Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 207South Africa
South African Legal Practice Council v Setati (570/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 207 (13 March 2024)
Headnotes
Summary: Legal practitioner – attorney – failure to assist in the administration of a deceased estate – allowing investment of estate funds in dubious investments in breach of his mandate – despite this, taking own fees and allowing fees of investment advisors – whole of estate funds depleted – minor as sole beneficiary prejudiced – failing to account for these breaches and to keep proper books of account – repeatedly practising without fidelity fund certificates – offending conduct established – respondent no longer fit and proper to practice law – striking off appropriate sanction.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## South African Legal Practice Council v Setati (570/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 207 (13 March 2024)
South African Legal Practice Council v Setati (570/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 207 (13 March 2024)
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sino date 13 March 2024
FLYNOTES:
PROFESSION – Striking off – Attorney –
Assisting
with administration of deceased estate – Attorney allowing
investment of estate funds in dubious investments
in breach of
mandate – Despite this, taking own fees and allowing fees of
investment advisors – Whole of estate
funds depleted –
Minor as sole beneficiary prejudiced – Failing to account
for these breaches and to keep proper
books of account –
Repeatedly practising without fidelity fund certificates –
Offending conduct established –
Respondent no longer fit and
proper to practice law – Striking off appropriate sanction.
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 570/2022
REPORTABLE
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
REVISED
DATE:13/03/2024
In
the matter between:
SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
Applicant
and
KAGISHO
SETATI
Respondent
Summary
:
Legal practitioner –
attorney – failure to assist in the administration of a
deceased estate – allowing investment
of estate funds in
dubious investments in breach of his mandate – despite this,
taking own fees and allowing fees of investment
advisors –
whole of estate funds depleted – minor as sole beneficiary
prejudiced – failing to account for these
breaches and to keep
proper books of account – repeatedly practising without
fidelity fund certificates – offending
conduct established –
respondent no longer fit and proper to practice law – striking
off appropriate sanction.
ORDER
1.
The
respondent, Kagisho Setati
is
struck from the roll of legal practitioners (attorneys) of this
Court.
2.
The
respondent is ordered to immediately surrender and deliver to the
Registrar of Court his certificate of enrolment as an attorney
of
this Court.
3.
In
the event of the respondent failing to comply with the terms of
paragraph 2 above within two (2) weeks from the date of this
order,
the sheriff of the relevant district is authorised and directed to
take possession of the certificate and hand it to the
Registrar.
4.
Paragraphs
3 to 10 of the order of Court dated 15 February 2022 shall remain in
force.
5.
The
respondent is hereby further ordered:
5.1.
to
pay, in terms of section 87(2) of the LPA, the reasonable costs of
the inspection of his accounting records;
5.2.
to
pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator;
5.3.
to
pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any person(s) consulted
and/or engaged by the curator aforesaid;
5.4.
to
pay the expenses relating to the publication of this order; and
5.5.
to
pay the costs of this application on an attorney and client scale.
This
matter has been heard in open court and is otherwise disposed of in
terms of the Directives of the Judge President of this
Division. The
judgment and order are accordingly published and distributed
electronically.
DAVIS,
J
Introduction
[1]
The
respondent is a legal practitioner. He was admitted as an attorney on
23 July 2010. Almost twelve years later, on 15 February
2022
this Court suspended the respondent from practice pending
finalization of this application for his striking off, launched
by
the Legal Practice Council (the LPC).
The
applicable principles
[2]
Although
the entire enquiry in a matter such as this depends on the
circumstances of the particular case
[1]
and the particular legal practitioner, certain trite principles have
been laid down by our courts.
[3]
When
a court considers an application of this kind, that is one where the
LPC as watchdog of the legal profession applies for the
striking off
of a legal practitioner from the roll, it follows a three-stage
inquiry.
[2]
[4]
The
first stage involves the determination of whether the offending
conduct has been established. This is determined on a
preponderance of probabilities and is a factual inquiry.
[5]
The
second stage of the enquiry involves the determination of whether the
practitioner is a fit and proper person to continue to
practice law.
This involves a value judgment by the court and a weighing-up of the
conduct complained of against the conduct
expected of a legal
practitioner.
[6]
The
third and last stage involves a determination of whether the
practitioner should be removed from the roll or whether any other
sanction would be appropriate. The primary concern at this
stage is to protect the public, rather than to punish an errant
practitioner.
[3]
[7]
The
approach to the second and third stages of the inquiry is informed by
a consideration aimed at prevention of the erosion of
professional
ethics.
[4]
The
offending conduct: the complaint
[8]
Before
dealing with the contravention of certain sections of the Legal
Practice Act 28 of 2014 (the LPA) and the LPC Rules (the
Rules), I
deem it apposite to deal with the principal complaint against the
respondent. It is this: On 28 April 2016 a Ms
Siboyane was
appointed by the Master as the executrix of the estate of her late
sister, Ms Siboyane (the deceased). The sole
beneficiary of the
estate was the deceased’s minor child. Ms Siboyane
approached the respondent in March 2019 to assist
her with the
administration of the deceased estate. The respondent advised
Ms Siboyane to invest some R300 000.00 of
estate funds in an
investment, of which he kept the terms confidential. He did
however disclose that the estate would earn
interest at 27% per
annum, receive quarterly payment of interest and a favourable
repayment of capital at the end of the investment
period. Ms
Siboyane provided the respondent with a mandate and the total of the
estate funds were paid over. Thereafter
however, Ms Siboyane,
in her capacity as executrix and as the person who looked after the
minor child, did not receive any quarterly
payment, had difficulty to
maintain the child and could not ascertain from the respondent the
whereabouts of the estate funds.
[9]
Ms
Siboyane referred a complaint about the above to the LPC who asked
for an explanation from the respondent. His response,
contained
in a letter of 26 July 2019 is elucidating. It went as follows:
“…
the
estate was registered in 2016 and no claim for maintains (sic) nor
request for same has ever been made by Ms Siboyane ….
However I believe that certain facts related to the matter are
necessary to disclose to the Society so they have a better
comprehension
of the facts that are pertinent thereto. The
estate had not gained interest since its inception. It was
incumbent on
myself and my fiduciary obligation to ensure that the
funds of the estate grew in value whilst in my care, to avoid their
diminishing
value and liability to the firm …
”
.
[10]
Having
provided the above background, the respondent referred to the mandate
which Ms Siboyane had furnished and attached same to
his response.
The one-page mandate is not the model of lucidity but the relevant
parts thereof read as follows: “
Whereby
the client, Jeanet Siboyane in her capacity as the executor …
has appointed Setati attorneys as their agents in respect
of the
administration of the estate … THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE
TERMS OF THE MANDATE AGREEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1. The client
authorize the investment of the fiduciary finds into an investment
that increases the value of the fiduciary funds. 2. The client
holds
Setati attorneys to its various fiduciary obligations, including
ensuring that only credible, legal and value increasing
investments
of the fiduciary funds are conducted. 3. The client is informed
of the various market to market investment opportunities
in the
listed and unlisted markets. 4. The client authorised Setati
attorneys to invest the fiduciary funds with listed entities
that can
furnish with returns in excess of the highest interest rate offered
by commercial banks …. 5. The client
and Setati
attorneys agree that the client is entitled to a gratuity payment in
respect of the disbursements incurred to maintain
the minor child ….
6. The investment firm appointed to facilitate the transaction will
invoice Setati attorneys for
the fees charged which shall be the sum
of twenty percent of the value of the fiduciary funds, which fee is
payable over the life
of the investment
”
.
[11]
The
respondent’s explanation of what he did in performance of the
mandate continued as follows in his letter of 26 July 2019:
“
As
already alluded to the aforementioned attorneys Tonkin Clacey [the
executrix’ subsequent attorneys] the monies are invested
in a
highly confidential and highly collateralised convertible note.
Interest payment for the note are on a quarterly basis
rate of 27% p.
a with the capital repayment at the end of the investment period
being the sum of R420 000.00. In other
words the monies
are being held in quoted investment on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange …
”
.
The respondent then tendered a copy of the “convertible note”
but only against receipt of a confidentiality
agreement “…
since the
note contains highly sensitive market information …
”
.
[12]
The
“convertible note” surfaced during the course of this
litigation. It was not from a listed company.
It was a
complex document signed by one Mxolisi Motau as director of Caligraph
(Pty) Ltd, referred to in the note as “the
Company”.
The terms of the “Senior Convertible note” was to the
effect that “…
the
Company promises to pay to the trust account of Setati Attorneys,
acting on behalf of the estate … the amount as per
the
Original Principal Amount (as reduced pursuant to the terms hereof
pursuant to conversion or otherwise) when due, whether upon
the
Maturity Date … and to pay interest, if any, on outstanding
Principal amount …
”
.
[13]
The
“note” provided for an “issuance date” of 28
February 2019, an Original Principal Amount of R200 000,00
and a
Maturity Date of 27 February 2020. In the meantime “mandatory
prepayments” of R15 000,00 per month
would be paid from 31
May 2019. A curious feature was that the client could opt not
to receive cash, but payment by way of
ordinary shares (apparently in
Caligraph (Pty) Ltd). A more disturbing feature, was that
Caligraph (Pty) Ltd would also be
able to “…
elect
to repay in Ordinary Shares …
”
.
Payment by way of shares rather than in money, would take
place due to a clause providing for the “conversion”
of
the note at a “conversion rate” at an intricate and
undecipherable “mechanics of conversion” clause.
[14]
The
“security” and “covenants” clauses of the
note, apart from also suffering from vagueness, did not give
any
investor much comfort: “
5
SECURITY As security for the repayment of the Principal amount and
interest, the Company shall, at its costs, procure pledge its
shares
interest in Go Life International, its orders or assigns, on terms
and conditions acceptable to the Holder. The parties
shall
enter into a Pledge and Cession Agreement simultaneous with this
agreement encapsulating the terms in this clause 6.
6.
COVENANTS All payments due these Note shall rank junior to all
Indebtedness of the Company and its subsidiaries and as of the
issuance date, shall rank pari passu with all other notes and shall
rank senior to al indebtedness of the Company … incurred
after
the issuance date …”
.
[15]
The
respondent has never disclosed to the client fully what had happened
to the funds of the estate, nor has he informed the LPC
and neither
has he, on the papers, despite him filing even a supplementary
answering affidavit, taken the court into his confidence
in this
regard.
[16]
Attached
to the respondent’s supplementary answering affidavit, was an
e-mail sent by the respondent to the LPC setting out
his “records”
of fees paid in respect of the investment of estate funds in the
“note”. Therein he
mentioned that he would furnish
dates of the payments later, but he confirmed having paid himself
R70 000,00 as a fee, paid
one Vuyo Mpalwane of African Panther
(Pty) Ltd R30 000,00 and paid a further R15 000,00 to one
Bongo Mvunyiswa, also
of African Panther (Pty) Ltd. This meant
that of the estate funds of some R315 000.00, R115 000.00
went to the
respondent and his privies and R200 000.00
contributed the “Original Principal Amount” of the
investment “note”.
[17]
How
African Panther (Pty) Ltd fits into the picture can be gleaned from
the respondent’s response to the complaint as dealt
with by him
in his answering affidavit: “
3.8
The LPC characterization of this investment choice by client as
investment advice is entirely wrong and unfortunate. I
did not
provide any investment advice to client in contravention of various
legislative provisions…. 3.9 I received
a concern
that the funds are not generating interest and that it would be
prudent to have these funds in a facility generating
interest.
I referred the client to investment specialist African Panther (Pty)
Ltd and Caligraph (Pty) Ltd and these companies
provided the
investment advice to client. 3.10 It cannot be a correct
statement of fact that: 3.10.1 I provided investment
advice, 3.10.2
The funds in dispute where (sic) in trust
”
.
[18]
At
the time that Ms Siboyane appointed the respondent to assist with the
administration of the deceased estate, they had agreed
with each
other in the written mandate referred to above, that the funds
recorded in the estate account amounted to R315 667,00.
This is the amount which the executrix’ attorney demanded to be
re paid and which the LPC wanted the respondent to account
for.
[19]
The
auditor appointed by the LPC to investigate the respondent’s
books of account (and who as curator in terms of the interim
suspension order, furnished the court with a report) Mr Reddy, could
find little trace of the R315 667,00. He found
a deposit
of R30 000,00 received into the respondent’s trust account
dated 13 March 2019 and marked “Corporate
fee/vy/est” and
a payment on the same day and for the same amount, marked “Siboyane
CP Fee 1.2”. The auditor
further found 37 payments from
the respondent’s trust bank account in amounts ranging from R1,
000.00 to R10 000,00
on odd dates from 26 June 2019 to 31
October 2020 totaling R136 600.00. It could not be
established whether these payments,
all marked “Siboyane/CP Fee
1.2” were made to the estate account or not.
[20]
It
appears from these facts that the respondent has grossly failed in
his fiduciary duty (which he had accepted) in assisting the
executrix
of a deceased estate in administering that estate. “On
his watch” so to speak, virtually the totality
of estate funds
had been invested in a dubious investment in respect of which the
respondent (and others) had been paid fees for
themselves but which
investment ultimately led to a devastating loss for the estate and a
minor.
[21]
The
above resulted in a clear breach of the respondent’s mandate,
not only to assist in the proper administration of the estate
but to
invest funds in a
listed
company. These
breaches are exacerbated by the respondent’s false portrayal to
a fellow attorney (who later acted on
behalf of the estate) that the
funds had indeed been invested in a listed company.
[22]
When
confronted with these allegations, the respondent’s partial
admission of liability for what could only be described as
a gross
dereliction of his duties as a legal practitioner. Contained in heads
of argument delivered on his behalf, reads as follows:
“
The
respondent’s decision to direct Ms Siboyane’s investment
may attract delictual liability for the failure to deal
with the
funds appropriately, however it is doubtful in the context of
proceedings directed at the striking off of an attorney
for lapse of
professional judgment in the handling of client’s
instructions
”
.
[23]
This
attitude, repeated by the respondent in the various affidavits
delivered by him, misses the point. When a practitioner
receives an application for his suspension or striking off, he should
realize that the time for telling the truth has arrived.
[5]
A practitioner must then declare the relevant facts fully and raise
defences in a manner that evinces complete honesty and
integrity.
[6]
Where allegations and evidence of misconduct have been presented
against a legal practitioner, they should not be brushed
aside or
side-stepped. The legal practitioner is expected to respond
meaningfully to those allegations and to furnish a full
and proper
explanation.
[7]
The bald
allegation that the client had been referred to Black Panther and
Caligraph without dealing with the respondent’s
own role, his
further administration of the funds and the estate, how he had
calculated his fees, his lack of accounting to his
client and the
ultimate fate of the funds do not satisfy the disclosure obligations
of the respondent. It demonstrates either
a lack of insight in
the manner in which the estate entrusted to him had suffered a loss
or a deliberate attempt at avoiding to
deal with the issue.
Offending
conduct: Lack of fidelity fund certificates
[24]
The
respondent accused the LPC of “recalibrating” its version
regarding the respondent’s lack of having fidelity
funds
certificates in place for various periods. I must say I
did not read the LPC’s papers like that, but even
so, the
respondent had not only delivered an answering affidavit, but a
supplementary answering affidavit and even a “submission
of
further evidentiary documentation affidavit”. He
therefore had ample opportunity to address any alleged
“recalibration”,
more than ordinarily afforded to a
respondent.
[25]
Quite
aside from the above contention, the evidence has established that
the respondent had practiced without a fidelity fund certificate
for
multiple years. Those are 2013, 2014, 2015, 2021 and thereafter
until his suspension. In addition, mainly due to
the late
submission of audit reports or payment of fees, he also practiced
without a fidelity fund certificate for the periods
of
January/February 2012, January/March 20216, January/March 2018 and
January 2019.
Offending
Conduct: record keeping and trust account administration
[26]
The
LPA demands that a practitioner keeps proper accounting records in
respect of his (or her) practice.
[8]
In terms of the LPA further, when requested to do so by an
investigating committee of the LPC, a practitioner is obliged
to
produce his books of account for inspection.
[9]
[27]
Despite
the above, Mr Reddy, being the chartered accountant and auditor in
the employ of the LPC tasked to conduct an inspection
of the
respondent’s affairs and books of account, experienced extreme
difficulties in obtaining access to the accounts.
After no less
than 21 attempts to engage the respondent in order to perform a full
investigation, the respondent had still not
provided his full
accounting records and Mr Reddy had to complete a report from partial
records and from bank statements.
[28]
The
result of the above is that Mr Reddy was forced to conclude (inter
alia) as follows:
“
11.15
The current trust position of the firm is unknown and the
practitioner has failed to submit an auditor’s
report to the
LPC for the year ended 29 February 2020. The practitioner is
thereafter not eligible for a fidelity fund certificate
since 1
January 2021.
- Considering
that the practitioner has failed to pay over monies entrusted to
him and has failed to account for said monies,
I am of the view
that the firm poses a risk to its clients, future clients of the
firm as well as the Legal Practitioners Fidelity
Fund”
Considering
that the practitioner has failed to pay over monies entrusted to
him and has failed to account for said monies,
I am of the view
that the firm poses a risk to its clients, future clients of the
firm as well as the Legal Practitioners Fidelity
Fund
”
Conclusion
regarding the offending conduct
[29]
The
respondent made much of the fact that he had been accused of running
an investment practice and of providing financial or investment
advice contrary to statutory provisions, all of which he denied, but
quite apart from these accusations, I find that, on a conspectus
of
all the evidence, the respondent is guilty of at least the following
offending conduct: breach of a clear mandate given to him
by a
client, failure to account fully, properly and timeously to that
client. In doing so, the respondent also breached Rule
3.1 of
the Code of Conduct
[10]
, by
failing to maintain the highest standards of honesty and integrity as
well as Rule 3.3 of the Code of Conduct by failing to
treat the
interests of a client as paramount. Various rules of the LPC
have also been breached, such as failing to pay annual
fees to the
LPC timeously (Rule 4); failing to keep proper accounting records
(Rule 54.6), failing to retain such records for at
least seven years
(Rule 54.9), failing to keep a monthly updated record of his practice
(Rule 54.10) and failing to submit his
audit reports (Rules 54.20 –
54.28). As referred to above, the respondent also breached
sections 37 and 87 of the LPA
in having failed to keep proper books
of account and to produce documents in respect thereof for
inspection. The offending
conduct has therefore sufficiently
been established.
Fit
and proper?
[30]
Having
determined that various instances of offending conduct have been
established, I now turn to the question of whether these
rendered the
respondent no longer to be a fit and proper person. It is trite
that when this court admits a practitioner,
(whether in terms of the
LPA or its predecessor, the Attorneys Act
[11]
)
to practice as an attorney, he (or she) is put in a position of trust
regarding the affairs of his clients. The court is
entitled to
demand the highest standards of professionalism, honesty and
integrity from a legal practitioner who is an attorney,
who is also
regarded as an officer of the court. In fact, not only the
courts, but the law has always demanded the highest
standards of good
faith from an attorney regarding the affairs of those who place their
trust in the practitioner.
[12]
[31]
The
offending conduct in this matter is no mere error of judgment or
negligent investment, it constitutes a direct breach of an
instruction to assist with the administration of a deceased estate.
If funds are to be invested until the finalization of
an estate, if
it is not done in an interest-bearing trust account
[13]
,
it must at least be done prudently and with strict adherence to the
attorney’s mandate. In the present matter, the
funds were
not invested in a listed company as per the respondent’s own
version of his mandate.
[32]
Apart
from the clear breach of a mandate, the respondent failed to disclose
what steps he took to ensure the prudency or safety
of the
investment, irrespective of whether the advice was forthcoming from
the hitherto unknown company African Panther (Pty) Ltd.
The
respondent further dialed to perform any follow-up of the security
and monthly interest payments, the alleged conversion or,
in fact,
what had ultimately become of the investment. He has therefore,
not only breached his mandate, but also the trust
placed in him and
the remainder of the duties to ensure his client comes to no harm.
As if this was not enough, the respondent
took care that he and the
representatives of the investment company be handsomely rewarded.
This he did without explanation
or remorse.
[33]
The
above approach by the respondent to the affairs of his client is
exacerbated by thereafter attempting to withhold the truth
about his
conduct from the client, her subsequent attorneys and even the LPC
and its auditor. Having regard to the paucity
of explanations
furnished in the papers, the respondent has even kept the court in
the dark as to what had happened with the estate’s
funds.
This conduct falls woefully short of the honesty and integrity
expected from a legal practitioner.
[34]
When
measuring the respondent’s persistent conduct and attitude to
the complaints against him against the standard expected
of him, I
find that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to
practice law.
Sanction
[35]
The
final step in the court’s enquiry is to determine whether a
striking off is warranted or whether a suspension from practice
or
any other sanction would be more appropriate.
[36]
Considering
this aspect also involves taking into account that it did not bother
the respondent that, for long and numerous times
in his practice, he
saw fit to practice without a fidelity fund certificate, thereby
placing clients and members of the public
at financial risk. He
has, since the commencement of the investigation against him, not
taken any steps to remedy the
situation, to have his books brought up
to date or to assist the LPC in making a final and accurate
determination of what his practices’
financial position was up
to when he was suspended.
[37]
There
is every indication that should the respondent be allowed to resume
practicing, that this kind of conduct would be repeated.
I am
fortified in this view by the lack of insight or appreciation of this
kind of conduct displayed by the respondent. Rather
than
seeking to make amends or remedy the position, he still maintains
that it was improper for the LPC to proceed with the present
application rather than to conduct a disciplinary investigation and
hearing as proposed in prior litigation.
[38]
In
this regard, the correct position is the following: the Supreme Court
of Appeal reinforced the viewpoint of the various divisions
of the
High Court that an application to strike a legal practitioner from
the roll may be proceeded with without first conducting
or finalizing
a disciplinary hearing and confirmed that the provisions of section
44 of the LPA were in line with the section 34
of the Constitution.
The test is simply whether the practitioner is at the relevant time
no longer considered a fit and proper
person in the opinion of the
Council dealing objectively with the facts before it.
[14]
“…
In
general it is correct that the Council may proceed with the
application for the striking off of the practitioner or for his or
her suspension from practice without pursuing a formal charge before
a disciplinary committee if in its opinion, having regard
to the
nature of the charges, a practitioner is no longer considered to be a
fit and proper person
”
.
[39]
This
view has more recently been reiterated in
South
African Legal Practice Council v Mphanama
[15]
as follows: “
The
right of the Legal Practice Council (“the LPC”) to
approach the Court for relief as sought in the present application
before us does not depend on its prior holding of a disciplinary
enquiry against the legal practitioner concerned
”
.
The present application was therefore validly launched and this
“defence” of the respondent must fail.
[40]
The
respondent’s conduct involved elements of deception and
dishonesty and this, coupled with his repeated disregard of how
trust
funds
[16]
are to be accounted
for, merit his removal from the roll as the most appropriate
sanction.
Costs
[41]
It
is trite that in matters of this nature, which are sui generis, the
role of the LPC is not that of a party, but of a custodian
of the
legal profession and that it should be entitled to its costs.
[17]
Order
[42]
The
following order is made:
1.
The
respondent, Kagisho Setati
is
struck from the roll of legal practitioners (attorneys) of this
Court.
2.
The
respondent is ordered to immediately surrender and deliver to the
Registrar of his certificate of enrolment as an attorney of
this
Court.
3.
In
the event of the respondent failing to comply with the terms of
paragraph 2 above within two (2) weeks from the date of this
order,
the sheriff of the relevant district is authorised and directed to
take possession of the certificate and hand it to the
Registrar.
4.
Paragraphs
3 to 10 of the order of Court dated 15 February 2022 shall remain in
force.
5.
The
respondent is hereby further ordered:
5.1
to
pay, in terms of section 87(2) of the LPA, the reasonable costs of
the inspection of his accounting records;
5.2
to
pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator;
5.3
to
pay the reasonable fees and expenses of any person(s) consulted
and/or engaged by the curator aforesaid;
5.4
to
pay the expenses relating to the publication of this order; and
5.5
to
pay the costs of this application on an attorney and client scale.
N
DAVIS
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
I
agree
J
L BHENGU
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Date
of Hearing: 21 November 2023
Judgment
delivered: 13 March 2024
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicant: Mr R Stocker
Attorney
for the Applicant: Rooth & Wessels Inc., Pretoria
For
the Respondent: Adv M R Maphutha
Attorney
for the Respondent: GM Tjiane Attorneys Inc., Pretoria
[1]
Solomon
v Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope
1934
AD 401.
[2]
Jasat v
Natal Law Society
2000
(3) SA 44
(SCA
);
Malan & Another v Law Society of the Northern Provinces
[2008] ZASCA 90
;
2009 (1) SA 216
(SCA)
(
Malan
).
[3]
See
Malan
(above) at par 7.
[4]
Hewetson
v Law Society of the Free State
[2000]
All SA 15
(SCA) at par 51.
[5]
Kekana
v Society of Advocates of South Africa
[1998] ZASCA 54
;
1998
(4) SA 649
(SCA) at 656D.
[6]
Law
Society of the Northern Provinces v Sonntag
2012
(1) SA 372
(SCA) at 380 C – I.
[7]
Hepple
v Law Society of the Northern Provinces
2014
JDR 1078 at par 9.
[8]
Section 87 of the LPA.
[9]
Section 37(2) of the LPA.
[10]
Code of Conduct for all Legal Practitioners, Candidate Legal
Practitioners and Juristic Entities, promulgated in terms of the
LPA.
[11]
No 53 of 1979.
[12]
See, inter alia
Law
Society, Transvaal v Visse and Others
,
1958 (4) SA 115
(T) at 131 A-C.
[13]
As provided for in Section 86 of the LPA.
[14]
[14]
See:
Law
Society of the Northern Provinces v Morobadi
[2018] ZASCA 185
;
[2019]
JOL 40677
(SCA) at paragraph 25
[15]
(9875/2022) [2022] ZALMPPHC 70 (13 December 2022) per Makgoba JP at
par 5.
[16]
See:
Law
Society, Transvaal v Visse
(above)
at 132 D-G and
General
Council of the Bar v Geach and Others
2013
(2) SA 52 (SCA).
[17]
Law
Society of the Northern Provinces v Mogami & Others
2010 (1) SA 186
(SCA).
sino noindex
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