Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 417South Africa
Totally Board (Pty) Ltd v Meyer and Another (037796/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 417 (3 May 2024)
Headnotes
contracts in restraint of trade were contrary to public policy and therefore
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Totally Board (Pty) Ltd v Meyer and Another (037796/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 417 (3 May 2024)
Totally Board (Pty) Ltd v Meyer and Another (037796/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 417 (3 May 2024)
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sino date 3 May 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 037796/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
(3)
REVISED:
NO
(4)
Date: 03 May 2024
Signature:
In
the matter between:
TOTALLY
BOARD (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
And
ANGELA
MEYER
1
st
Respondent
CITIWOOD
HOLDINGS (PTY)
LTD
2
nd
Respondent
t/a
CITIWOOD
JUDGMENT
NYATHI
J
A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant approached this court urgently to enforce a restraint
of trade agreement between
the applicant, and the first respondent,
its erstwhile employee as well as the second respondent, who is the
new employer of the
first respondent. The application is opposed by
the first respondent.
[2]
By its very nature, the application is for final interdictory relief.
B.
BACKGROUND
[3]
The first respondent was employed as a sales representative by the
applicant from 16 May
2022.
[4]
The
applicant and the second respondent are both businesses involved in
the selling of wood products such as chipboard, melamine
boards and
related products.
[1]
[5]
The respondent entered into a restraint of trade agreement with the
applicant on 16 May
2022 which,
inter alia
, provided that she
could not be employed as a sales representative by a competitor for a
period of twelve months after the date
upon which the first
respondent’s employment terminates.
[6]
The
restraint of trade agreement (attached to the founding affidavit)
provides for the payment of an amount of R5 000.00 per
month in
reciprocation for the restraint.
[2]
[7]
The first respondent left the applicant's employ on 29 August 2022.
[8]
The first respondent was employed by the second respondent as a sales
representative from
1 September 2022.
[9]
The applicant seeks enforcement of the restraint agreement on the
premise that it has a
protectable interest consequent to the
resignation of the first respondent and her subsequent taking up of
employment with the
second respondent who it regards as its
competitor who stands to benefit from confidential information which
the first respondent
is privy to.
[10]
The
applicant more particularly alleges that it has come to its attention
that the first respondent has seemingly already approached
one of its
medium sized customers, namely Atlas Kitchens, Boksburg, to buy
products from the second respondent.
[3]
Applicant’s
case
[11]
The applicant contends that the second respondent is its competitor.
The applicant thus has a protectable
interest which should be
protected by the enforcement of the restraint of trade agreement.
[12]
The protectable interest referred to includes,
inter alia
,
access to and knowledge of the applicant's trade secrets and
confidential information, including the identity of its customers.
Respondent’s
case
[13]
The first respondent disputes that she is bound by the restraint of
trade agreement referred to
supra
on various grounds,
including,
inter alia
, the following:
13.1
The applicant and the second
respondent are not competitors.
13.2
The applicant has not shown
any protectable interest.
13.3
The applicant has not made
the necessary allegations that it has performed a reciprocal
obligation in terms of the employment contract
with her, namely, to
pay her an amount of R5,000.00 per month in respect of the restraint
of trade. The first respondent does not
deny that the applicant has
performed its part of the bargain.
13.4
The applicant has failed to
make out a case for urgency and/or has created its own urgency by not
immediately launching this application
at the first available
opportunity and/or that there is no reason why this application could
not be brought in the normal course.
[14]
Adv. Malan submitted on behalf of the respondents that the applicant
is in fact seeking a final interdict.
This is so whilst the
application is mired in factual disputes. The court ought to deal
with this application as guided by the
Plascon-Evans
rule.
[15]
The first respondent does not dispute the conclusion of the restraint
of trade agreement, she however, submits
that due to only being
employed with the applicant for a period of three months, that the
enforcement thereof is against public
policy and that considering the
nature of the first respondent's employment, that she was not exposed
to any confidential information,
that she was not provided with
customer lists of the applicant and that the relief sought should
therefore not be granted.
[16]
It was contended by the first respondent that she had already been in
the second respondent’s employment
for several months now and
that consequently, the proverbial horse has bolted.
[17]
Furthermore, the Applicant has not offered any evidence that any of
its customers had followed her to her
new place of employment.
C.
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[18]
Applications for final order must satisfy the following requirements:
18.1
a clear right needs to be
established;
18.2
the injury complained of
must be actually committed (and not apprehended);
18.3
the absence of any other
satisfactory remedy.
[19]
The
decision in
Magna
Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis
[4]
is a landmark decision on the enforceability of contracts in
restraint of trade in South Africa. In one fell swoop it moved away
from the influence of English law which held that contracts in
restraint of trade were contrary to public policy and therefore
invalid.
[20]
Magna
Alloys
made it clear that covenants in restraint of trade were generally
enforceable, unless their enforcement would be unreasonable and
therefore against public policy.
[5]
[21]
Didcott J
then succinctly set out the effect of the
Magna
Alloys
judgment in
J
Louw & Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter & Others
[6]
as follows:
" …Covenants
in restraint of trade are valid. Like all other contractual
stipulations, however, they are unenforceable
when, and to the extent
that, their enforcement would be contrary to public policy. It is
against public policy to enforce a covenant
which is unreasonable,
one which unreasonably restricts the covenantor's freedom to trade or
to work. In so far as it has that
effect, the covenant will not
therefore be enforced. Whether it is indeed unreasonable must be
determined with reference to the
circumstances of the case. Such
circumstances are not limited to those that existed when the parties
entered into the covenant.
Account must also be taken of what has
happened since then and, in particular, of the situation prevailing
at the time enforcement
is sought. Therefore, a party who seeks to
enforce a contract in restraint of trade must invoke the contract and
prove the breach
thereof. Thereafter, a respondent who seeks to avoid
the restraint bears an onus to demonstrate, on a balance of
probabilities,
that the restraint agreement is unenforceable because
it is unreasonable."
[22]
To
determine whether the restraint of trade is reasonable or not, one
needs only look at the decision in
Basson
v Chilwan and Others
[7]
where four principles were enunciated in the following terms:
22.1
Does
the one party have an interest that deserves protection after
termination of the agreement?
22.2
If
so, is that interest threatened by the other party?
22.3
In
that case, does such interest weigh qualitatively and quantitively
against the interest of the other party not to be economically
inactive and unproductive?
22.4
Is
there an aspect of public policy having nothing to do with the
relationship between the parties that requires the restraint be
maintained or rejected?
[23]
In some
instances, a fifth principle has been recognized. Namely, “Is
the restriction necessary to protect the interests,
or does it go
further than is necessary?”
[8]
[24]
In
Reddy
v Siemens
Telecommunications
(Pty) Ltd
[9]
the
facts were, as in this case, that Reddy had resigned from Siemens,
with whom he had signed a restraint of trade agreement and
joined a
competitor. Siemens in response, approached the court in a bid to
hold Reddy to the restraint clause in his contract of
employment. The
court held that the information in Reddy’s possession, if
disclosed, could be used to the disadvantage of
Siemens. The risk of
disclosure alone, was considered by the court to be sufficient, and
Reddy was accordingly held to his contractual
undertakings.
[25]
Over and
above obtaining an interdict, the aggrieved employer may also seek
for damages.
[10]
This is not
up for decision herein.
D.
EVALUATION
[26]
Although
there is no closed list of proprietary interests, there exist two
main categorises which can be protected by a restraint
of trade,
namely trade connections (e.g. customers) and trade secrets (e.g.
confidential information).
[11]
[27]
In
casu
, the respondents breached both categories of
proprietary interests which the applicant had sought to protect by
resorting to the
restraint of trade agreement. The applicant has set
out in its founding affidavit a case on a balance of probabilities
that it
has a protectable interest in this regard.
[28]
The first
respondent does not deal with the content of the restraint of trade
agreement save to allege that the applicant has not
made out a case
in its founding papers.
[12]
She then makes a blank denial on the existence of a protectable
interest therein.
[29]
The answering affidavit is also devoted to technicalities on urgency
and an allegation that Mr. Coetzee,
who deposed to the founding
affidavit on behalf of the applicant lacks authority to represent it.
E.
CONCLUSION
[30]
In consideration of the above, it is my conclusion that the applicant
has made out a case for the relief
it seeks as set out in the notice
of motion. There is in addition no reasons to deviate from the
standard rule that in such circumstances
the successful party is
entitled to its costs.
[31]
The following order is made:
i.
The application succeeds.
ii. The
respondents are ordered to pay the applicants costs jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
J.S. NYATHI
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date
of hearing: 08 February 2023
Date
of Judgment: 03 May 2024
On behalf of the
applicant:
Adv. SLP Mulligan
Duly instructed by:
Nixon & Collins
Attorneys; Pretoria
e-mail:
law@nixcol.co.za
On behalf of the
respondent:
Adv. L. Malan
Duly instructed by:
Fullard Mayer
Morrison Inc. Pretoria
e-mail:
fullard@fullardmayer.co.za
,
lorinda@jpkruyshaar.co.za
Delivery
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email and uploaded on the
CaseLines
electronic platform. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 03 May
2024.
[1]
Founding
affidavit by Mr. H.C. Coetzer para 2.5.
[2]
Ibid
clause
5.3.4 and the restraint agreement clause 2.1.11 which reads as
follows
:
“
"restraint
payment" means the monthly payment of R5 000.00 per month being
paid as specific compensation for agreeing
to the terms and
conditions of this agreement;”
[3]
Founding
Affidavit para 15.
[4]
1984
(4) SA 874 (A), [1984] 2 All SA 583.
[5]
Christie’s
Law of Contract 7ed – G.D. Bradfield p421.
[6]
1987
(2) SA 237
(N) at 243B.
[7]
[1993] ZASCA 61
;
1993
(3) SA 742
(A).
[8]
Tor
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gee-Six Superweld CC and Others
2001 (2) SA 146
(W) at 161Jto 162A;
Kwik
Copy (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Haarlem
1999 (1) SA 472 (W).
[9]
2007
(2) SA 486
(SCA) [13].
[10]
Waste
Products Utilisation (Pty) Ltd v Wilkes
2003 (2) SA 515(W)
at 573F.
[11]
Basson v Chilwan and Others
supra;
Dickinson Holdings Group (Pty) Ltd and Others v Du Plessis and
Another 2008 (4) SA 214 (N)
[12]
Answering
affidavit para 11 to 15.
sino noindex
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