Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 238South Africa
R.J.M v Road Accident Fund (60042/2019) [2024] ZAGPPHC 238 (4 March 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
4 March 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## R.J.M v Road Accident Fund (60042/2019) [2024] ZAGPPHC 238 (4 March 2024)
R.J.M v Road Accident Fund (60042/2019) [2024] ZAGPPHC 238 (4 March 2024)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 60042/2019
•
REPORTABLE: NO
•
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
•
REVISED: NO
4
March 2024
In
the matter between:
RJ
M[...]
Plaintiff
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT
K.
STRYDOM AJ
1.
On the 6
th
of May 2018, the plaintiff’s life changed
irreparably. Up until then she had been a relatively carefree
17-year-old who was
busy with her grade 11 year. In a devastating
motor vehicle collision, she sustained severe injuries which have had
the effect
of drastically changing the trajectory of her life, in
general, and her earning potential, specifically.
2.
In her claim against the defendant stemming from losses due to the
sequalae of her injuries, the question
of liability and future
medical expenses have already been settled 100% in her favour.
Additionally, despite a whole person impairment
of 38%, the defendant
has not conceded to the seriousness of her injuries. As such this
Court does not have jurisdiction to decide
the issue of general
damages. I am accordingly called upon to assess her loss of earnings
only.
3.
There was no appearance for the Defendant on the day of hearing and
the matter proceeded on a default
basis. I also admitted the
Plaintiff to lead her expert evidence on affidavit in terms of Rule
38(2).
Background
to claim for loss of earnings
Injuries
and sequalae
4.
Her injuries are polytraumatic of nature: she sustained a traumatic
brain injury, which was described
as a “subarachnoid
haemorrhage with multiple contusions” (her initial Glasgow coma
scale was 8/15), a left mandible
fracture, bilateral humerus
fractures and lacerations to her forehead. She underwent various
surgical procedures and spent approximately
four months in hospital,
before being discharged.
5.
Despite a fair prognosis insofar as her orthopaedic injuries are
concerned, she still has complaints
of bilateral shoulder, pain
pelvic pain and pains to her knees and jaw. Crucially, the accident
has resulted in not only cognitive
deficits but also psychological
deficits stemming from the brain injury, her severe facial scarring
and her involvement in the
accident itself.
6.
Unsurprisingly she failed grade 11 in 2018. However, she passed it in
2019 and in 2020 completed her
grade 12 with admission to a
bachelor’s degree. She obtained a foundational literacy
certificate as well as a basic computer
literacy certificate in 2021.
In that year she applied for studies towards a degree in law but did
not meet the minimum requirements
for entry to that course. In 2022
she registered for degree in Communications but could not study due
to lack of finances. She
has since then worked for short stints as a
waitress call centre agent or casual work in sales. In all these she
experienced not
only physical problems including headaches and
shoulder pain but also anxiety attacks and light headedness.
7.
Testing performed by the educational psychologist revealed that,
whilst her verbal comprehension and
perceptual reasoning fell within
the average range, her working memory and processing speed were
borderline. Overall, she presented
with average intellectual
functioning post-accident. On testing specifically pertaining to
education, she similarly performed average
in terms of inter alia her
reading mathematics and spelling. Testing did however reveal that she
had some difficulty in terms of
recollection. Emotionally, the
educational psychologist test showed a moderate depressive mood
level. The clinical psychologist
also reported deficits especially in
concentration and memory, as well as severe depression and anxiety.
Earnings
postulations by experts
8.
The educational psychologist is of the view that, had the accident,
not occurred the plaintiff would
have completed a degree (NQF 7)
level qualification.
9.
According to the industrial psychologist upon completion of the
degree by 2022/2023 it would have taken
about 12 months to do learn
ship in which she could have earned the median quartile of Patterson
level B1. Thereafter it would
have taken her six months to secure
employment in line with the qualification at which stage she would
have started earning at
the median quartile of Patterson level B5/C1.
Upon reaching her career ceiling at the age of 45 she would have
earned at the upper
quartile of Patterson level D2 where after should
have earned in line with the applicable inflationary increases until
retirement
at 65
10. Post morbidly,
according to the educational psychologist, as a result of the
sequelae of the accident, she will remain
with only a grade 12 (NQF
4) qualification.
11.
The industrial psychologist explains that as a result of the
combination of her cognitive deficits, especially in the
areas of
memory and concentration, as well as her emotional deficits she will
not be able to obtain further qualifications and
will have difficulty
sustaining employment. She will be limited to semiskilled employment
and, even then, will experience slower
career progression should she
be fortunate enough to obtain such employment. She will experience
periods of unemployment in between
works as a result. Given her
qualification post morbidly (grade 12) she will be limited to low
semiskilled categories of employment.
Applicable
legal principles
12.
In
Southern
Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO
[1]
the following is stated:
“
Any enquiry
into damages for loss of earning capacity is of its nature
speculative, because it involves a prediction as to the future
without the benefit of crystal balls, soothsayers, augers or oracles.
All that the Court can do is to make an estimate, which is
often a
very rough estimate, of the present value of a loss.
One is for the Judge
to make a round estimate of an amount which seems to him to be fair
and reasonable. That is a matter guesswork,
a blind plunge into the
unknown,
The other is to try to
make an assessment, by way of mathematical calculations, on the basis
of assumptions resting on the evidence.
The validity of this approach
depends of course upon the soundness of the assumptions, and these
may vary from the strongly probable
to the speculative. It is
manifest that either approach involves guesswork to a greater or
lesser extent ....
In the case where the
Court has before it material on which an actuarial calculation can
usefully be made, I do not think that the
first approach offers any
advantage over the second. On the contrary, while the result of an
actuarial computation may be no more
than an "informed guess",
it has the advantage of an attempt to ascertain the value of what was
lost on a logical basis;
whereas the trial judge's "gut
feeling….as to what is fair and reasonable is nothing more
than a blind guess.""
13.
Factually
based calculations should be preferred over a Court blind guess, the
Court still has at its disposal a ‘levelling’
instrument
two ensure that the calculations are reasonably in line with the
probabilities of each plaintiff’s factual circumstances.
This
instrument is referred to as “contingencies”. Matters
which cannot otherwise be provided for or cannot be calculated
exactly, but which may impact upon the damages claimed, are
considered to be contingencies. They include any possible relevant
future event which might cause damage or a part thereof or which may
otherwise influence the extent of the plaintiff’s damage.
[2]
14.
In terms of
the calculation, contingencies are usually taken into account over a
particular period of time, generally until the
retirement age of the
plaintiff
[3]
and are usually provided for by deducting a stated percentage of the
amount or specific claims.
[4]
The deduction so done represents the risk that the calculated
earnings will not in fact realise in the future.
15. Contingencies are
subjective; however, the learned author Koch has suggested the
following well-followed approach to determine
what the ‘normal’
contingency (i.e the risks that can affect the earnings of people in
general) would be:
“…
what
is described as a “sliding scale” is used, under which it
is allocated a “1/2% for year to retirement age,
i.e 25% for a
child, 20% for a youth and 10% in middle age”.
[5]
16. Using this
‘rule of thumb’ as a baseline, it is up to the Court to
then, on the facts before it, adjust the
percentage to be deducted
accordingly. In some instances, this would involve a downward
adjustment, whilst in other higher deductions
may be warranted.
Naturally the rule of thumb is just that: a useful, but not
obligatory, guide to calculation of the norm.
Finding
Pre
morbid earnings
17. On the day of
hearing, I queried Counsel for the plaintiff on the pre morbid career
ceiling of Patterson D2, as postulated
by the industrial
psychologist. Noting that the determination of what a young person’s
potential would have been had she
not been involved in an accident is
highly speculative, I queried from counsel whether the relatively
high career ceiling, under
the circumstances was not overly
optimistic. Pursuant to this discussion and argument by counsel, I
requested that the plaintiff
prepare calculations based on a lower
career ceiling of Patterson C5. These calculations have been supplied
and will be discussed
forthwith.
18. The remaining
issue for determination, is that of the applicable premorbid
contingency to be deducted. Whilst the actuary
has applied a 15%
deduction to the future premorbid earnings, it is trite that the
determination of contingency deductions falls
within the discretion
of the Court.
19. The Plaintiff
is 22 years old. Assuming retirement age 65, she has a work life span
of 43 years left. Applying the rule
of thumb per Koch, the normal
contingency applicable to the period would be 21,5%.
20. In considering
the adjustment to this baseline contingency, I have had regard to her
specific circumstances. In the first
place, it should be noted that
the determination of employment potential of a person who had yet to
complete schooling at the time
of the accident, is by its nature
extremely speculative. In this specific instance, the Plaintiff has
proven (even post-accident)
that she could meet the educational
requirements for admission to bachelor’s degree qualification.
However, different degrees
come with different levels of earnings.
21. Additionally,
as shown post morbidly, obtaining a matric with admission to a
bachelor’s degree does not automatically
translate to admission
to a specific course or, for that fact, admission to university
itself. In
casu
, for instance, she did not meet the
requirements for an LLB degree but did meet those for a degree in
Communications.
22. A further bar
to her earning as per the calculated premorbid scenario, is naturally
that of finances. Factually it has
been demonstrated that she does
not possess the finances to study at a university and would be
reliant on a bursary or NSFAS. The
calculation is based on the
assumption that she would have studied full time and would have
started earning by the latest in 20223.
Given her lack of finances,
this timeline would not have been guaranteed pre morbidly. Any delay
in her obtaining her degree qualification,
would have resulted in an
exponential reduction of her earnings.
23. In view hereof,
a premorbid deduction of 30%, in my view, would be reasonable to
account for these additional risks.
Post
morbid earnings
24. As a result of
the accident, there can be no dispute that her earning potential has
then severely negatively affected.
In this regard I have taken into
account that even after the accident she managed to obtain matric
with admission to a bachelor’s
degree as well as some
certificate level qualifications. However, as per the educational
psychologist, she will not be able to,
even if she gains admission to
degree level studies, complete such a degree.
25. Per the
industrial psychologist she would therefore be reliant on only her
grade 12 to obtain employment. Where she has
obtained employment, she
has been unable to sustain same due to the accident-related sequelae.
As a result, the expert is of the
opinion she will be limited to low
semiskilled types of employment. In calculating this, the actuary has
assumed that she will
obtain employment at this level which will be
assumed to be her career ceiling. She would therefore receive only
inflationary increases
over the remainder of her life.
26. I am of the
view that this is an overly pessimistic approach given the fact that
a large portion of the inability to work
post morbidly relates to her
orthopaedic injuries, which have a reasonably fair prognosis and can
therefore improve. She has also
managed to complete her matric fairly
well and to obtain certificates post morbidly. I accept that she will
not be able to obtain
a degree level qualification, however given her
prowess in her academic performance post morbidly the possibility of
her obtaining
further training and thereby being able to move to a
higher band within the semiskilled scales cannot be discounted.
27. I have noted
the additional risks as outlined by the industrial psychologist
supra
, however in balancing the relative risks discussed, I am
of the view that the normal contingency of 21,5% (see above) stands
to
be reduced somewhat to account for the possibility that the post
morbid earnings are undervalued. As such a contingency deduction
of
15% in the post morbid scenario would be fair and reasonable.
Finding
28. In the
premorbid scenario, the actuary has calculated that the plaintiff
would have earned an amount of R12 146 413-00
until date of
retirement. Deducting the 30% contingency, as discussed above, from
this amount results in total future premorbid
earnings of
R8 502 489,10.
29. Post-morbidly
earnings in the amount of R928 557-00 have been calculated.
After deduction of the 15% contingency,
the total post morbid
earnings would be R789 273,45..
30. The comparison
between the postulated earnings had the accident not occurred, with
those having regard to the accident,
therefore reveals an estimated
total future loss of earnings suffered by the Plaintiff of
R7 713 215,65.
31. I have noted
that the so-called statutory “cap” is applicable in this
instance. However, per the calculations
done by the actuary, the
effect of the cap on the overall claim is negligible (and amount of
between approximately R40,000 to R50,000
is deducted on the basis as
used by the actuary.) Given the discretionary and speculative nature
of determinations of future loss
of earnings, I am satisfied that a
recalculation, using the contingencies discussed in this judgment, is
unnecessary.
32. As a result,
the following order is made:
Order
1. The
Plaintiff’s application to lead expert evidence on affidavit
per Rule 38(2) is granted.
2. The
Defendant is ordered to pay an amount of R7 713 215,65 to
the Plaintiff, which amount represents
the Plaintiff's claim in
respect of loss of earning.
3. The
Plaintiff’s claim for general damages is postponed sine dies.
4. The
amount referred to hereinabove and interest on the said amount is due
within 14 days as prescribed by the
Act, and will be paid within 180
days into the trust account of Plaintiff's attorney of record with
the following detail:
Name: H MAMBA INC
Bank: First
National Bank
Account Number: 6[...]
Branch Code: 2[...]
Reference: H M[...]
5. The
Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff's attorney's taxed or
agreed party and party costs on a High
Court scale, to date hereof.
6. The
costs referred to herein above, are subject to the discretion of the
Taxing Master, including the following:
a. Fees
of counsel, including preparation and drafting of heads of argument.
b. The
reasonable costs of Plaintiff to scan and upload additional documents
and bundles on the electronic Caselines;
c. The
reasonable costs relating to obtaining of all the expert medico-legal
reports, actuarial calculations,
radiological reports, addendum
reports and affidavits obtained in terms of Rule 38(2).
7. In
the event that the costs are not agreed the Plaintiff shall serve a
notice of taxation on the Defendant's
attorney of record and shall
allow the Defendant 14 days from date of allocator to make payment of
the taxed costs.
8.
Should payment not be affected timeously, the Plaintiff will be
entitled to recover interest at the prescribed
rate as announced and
published from time to time as at 14 days from date of allocator to
date of final payment (8.25%)
9. It
is noted that there is no contingency fee agreement applicable.
K STRYDOM
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Heard
on: 20 November 2023
(Further
calculations filed 21 November 2023)
Judgment
delivered: 4 March 2024
Appearances:
For
the Plaintiff:
Adv A
Frosch
Instructed
by:
Mamba
H Incorporated
For
the Defendant:
No
appearance
[1]
1984(1)
SA 98 AD at 113F- 114A
[2]
Erdmann
v SANTAM Insurance Co Ltd
1985
3 SA 402
(C) 404-405;
Burns
v National Employers General Insurance Co Lt
d
1988
3 SA 355
(C) 365
[3]
Goodal
v President Insurance Co Ltd
1978
1 SA 389
(W) 393;
Rij
NO v Employers’ Liability Assurance
1964
(4) SA 737
(W);
Sigournay
v Gillbanks
1960
2 SA 552
(A) 569;
Smith
v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd
1986
2 SA 314
(SE) 319
[4]
De
Jongh v Gunter
1975(4) SA 78 (W) 80F
[5]
Goodall
v President Insurance Company Limited
1978(1) SA 398(W) and
Road
Accident Fund v Guedes
2006(5) SA 583(A) 588D-C. Likewise, see
Nonwali
v Road Accident Fund
(771/2004) [2009] ZAECMHC 5 (21 May 2009) para 23
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