicant’s attorney ” in the fourth sentence of paragraph [53] thereof,  correcting the word “ Carelines ” in  paragraph [39] to read “ Caselines ”, and  including the word “ not ” in paragraph [60] after the words “ suspension was ”. The applicant and respondent’s counsel were given the opportunity to react thereto, but neither indicated that they required to do so. [3]          The following orders were made as part of my judgment: “ 1. The warrant of execution/delivery issued by the Applicant in June 2023 is set aside. 2. The cancellation of the credit agreement between the parties is confirmed. 3. The Sheriff of the High Court is authorised to attach, seize and hand over the vehicle, a 2016 Mercedes- Benz GLE 63 S AMG, Engine number:1[...], Chassis number: W[...] 1[...] to the Applicant. 4. The Applicant is given leave to approach the court on the same papers, as may be supplemented, for payment of the difference between the balance outstanding and the market value of the vehicle, in the event of there being a shortfall after the vehicle has been repossessed and sold or re-leased and there being a balance outstanding payable by the respondent to the respondent. 5. The respondent is ordered to pay the cost of the application, including the cost of counsel on scale B .” [4]           To provide some context, the essence of the main application was that the applicant sought the enforcement of a settlement agreement, which was made an order of court. The settlement order provided for the relief as set out in prayers 2 to 5 above being granted, should the applicant breach the terms of such settlement agreement. [5]           The applicant filed an application for leave to appeal which sets out certain grounds for his application. In such application it was stated that he reserved the right to supplement his grounds for the application for leave to appeal. He did not file a supplementary application for leave to appeal, but in argument he proceeded to rely on additional grounds, which eventually appeared to constitute the main thrust of his argument. I provisionally allowed argument on these further submissions, without deciding on the admissibility thereof at the hearing. I deal therewith below. [6]         The five grounds of appeal set out in his application for leave to appeal read as follows: “ 1. The honourable court erred by granting an application for condonation under circumstances where no application for condonation was before the court. The respondent did not bring an application for condonation and therefore none ought to have been granted. The court cannot mero motu bring an application on behalf of a litigant and then grant such application. The respondent is bound by its pleadings and in the case of an incorrect and irregular procedure being followed by the respondent, the court should not come to the aid of the respondent. 2.  The honourable court erred by entering the arena and taking the side of the respondent in the application. The honourable court erred in failing to uphold the applicant’s rights as a consumer. 3.  The appellant submits that the correct procedure would have been an application for amendment of the respondent’s notice of motion and no such amendment was sought by the respondent. The respondent did not bring an application for amend (sic). 4.    The honourable court erred by disregarding the breach committed by the respondent and its fraudulent conduct in causing the warrant of delivery to be issued when no order to that effect existed at the time. 5.    The honourable court erred by accepting as gospel truth the respondents’ version that no payment was made at the time the application was issued. Payments were in fact made to the respondents.” [7] The test for the granting of leave to appeal is set out in section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act [1] . “ 17 Leave to appeal (1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that- (a) (i)   the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or (ii)   there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration. (b)   the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16 (2) (a); and (c)   where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties.” [8] In Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others [2] Bertelsmann J expressed the following view: “ It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cronwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343 H. The use of the word "would" in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against. [9] The test was also discussed in S v Smith [3] where it was held: “ What the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law, that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the trial court. In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on appeal and that those prospects are not remote but have a realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established than that there is a mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorised as hopeless. There must, in other words, be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.” [10] In Mavundla v MEC, Department of Co-Operative Government and Traditional Affairs, Kwa-Zulu-Natal [4] Bezuidenhout J referred to Four Wheel Drive v Rattan NO [5] as follows: “ [ 7] In Four Wheel Drive v Rattan NO Schippers JA, with reference to Smith, referred to the principle that leave to appeal should only be granted where 'a sound, rational basis [exists] for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal'. Put differently, the court is required to test the grounds on which leave to appeal is sought against the facts of the case and the applicable legal principles.” [11] The more stringent test has also been endorsed by the Full Court [6] . [12]             I will firstly deal with the grounds that are identifiable from the applicant’s application for leave to appeal, as he dealt with same in argument. [13] In support of the first ground, the applicant referred me to Hano Trading CC v JR Investments (Pty) Ltd and others [7] . In such matter an issue on appeal was whether the court a quo should have allowed the filing of a further affidavit or not. The Supreme Court of Appeal  decided that the court a quo correctly disallowed the affidavit. The court found that a litigant who wished to file a further affidavit must make formal application for leave to do so and that it cannot simply slip in an affidavit into the court file, as it prejudices a party who has to meet a case based on those submissions and no reason for placing it before the court a quo was provided. [14] In my view the present matter is to be distinguished from Hano . The real issue in casu is whether the respondent was entitled to relief claimed based on the applicant’s ’s default in failing to comply with payment obligations in terms of a settlement which was made a court order, which default was not disputed in the applicant’s answering affidavit.  Mr Minnaar referred me to Moosa v Knox [8] where it was held that a party must set out a defence in his answering affidavit. The applicant did not dispute in his answering affidavits the allegations in respondent’s attorney’s affidavit that he breached the settlement order and that he did not make the required payments. [15] In my view it is unlikely that another court will find on the facts of this matter that the settlement order should not be enforced, in view of the dictum in Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Pylon Trading Close Corporation [9] at para [23] where the Supreme Court of Appeal stated the following in respect of a consent order: “ The consent order, which embodied the settlement agreement, had to be enforced if it was not set aside. No application was launched to rescind or appeal the consent order.  Nor was it abandoned.  It was of full force and effect. As such, the High Court was not entitled to ignore it and to enter the terrain of the previous lis between the parties. The Court had no jurisdiction to do anything other than give effect to the consent order. The only additional information required was whether or not the amount of R18 million had been paid timeously or not.  That undisputed information was before it. In the circumstances, it was obliged to make the final order sought by the bank.” [16]             The court did not itself bring an application as stated in paragraph 1 of the application for leave to appeal. Condonation was granted in the exercise of the court’s discretion, based on the facts of this matter. [17] Furthermore, insofar condonation was necessary, I am of the view that there are no reasonable prospects that another court would hold that condonation should not have been   granted, in view of the facts of this matter and well-established principles that courts should place substance over form, not be detained by the rules to a point where they are hamstrung in the performance of the core function of dispensing justice, and that courts must depart from a strict observance of rules where the interest of justice so dictate. [10] [18]             The issue for condonation in casu differs from the issue in Hano . In casu the issue is that the application for judgement was couched in a less than perfect form. It was a technicality. In Hano the issue related to evidence, in an affidavit. [19] As was held in Trans-African Insurance v Maluleka [11] technical objections to less than perfect procedural steps should not be permitted, in the absence of prejudice, to interfere with deciding cases expeditiously on the real merits. In argument on the application for leave to appeal, the applicant did not challenge the correctness of my finding that the condonation did not cause any prejudice to him, nor did he address the interests of justice. He also did not dispute the applicability of the authorities mentioned in my judgment that a court has an inherent discretion to condone non-compliance with the rules in suitable circumstances. The applicant never objected to the form in which the respondent’s application was couched, prior to it being raised by the court. These facts also differ from Hano . [20] In view of the authorities regarding the test for leave to appeal, in particular the dicta in Eke v Parsons [12] , and the circumstances and authorities referred to in my judgment, I find that there exist no reasonable prospect that another court would make a different finding on the facts and come to different legal conclusions regarding the granting of condonation. I am unable to find that the applicant would have reasonable prospects of success on appeal based on the first ground. [21]             The second ground of appeal, the submission that the court entered into the arena, taking the side of the respondent, and failing to uphold the applicant’s right as a consumer, was not taken further by the applicant in oral argument. When I asked him to deal with this ground, he merely intimated that the court took the respondent’s side as the court found against him. He did not elaborate, nor did he indicate which rights as a consumer he was referring. In my view it cannot be said that the court entered into the arena. The matter was decided on the facts before the court and what I found to be applicable legal principles. In my view here is no merit in this contention. [22] The third ground is similar to the first ground. It pertains to the issues of substance and form. With reference to Eke v Parsons [13] , he submitted that whether he breached the settlement order or not, the respondent should have followed the correct procedure. He submits that the correct procedure would have been for the respondent to have amended its notice of motion. In my view this ground has no prospect of success on appeal for the same reasons as mentioned in respect of the first ground. It disregards the import of the Constitutional Court’s views in Eke v Parsons that substance must prevail over form. The outcome of an amendment to the respondent’s notice of motion or other papers, to merely remove the technical issue, would have been that the matter would have had to come before the court again on the same factual matrix as already contained in the application. In view of the authorities mentioned, such an approach would have indeed put form before substance. In my view there are no reasonable prospects that another court would follow aa highly technical approach at variance with the principles laid down by the Constitutional Court in Eke v Parsons. [23]             The fourth ground relied on by the applicant, that I erred in “ disregarding the breach committed ” by the respondent and its “ fraudulent conduct in causing the warrant of delivery to be issued when no order to that effect existed ” is without foundation. In paragraphs [49] to [64] of my judgment I have dealt at length with the applicant’s arguments regarding the warrant and his submission that the respondent acted fraudulently and issued the warrant in breach of the agreement. In argument the applicant did not advance new contentions in this regard. I am of the view that there exist no reasonable prospects that another court would come to different factual finding and legal conclusions on the issues raised in this ground. [24]             In consideration of the fifth ground, the crisp issue is that the applicant has failed to dispute in his answering affidavit the allegations contained in the affidavit of the respondent’s attorney that he breached the settlement order, and that he did not make the required payments. He did not put forth any evidence in his answering affidavit to refute the allegations that he beached the settlement order by failing to make payment. He bears the onus of proving payment. His bald allegation in his application for leave to appeal that he did make payments, whether in terms of the credit agreement or in terms of the settlement order, does not support a finding that another court would reasonably come to a different conclusion on appeal. [25] In his short heads of argument and in oral argument the applicant raised further grounds for leave to appeal, which are not contained in his application for leave to appeal. It turned out to be the focus of his argument. Mr Minnaar objected thereto. He referred me to Songomo v Minister of Law and Order [14] in which case the court held: “ It seems to me that, by a parity of reasoning, the grounds of appeal required under Rule 49(1)(b) must similarly be clearly and succinctly set out in clear and unambiguous terms so as to enable the Court and the respondent to be fully and properly informed of the case which the respondent seeks to make out and which the respondent is to meet in opposing the application for leave to appeal. Just as Rule 49(3) is peremptory in that regard, Rule 49(1)(b) must also be regarded as being peremptory. In my view the lengthy and rambling notice of appeal filed in casu falls woefully short of what was required. Mr Bursey suggested that grounds of appeal could be gleaned from the notice but that is not the point - the point is that the notice must clearly set out the grounds and it is not for the Court to have to analyse a lengthy document in an attempt to establish what grounds the respondent intended to rely upon  but did not clearly set out. On this basis alone the application seems to me to be fatally defective and must be dismissed. [26] In Van der Walt v Abreu 1999 (4) SA 85 (W) the learned Judge dealt with the requirements for a valid notice of appeal in terms of Rule 51 of the Magistrate's Courts Rules (which in my opinion equally applies to Rule 49 of the Uniform Rules) at 94E as follows: "(1) It must specify the details of what is appealed against (ie the particular findings of fact and rulings of law that are to be criticised on appeal as being wrong); and (2) it must also state the grounds of appeal (ie it must indicate why each finding of fact and ruling of law that is to be to criticise as wrong is said to be wrong, ...... Only when both of these requirements have been set out in a notice of appeal has a valid ground of appeal been disclosed according to the language of the Rule." (My emphasis). [27] In Coetzer and Another v Die Padongelukkefonds [15] the court, referring to Songomo , stated the following: “ Die Hof het in die Songomo-saak waarna ek verwys het, dan ook op 386B in 'n Aansoek om Verlof om te Appelleer beslis dat die bepalings van Reël 49(1)(b) dwingende bepalings is en dat 'n kennisgewing wat nie daaraan voldoen nie fataal gebrekkig is (sien ook: Tzouras v SA Wimpy (Pty) Ltd 1978 (3) SA 204 (W) , 205E ). Dit kom my dus voor dat, vir sover geen redes vir die gronde vervat in die Kennisgewing aangevoer word nie, die Kennisgewing van Aansoek Om Verlof om te Appelleer in alle waarskynlikheid 'n nietigheid is. [28] Following the last-mentioned authorities, [16] the applicant would not be allowed to raise further grounds which were not raised in his application for leave to appeal, and to indicate further findings of fact and law he seeks to rely on. The applicant however submitted that he would be entitled to rely on further grounds on appeal. [29]             Insofar as I may be wrong in finding that the applicant is bound by the grounds as contained in his application for leave to appeal, I did proceed to consider same. In my view, even if the applicant would be allowed to rely on such further contentions, it will not assist him to obtain leave to appeal. [30]             If I understood the applicant correctly, his further contentions can be summarised as follows: 31.1 His argument firstly stems from the fact that the settlement agreement, which was made an order of court, contains a paragraph wherein it is stated that the settlement was not a novation. He contends that the original credit agreement therefore (because it was not novated) remained in existence until it terminated, [17] His submissions regarding the effect of the fact that the credit agreement was not novated, is essentially that the respondent had to seek recourse in terms of the original credit agreement. 31.2        He relies thereon that the original credit agreement terminated on 1 April 2019, being the date upon which the last instalment had to be paid in terms of the credit agreement (he does not say that full and final payments have been made). 31.3        He avers that he was not in arrears with payments at the time of the summary judgment application in the action which was based on the original credit agreement (before the settlement agreement). He submits that there exists a “fall-back” to the original agreement. My understanding of his argument is that, in view of the clause which provides that the settlement agreement did not novate the credit agreement, the matter should have been dealt with in terms of the original credit agreement, not the settlement agreement which was made an order of court. The respondent, so he argues, should have applied for default judgment in terms of rule 31, and should have complied with requirements for enforcement of the original credit agreement, not the settlement agreement. However, as the credit agreement had terminated, he submits that it also could not be relied upon by the respondent, nor could it have been cancelled. 31.4         According to the applicant the settlement agreement did not terminate the litigation between the parties in the action. He uses the term “fall-back” to describe that the action proceedings should have been “revisited”, and the respondent should have applied for default judgment in terms of rule 31 based on the credit agreement (which he now says was not breached, and which has terminated) and not for judgment based on a breach of the settlement agreement. This, however, is subject to his submission that such agreement terminated and cannot be enforced any more. 31.5        He submitted that he could not, by way of the settlement agreement, have validly consented to “ the revival of the expired contract ” (apparently a reference to the credit agreement,). After it, on his version, had terminated. He also submitted that the relief that I granted could not have been granted as the credit agreement does not exist anymore (on the basis of his argument that it terminated as aforesaid). 31.6        He also submitted, that the respondent should have sought a warrant in terms of the original credit agreement, not the settlement order. Th respondent should have proved a breach of the credit agreement (which breach he disputes despite having entered into the settlement agreement). 31.7        He submitted, with reference to Eke v Parsons, where the Constitutional Court found that an agreement should not be made an order of court if it is objectionable,   that although the settlement was made an order of court, it was still objectionable and did not meet the required standard as set out in such decision of the Constitutional Court. For this submission he essentially relied on the allegation that the agreement terminated. [31]             I am unable to find that any of these contentions would hold a reasonable prospect of success on appeal these contentions would have reasonable prospects off success on appeal, even if the applicant would be allowed to raise same on appeal. In my view these contentions cannot avail the applicant for various reasons. In the first place, it is again based on an attack on the enforceability of the settlement agreement which was made a court order. The validity of the settlement agreement has already been the subject-matter of rescission proceedings in this court before Vermeulen AJ. Vermeulen AJ found that the settlement agreement was valid and could be made an order of court. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against Vermeulen AJ’s judgment was refused. Before my judgment this court has therefore already pronounced on the validity and enforceability of the settlement agreement. It was made an order of court, which was not rescinded. It does not remain open to the applicant to challenge the enforceability of the settlement order again. [32] The applicant’s view of the effect of the settlement agreement and of the clause which provides that it did not novate the credit agreement, cannot be sustained.  The Applicant entered into the settlement agreement acknowledging his indebtedness, and he undertook to make payments in terms thereof. The settlement included provisions that the respondent would be entitled to seek relief as sought in the summons, upon a breach of the settlement order. Whether the credit agreement was novated or not, what the applicant cannot escape is the fact that the settlement was made an order of court, which remains of full force and effect. Despite his efforts, the court did not set it aside. It must be complied with, as is clear from the authorities. [18] The fact that the credit agreement may not have been novated in terms of the settlement agreement, does not detract from the self-standing enforceability of the court order, which constituted a settlement of the litigation in the action in terms thereof. On his own version, the credit agreement terminated. Whether this is correct or not, the settlement order remained in force, and therefore an order could have been granted as provided for in the settlement. [33] As was held in Swadif v Dyke [19] , cited with approval in MV Ivory Tirupati and Another v Badan Urusan Logistik (aka Bulog), [20] where the only purpose of a judgment is to enable the creditor to enforce his rights to payment it is realistic and in accordance with the Roman-Dutch writers to regard the judgment not as novating the obligation, but rather to strengthening and enforcing it so that the enforceable right remain the same. In MV Ivory Turapati [21] it was held that “ there is nothing unusual about an obligation being confirmed or reinforced by the incurrence of another obligation which is in effect an alternative to an antecedent one, such as where a cheque is given in payment of an existing debt without any intention to novate the existing debt. ”. [34]             The applicant’s argument that the respondent may only obtain relief if it reverts to claim relief in terms of the original credit agreement is not sustainable. The very object and effect of the settlement order was to settle the litigation in the action, and to establish an enforceable court order which allowed the respondent to apply for judgment against the applicant based on such court order, should he be in breach of the agreement. The fact that the credit agreement was not novated, does not detract from the enforceability of the settlement order and the respondent’s entitlement to proceed in terms thereof. [35] In addition, a credit agreement does not terminate simply because the contractually determined date of the last payment has been reached. In the absence of proof of payment in full, an argument that the credit agreement was terminated simply as the last payment date in terms thereof had arrived, cannot be sustained. The applicant referred me to Mlungisi Ndodana Sontsele v 140 Main Street Properties CC and Another [22] arguing that it supports his arguments on the effect regarding novation. The matter however relates to the renewal of a lease agreement, which in my view it is not comparable to the present matter. Mr Minnaar, justifiably so, complained that the argument based on the alleged termination of the agreement was raised for the first time in argument, and that it is not on the applicant’s papers. This belated attempt to rely on this ground is in any event in my view without any reasonable prospect that another court will find that it can sustain a defence to the respondent’s application. [36]             The applicant’s contentions at this stage that the respondent should have relied on the credit agreement to apply for judgment, and that he was not in breach of the credit agreement, is at odds with his willingness to enter into the settlement agreement, and his failure to dispute the breach of the settlement order, on which the respondent’s application was based. These contentions again speak of a failure to appreciate the status and enforceability of the settlement order. [37]              I am of the view that another court is not likely to sustain any of the additional contentions of the applicant which are not included in his application for leave to appeal, even if he is allowed to rely thereon. [38]             In conclusion, I am not persuaded that the issues raised by the applicant in his application for leave to appeal are such that another court is likely to make factual findings and reach legal conclusions different from my findings and conclusions. I am also of the view that there are no reasonable prospects of another court making factual or legal findings in favour of the applicant based on the points raised in argument in the application for leave to appeal which are not included in the application for leave to appeal, even if he is allowed to rely thereon. In my view the appeal therefore would not have reasonable prospects of success. I MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORDER: 1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs, 2. The applicant shall pay the costs of the application, on Scale B. JS STONE AJ (Acting Judge of the High Court) This judgment is handed down electronically by circulating it to the legal representative by email and being uploaded on Caselines. Appearances: Attorneys on behalf of the Applicant:                 Botha, Massy and Thobejane Attorneys On behalf of the Applicant:                                  Mr L E Thobejane (In person) Attorneys on behalf of the Respondent:             Hammond Pole Majola Inc. Counsel on behalf of the Respondent:                Adv J Minnaar [1] Act 10 of 2013. [2] 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) at par 6 [3] 2012 (1) SA CR 567 (SCA) par 7. [4] 2025 (3) SA 534 (KZP) par 7. See also Pretoria Society of Advocates v Nthai 2020 (1) SA 267 (LP) at par [5]; Beamish v Van der Merwe (Leave to Appeal) 2025 JDR 3727 (GP) at paras 20 to 24. [5] Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Rattan NO 2019 (3) SA 451 (SCA) at par 34. [6] Compare also in Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance (Society for the Protection of Our Constitution Amicus Curiae) 2016 JDR 1211 (GP) at par 25. [7] 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA). [8] 1949 (3) SA 327 (N) at 221. [9] 2024 JDR 1232 (SCA) at paragraph [23]. [10] Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) at paras [39] – [42]. [11] 1965 (2) SA 273 at 278E-F/H; Federated Trust Ltd v Botha 1978 (3) SA 645 (A) at 654 D. [12] Supra, n10. [13] Supra, n10. [14] 1996 (4) SA 384 (E) at 385J -386A. [15] 2003 JDR 0430 (SCA). [16] Referred to in paras [25] to [27] supra . [17] Referring to Prinsloo v Derksen 2007 JDR 0561 (T) [18] Eke v Parsons supra , at paras [29], [31], [36] & and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Pylon Trading Close Corporation 2024 JD 1232 ((SCA) at par [23]. [19] 1978 (1) SA 928 (A) at 944G. [20] 2003 (3) SA 104 (SCA). [21] Id , n 2 at par [29]. [22] (328/2019) [2020] ZASCA 85 (6 July 2020). sino noindex make_database footer start