Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 1154South Africa
Watkins Jnr and Others v S (A258/2024) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1154 (5 November 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
5 November 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Watkins Jnr and Others v S (A258/2024) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1154 (5 November 2024)
Watkins Jnr and Others v S (A258/2024) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1154 (5 November 2024)
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sino date 5 November 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: A258/2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
DATE:
05 NOVEMBER 2024
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
WILLIAM
LOUIS WATKINS Jnr
First Appellant
WILLIAM
L WATKINS Snr
Second Appellant
MARIA
MAGDELENA WATKINS
Third Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
The
matter was heard in open court, and the judgment was prepared and
authored by the judge whose name is reflected herein and is
handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email. The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 05
November 2024
.
JUDGMENT
Mazibuko
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is a bail appeal against the judgment and order by the
Regional Magistrates’ Court, Benoni,
wherein the court refused to remit the appellants on bail pending an
outcome of their
appeal.
Background
facts
[2]
The appellants were
convicted on 19 May 2022 as follows:
Count 1: Contravening the
provisions of section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act
[1]
(The Act) read with the provisions of section 51(1) of the
Criminal
Law Amendment Act
[2]
(The CLAA).
Count 2: Contravening the
provisions of section 3 of the Act read with the provisions of
section 51(1) of the CLAA.
Count 3: Contravening the
provisions of section 5(1) of the Act.
Count 4: Contravening the
provisions of section 5(1) of the Act.
Count 5: Contravening the
provisions of section 18(2)(a) of the Act.
Count 6: Assault.
[3]
On 11 July 2023, they were sentenced as follows:
a)
The first appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment in respect of
counts 1 to 4 and 6, which
were taken together for the purpose of
sentencing and 10 years in respect of count 5.
b)
The second appellant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in
respect of counts 1 to 4 and
6, which were taken together for the
purpose of sentencing and 10 years in respect of count 5, effectively
40 years.
c)
The third appellant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in respect
of counts 1 to 4 and
6, which were taken together for the purpose of
sentencing and 10 years in respect of count 5, effectively 40 years.
[4]
The first appellant has an automatic right of appeal, and his appeal
was duly prosecuted.
[5]
The second and third appellants applied for leave to appeal against
the conviction and sentence.
On 6 September 2023, leave to appeal was
granted regarding the conviction and sentences imposed on counts 1
and 2. However, leave
to appeal against the other charges was
refused. The second appellant then petitioned the Judge President.
His petition application
was successful, and leave to appeal was
granted to the appellants against the conviction and sentences
imposed with regard to all
counts. The second appellant also
prosecuted his appeal.
[6]
The third appellant, accused 3 in the court a quo, has since passed
away whilst in prison, serving
her sentence.
[7]
Regarding the appeal, the appellants have received a notice from the
office of the Director of
Public Prosecutions to file their heads of
argument in the main appeal on or before 29 November 2024.
[8]
After the appellants’ successful petition, they brought a bail
application pending the outcome
of the appeal. The court a quo
refused the application on 27 August 2024.
Aggrieved by the refusal, they have now appealed against the court
a
quo
’s decision.
The
court
a quo’s
decision
[9]
What was before the court a quo was whether the appellants
have,
on a balance of probabilities, proven that there are exceptional
circumstances which, in the interest of justice, permit their
release
on bail pending appeal.
[10]
The appellants, in summation, based their bail application on the
following:
a)
Their petition was successful, and there are prospects of success on
appeal against conviction
and sentence.
b)
They were on bail before their conviction and religiously attended
court. After conviction,
their bail was extended, and they continued
to attend court for more than a year until it was cancelled.
Therefore, they are not
flight risk.
[11]
In refusing bail for the appellant
s,
the
court a quo found that the court that granted the petition on merits
and sentence should have also considered the bail issue.
Assertions
[12]
On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that in none of the
charges, the state alleged that the accused
acted together to further
a common purpose. Therefore, the court
a quo
misdirected
itself in finding all three appellants guilty of rape of a minor
child.
[13]
The court a quo committed a material irregularity by sentencing
the
first and second appellants
on count 6, as count 6 was not put
to either of
them,
nor was any of them
requested to plead on count 6. Count 6 was only put to accused 3. She
was the only accused who had pleaded
to it.
[14]
It was argued that the court
a quo
erred
when it found that it was not addressed on the prospects of success
of the main appeal, for it was privy to the application
for leave to
appeal that was argued before it. It was also advised that the
petition of the second appellant on both the conviction
and sentence
was successful.
[15]
The respondent conceded that the prospects of success play a role in
determining the bail pending appeal.
It was pointed out that, on
behalf of the respondent, regarding the admissibility of evidence of
the child witness, another court
may conclude that a different
approach than that adopted by the trial court should have been
followed. Alternatively, the approach
by the trial court was
incorrect, which would render the complainant’s evidence
inadmissible, potentially vitiating the proceedings.
[16] On
the other hand, it argued that granting the petition does not
guarantee that the appeal will be successful.
The appellants were
granted leave to appeal regarding counts 1 and 2 because the court a
quo believed another court might find
the appellants guilty of a
competent verdict, not that they would be acquitted. The
respondent submitted that due to the
considerations it had alluded to
and its concession on the possibility of appellants succeeding, it
cannot persist in opposing
the bail appeal.
Issues
[17]
The issue before this court is whether the court
a quo
was
correct to refuse the bail application pending the outcome of the
appeal. Whether it exercised its discretion judicially and
correctly
in denying the bail.
Legal
principles
[18]
Section 65(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act
[3]
(The CPA) reads:
‘
The
court or judge hearing the appeal shall not set aside the decision
against
which the appeal is brought,
unless such court or judge is satisfied that the decision
was wrong, in which event the court or judge
shall give the decision which in its or his
opinion
the lower court should have given.’
[19]
Before the appeal court can intervene with the ruling of
the
court
a
quo,
it
is imperative that the court must ascertain that the decision
rendered by the
court
a
quo
was
erroneous. See
State
v Botha en ander
.
[4]
[20]
Section 60(11) (a) of the CPA stipulates:
‘
(11)
Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is
charged with an offence referred to-
(a) in Schedule 6, the
court shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he or
she is dealt with in accordance with
the law, unless the accused,
having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence
which satisfies the court that
exceptional circumstances exist which
in the interests of justice permit his or her release.’
[21]
In
S
v Petersen
,
[5]
on
the meaning and interpretation of ‘exceptional circumstances,’
the
full bench stated as follows:
‘
Generally
speaking "exceptional" is indicative of something unusual,
extraordinary, remarkable, peculiar or simply different.’
Discussion
[22]
It was common cause that one of the offences, counts 1
and 2, preferred against the appellants,
fall within the confines of
Schedule 6, and section 60(11)(a) of the CPA is applicable.
The appellants are required to prove
on a balance of
probabilities that there are exceptional circumstances which, in the
interest of justice, permit their release
on bail pending appeal.
[23]
In summation, the following was undisputed evidence regarding the
appellants’ circumstances presented
before the court
a quo
by way of the appellants’ respective affidavits. Among others,
it was that the appellants:
a)
do not have any other previous convictions except the current ones
or
any other outstanding cases against them. The matter had been pending
since 2017, when investigations continued. However,
they
religiously attended
the
lengthy
court proceedings after
they
w
ere
granted bail in
2020. After their conviction,
their bail was extended. For more than a year after the extension,
they attended court until it was
cancelled by the court
a
quo
. They complied with all bail
conditions
and submitted that they would again do so should
they be successful in their bail application
.
b)
have
strong family and emotional ties in
the jurisdiction area of the trial court. They w
ere
raised and grew up in
the Benoni area
,
where
t
he
y
remained until their incarceration. They have
fixed addresses, and they will return to their place of residence
where they were
before their imprisonment. The investigating officer
confirmed such addresses when they were initially granted bail before
conviction.
They had suffered immense hardship for the third accused
(the wife of the second appellant and the mother of the first
appellant)
since her passing in prison.
c)
are
not flight risk
s
as
their
family, relatives, and support are
also in the jurisdiction area of the trial court. They
do
not have any travel documents and do not intend to apply for same.
Further, they have
not threatened or intimidated any state
witnesses throughout the trial
. They
w
ere
gainfully employed in the jurisdiction area of the trial court for
many years and will rejoin
their
place
s
of employment if granted bail.
d)
have prosecuted their appeal, but it will probably
only be heard next year as the notice requires them to file their
heads of argument
by November 2024.
[24] It
was submitted that the second appellant has fixed and movable
property,
whilst the first has only
movable property in the jurisdiction area of the trial court. The
community will welcome them back and
not uproar if bail is granted
pending appeal.
[25]
The court
a quo
was required to conduct a careful judicial
enquiry as to the existence of exceptional circumstances. All the
aspects raised by
the appellants must be collectively examined to
determine the correctness of the decision made by the court a quo.
Should this
court establish that the court a quo's decision was
accurate, there would be no need to reassess the bail application.
[26] It
is imperative to mention that the constitutional presumption of
innocence until proven guilty is no longer
available to the
appellants, as they were already convicted. Ordinarily, the
appellants would be detained pending the appeal unless
compelling
reasons have been presented before the court to secure their release
on bail. As a result, the appellants
must substantiate, through
evidence, that the cumulative effect of their circumstances and other
relevant factors amount to exceptional
circumstances. These
circumstances, if proven, must be of such magnitude that they warrant
their release in the interest of justice.
[27]
The court
a quo
on page 65, line 24 of the record, found:
‘
In
the current case, both applicants tick most of the boxes, if one
looks or apply as standard whether the accused could bail or
not, but
I must point out that paragraph h is more problematic, because
accused are already serving sentence which is heavy.’
[28] On
page 68, lines 3 to 7, when in its judgment was considering the
caselaws dealing with bail pending appeal,
including that of Rhode v
The State (SS43/2017)[2021] ZAWCHC 221). The court a quo again
mentioned that all boxes could be ticked
in favour of the appellants.
Its concern was that the appellants had not ‘placed on record
before it to consider specifically
the question of prospects of
success.’
[29] On
page 68, line 21, the court
a quo
went on to say:
‘
Probably
the appropriate forum that might have considered prospects of success
is the court that considered the petition.’
[30] On
page 70, line 3, the court
a quo
concluded: ‘
In
conclusion, I personally am not refusing bail, but the important fact
relating to prospects of success was not drawn to my attention,
and I
find that the court which granted leave to petition, is an
appropriate forum, which could find or has found prospects of
success
to grant bail.’
(sic).
[31]
According to the bail application record, especially the court
a
quo
’s judgment, it can be accepted that the court
a quo
assessed the appellants’ circumstances and found that the
cumulative effect of their circumstances and other relevant factors
amount to exceptional circumstances, as it found the appellants
ticked all the boxes regarding bail pending appeal. I find that
was a
justified evaluation for consideration of bail pending appeal since
the court
a quo
had an opportunity to hear and evaluate the
evidence preferred before it.
[32] If
one accepts that the court
a quo
’s evaluation of the
appellants’ circumstances was correct, concluding that they
ticked almost all the boxes. One is
then left with the question of
the prospects of success on merits, as pointed out by the court
a
quo
. The court
a quo
’s reason for not remitting the
appellants on bail seems to be that the High Court, when granting the
petition, should have
also addressed the position of bail pending the
appeal, for the High Court dealt with the merits of the appeal,
which, it stated,
were not canvassed before it. With respect, I
cannot agree in this regard. My viewpoint is that the court
a quo
misdirected itself. The record shows that the appellants’ leave
to appeal application was argued before the court
a quo
. It
considered and granted leave regarding counts 1 and 2, on a
consideration that another court might find the appellants guilty
of
competent verdicts instead of rape.
[33] It
was incumbent on the court
a quo
to evaluate all the factors
and circumstances as presented before it and decide to either accept
them as exceptional circumstances
or reject them as not. The fact
that the appellants’ petition application was successful did
not mean that the court
a quo
had no role in deciding that
specific issue regarding the bail application it heard. The issue of
bail pending appeal was not before
the court which granted the
petition. I could find no grounds for the court
a quo
’s
election not to determine concerning bail application whilst relying
on the fact that the High Court who granted the petition
should have
also considered bail. I view this approach as a misdirection on the
part of the court
a quo
.
[34] On
behalf of the respondent, it was conceded that another court might
consider the admissibility of the single
child witness’
evidence differently when regard is had to the provisions of section
164 of the CPA. A different approach
than that followed by the court
a quo
in admonishing the child witness to speak the truth
could have been followed. Though submissions regarding this issue
were made
before me during the bail appeal hearing, I find no need to
deal with it as it is to be debated during the appeal hearing.
Conclusion
[35]
The court
a quo
found that
the
appellants had ticked most of the boxes to be released on bail
pending their appeal. It can be accepted that it was found that
there
were exceptional reasons for securing the release of the appellants
on bail.
[36]
In
S
v DV,
[6]
an
unreported case, Judge Legodi, as he then was, found:
‘
cumulatively
the fact that the state’s case was subject to some doubt, the
low risk pertaining to flight, the absence of likelihood
of
interference with the state witness and the low risk of re-offending,
constituted exceptional circumstances.’
[37] In
considering the factors, as elucidated in the appellants’
affidavits cumulatively and having considered
the court
a quo
’s
reasons for refusing bail as well as its concern that the appellants
had not explicitly placed on record before it for
consideration,
there were no extraordinary circumstances existed, which, in the
interest of justice, necessitated the appellants’
release on
bail. Instead, he concluded they ticked almost all the boxes, except
for the prospects of success issue, which I have
already dealt with.
The circumstances and factors favour the appellants because they
constitute and possess exceptional attributes.
Accordingly, I am
persuaded that the decision of the
court
a
quo
to
deny bail to the appellants was not properly made. Consequently, the
bail appeal must succeed.
[38]
As
a result, the following order is made;
Order:
1. The appeal is
upheld.
N
G M MAZIBUKO
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Date
of Hearing:
25 October 2024
Judgment
delivered:
05 November 2024
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
Mr M Van Wyngaardt
Attorney for the
Applicant:
Willem Stijn
Attorneys
For the Respondent:
Ms E Mafunisa
Attorney for the
Respondent:
State Attorney
[1]
Act
32 of 2007.
[2]
The
Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997.
[3]
Act
51 of 1977.
[4]
2002
(1) SACR 222
(SCA).
5
2008 (2) SACR 355(c)
, para 55.
[6]
2012
(2) SACR 4492
(GDP).
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