Nel v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others (2025-218236) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1365 (22 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1365 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Nel v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others (2025-218236) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1365 (22 December 2025) Nel v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others (2025-218236) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1365 (22 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1365.html sino date 22 December 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT) Case number: 2025-218236 (1)      REPORTABLE: NO (2)      OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3)      REVISED DATE 22 DECEMBER 2025 SIGNATURE In the matter between: JACQUELINE NEL                                                                         Applicant and MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY VETERANS     First Respondent CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE                                                        Second Respondent SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE                                          Third Respondent CHIEF OF SOUTH AFRICAN AIRFORCE                      Fourth Respondent JUDGMENT MINNAAR AJ: INTRODUCTION: [1] In this application, the applicant is seeking the following urgent relief: a. That the respondents are ordered to take all necessary steps to ensure that the employment agreement of the applicant is renewed before 31 December 2025 and to communicate in writing to the applicant’s attorney that same has been done. b. That the respondents are ordered to take all steps necessary to ensure that the applicant is rotated to the office of Military Defence Counsels pending the finalisation of a suitability work study that will be commissioned to investigate the alleged toxic work environment within Legsato, Bloemfontein, before 31 December 2025 and to communicate to the applicant’s attorney in writing that same has been done. c. The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and client scale, jointly and severally, the one to pay the other to be absolved. [2] The applicant describes herself as a military law practitioner serving in the South African Air Force of the South African National Defence Force (‘SANDF’). The applicant holds the rank of major and is employed on a fixed-term contract. [3] The SANDF first employed the applicant on 11 August 2011. The fixed-term contract was renewed twice and is now set to terminate on 31 December 2025. She is currently based in Bloemfontein. [4] It is the applicant’s case that she is entitled to a renewal of her employment contract beyond 31 December 2025, if such a renewal is granted, and that she is further entitled to remain stationed in Bloemfontein. [5] The respondents oppose the application on lack of urgency and on the merits. URGENCY: [6] Rule 6(12) provides, inter alia , that the Court may dispose of urgent applications at such time and place and in such manner and in accordance with such procedure as it seems meet. The circumstances that an applicant avers render a matter urgent, and the reasons why he claims that he could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course must, in terms of Rule 6(12) (b), be set forth explicitly in the supporting affidavit. [1] [7] The requirements under Rule 6(12)(b) are peremptory, and mere lip service will not suffice. [2] A proper explanation must be provided as to why an applicant should be granted preferential treatment to be heard in the urgent court, as opposed to having to join the queue in the normal course of the motion court. [8] One of the key urgency requirements is that an applicant establish a case that the applicant will not obtain substantial redress in due course. In this regard, it was stated by Tuchten J in Mogalakwena Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo 2016 (4) SA 99 (GP) at paragraph 64: “ It seems to me that when urgency is in issue, the primary investigation should be to determine whether the applicant will be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. If the applicant cannot establish prejudice in this sense, the application cannot be urgent. Once such prejudice is established, other factors come into consideration. These factors include (but are not limited to): whether the respondents can adequately present their cases in the time available between notice of the application to them and the actual hearing; other prejudice to the respondents and the administration of justice; the strength of the case made by the applicant; and any delay by the applicant in asserting its rights. This last factor is often called, usually by counsel acting for respondents, self-created urgency.” [3] [9] Where an applicant sits on its hands or takes its time to bring an urgent application, such urgency is self-created, unless an acceptable explanation is provided for the full period applicable to the urgency of the application ( Roets NO and Another v SB Guarantee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd and Others (36515/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 754 (6 October 2022). [10] Litigants cannot ignore pending infringements in the hope that they will not be implemented and then, when reality knocks on the door, rush to the urgent court for relief. Where an application has become urgent owing to circumstances for which the applicant is to blame, the court should not assist such an applicant with urgent relief ( Schweizer Reneke Vleis Mkpy (Edms) Bpk v Die Minister van Landbou en Andere 1971 (1) PH F11 (T). [11] Self-created urgency should not be countenanced ( Black Shash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others (Freedom Under Law Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC) at paragraph 36). [12] In Dynamic Sisters Trading (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank Limited (081473/2023) [2023] ZAGPPHC 709 (21 August 2023), Adams J stressed that urgent applications should be refused in cases when the urgency relied upon was clearly self-created, that consistency is important, and that legal certainty is a cornerstone of a legal system based on the rule of law. [13] In the founding affidavit, the following is stated by the applicant under the heading of ‘urgency’: “ 50.    As of 31 December 2025 I will no longer be employed if matters are not urgently remedied. I will set this matter down for shortly before the Christmas holiday period.” [14] From the above-quoted passage, the applicant’s urgency is solely premised on her being unemployed as of 31 December 2025. [15] If regard is had to the chronology of the applicant’s employment history, the extensions of her fixed-term contract, the grievances lodged and the outcomes received, the applicant knew, since at least 4 December 2024, that 31 December 2025 would be her last day of employment. [16] In amplification, on 7 April 2025, the applicant received a letter dated 31 March 2025 (FA9 to the founding affidavit). Paragraph 2 of this letter states that the applicant’s current contract will expire on 31 December 2025. [17] It was only on 27 October 2025 that the applicant’s SANDU-appointed attorneys addressed a letter of demand (FA12). No explanation is provided for the period from 7 April 2025 to 27 October 2025. [18] The applicant is not an illiterate litigant who is not au fait with the law. The applicant is legally qualified. She states that she has been practising military law as a prosecutor for more than 14 years. She joined the SANDF after being retrenched twice. She further reference that she has long been out of private practice. The applicant’s fanciful arguments to obtain urgent relief, premised on the fact that she will not be afforded substantial redress in due course, are unconvincing. [19] Faced with the possibility of being unemployed on 31 December 2025, the applicant sat on her hands. She knew that 31 December 2025 was approaching, yet she waited until the last possible opportunity to present this urgent matter to the court. This is a classic example of self-created urgency and borders on an abuse of Rule 6(12). [20] The application was served on 18 November 2025. The applicant’s generosity in granting the respondents until 28 November 2025 to file their notice of intention to defend and allowing them until 5 December 2025 to file an answering affidavit may be commendable. Still, it does not justify the application's urgency. [21] It follows that the application should be struck from the roll for lack of urgency. Apart from stating that the prospects of success on the merits are thin, there is no need to address the merits of the application. COSTS: [22] Under normal circumstances, costs would follow the outcome. [23] When the respondents uploaded their answering affidavit, they submitted it and the annexures as a single document. The Practice Directive is clear: documents must be identified and uploaded separately. On 16 December 2025, I circulated a widely shared note requesting that the respondent ensure that the answering affidavit and its annexures are uploaded in accordance with the Practice Directive. When this application was called on 18 December 2025, there was still no compliance in this regard. I indicated to the respondents’ counsel that I would take this aspect into account when determining costs. [24] Daily, I encounter the same non-compliance with the Practice Directive dealing with the uploading of documents. It is incredibly frustrating when preparing applications to have to wade through a bulk document where specific documents should have been identified. This practice should come to an end, as the Caselines system and the applicable Practice Directive have been in operation for many years, and, as such, this essential requirement is not a surprise to any legal practitioner. [25] In light of the respondents’ non-compliance (which has only been rectified after hearing argument and a further request for compliance), the respondents will not be entitled to any costs herein. ORDER: Consequently, I make the following order: 1. The application is struck from the roll due to a lack of urgency.. Minnaar AJ Acting Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria Heard on                                    : 18 December 2025 For the Applicant                         : Adv. J J G J Hamman Instructed by                               : Griesel Van Zanten Attorneys Incorporated For the Respondents: Adv W R Mokhare SC Instructed by: State Attorney Date of Judgment                        : 22 December 2025 [1] IL&B Marcow Caterers v Greatermans SA 1981 (4) SA 108 (C) at 110 [2] Luna Meubel Vervaardigers Eiendoms Beperk v Makin & Another (trading as Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers) 1977 (4) SA 135 (W) at 137F - G [3] See also: East Rock Trading (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite and Others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) sino noindex make_database footer start