Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 1255South Africa
Masilela v Road Accident Fund (83938/2017) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1255 (2 December 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
2 December 2024
Headnotes
100% liable. In respect of loss of earnings, submissions were made by the plaintiff’s Counsel that an amount of R585 752 should be awarded to the plaintiff based on the average of the two scenarios postulated in the actuarial report. It was also submitted that an order should be granted that the future medical expenses should be covered by an undertaking from the defendant in terms of section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The plaintiff’s Counsel also submitted that costs should be awarded to the plaintiff on scale C.
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Masilela v Road Accident Fund (83938/2017) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1255 (2 December 2024)
Masilela v Road Accident Fund (83938/2017) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1255 (2 December 2024)
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sino date 2 December 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
Number:
83938/2017
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES /
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/
NO
DATE:
2/12/2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
SIMPHIWE
RHODAH MASILELA
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
DEFENDANT
Link:
417804
REASONS FOR ORDER MADE
MMUOE
AJ
:
Background
[1]
The matter came before me on the civil
trial roll of 21 October 2024. I made the draft order marked “X”
as amended an
order of court. It is apposite to sketch a brief
background to the matter.
[2]
In the original particulars of claim dated
27 November 2017, the plaintiff claimed an amount of R600 000
for damages from the
defendant as a result of an accident that
occurred on 9 February 2017. The total claim amount was made up of
R5000 for past hospital
expenses, R5000 for past medical expenses,
R40 000 for estimated future medical expenses, R50 000 for past
loss of income,
R250 000 for estimated future loss of income and
R250 000 for general damages.
[3]
The claim was defended, two special pleas
filed and the matter proceeded as a defended action. On 2 July 2024,
the plaintiff filed
a notice of intention to amend the particulars of
claim. The intended amendment would result in the total claim amount
increasing
to R1 950 000. The R1 950 000 was made
up of R5000 for past hospital expenses, R5000 for past medical
expenses,
R40 000 for estimated future medical expenses, R500
000 for past loss of income, R700 000 for estimated future loss
of
income and R700 000 for general damages. There was no
objection to the intended amendment and on 18 July 2024 the
amendments
were duly effected by the plaintiff.
[4]
At the commence of the trial on 21 October
2024, the plaintiff’s Counsel confirmed that there would be no
need for the court
to consider the issue of general damages as the
claim would be postponed
sine die
.
The only issues before the court were those of liability, loss of
earnings, future medical expenses and costs. The plaintiff’s
Counsel handed up the plaintiff’s submissions/short heads of
argument (“
heads of argument
”)
and a draft order.
[5]
The
submissions made by the plaintiff’s Counsel were consistent
with the heads of argument. The plaintiff’s Counsel
asked the
court to disregard the portion in the heads of argument that dealt
with the issue of general damages
[1]
.
The remainder of the heads of argument remained relevant and were
duly considered by the court in arriving at a decision.
[6]
During his address, the plaintiff’s
Counsel submitted that in respect of liability, the defendant should
be held 100% liable.
In respect of loss of earnings, submissions were
made by the plaintiff’s Counsel that an amount of R585 752
should be
awarded to the plaintiff based on the average of the two
scenarios postulated in the actuarial report. It was also submitted
that
an order should be granted that the future medical expenses
should be covered by an undertaking from the defendant in terms of
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
. The
plaintiff’s Counsel also submitted that costs should be awarded
to the plaintiff on scale C.
Discussion
[7]
When the matter commenced, an application
to adduce all evidence in terms of section 34(2) of the Civil
Proceedings Evidence Act
25 of 1956 read with Rule 38(2) of the
Uniform Rules of Court was made by the plaintiff. The application had
been served on the
defendant on 18 October 2024 and I was satisfied
that it should be granted.
[8]
I considered all of the evidence, the
pleadings and documents filed. I found that it was established that
the plaintiff was involved
in the accident as is described in the
plaintiff’s particulars of claim. It was also established that
as a result of the
aforesaid accident, the plaintiff sustained
injuries including a hard blow to her face, bruises to her lower back
and a fracture
of the left rib. I was satisfied that the defendant
was liable for 100% for the plaintiff’s proven or agreed
damages.
[9]
Having had regard to the facts, expert
reports and affidavits, I was satisfied that the calculations by the
actuarial expert, Mr
Johan Potgieter were accurate. I could not fault
the submission made by the plaintiff’s Counsel that an average
between the
two scenarios postulated will result in fair and just
compensation for the plaintiff in the amount of R585 752 in
respect
of loss of income.
Scale A costs
[10]
The
plaintiff’s Counsel’s heads of argument deal with the
reasons why costs should be awarded on scale C under the the
section
titled: “
plaintiff’s
supplementary short heads of argument on costs scale- new rule
67A-effective from 12 April 2024
[2]
.”
The crux of the argument is that the defendant should not be left out
of pocket due to having instructed counsel who is
of a “
senior-junior
status
”
and who has been in practice for over thirty years. An argument is
also made that the awarding of costs on scale C is not
punitive and
that the plaintiff has a right to appoint counsel of their choice.
Plaintiff’s Counsel also argues that the
defendant has ignored
the basic rules together with principles and that the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff are serious, thus
justifying costs on
scale C.
[11]
In
Mashavha
[3]
,
Wilson J dealt extensively with the issue of scales of costs within
the context of the new rule 67A, and in expressing the purpose
of the
rule said: “
rule
67A addresses itself only to awards of costs as between party and
party. Its purpose is to permit a court to exercise control
over the
maximum rate at which counsel’s fees can be recovered under
such an award
.”
The monetary value of the relief sought by the plaintiff in this case
was R585 752, which is at the lower end of the
scale in terms of
the monetary jurisdiction of this court. I have no doubt that a party
is free to brief counsel of any seniority
level they deem
appropriate. In this instance a “senior-junior” counsel
was briefed for the matter. If regard is to
be had to the seniority
of counsel within the context of the monetary value of the claim
(R585 752) as well as the nature
of relief sought generally, a
scale C costs order is simply not justifiable. In paragraph [25] of
Mashavha
,
in addressing the actual amounts that can be potentially recovered in
terms of rule 67A, Wilson J expressed: “
I
emphasise that these figures are the maximum that can be recovered on
these scales from the losing party for the winning party’s
counsel’s fees on the party and party scale. They do not
represent what may actually be charged
.”
It is the plaintiff’s own election to brief counsel that was
deemed appropriate for this matter and pay counsel his
own actual
fees charged. However, it does not follow that the court should be
bound to award costs on a scale that is commensurate
with counsel’s
own fees charged. Put differently, just because the plaintiff decided
to brief counsel who is of higher level
of seniority for a matter
that did not have necessarily require that level of counsel, does not
mean that the court must award
costs equivalent or close to the costs
actually charged by that counsel.
[12]
I also disagree with the plaintiff’s
Counsel’s submission that the defendant ignored basic rules and
principles.
There was no evidence of this before me to that
effect and in any event, the conduct of the other defendant is not
relevant for
purposes of determining which scale applies. As further
expressed by Wilson J at paragraph [19] of
Mashavha
:
“
There mere fact that punitive
costs were sought by the successful party does not mean that a higher
scale of counsel’s costs
ought to be awarded on the party and
party scale
.” The plaintiff’s
Counsel at any rate also correctly conceded in the heads of argument,
that the awarding of costs
on scale C is not meant to be punitive.
[13]
The argument that the injuries are serious
and therefore scale C costs should be awarded cannot be sustained.
There was no evidence
led at trial regarding the seriousness of the
injuries. The seriousness of the injuries in this matter is an issue
yet to be determined.
The issue of general damages (which would only
be adjudicated upon if the injuries are found to have been serious)
was postponed
sine die
at the request of the plaintiff. Therefore, the seriousness of the
injuries argument in respect of costs does not arise.
[14]
The plaintiff’s Counsel did not
advance argument on the importance of the relief nor in respect of
the complexity of the matter.
Having considered all the issues in the
matter and arguments advanced, I found that there was no issue of
importance in the relief
granted. I also found that there were no
complex issues that justified scale C costs to be granted. The matter
that came before
me at trial on 21 October 2024 was a run-of-the-mill
Road Accident Fund case. The argument by the plaintiff’s
Counsel lasted
a few minutes. The argument did not raise any complex
issues and it was uncomplicated. I found there to be no justification
to
depart from the normal scale A.
The claim for
general damages
[15]
In paragraph 6 of the draft order handed up
by the plaintiff’s Counsel, the plaintiff sought the following
order:
“
The
claim for general damages is postponed
sine
die
and
may be referred to the HPCSA for determination of seriousness
”
(own emphasis.)
[16]
I did not grant the emphasised portion of
the prayer. It is important to note that the defendant has filed two
special pleas. Both
special pleas are to the effect that the
plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary loss is limited to serious
injuries in terms
of section 17(1A) of the Act. In the special pleas,
the defendant raises the procedure to be followed in the assessment
of serious
injuries. According to the defendant, the jurisdiction for
assessment of the serious injuries is within the ambit of the Appeal
Tribunal established in terms of the 2008 Regulations to the Act and
not the court. The defendant also raises the special defence
that the
plaintiff has not followed the process for the submission of a
Serious Injury Report in terms of the Regulations. These
special
pleas relate to the issue of general damages.
[17]
There is no replication to the special
pleas. The plaintiff’s counsel was clear from the outset that
the general damages claim
would be postponed
sine
die
. First, there was no evidence
presented that justified the additional relief that the court should
grant an order that the claim
for general damages “
may
be referred to the HPCSA for determining the seriousness
”.
Second, there was also no argument made by the plaintiff’s
Counsel to the effect that the order is justified. Third,
I am alive
to the fact that the defendant’s special plea is still there
and the defendant’s defence has not been struck
out. Fourth,
the case pleaded by the plaintiff does not seek this additional
relief of a referral to the HPCSA. To add to
the reasons
mentioned above, it is simply not for this court to say whether or
not the claim for general damages may or may not
be “
referred
to the HPCSA for determination of the seriousness”
.
[18]
I also note that if wording in paragraph 6
of the draft order as proposed by the plaintiff’s Counsel were
to be adopted, it
would in any event have created ambiguity. If the
plaintiff deems it necessary to refer the matter “
to
the HPCSA for determination of seriousness”,
then the plaintiff is free to do so out of her own accord. It is not
for this court to make any such pronouncements and no evidence
was
provided to justify this proposition.
[19]
Accordingly, I was inclined to postpone the
claim for general damages
sine die
.
Conclusion
[20]
The amendments made to the draft order
handed up by the plaintiff in respect of prayers one and two were
made in accordance to what
the plaintiff asked for. I did not find
any justification for costs to be awarded on scale C for reasons
stated above and therefore,
I amended the draft order to reflect that
costs are awarded on scale A. Lastly, I agreed with the plaintiff
that the claim for
general damages should be postponed
sine
die
. I however did not find that there
was justification for the additional wording that the claim for
general damages may be referred
to the HPCSA for determination of
seriousness.
Order
[21]
I therefore granted the draft order as
amended with the following done in manuscript additions and
amendments:
a)
Inserted the figure “100” in
prayer 1.
b)
Inserted the amount of “R585 752”
in prayer 2.
c)
Amended the scale of costs to reflect the
award of costs on scale A in paragraph 4(a).
d)
Removed the words: “
and
may be referred to the HPCSA for determination of seriousness.
”
Hand-down and date
of reasons
[22]
These reasons are handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties or their legal
representatives by email and by uploading
the reasons onto Caselines.
The date for hand down for the reasons is deemed to be 2 December
2024.
KM MMUOE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
PRETORIA
For
the Plaintiff:
Adv.
G. Lubbe
Instructed
by:
Frans
Schutte & Matthews Phosa Attorneys
For
the Defendant:
No
appearance
Instructed
by:
STATE
ATTORNEY, PRETORIA
[1]
Plaintiffs submissions/Short Heads of Argument from the end portion
of page 16 to the beginning of page 45.
[2]
Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Heads of argument pages 45-48
[3]
Mashavha v Enaex Africa(Pty) Ltd
Unreported
judgment of the Gauteng Division of the High Court
(2022/18404)[2024]ZAGPJHC
387(22 April 2024) –para 5
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