Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 873South Africa
Nel N.O and Others v Astrotail 109 (Pty) Ltd and Another (30326/22) [2022] ZAGPPHC 873 (21 November 2022)
Headnotes
in paragraph [28]:
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Nel N.O and Others v Astrotail 109 (Pty) Ltd and Another (30326/22) [2022] ZAGPPHC 873 (21 November 2022)
Nel N.O and Others v Astrotail 109 (Pty) Ltd and Another (30326/22) [2022] ZAGPPHC 873 (21 November 2022)
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sino date 21 November 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 30326/22
REPORTABLE:
YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
Date:
21 November 2022
In
the matter between:
JACOBUS
JOHANNES NEL N.O. FIRST
APPLICANT
BRUNHILDA
ELSE NEL N.O.
SECOND APPLICANT
TIELMAN
CHRISTIAAN ROOL N.O. THIRD
APPLICANT
HENNIE
DANIEL VERMAAK
FOURTH APPLICANT
FUCHSIA
TRADING (PTY) LTD
FIFTH APPLICANT
and
ASTROTAIL
109 (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT
and
THE
EMPLOYEES OF ASTROTAIL 109 (PTY)LTD INTERVENING
PARTY
JUDGMENT
Van
der Schyff J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for the
provisional winding-up of the respondent. The applicants are the
trustees of the JJ Nel Junior Trust
and a private company Fuchsia
Trading (Pty) Ltd. The applicants issued an application seeking the
provisional winding up of the
respondent on 3 June 2022. A notice of
intention to oppose the application was filed on 22 June 2022.
Affidavits were exchanged,
and the matter was subsequently set down
for determination on 7 November 2022. On 2 November 2022, an
application was filed with
the applicant’s attorney of record
wherein the intervening party seeks leave to intervene in the
liquidation application.
The intervening party seeks to have the
respondent placed under supervision and for business rescue
proceedings as contemplated
in s 131 (4)(a) of the Companies Act 71
of 2008 (the Act) to commence.
[2]
At the hearing, counsel for the
applicants submitted that the intervention application does not
constitute a bar to considering
the liquidation application because s
131 (6) is only triggered once an application for business rescue is
served in accordance
with the prescripts of s 131(2). Counsel
submitted that the business rescue application was not ‘made’
as is required
in terms of s 131(6). In addition, counsel submitted,
an application in terms of s 133(1)(b) may be launched from the bar,
and
the factual circumstances justify the court granting an order in
terms of s 133(1)(b).
[3]
Counsel for the respondent submitted
that he only had instructions to support the intervention- and
business rescue application.
He did not have any instructions to
oppose the liquidation application on the merits.
[4]
Counsel for the intervening party moved
the intervention and business rescue applications. He emphasised the
plight of the employees
and explained how they would be affected if a
provisional liquidation order was granted
vis-à-vis
a business rescue.
[5]
Due to the nature of the intervening
party’s interest in the matter, they are allowed to intervene.
It is subsequently necessary
to consider whether a business rescue
application was ‘made’ that will suspend the liquidation
proceedings, since the
business rescue application is not ripe for
hearing due to the fact that the applicant could not file an
answering affidavit.
Was
the business rescue application ‘made’?
[6]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal dealt definitively with the question as to
when a business rescue application is ‘made’
in
Lutchman
N.O. and Others v African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others:
African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lutchman
N.O. and
Others.
[1]
Meyer AJA, as he then was, held in paragraph [28]:
‘
The
business rescue application must be issued, served on the company and
the Commission, and all reasonable steps must have been
taken to
identify affected persons and their addresses to deliver the
application to them, to meet the requirements of s 131(6)
in order to
trigger the suspension of the liquidation proceedings.’
[7]
The Supreme court of Appeal stated in
paragraph [39] of
Lutchman:
‘
The
service and notification requirements set out in
s 131(2)
of the
Companies Act are
not merely procedural steps. According to
Taboo
,
[t]hey are substantive requirements, compliance with which is an
integral part of making ‘an application for an order in
terms
of
s 131(1)
of the
Companies Act&rsquo
;. Strict compliance with
those requirements is required because business rescue proceedings
can easily be abused.’ (Footnotes
omitted.)
[8]
In the current proceedings, a service
affidavit was filed on behalf of the intervening party. It is
explained in this affidavit
that:
i.The
documents were served on 2 November 2022 at approximately 15h03, on
the applicants’ and respondent’s attorneys
of record,
respectively;
ii.The
documents were served on the Master of the High Court and SARS on 3
November 2022;
iii.The
documents were served on the CIPC on 4 November 2022 via email.
[9]
It is not evident from the service
affidavit that any other interested and affected parties, save for
the applicant, the Master,
and SARS, were notified of the application
in the prescribed manner. There is no indication as to any steps that
the intervening
party took to identify any other interested parties,
despite them referring to ‘creditors of the respondent and its
various
stakeholders, which include shareholders, directors,
employees, the South African Revenue Services and various others.’in
the business rescue application.
[10]
Due
to the existing liquidation application, it seems, at first glance,
pedantic to raise the issue that the business rescue application
was
served on the attorneys of record of the respondent, and not on the
respondent at its registered address. However, the Supreme
Court of
Appeal unequivocally stated in
Lutchman
that a business rescue application is a
[2]
‘
substantive
Form 2(a) application,
and not an ancillary or interlocutory
application
, which in terms of
rule 4(1)(aA)
, may be served upon
an attorney representing a party in proceedings already instituted.
In general,
rule 4(1)(aA)
applies to proceedings already instituted
so that it in effect applies to ancillary and interlocutory
applications.’ (My
emphasis.)
[11]
In light thereof that the business
rescue application was not served on the company at its registered
address, and that the court
is not informed of any steps taken by the
intervening party to identify affected persons and their addresses
for the court to determine
whether all reasonable steps have been
taken to identify affected persons and their addresses to deliver the
application to them,
I conclude that the business rescue application
was not ‘made’ within the meaning of
s 131(6)
of the
Companies Act. As
a result the suspension of the liquidation
proceedings is not triggered in terms of the section. Factually,
there is no business
rescue application before the court. In line
with the decision in the
Lutchman
case, the business rescue application is not considered on its merits
and stands to be struck from the roll.
The
liquidation application
[12]
The applicants only seek the provisional
winding-up of the respondent at this stage. I am of the view that a
proper case has been
made out by the applicants for the relief to be
granted. Even though the counsel for the respondent indicated that he
was not briefed
to oppose the liquidation application on its merits,
I considered the application on the affidavits filed.
[13]
The
liquidation application is premised on the basis that the respondent
is unable to pay its debts in the manner contemplated by
s 345 of the
Companies Act, 1973, read together with item 9 of schedule 5 of the
Companies Act, 2008
. The respondent’s indebtedness arose from a
written acknowledgment of debt. The debt is secured by a mortgage
bond registered
on 15 March 2018. As a result, the respondent’s
view that the debt prescribed is ill-conceived. On the facts before
the court,
it is evident that the respondent is commercially
insolvent.
[3]
Conclusion
[14]
Because I am of the view that the
business rescue application was not made, and as such, did not
trigger the suspension of the liquidation
proceedings as contemplated
in
s 131(6)
of the
Companies Act, and
a case is made out for the
provisional winding up of the respondent, the provisional winding-up
order stands to be granted.
ORDER
In
the result, the following order is granted:
1.
The employees of Astrotail 109 (Pty) Ltd
(the intervening parties) are granted leave to intervene in the main
application for winding-up
launched by the applicants under case
number 30326/22;
2.
The business rescue application is
struck from the roll;
3.
The respondent is placed in provisional
liquidation in the hands of the Master of the High Court, with return
date 16 January 2023,
at 10h00 or as soon thereafter as the matter
may be heard, for all interested parties to advance reasons why the
provisional liquidation
order should not be made final;
4.
The applicants are to finally enrol the
application to be heard on the return date;
5.
A copy of the provisional liquidation
order is to be served on the respondent at its registered office,
upon SARS and the Master
of the High Court, upon the Respondent’s
employees and trade unions (if any) and all known creditors, and be
published in
one issue of the Government Gazette and Citizen
newspaper;
6.
The costs of the application are costs
in the winding-up.
E
van der Schyff
Judge
of the High Court
Delivered:
This judgement is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
As a courtesy gesture,
it will be sent to the parties/their legal representatives by email.
For
the applicants: Adv.
M. P. Van der Merwe SC
Instructed
by:
MacRobert
Attorneys
For
the respondent: Adv.
H.P. West
Instructed
by:
SPS
Attorneys
For
the intervening parties: Adv.
R de Leeuw
Instructed
by:
Peters
Attorneys
Date
of the hearing: 7
November 2022
Date
of judgment: 21
November 2022
[1]
2022
(4) SA 529 (SCA).
[2]
Lutchman
,
par [40].
[3]
Boschpoort
Ondernemings (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd
[2013]
ZASCA 173
at paras [13] and [14].
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