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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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[2024] ZAGPPHC 1256
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## South African Securitisation Programme (RF) Ltd and Others v Adam Masebe Secondary School and Another (2022-025736)
[2024] ZAGPPHC 1256 (27 November 2024)
South African Securitisation Programme (RF) Ltd and Others v Adam Masebe Secondary School and Another (2022-025736)
[2024] ZAGPPHC 1256 (27 November 2024)
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sino date 27 November 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2022- 025736
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
(3)
REVISED:
NO
(4)
Date: 27 November 2024
(5)
Signature
In
the matter between:
SOUTH
AFRICAN SECURITISATION PROGRAMME (RF) LTD
First Plaintiff
SASFIN
BANK
LIMITED
Second Plaintiff
SUNLYN
(PTY)
LTD
Third
Plaintiff
TECHNOLOGIES
ACCEPTANCES RECEIVABLES (PTY) LTD
Fourth
Plaintiff
FINTECH
UNDERWRITING (PTY) LTD
Fifth
Plaintiff
And
ADAM
MASEBE SECONDARY SCHOOL
First
Defendant
THE
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR
Second Defendant
EDUCATION
FOR GAUTENG PROVINCE
JUDGMENT
NYATHI
J
A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application for summary judgment in terms of Rule 32 of
the Uniform
Rules of court against the first and second defendants,
jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. It is
opposed
by the defendants.
B.
BACKGROUND
[2]
On 1 July 2015 and 31 July 2020 respectively, the first
defendant, Adam
Masebe Secondary School ("the school'’)
concluded two rental agreements with Technologies Acceptances
Receivables (Pty)
Ltd ("TAR”) and Sunlyn (Pty) Ltd
("Sunlyn") respectively in relation to the rental of
certain office equipment.
[3]
TAR concluded the first rental agreement with the school as an agent
for and
on behalf of the undisclosed principal, Fintech Underwriting
(Pty) Ltd ("Fintech"), pursuant to and in terms of a
written
agency agreement concluded between them previously, in 2004.
[4]
Both rental agreements were for a period of 60 months and the
respective agreed
upon monthly rentals were:
4.1
first rental agreement:
R8,600.00 plus VAT; and
4.2
second rental agreement:
R2,000.00 plus VAT.
[5]
The first defendant acknowledged in writing that
the equipment underlying each of the rental agreements was duly
delivered and installed
to the satisfaction of the first defendant.
[6]
Both rental agreements provided for TAR and Sunlyn
and/or all their cessionaries would be entitled to prove, on a
prima
facie
basis, the school’s
indebtedness.
[7]
The second defendant, the Member of the Executive
Council for Education for Gauteng Province (“the MEC”) is
liable for
the debts of the school as contemplated in
section 60(1)
,
(2) and (3) of the
South African Schools Act 84 of 1996
and the
State
Liability Act 20 of 1957
.
[8]
Pursuant to and in terms of:
8.1
the
first
main cession agreement concluded between Fintech and the third
plaintiff, Technologies Acceptances Receivables (Pty) Ltd ("TAR'’),
all rights, title and interest in and to the first rental agreement
were ceded, transferred and made over from Fintech to TAR on
25 June
2015;
8.2
a second main cession
agreement concluded between Sunlyn and the second plaintiff, Sasfin
Bank Ltd ("Sasfin") all rights,
title and interest in and
to the second rental agreement were ceded, transferred and made over
from Sunlyn to Sasfin on 31 July
2021; and
8.3
a Sale Agreement concluded
between Sasfin and the first plaintiff, the South African
Securitisation Programme (RF) Ltd ("SASP'’)
all rights,
title and interest in and to the second rental agreement were duly
sold from Sasfin to SASP on 17 February 2021.
[9]
Consequently, as at date hereof, all rights, title and interest in
and to:
9.1
the first rental agreement
vests in TAR; and
9.2
the second rental agreement
vests in SASP.
[10]
The school, in breach of each of the rental agreements, failed to
maintain the monthly agreed upon
rental instalments. Notwithstanding
demand, the school failed to remedy same.
[11]
Each of the rental agreements provided that in the event of the
school failing to make any payment
pursuant to and in terms of the
rental agreements on the due date thereof, it would be deemed that
the school breached the respective
rental agreements, whereupon TAR
and SASP would be entitled to
inter alia
forthwith claim
immediate payment of all amounts which would have been payable in
terms of the rental agreements until expiry of
the rental period
stated in the schedules to each rental agreement, whether such
payments were then due for payment or not.
[12]
TAR and SASP elected to invoke the acceleration clauses as a direct
result of the school’s breaches
as aforesaid. Consequently, the
school is indebted to TAR and SASP respectively in the following
terms:
TAR
12.1
Claim A: R85 326.27 together
with interest thereon at the rate of 12.50% (prime plus 5%) per annum
from 25 November 2021 to date
of final payment.
SASP
12.2
Clam B: R172 548.39 together
with interest thereon at the rate of 13.00% (prime plus 6%) per annum
from 25 November 2021 to date
of final payment.
[13]
As a direct result of the first defendant’s breach of the
rental agreements, the plaintiffs,
in the alternative to each other,
instituted the present proceedings.
C.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The
defendants’ contentions:
[14]
The plea
14.1
In
their plea to the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim, the
defendants by way of special plea, allege that the action was
instituted prematurely in view of the plaintiffs' purported failure
to have complied with the provisions of
section 2(2)(a)
of the
State
Liability Act
[1]
i.e the failure
to have served the summons on the MEC.
14.2
Defendants
deny that the MEC, in terms of section 60 of the School's Act
[2]
is liable on account of the fact that the second defendants have no
knowledge thereof;
14.3
Deny a cession of rights in
and to the respective rental agreements, had taken place on account
of the fact that they have no knowledge
thereof;
14.4
Deny that the defendants
breached any or both of the rental agreements; more specifically, it
is alleged that:
14.4.1
the first rental agreement
had lapsed through effluxion of time in May 2020, alternatively;
14.4.2
the defendants cancelled the
first rental agreement during or about 7 September 2021;
14.4.3
the equipment rented in
terms of the second rental agreement was defective; and
14.4.4
the plaintiffs collected the
equipment during or about 31 August 2021; the said collection
constituted a repudiation of the second
rental agreement.
The
defendants’ affidavit resisting the application for summary
judgment
[15]
In addition to the defences raised in the plea, the defendants in the
answering affidavit allege that
the conclusion of the two rental
agreements were in violation of section 217 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa
("the Constitution”) read
with section 38 of the Public Finance Act, Act 1 of 1999 ("the
PFMA").
The
plaintiffs’ main submissions
[16]
The defendants are not entitled to raise a ground in the affidavit
resisting the application for summary
judgment, not raised in their
plea. See:
Bragan Chemicals (Pty) Ltd v Devland Cash and Carry
(Pty) Ltd
2020 JDR 1742 (GP)
[17]
Notwithstanding, the purported non-compliance does not amount to a
defence in law. See: -
Technofin Leasing and Finance (Pty) Ltd v
Framesby High School
2005 (6) SA 87
[18]
The purported non-compliance with
section 2(2)(a)
of the
State
Liability Act 20 of 1957
does not render the action premature. See: -
Minister of Police and Others v Samuel Molokwane
(730/2021)
[2022] ZASCA 111
(15 July 2022).
[19]
The defendants, as non-parties to any of the instruments of cession,
are not entitled, procedurally
or otherwise, to raise any issues in
respect of the process of cession and/or call upon the plaintiffs to
prove the cessions. See:
-
Hillock and Another v Hillsage
Investments (Pty) Ltd
1975 (1) SA 508
(A).
[20]
In relation to the first rental agreement the defendants allege that
payment of the monthly agreed
upon rental instalments had been made
up and until the expiry of the said agreement through effluxion of
time. With the plaintiffs
relying on a certificate of balance, an
allegation that payment was made, is insufficient to disturb the
evidentiary burden placed
on the defendants by the certificate of
balance. See:
Breitenbach v Fiat (Edms) Bpk
1976 (2) SA 226
(T).
[21]
The purported failure of the equipment does not amount to a defence
as against the plaintiffs. See:
South African Securitisation
Programme (RF) Ltd v Fullimput 11 (Pty) Ltd t/a Barons Place and
Another
2021 JDR 1671 (WCC).
[22]
On behalf
of the plaintiffs, Mr Aucamp dealt with the point taken concerning
the non-compliance with
section 2
of the
State Liability Act 20 of
1957
by not serving the summons on the MEC or Head of a State
Department. He referred to the matter of
Minister
of Police and Others v Samuel Molokwane
[3]
where the Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised that the purpose of the
section was to ensure the Head of Department is legally represented.
In this case, the Head of Department was represented by counsel. In
the fullness of the hearing Ms Kwanaite abandoned the special
plea.
There is consequently no need to belabour the point.
[23]
Ms Kwanaite
commenced her address resisting the application for summary judgment
by submitting that the defendants have a bona fide
defence as
contemplated in
Tumileng
Trading CC v. National Security and Fire (Pty) Ltd
[4]
.
In
Tumileng,
[5]
the
court held that:
“…
A
defendant is not required to show that its defence is likely to
prevail. If a defendant can show that it has a legally
cognisable defence on the face of it, and that the defence is genuine
or bona fide, summary judgment must be refused. The
defendant’s
prospects of success are irrelevant”.
[24]
Ms. Kwanaite submitted further authority in this regard, and
proffered a defence based on
section 217
of the constitution, which
states that
when an organ of state procures goods
and services, it should do so in accordance with a system that is
fair, equitable, transparent,
competitive, and cost-effective. In
this matter, the first rental agreement and the second rental
agreement was not done in accordance
with
section 217
of the
constitution because, there was not even a tender process that was
conducted. There was only an agreement between
the applicant
and the first defendant, which on its own is not a valid agreement.
[25]
Ms Kwanaite galvanised her submissions by
stating that the contracting scheme by the school was not compliant
with the National
Treasury Note of 2007/8 or the rules for deviating
from calling for competitive bids.
[26]
Since this was not pleaded in the plea, it
was submitted that the defendants still have an opportunity to amend
their plea in terms
of
Rule 28(10)
even though no notice or
application to amend has been made so far.
[27]
The
above defences cannot prevail in light of the decision in
Greater
Tzaneen Municipality v Bravospan 252 CC
[6]
referred
to on behalf of the plaintiffs. The Constitutional Court held
that:
[7]
“
Unfortunately,
the circumstances of this case are not unique.
As
Navsa ADP stated in
Govan
Mbeki
:
“
This
case is part of an ever growing, and frankly disturbing, long line of
cases where municipalities and organs of state seek to
have their own
decisions, upon which contracts with service providers are
predicated, reviewed and overturned, for want of legality,
more often
than not after the contracts have run their course and services have
been rendered thereunder.”
D.
CONCLUSION
[28]
In light of the above scathing
observations by the apex court, it is clear that no bona fide defence
was advanced and that the plaintiffs
are entitled to summary
judgment.
[29]
In the result, the following order must
follow:
[30]
Summary judgment is granted against the
first and second defendants, jointly and severally, the one paying
the other to be absolved,
in the following terms:
IN FAVOUR OF THE
SECOND PLAINTIFF:
[1] Payment
of the amount of R85 326.27.
[2] Payment
of interest on the amount of R85 326.27 at the rate of 12.50%
per annum from 25 November 2021 to date
of final payment.
[3] Costs of suit, such
costs to be taxed on the attorney and client scale.
IN FAVOUR OF THE FIRST
PLAINTIFF:
[1] Payment
of the amount of R172 548.39.
[2] Payment
of interest on the amount of R172 548.39 at the rate of 13% per
annum from 25 November 2021 to date
of final payment.
[3] Costs of
suit, such costs to be taxed on the attorney and client scale.
J.S. NYATHI
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division,
Pretoria
Date
of hearing: 15/10/2024
Date
of Judgment: 27 November 2024
On
behalf of the Plaintiffs: Mr S. Aucamp
Instructed
by:
On
behalf of the Defendants: Ms R Kwanaite
Delivery
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email and uploaded on the
CaseLines
electronic platform. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 27
November 2024.
[1]
Act 20 of 1957.
[2]
Act 84 of 1996.
[3]
Minister
of Police v Molokwane
[2022]
ZASCA 111.
[4]
2020 (6) SA 624
(WCC).
[5]
Supra
at
para 13.
[6]
[2024]
ZACC 20.
[7]
At
para 49.
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